

U.S. Foreign Policy and International Regimes: the Case of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development*

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INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War world has faced both proliferation of mass destructive weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, and an outbreak of regional conflicts. These issues of nuclear proliferation and regional conflict have been regarded as unstable elements, and the post-Cold War world has thus considered ways of managing and preventing these instabilities in order to establish world order after the Cold War. The United States, especially as an only super power, deals with both managing nuclear proliferation and preventing regional conflicts.

On one hand, international society has provided an international non-proliferation regime to deal with nuclear proliferation, and on the other, it has provided coordination of concerned countries' interests or multilateral approaches with regional conflicts. However, after the Cold War, these prescriptions have not always coexisted with each other. For example, the application of international norms and rules does not necessarily contribute to regional stability *per se*.

The purpose of this research is to examine the changes of U.S. policy choices focusing on a discord between the international nonproliferation regime and regional security. This research takes North Korea's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) nuclear weapons development as a case study in order to justify the following points:

The tendency towards strengthening nuclear nonproliferation has

increased internationally since the end of the Cold War. In regards to North Korea's nuclear weapons development, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demanded that North Korea undergo a special inspection. Although the United States also demanded this special inspection following the IAEA's intention upon commencement of negotiations with North Korea regarding its nuclear development, the United States ultimately took a policy that postponed this special inspection towards North Korea. This research underlines the reasons for U.S. policy changes in order to determine the elements which decide a state's policy choices, especially focusing on a gap between the international nonproliferation regime and regional security in the post-Cold War era.

The reason for adopting the case study of North Korea's nuclear weapons development will be highlighted both theoretically and practically. First, from the international relations theory viewpoint, the case of North Korea is important as it examines how international regimes affect states' foreign policy. In the case of North Korea, the preference of decision-makers in the United States shifted between a policy supporting the rules of the international nonproliferation regime and a non-supporting policy. Second, the case of North Korea is also important in the post-Cold War era, a time when the United States faced a gap between the international nonproliferation regime and regional security.

OTHER RESEARCH

There are three types of studies regarding U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea's nuclear weapons development. The first study focuses on international elements that increase the probability of both international nuclear proliferation and the outbreak of regional conflicts, and explains that the international structural change which took place after the collapse of the Cold War decided U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea.¹ Although this study may explain the negative commitment of the U.S. towards North Korea's nuclear problem from the beginning, it does not explain U.S. policy

changes after its inception.

The second study focuses on the relationship between regional security in Northeast Asia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Most studies regarding North Korea's nuclear problem discuss this important relationship. This study involves two groups; the first group deals with the compatibility of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the NPT,² and the second group makes a point of interests coordination of concerned countries to the North Korea problem rather than the problem-solving framework of the NPT and the IAEA.³ Both study groups focus on the negotiation strategies of the United States and North Korea. As a result, this study is able to determine domestic sources in the decision-making process to some extent. However, this study does not explain incentive and restraint, that is the preference of domestic actors for policy choices. Additionally, this study deals with the international nonproliferation regime, but lacks theoretical discussion of the components of the international nonproliferation regime.

The third study focuses on the redefinition of the concept of U.S. nuclear policy,⁴ from the concept of 'non-proliferation' to the concept of 'counter-proliferation.' This is an interesting study, although the reason for and the way in which the United States redefined the concept of nonproliferation problem are not explained.

As stated above, most studies highlight the changes in U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea, but few concern the policy process in the United States. Additionally, they lack detailed information regarding the relationship between the international nonproliferation regime and U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea. This relationship is particularly important in analyzing the interaction of both international and domestic sources of foreign policy. Two approaches of the analysis of foreign policy will be discussed in the following section.

APPROACHES OF THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

International level approach

There are two theoretical approaches of foreign policy analysis; the international level approach and the domestic level approach. International regimes will be discussed in relation to foreign policy in this section. Krasner defines regimes as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.⁵ Components of international regimes need not be explicitly decided, such as international organizations and international agreements. International regimes exist when agreements among states are vague and constraints are loose, therefore international regimes have theory as their strong point. Regime theory argues that international regimes play autonomous roles between international systems and states' foreign policy.

