Green taxes and double dividends in a dynamic economy

Gerhard Glomm
Economics Department
Indiana University at Bloomington

Daiji Kawaguchi
Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University

Facundo Sepulveda
Research School of Social Science
The Australian National University

May 25, 2004

1Corresponding author: Facundo Sepulveda, Economics Program, RSSS. H.C Coombs Building. The Australian National University. Canberra, ACT 0200. Australia. Email: facundo.sepulveda@anu.edu.au

2We are thankful to Steve Cassou, Joseph Haslag, Thomas Renström, Akihito Asano, Jean Christophe Pereau and participants at the MSU macroeconomics study group for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are our responsibility.
Abstract

This paper examines a revenue neutral green tax reform along the lines of the Double Dividend hypothesis. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy, we find that increasing gasoline taxes and using the revenue to reduce capital income taxes does indeed deliver both types of welfare gains: from higher consumption of market goods (an efficiency dividend), and from a better environmental quality (a green dividend), even though in the new steady state environmental quality may worsen. We also find that, given the available evidence on how much households are willing to pay for improvements in air quality, the size of the green dividend is very small in absolute magnitude, and much smaller than the efficiency dividend.
1 Introduction

The possibility that green tax reform may yield a double dividend has become a major issue in the environmental policy arena. The double dividend hypothesis is nicely exposited in Goulder [1995b] and Bovenberg [1999]. Apart from increasing welfare due to lower pollution externalities, a ‘green’ dividend, environmental taxes raise revenue that can be used to lower other pre-existing tax distortions, resulting in welfare gains from a smaller deadweight loss of the tax system, or ‘efficiency’ dividend. Because of its appealing nature, environmental tax reform has been labelled a ‘no regret option’. This paper examines the effects of environmental tax reform in the U.S. along the lines of the Double Dividend hypothesis.

Previous work on the double dividend problem addresses a question on the nature of optimal taxes: It examines whether in the presence of preexisting distortions, the optimal environmental tax lies above its Pigovian level. Here, the distortionary effect of increasing green taxes above the level at which the marginal pollution damage is internalized should be compared to the efficiency gains from reducing other taxes. In an influential paper, Bovenberg and de Mooij [1994] examine whether increasing the tax rate on a polluting good from its Pigovian level, and reducing preexisting labor taxes in a revenue neutral fashion will deliver a welfare gain. Their main finding shows that, although environmental quality improves, the efficiency dividend does not materialize. In that model, green taxes turn out to be more distortionary at
the margin than the labor tax, by virtue of their effect on the composition of the production bundle. This important result has become a stepping stone, and has proved robust to a number of extensions, including capital accumulation dynamics (e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder [1996], Bovenberg and Smulders [1996]).

A related literature on environmental tax policy considers the aggregate effects of implementing a revenue-neutral tax reform through carbon taxes in the U.S. economy. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993] estimate a disaggregated growth model using post war data. Simulations from this model suggest that a carbon tax would have qualitatively different impacts on long run GDP depending on the preexisting taxes that are reduced. The authors also note that the costs of keeping CO₂ emissions below predetermined standards would increase with higher levels of GDP growth. We believe that this is an interesting insight. A similar theoretical possibility was already mentioned by Koskela and Schob [1999], and considered in more detail by Bayindir-Upmann and Raith [2003], who showed that, in a distorted labor market, substituting green taxes for labor taxes would increase employment, output, and have eventually a detrimental effect on the environment. After Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993], Goulder [1995a] use a calibrated model to consider different tax recycling policies after a carbon tax is imposed, and finds that green tax reform will invariably reduce the efficiency of the tax system.

The current consensus on the effects of green tax reform is summarized by Lans Bovenberg in his preface to de Mooij [2000],
Whereas the second dividend may be in doubt, the first dividend (i.e. a cleaner environment) remains a powerful reason for the introduction of pollution taxes.

In this paper we evaluate this claim by making use of the large literature on the valuation of environmental amenities (see for instance Freeman III [1993]). This literature allows for the calibration of preferences for a cleaner environment, and therefore for comparing environmental and market effects of green tax policy in a unified framework.

This paper then contributes to the Double Dividend literature in that it evaluates whether environmental tax reform in the U.S. economy will deliver either of the two types of welfare gains. In so doing it examines the effects, including welfare effects, of a policy reform rather than asking the normative question of characterizing the optimal policy, and thus it is probably closer in scope to the work by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993] and Goulder [1995a]. As in that literature, we consider the welfare effects associated with the consumption of market goods, or efficiency dividend, but we also attempt to assess the welfare effects associated to changes in the quality of the environment, or green dividend, as mentioned above. Our paper contributes to the existing policy literature in three other dimensions. First, it shows the importance of transition dynamics in evaluating the welfare effects of the reform. Second, it examines the effects that higher levels of capital accumulation resulting from a lower tax on capital earnings will have on environmental quality, a point first raised by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993]. Finally, and
unlike previous literature, this paper focuses on gasoline and capital income taxes as the relevant policy instruments, a choice that we now discuss.

The policy exercise examined in this paper consists in increasing the tax on gasoline consumption, and using the revenue to reduce the tax on capital earnings. We are interested in capital taxes first since under certain robust conditions the optimal capital tax rate in the long run is known to be zero (see Chamley [1986], Judd [1987], Jones et al. [1993] and Atkeson and Kehoe [1999]). Considering a model in which capital taxes are positive then allows for clean welfare comparisons. Second, we know from Lucas [1990] and others that capital income taxes have strong effects on capital accumulation. By promoting growth, a lower level of capital taxes -made possible by higher green tax revenue- has a negative impact on environmental quality. If it turns out that the green dividend is achieved by decreasing this tax, then it will most likely be achieved by shifting the tax burden from any preexisting tax to green taxes. On the other hand, our choice of gasoline taxes -instead of carbon taxes as in most of the literature- is dictated by our policy focus: unlike carbon taxes, gasoline taxes exist at the federal and state levels, so increasing them would not require incurring in implementation costs in the form of creating a new legal framework.

Our results show that, because a lower tax rate on capital earnings encourages capital accumulation, the new steady state levels of capital and consumption of the clean good are higher than their pre reform levels, and as a result the quality of the environment may worsen in the new steady
state. However, in all the cases we consider, at the beginning of the transition a cleaner environment is obtained, and consumption has to be sacrificed in order to build up capital, so that accounting for transition dynamics is necessary in order to assess the welfare effects of this policy change. Our results show that both dividends are likely to materialize under general conditions. We also find that the green dividend, or higher discounted utility from a cleaner environment, is much smaller -by as much as one order of magnitude- than the efficiency dividend, or higher discounted utility from the consumption of market goods. These results are broadly consistent with those found in the literature. They complement those in Bovenberg and de Mooij [1994] and most of the Double Dividend literature in showing that, given current levels of taxes, a green tax reform of the type examined here would achieve both dividends. These results also show that once transitional dynamics are accounted for, the negative impact of growth on the environment suggested in Bayindir-Upmann and Raith [2003] is not sufficient to reverse the welfare gains obtained from a better environmental quality at the beginning of the transition, a point on which the policy literature is silent.

This paper has four other sections. In section 2 the model is presented. In section 3 functional forms and parameter values are chosen, then section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
2 The model

The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely lived individuals. We abstract from population growth and normalize population size to unity. Preferences of the representative individual are given by

\[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, m_{ct}; h_t), \] (1)

where \( c_t \) is consumption of the single perishable consumption good at time \( t \), \( m_{ct} \) is the amount of fuel consumed at time \( t \) and \( h_t \) is the state of health at time \( t \), \( \beta \) is the discount factor which is a real number between zero and one, and \( u \) is felicity. We find it useful here to disaggregate consumption goods into two types: one good, which is associated with negative pollution externalities, we call fuel, \( m_{ct} \), and the other good, which is not associated with such externalities we refer to as the consumption good, \( c_t \). In the utility function specified in equation (1) the state of health, \( h_t \), enters as a separate variable. Health here is a stock variable, which is taken as given by each individual, and depends on the aggregate amount of pollution in the economy.

The relationship between health and the aggregate amount of pollution, \( z_t \), is given by

\[ h_t = h(z_t), \quad h' < 0 \] (2)

From a historical perspective, changes in life expectancy and morbidity patterns are more closely linked to economic growth than to changes in pollution levels. Our specification is motivated by widespread evidence that
pollution levels have a strong impact on morbidity rates, in particular among children and elderly people (e.g. Schwartz et al. [1994]).