According to regime theory, international regimes provide a framework of mid-term and long-term cooperative action which stipulates common goals and measures of collective action. The state action suits interests sought by concerned states as a whole.⁶ Namely, regime theory discusses the idea that international regimes can encourage states to behave cooperatively. Therefore, the question which must be considered here is the way in which international regimes affect states' policy choices.

The international level approach regards a state as a rational and unified actor and discusses the idea that the distribution of power among states decides states' policy. Consequently, the international level approach does not shed light on domestic sources of states' foreign policy. However, in order to understand incentive to and restraint on states' foreign policy more clearly, it is important to consider the extent to which domestic sources affect states' policy choices in the process of policy formulation. Therefore, it appears that domestic sources are important elements in deciding foreign policy of states.

However, in Putnam's words, "it is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse."⁷ What is important is to thoroughly examine issues as to when and how international sources and domestic sources affect states' foreign policy. The domestic level approach in analyzing states' foreign policy will be examined in the following section.

Domestic level approach

It is important to analyze domestic politics which are regarded as the "black box" in international level approaches, in order to fully understand the choices in foreign policy by states. It is the way in which we open the "black box" that should be examined. It is important to focus attention on the way in which foreign policy process approaches incorporate international sources in domestic politics.

Approaches of foreign policy process analyze the way in which foreign policies are formulated in order to systematically deal with the relationship between decision-makers and domestic and/or international conditions. A pioneer study by Snyder tried to reconstruct conditions restraining decision-makers and, as a result, dealt comprehensively with both domestic and international levels of analysis.⁸ However there are several kinds of conditions which influence the decision-making process, therefore it is not necessarily easy to manage these models of analysis. For that reason, Snyder's study was a taxonomic analysis and failed to establish a priority framework as well as an interactive model among its elements.

Following this, analyses of foreign policy have tended to concentrate on nation-level analysis. Allison focused on actors in government and their pulling and hauling of the bureaucratic political model,⁹ shedding light on the decision-making mechanism in which conflict and infighting in government prevent states from acting rationally. However, the bureaucratic political model was a partial model which dealt with limited aspects, suggesting that international conditions influenced governmental actors'

images. Hence, it can be said that Allison's model was not adequate in considering international sources. As a result, this influential work by Allison became the foundation for theoretical and empirical studies in decision making. On the theoretical side, studies on decision making try to emphasize rigorous models rather than grand theory. It is thought, however, that there are too many models of decision making.

As described above, the foreign policy process of a state has been considered to develop in accordance with domestic politics. However, the deeper the interdependence, the more usual interference at foreign policy process has occurred. Presently, foreign policy process involves national logic and international logic mingling with each other. Hence it is difficult to have a clear picture of the interrelation between the national level and the international level of foreign policy processes. Relations between the foreign policy process and international regimes are a typical case. However it appears dubious that domestic politics approaches provide us with an adequate analytical framework which takes in aspects of international regimes.

To satisfy the theoretical requirements mentioned above, this paper examines closely the influence of both the changed concept of nuclear proliferation after the Cold War and of the international nonproliferation regime on decision-makers in the United States. An analytical framework which focuses on the preference of U.S. domestic actors for North Korea and actors' coalition on this preference will be presented in the following section.

FRAMEWORK

International nonproliferation, regional security, and the United States after the Cold War

The international nonproliferation regime exists as an international institution to manage international nuclear proliferation. The international nonproliferation regime consists of the NPT and the IAEA as practical organizations of the safeguards system. The fundamental principle of the international nonproliferation regime is both constraining the use of atomic

and nuclear technology for military purposes and encouraging peaceful purposes. Norms of the regime are that nuclear weapons states owe a duty to prevent vertical proliferation and non-nuclear weapons states owe a duty to prevent horizontal proliferation. In particular, non-nuclear weapons states have a right to accept provision of atomic and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Rules of the regime are that non-nuclear weapons states conclude the safeguards system agreement with the IAEA and agree to inspections. The decision-making procedures of the regime are to hold review conferences each five years after the treaty comes into effect and to hold an extension conference fifty five years after the treaty comes into effect. Additionally, amendments to the treaty require the agreement of the majority of member countries.

Nuclear proliferation in a region is an unstable element for regional security; that is, nuclear proliferation is a problem concerning both the international nonproliferation regime and security issues of the region. International nonproliferation is required for regional security. However, a situation where these two elements do not coexist can occur.

If a non-nuclear weapons state that is affiliated with the NPT is suspected of developing nuclear weapons, the IAEA, under the safeguards system, can demand this suspicious state to undergo a special inspection of its nuclear facilities. Operating the special inspection, the IAEA attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region in order to achieve international nonproliferation. Hence, the demanding of a special inspection by the IAEA can be seen as one rule of the international nonproliferation regime.

When a suspicious state rejects this special inspection, the IAEA informs the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that the suspicious state has rejected the safeguard system and the IAEA then commissions the matter to the UNSC. Thereafter, the UNSC urges the suspicious state to consult with the IAEA, ultimately, and the UNSC imposes sanctions based on the UNSC resolution to the state. Namely, the special inspection demanded by the IAEA is made according cooperation between the UNSC and

the IAEA.


If the special inspection by the IAEA takes place, it then clears suspicion of the subject state and prevents nuclear proliferation in the region. However, because the demanding of a special inspection by the IAEA has with it the possibility of sanctions by the United Nations (U.N.) the suspicious state may take brinkmanship. As a result, the situation can escalate. Increased tension caused by U.N. sanctions is not preferable to political and economic stability of the region; but demanding no special inspection cannot clear the suspicion nor achieve nonproliferation. Thus a dilemma exists between the demand of a special inspection by the IAEA and regional security.

This dilemma influences the preference of U.S. domestic actors. The dilemma involves whether they support the demand of a special inspection by the IAEA or whether they think political and economic stability in the Northeast Asian region is more important. U.S. domestic actors face a trade-off between these two choices concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons development.

U.S. policy choices

To sum up, below are U.S. policy choices concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons development (FIGURE 1). At choice A the dilemma mentioned above occurs as a result of a situation where the preference towards supporting a rule of the international nonproliferation regime and the preference which takes political and economic stability in Northeast Asia seriously do not coexist. In the next stage domestic actors are urged to decide whether they support a policy based on a rule of the international nonproliferation regime (choice B) or whether they support a policy based on regional stability (choice C). That is, choices B and C are a trade-off. The question we have to ask here is which elements decide the preference of U.S. domestic actors.

FIGURE 1. INDIFFERENCE CURVE OF U.S. NORTH KOREAN POLICY



Analytical framework: shared perception and coalition

This research presents the following analytical framework focusing on the shared perception and coalition among U.S. domestic actors in order to examine U.S. policy choices concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons development. First, the perception among U.S. decision-makers towards North Korea is divided as to whether or not they regard the situation of North Korea's nuclear weapons development as a short-term threat. Second, coalition among U.S. domestic actors decides U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea. For example, if domestic actors have a shared perception that the situation of North Korea's nuclear weapons development is dangerous to U.S. national short-term interests then, each actor forms a coalition based on a preference towards a rule of the international nonproliferation regime and the support of the demand of a special inspection. On the other hand, if these domestic actors have no shared perception of the situation of North Korea's nuclear weapons development, they dismantle their coalition and weaken their support for a policy based on a rule of the

international nonproliferation regime. This results in the formation of a coalition based on the preference towards political and economic stability in Northeast Asia.

Hypotheses of this paper

Three hypotheses regarding U.S. policy choices, focusing on the two elements mentioned above will be presented. My first hypothesis is that U.S. domestic actors have a shared perception of North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Because of this shared perception, U.S. domestic actors nominate a preference towards supporting a policy based on a rule of the international nonproliferation regime and approve the IAEA's demand of a special inspection. This policy is called the "step-by-step" approach. On the other hand, when U.S. domestic actors have no shared perception, they relatively weaken their preference towards supporting a policy based on a rule of the international nonproliferation regime.