Given that our focus is not on examining the sectoral effects of green tax reform, we adopt a simple structure for the production technology of market goods, and refer the reader to Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993] for a more disaggregated analysis. The consumption good is produced via a constant returns to scale technology using two inputs, capital $k_{pt}$ and fuel $m_{pt}$. The production function is given by

$$y_t = f(k_{pt}, m_{pt}).$$

(3)

Fuel is produced using capital $k_{mt}$ only, with a production function given by

$$m_t = g(k_{mt}).$$

(4)

There are two stock variables in this economy, physical capital ($k_t$) that can be used in the production of the consumption good ($k_{pt}$) or fuel ($k_{mt}$) (so $k_t = k_{pt} + k_{mt}$), and the stock of pollution ($z_t$). These two stock variables evolve according to

$$k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_t + i_t,$$

(5)

$$z_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_z)z_t + m_t,$$

(6)

where $i_t$ is investment in physical capital at time $t$. In this economy, fuel $m_t$ can be used as an input in the final goods sector, $m_{pt}$, or consumed, $m_{ct}$, so $m_t = m_{pt} + m_{ct}$. The initial endowments are $k_0$ and $z_0$. 

7
The government in this economy collects taxes on capital income at the uniform rate $\tau_k$, and taxes on household fuel consumption and fuel use by firms at the rate $\tau_m$. All tax revenue is rebated in a lump sum fashion to the households.

The representative household solves the problem

$$\max_{(c_t,k_{t+1},m_{t+1})_{t=0}^\infty} \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t u(c_t,m_{t};h_t),$$

subject to

$$\sum_{t=0}^\infty p_t(c_t + i_t + (1 + \tau_m)w_tm_{t+1}) = \sum_{t=0}^\infty p_t((1 - \tau_k)q_t k_t + \pi_{m,t} + T_t),$$

$$k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_t + i_t,$$

given

$$k_0, \{p_t,q_t,w_t,h_t\}_{t=0}^\infty,$$

where $p_t$ is the price of final goods at time $t$, $w_t$ is relative price of fuel compared with final goods at time $t$, and $q_t$ is the return to capital at time $t$. Here $\pi_{m,t}$ are profits from producing fuel and $T_t$ are the lump sum transfers from the government. The final goods producing firm solves the problem

$$\max_{(k_{pt},m_{pt})} f(k_{pt},m_{pt}) - q_t k_{pt} - (1 + \tau_m)w_tm_{pt}.$$  

(8)

The fuel producing firm solves the problem

$$\max_{\{k_{mt}\}} w_t g(k_{mt}) - q_t k_{mt}.$$  

(9)
We do not allow the government to run a deficit or surplus, so the government budget constraint each period is

$$\tau_m w_t (m_{ct} + m_{pt}) + \tau_k q_t k_t = T_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

An equilibrium for this economy is an allocation for the representative household \(\{c_t, m_{ct}, k_{pt+1}, k_{mt+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\), an allocation for the final goods producing firm \(\{k_{pt}, m_{pt}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\), an allocation for the fuel-producing firm \(\{k_{mt}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) and prices \(\{w_t, q_{pt}, q_{mt}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\), which together with a sequence of health states \(\{h_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) satisfy

1. the household’s allocation solves the maximization problem in (7),
2. the final goods producing firm solves the maximization in problem (8),
3. the fuel-producing firm solves the problem in (9),
4. the fuel and capital markets clear.
5. the government budget constraint (10) is satisfied, and
6. the state of health satisfies (2).

3 Calibration

In this section we restrict the model by choosing functional forms and parameter values. For the utility function, we need to choose a functional form that allows us to match the observed income and price elasticities for household
fuel demand. In most standard utility functions, such as Cobb-Douglas or CES, the implied income elasticity is unity, but typical estimates are much lower. To allow for varying income elasticities we pick the following utility function:

\[
    u(c_t, m_{ct}; h_t) = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} (h_t^\eta (\theta c_t^\xi + (1-\theta) m_{ct}^\rho)^{1-\eta})^{1-\sigma},
\]

\[\xi > 0, \ \rho > 0, \ 0 < \theta < 1, \ 0 < \eta < 1, \ \sigma \geq 1. \quad (11)\]

For the production technology we choose a CES production function. This functional form allows for a response of input use to changes in relative prices in accordance with microevidence, as will be discussed below. The production function is given by

\[
    f(k_{pt}, m_{pt}) = A[\chi k_{pt}^\alpha + (1-\chi)m_{pt}^\alpha]^{1/\alpha}, \ A > 0, \ \alpha < 1, \ 0 < \chi < 1. \quad (12)
\]

The production function for fuel is Cobb-Douglas in one input, capital, so that

\[
    g(k_{mt}) = E k_{mt}^\psi, \quad 0 < \psi < 1. \quad (13)
\]

Finally, the relationship between health and pollution is given by

\[
    h(z_t) = 1/z_t. \quad (14)
\]

Given that in our exercise \(z_t\) will display only small deviations around its steady state, and that preferences for health are calibrated -as will become clear below- so that these deviations have a given welfare cost, equation 14 effectively places no restrictions on the results other than those mentioned in
the previous section, when discussing the general form of the health-pollution relationship.

We calibrate our model to the US economy. The benchmark parameters we use are illustrated in Table 1. Calibrating the utility function to long-run data is a bit tricky since preferences are not homothetic and expenditure shares do depend upon the level of income. We thus pick preference parameters $\xi$ and $\rho$ that match observed income and price elasticities for gasoline demand at the steady state. Espey [1996] conducts a meta analysis of elasticity estimates for gasoline demand, and reports that estimates are consistent across estimation methods, with a mean price elasticity of $-0.53$ and a mean income elasticity of $0.64$.

To choose a value for the parameter $\eta$ we rely on a large literature on the valuation of environmental quality. The purpose of this literature is to assess the households’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a decrease in the pollution levels. A first approach, pioneered by Ridker and Henning [1967] is based on the observation that differences in pollution levels across communities can be used to identify -via differences in property values- the value assigned to a better environmental quality. In a recent paper, Smith and Huang [1995] presents results of a number of studies that use this approach, summarized in table 2. The authors report that the distribution of MWTP for a reduction in Total Suspended Particulate (TSP) is highly skewed, with the mean being nearly five times the median (109.90 vs. 22.40 1983 dollars).

A different approach uses contingent valuation methods to assess MWTP
for improvements in pollution levels. Brookshire et al. [1982] shows that property value premia should always exceed MWTP measures derived from contingent valuation methods, and finds empirical support for this result. In this paper, we will use the results reported by Smith and Huang [1995]. To be useful for our purposes, these results need to be converted in a format interpretable as a $x\%$ reduction in consumption being equivalent to a $y\%$ improvement in air quality. To convert the reported MWTP into a $\%$ reduction in consumption, we use the model real interest rate of 4.5$\%$ to annuitize the MWTP, and express it in percentage of mean US disposable household income for 1983. We then convert ‘marginal’ reductions in TSP into percentage changes by using mean levels of TSP for a sample of 18 cities \(^1\) (Smith and Huang [1995], table 3). We find that households are willing to pay an annuity of .014$\%$ of their income in exchange for a .56$\%$ permanent improvement in air pollution levels.

Using this information, \(\eta\) is selected such that households are indifferent between a 1$\%$ steady state reduction in air quality and a .025$\%$ steady state reduction in consumption of market goods. This ratio is consistent with the estimated benefits from air pollution reduction reported in Bender et al. [1980], of 708 to 1,781 US\$ for a 10$\%$ reduction (720 US\$ in our model, for a comparable reduction).

For the elasticity of substitution (ES) parameter, \(\alpha\), we follow the litera-

\(^1\)Although the focus in this paper is on pollution by \(CO_2\), results in Brookshire et al. [1982] provide strong evidence that behavioral responses to TSP and \(CO_2\) are highly correlated
ture on capital-energy substitution. A large body of research has attempted to identify the degree of substitutability between capital and energy after the first oil crisis (see Apostolakis [1990] for a review). When estimating the Hicksian elasticity of substitution, cross section data usually suggests that capital and energy are substitutes, while panel datasets provides evidence of complementarity. Thompson and Taylor [1995] provide a brief survey of the literature, and argue that Hicksian elasticities of substitution are inherently difficult to identify in this problem. They show that the Morishima elasticity of substitution provides consistent estimates across different datasets. These estimates are almost all positive (98%, compared to 70% for Hicksian elasticities), with a mean of .76 and a variance of .25, making energy and capital Morishima substitutes 2.

Data on output and consumption show that fuel usage by household out of total usage is 30% 3 fuel share of GNP is 7% 4, and household’s expenditure share for fuel is about 3.5 percent 5. The preference and technology parameters \{E, A, \theta, \chi\} are chosen to approximate these shares.

---

2 The Morishima elasticity of substitution is \( -\frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \), while the Hicksian measure has a more cumbersome form, but its sign is given by the sign of \( \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha} \). If we use a Morishima ES of .76 for the calibration, capital and fuel are then also Hicks substitutes, in accordance with most of the evidence drawn from cross-section data.

3 The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1999, table 955 contains data on fuel use which is broken down into the following categories: residential and commercial, industrial, and transportation. We assign 50 percent of fuel use in the residential and commercial category to fuel use in consumption. Over the period from 1970 - 1997, households used 30.75 percent of all fuel.