My second hypothesis is if U.S. domestic actors relatively weaken their preference towards supporting a policy based on a rule of the international nonproliferation regime, they strengthen their coalition based on the preference towards taking political and economic stability in Northeast Asia seriously. The policy they adopt is called the "comprehensive" approach.

My third hypothesis is if the shared perception of fear among U.S. domestic actors increases, they will then approve sanctions imposed on North Korea by the United Nations.

The following section will examine these hypotheses.

NORTH KOREA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT AND U.S.-NORTH KOREA NEGOTIATIONS (MARCH-JULY 1993)

In March 1993, rejecting and condemning the demand by the IAEA Director General and the IAEA Board of Governors to accept a special inspection, North Korea stated its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

Immediately after the statement by North Korea, military information on the Korean peninsula's situation including North Korea's nuclear development influenced the formation of the perception of U.S. domestic actors towards North Korea. The military information revealed that North Korea had already produced enough plutonium to make at least one nuclear weapon.

U.S. domestic actors shared a similar perception of North Korea based on the military information. If North Korea's nuclear weapons development was approved, this would have serious implications for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and international nonproliferation. North Korea with a nuclear weapon would make Japan and South Korea nuclear states. Additionally, if North Korea possessed mid-range and long-range missiles which could transport nuclear weapons, its nuclear weapons would also threaten U.S. allies and bases in Northeast Asia. As a result, U.S. domestic actors shared the perception of fear towards North Korea.

In the United States, in particular, U.S. Congress condemned North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and urged the Clinton Administration to take strong measures towards North Korea.¹⁰ Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord gave a testimony that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and its possession of a nuclear weapon was considered a challenge to international nonproliferation and insisted that the United States would demand North Korea to agree to an inspection.¹¹ The Clinton Administration decided on a policy to clear North Korea's suspicious nuclear program by supporting the IAEA's safeguards system. Consequently, the shared perception of fear among U.S. domestic actors towards North Korea's nuclear weapons development led to support for both the international nonproliferation regime and the IAEA.

As a result of the first round and the second round of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations in June and July 1993, North Korea suspended its withdrawal from the NPT and agreed to consult with the IAEA regarding the

IAEA's safeguards system and with South Korea regarding the Korean peninsula situation.¹² Until this process of negotiating, U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea attached importance to the role of the IAEA in achieving international nonproliferation.¹³ U.S. domestic actors shared the general agreement that the IAEA's safeguards system was important in order to clear the suspicious situation regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons development and to realize both the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and international nonproliferation.

This shared perception was due to a scarcity of information regarding the situation of the Korean peninsula. Information about North Korea was limited to military sources, thus a uniform perception regarding North Korea based on limited and scarce information was shaped and shared among U.S. domestic actors.

It is fair to say that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) had an important role during the process of this U.S. domestic actors' shared perception of North Korea. The ACDA insisted on reinforcing the international nonproliferation regime through the IAEA's safeguards system as a measure of preventing nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era.¹⁴ The ACDA regarded North Korea's nuclear weapons development as something which threatened an international norm of nonproliferation and thus willingly supported the IAEA.¹⁵ As a special organization concerned with the nuclear proliferation problem, the ACDA assumed an important role in having U.S. domestic actors support a policy based on the international nonproliferation regime.

At the onset of U.S.-North Korea negotiations, the United States took an approach to negotiation which had two preconditions before entering the next round of U.S.-North Korea talks. First, North Korea should thoroughly accept all inspections which the IAEA demanded. Second, North Korea should hold conferences with South Korea regarding agendas including the nuclear problem. This U.S. negotiation approach is referred to as the "step-by-step" approach. This step-by-step approach was a functional

policy regulated by the international nonproliferation regime.

ENTANGLING OF POLICY APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES (AUGUST 1993-FEBRUARY 1994)

IAEA-North Korea talks were held in August 1993 after the second round of U.S.-North Korea negotiations. The IAEA demanded that North Korea agree to a special inspection for suspicious nuclear facilities at these talks. The IAEA emphasized demanding full-scope inspections including special inspections. The IAEA Director General Hans Blix pushed North Korea to continue IAEA-North Korea talks in order to discuss the nuclear problem,¹⁶ but North Korea claimed that the IAEA's excessive demanding of a special inspection was interference of sovereignty.

South and North Korea talks were also held in August. North Korea was not willing to talk about the nuclear problem at the meeting with South Korea. North Korea repeatedly insisted on bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea to deal with the nuclear problem.

During this period, U.S. domestic actors continued to take the policy based on the step-by-step approach. For example, Assistant Secretary of State W. Lord gave the statement that the United States would not hold the third round of U.S.-North Korea negotiations until North Korea resumed talks with both the IAEA and South Korea and agreed to a special inspection.¹⁷

However, after the Fall of 1993, the Clinton Administration no longer had a shared perception of North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Evaluation of North Korea's nuclear weapons development became divided, which led to the perception of fear of North Korea not being shared among the Clinton Administration.¹⁸

Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, who was then involved in North Korea negotiations, suggested that the special inspection was the only solution to the North Korea nuclear problem. Gallucci had previously thought that the only way to resolve the problem was to fulfill the special

inspections as the ACDA had insisted in the first stages of negotiations with North Korea. However, he later concluded that it was to prevent future nuclear development in North Korea which was practical arms control, rather than to clear the past nuclear development of North Korea. He thought that it was profitable for the management and prevention of North Korea's nuclear weapons development to operate regular inspections for the purpose of continuity of the IAEA's safeguards system rather than to demand special inspections.¹⁹

When the shared perception of North Korea's nuclear weapons development diminished, the preference towards supporting the step-by-step approach, a policy based on the international nonproliferation regime, also weakened. On the other hand, a preference towards taking the issue of political and economic stability in Northeast Asia seriously increased among U.S. domestic actors.

In November 1993 North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who led a delegation for negotiations with the United States, called on the United States to agree to a 'package solution' which dealt comprehensively with the nuclear problem with the conditions that; (1) the United States approved the continuity of North Korea's political system; (2) the United States took practical actions in providing light-water-moderated reactors (LWRs); and (3) North Korea stayed with the NPT and accepted the IAEA's inspections. The Clinton Administration agreed to adopt this solution as a negotiation approach. This approach is known as the "comprehensive approach." The United States and North Korea resumed unofficial talks based on the comprehensive approach from November 1993 through February 1994 and agreed on the conditions that; (1) the United States canceled Team-Spirit; (2) North Korea allowed the IAEA to make inspections for the continuity of safeguards; (3) North Korea resumed talks with South Korea; and (4) the third round of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations was to be held on March 21, 1994.

NORTH KOREA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE IAEA AND MOTIONS TOWARDS U.N. SANCTIONS (MARCH-JUNE 1994)

After the February agreement between the U.S. and North Korea based on the comprehensive approach, the United States went back to the first step-by-step approach.²⁰ According to my second hypothesis, that is because a coalition among U.S. domestic actors based on the preference of political and economic stability in Northeast Asia was not strong enough. The preference of political and economic stability in Northeast Asia was supported by a skeptical attitude towards the effect of special inspections. That is, U.S. domestic actors lacked the incentives to take the issue of political and economic stability in Northeast Asia seriously. Because the coalition for supporting the comprehensive approach weakened, the United States went back to the step-by-step approach as a result of unsuccessful negotiations with North Korea.

At that time, U.S. domestic actors had not reached a consensus on a negotiation approach towards North Korea. Simultaneously, North Korea broke down negotiations with South Korea and expressed its intention to withdraw from the IAEA.²¹ Following these actions by North Korea, the United States concluded that North Korea had no intention to negotiate. In particular, its withdrawal from the IAEA meant that North Korea renounced its duty to obey the IAEA's safeguards system. The withdrawal was clearly a violation of the rules of the international nonproliferation regime. Consequently, this situation confirmed U.S. domestic actors' perception of fear of North Korea. These so-called continuities of North Korea's action were considered to challenge two objectives of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, that is, international nonproliferation and regional securities. As a result, a preference for a punishment for North Korea grew among U.S. domestic actors and the United States adopted a policy to support U.N. sanctions against North Korea.