4 According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States table 958 and table 727, expenditure on fuel as a fraction of GDP in the US for 1995 is about 7%.

5 This is slightly lower than the average share of household income allocated to fuel estimated by Chernick and Reschovsky [1997].
We know very little about the technology parameter $\psi$. We execute some sensitivity analysis and find that our qualitative results are robust to changes in $\psi$. We assume that the depreciation rate for capital is 4%, and a high rate of depreciation for pollution ($\delta_z$) of .8, consistent with our focus on $CO_2$ emissions.

The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1999, table 793 shows that state gasoline taxes averaged 19 cents a gallon in 1996. Together with a federal gasoline tax of 18.4 cents, and given that before tax gasoline prices were 74 cents a gallon, the average tax rate for gasoline is around 50%.

4 Results

We now report the results of our experiment $^6$, a revenue neutral tax change. In this experiment, we raise the fuel tax and adjust the capital tax to keep the government share of GDP constant at 35%. For ease of exposition, we concentrate first on steady-state comparisons, and examine the transition path later.

Figure 1 shows fuel usage in steady state as the tax on fuel increases for the baseline parametrization. Although it is not evident from looking at it, this figure shows a steady state level of aggregate fuel consumption that is not monotonic in the tax rate on fuel. In fact, fuel use by household is

---

$^6$To solve this model, we first obtain the steady state using a Newton-Raphson procedure, then we linearize the first-order conditions around the steady state and solve the resulting difference equations. The approximation errors that result are very small, with the euler residuals $\frac{u_c(t)}{u_c(t+1)\beta(1+r_t+1-\delta)} - 1$ being of the order of $10^{-6}$. 

---
monotonically declining in the tax rate, as the substitution effect dominates the income effect because of similar magnitudes of the price and income elasticities, but larger increase in the steady state relative price of fuel (price change) with respect to the increase in the capital stock (income change). Fuel use by firms, however, increases in the green tax rate, since higher tax rates on fuel are accompanied by lower capital tax rates, and therefore higher steady state levels of the capital stock. When the fuel tax rate is low (high), the former (latter) effect tends to dominate\(^7\), giving a hump shaped relationship between tax rates and aggregate fuel usage.

The steady state levels of the capital stock as \(\tau_m\) changes are depicted in figure 2. While the amount of capital devoted to fuel production stays roughly constant, as \(\tau_m\) increases and the tax on capital income is reduced, capital in the final goods producing sector increases until the after tax rate of return on capital equals the subjective rate of preference.

We now examine the transition path for all variables after the tax on fuel \(\tau_m\) increases from the baseline level of .5 to .55. Figures 4 to 5 show the transition path from period 11 (time 1), when the policy change occurs. At time 1, the higher tax rate on fuel generates, via a substitution effect, a sharp decrease in fuel consumption (figure 3). The lower tax rate on capital earnings, however, creates incentives to accumulate capital (figure 4). Since fuel is an input in the production of the capital good, fuel consumption by firms increases monotonically from time 1 (period 11). As capital is

\(^7\)Aggregate fuel consumption peaks at a fuel tax rate of 90%. 
accumulated however, decreasing returns to capital in the fuel producing sector implies that the relative price of fuel must increase, so household consumption of fuel further decreases from time 1 on.

Figure 5 shows the evolution of GDP and consumption of the final good. At the time the policy change takes place and the rate of return to capital jumps, more capital is devoted to investment, and consumption of the final good must be sacrificed for a period of about 15 years (years 11-35 in figure 5).

We now turn to the welfare effects of this policy experiment. To disentangle welfare changes from different consumption paths and different pollution stock paths, a measure of compensating variation is used. We first compute the level of discounted utility during the transition to the new steady state, assuming that households enjoy the levels of health of the original steady state. We then calculate by what percentage should consumption (of both fuel and the final good) decrease along the transition path for both discounted utilities (original steady state and transition) to be equal, and label this number the efficiency dividend. Next, we do the same exercise but now holding consumption at the level of the original steady state, and comparing discounted utilities where only the stock of health changes. We label this second number the green dividend. Finally, a measure of aggregate welfare change is computed along the same lines.