In June 1994, at the time when U.N. sanctions against North Korea were about to be decided, the former President of the United States Jimmy Carter visited North Korea to meet North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. This resulted in North Korea agreeing to freeze its nuclear development program under the condition of accepting the support of constructing LWRs. This statement led the United States to postpone a U.N. sanction-driven policy and the third round of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations begun in Geneva.

THE GENEVA AGREED FRAMEWORK (JULY-OCTOBER 1994)

As a result of the Carter mission, the perception of fear of North Korea among U.S. domestic actors mitigated. The United States evaluated that the freeze of North Korean nuclear program would minimize North Korea's nuclear threats in the future. Here we need to examine how and where U.S. policy choices shifted after the perception of fear of North Korea diminished.

Following the Carter mission, the perception of fear of North Korea was not necessarily shared among U.S. domestic actors. U.S. Congress and the ACDA thoroughly considered North Korea as a threat unless there was some transparency in North Korean nuclear program. Because the Department of State, especially Gallucci, had perceived that minimizing North Korea's nuclear threats would contribute to political and economic stability in the Northeast Asian region, the State did not adhere to North Korea's past nuclear program. The White House shifted its concern to the realization of an indefinite extension of the NPT and stated its wishes to conclude negotiations with North Korea immediately.

A focal point of the third round of U.S.-North Korea negotiations in Geneva was the means in dealing with the demand of a special inspection regarding the international nonproliferation regime. The United States took the position of not adhering to North Korea's past nuclear program.

Namely, the United States did not adhere to a guarantee of transparency of the past nuclear program and made a concession on a special inspection which was able to clear the suspicious nuclear facilities. Alternatively, the United States asked North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

In October 1994, the United States and North Korea agreed on a framework concerning both the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and normalization of the U.S.-North Korean relationship. This Agreed Framework was exposed to the pros and cons in the United States. In particular, U.S. Congress, in which the Republican took majority, opposed the Agreed Framework. However, the security situation of the Korean peninsula has improved since the Agreed Framework, for example, talks among the United States, South and North Korea, and Russia have taken place. In short, the United States adopted a policy which took the issue of political and economic stability and regional security in Northeast Asia seriously, which also relatively weakened the perception of fear of North Korea.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea's nuclear development problem has been outlined in this research. In concluding, it was apparent that it was the perception of fear of North Korea among U.S. domestic actors that decided U.S. policy choices. Namely, what was important was whether or not U.S. domestic actors recognized North Korea's nuclear weapons program as a short-term threat for the United States and allies in Northeast Asia. Additionally, the perception of fear was decided according to uniform military information on North Korea.

If the perception of fear of North Korea was shared among U.S. domestic actors, these actors expressed a preference towards supporting a policy based on the rules of the international nonproliferation regime. Thus, the United States took an approach to support the IAEA's demand of a special inspection. The first and second round of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations were typical of the step-by step approach.

In contrast, if multiple sources of information on North Korea made the perception of fear of North Korea inconsistent, the preference towards supporting a policy based on the rules of the international nonproliferation regime weakened. Therefore, U.S. domestic actors formed a coalition to take political and economic stability in Northeast Asia seriously. This typical situation occurred from the Fall of 1993 to February in 1994 when the United States shifted its North Korean policy to the comprehensive approach. However, because of the lack of strong incentives during that period, the coalition which took this approach based on the preference of regional stability lacked confidence in this approach.

In regards to the other situations in which North Korea discontinued its talks with South Korea and it withdrew from the IAEA, the perception of fear greatly increased. As a result, the United States took a sanction-oriented policy. On the other hand, when the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons decreased after the freeze of its nuclear program, U.S. domestic actors reformed a coalition based on the preference for regional stability in Northeast Asia. Consequently, the United States showed the intent to contribute to regional stability and this led to the Agreed Framework in Geneva.

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Notes

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