Table 3 shows these welfare measures for the baseline case, where $\tau_m$ increases from .5 to .55, as well as for alternative tax changes and different calibrations. Note that both dividends are always obtained under reasonable
parameter values. The efficiency dividend decreases monotonically with the tax rate on fuel, and becomes negative at high levels of $\tau_m$ (above 150% for the baseline calibration). When simulating a similar policy experiment, Goulder [1995a] reports a negative efficiency dividend, but Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1993] finds that output actually increases, in line with our results. With respect to the green dividend, we are not aware of previous work that attempts to measure it, and we find that it is always positive for all reasonable parameter values\(^8\), even though environmental quality is likely to be lower at the new steady state, and is certainly lower for all policy changes considered in table 3. The reason why we find positive green dividends across the board is of course that the transition dynamics are very slow, with a half life of about 300 years in the baseline model. To make sense of this result, we should keep in mind that in the data this transition occurs around a balanced growth path, so it is not at odds with the observed growth rates of gasoline consumption in the US.

Since we have calibrated preferences for pollution to be consistent with the evidence, the size of green and efficiency dividends can be compared. The striking feature of table 3 is of course that green dividends are always very small, and much smaller (by about 85% in the baseline case), than efficiency dividends, so that aggregate welfare change can always be approximated by welfare changes from the consumption of market goods. We may question

\(^8\)When the elasticity of substitution becomes close to zero, the Leontief case, we find that the green dividend actually disappears.
whether this result is sensible. After all, environmental concerns seem to be high on the public policy agenda, as well as in people’s perceptions of what matters for quality of life. The point is that, while there is consensus that a cleaner environment is a desirable policy goal, there is strong evidence that actual willingness to pay for a better environmental quality is very low, as shown consistently by the literature reviewed in the previous section.

Summarizing, even though in steady state comparisons the efficiency dividend always holds, and the green dividend is in doubt, both types of welfare gains will be obtained when transition dynamics are accounted for. Moreover, green dividends are always smaller than efficiency dividends, and very small in absolute terms, so that aggregate welfare effects will likely be well approximated by the efficiency dividend.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we have studied whether a green tax reform actually does deliver a double dividend in a model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Our answer is yes. In our model, raising a green tax does indeed allow a pre-existing tax to be decreased, here a tax on capital income. Cutting the highly distortionary capital taxes does reduce the deadweight loss from the tax system given current tax levels, so green tax reform does yield one dividend. If fuel is an input in the production of capital, however, increasing the capital stock raises the demand for fuel which may offset any decline in fuel use due to higher fuel taxes. While this offsetting effect is important in steady state comparisons,
it is dwarfed by substitution effects that decrease the consumption of fuel and thus deliver a better environmental quality for a very long period along the transition path. A green dividend is then also achieved, but given the low value that households show for the quality of the environment, the size of this welfare gain is very small in absolute terms, and much smaller than the efficiency dividend. Reconsidering Lans Bovenberg’s citation in the introduction of this paper, our results suggest that the green dividend may not be after all a strong argument in favor of the implementation of green tax policy reform.
References


R. G. Ridker and J. A. Henning. The determinants of residential property


Table 1: Benchmark parameters and data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference parameters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>0.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology parameters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final good production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fuel production</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$E$</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depreciation rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_z$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{m_c}{m_c+m_p}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{wm}{GNP}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{w(1+\tau_m)m_c}{c+i+(1+\tau_m)wm}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: MWTP in selected studies (from Table 1 in Smith and Huang [1995])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Year of data</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>MWTP Range (1982-1984 US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest 5 MWTP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ega [1973]</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td>1,612 to 1,807.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson [1978]</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0 to 1,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson [1979]</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>551.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brucato et al. [1990]</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>500.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest 5 MWTP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry [1976]</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>−1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li and Brown [1980]</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>2.7 to 10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson and Crocker [1971]</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>16.4 to 31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson and Crocker [1971]</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>17 to 32.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Welfare analysis: Compensating variation (% of consumption)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibration</th>
<th>Efficiency dividend</th>
<th>Green dividend</th>
<th>Aggregate welfare change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_m$ from .5 to .55</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_m$ from .35 to .4</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_m$ from .4 to .45</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_m$ from .55 to .6</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity analysis ($\tau_m$ from .5 to .55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$: MWTP is 2 times the baseline</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$: ES is .65 (.76-2SD)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$: ES is .87 (.76+2SD)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi = .1$</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi = .5$</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_z = .1$</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_z = .99$</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma = 1$</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Steady state comparisons: fuel
Figure 2: Steady state comparisons: capital
Figure 3: Transition path: fuel
Figure 4: Transition path: capital

\[ k(-), km(\alpha), kp(.) \]
Figure 5: Transition path: GDP and final goods consumption