

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE FORMATION OF COLD WAR STRUCTURE 1945–1955: WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

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Introduction

The end of the cold war urges and encourages the cold war historians to write a history from novel perspectives. Before then, they tended to focus their attention to the following questions: why the cold war began and how it has developed. But now, it became possible for them to treat the cold war period as a concluded history and look at its whole process from a new viewpoint by asking why and how the cold war was terminated.

The purpose of this essay is to investigate tentatively the formation of the cold war structure in western Europe, which has been mainly examined in the context of the origins of the cold war, from the new viewpoint of terminating process of the cold war, in other words, by treating the beginning of the cold war as the beginning of its terminating process. In this sense, the main hypothesis is that the process of the cold war structure formation has already contained some factors which were to contribute to the termination of the structure.

In this essay, the main analytical focus is placed upon the relations between the western European countries, such as Britain, France and West Germany, and the United States. Although it has been widely shared that the cold war started in Europe and that the those western European states played significant roles starting and intensifying the cold war from the late 1940s to the first half of the 1950s, they also paradoxically tried to restrain the process of the intensification and indirectly erode the cold war structure in the same period. The US-Western European relations at the beginning of the cold war seem to be one of the most relevant cases demonstrating that the abovementioned complicated and dual feature of the cold war origins.

Here, I have no such an ambitious intention to conduct any thorough research based on the primary sources. Rather I shall try to describe a rough historical sketch and hypotheses about the origins of the cold war based on the preceding secondary works, in order to provide a basis of further empirical historical analysis of cold war history from the new perspective.

Elements of the Cold War Structure¹

Prior to a historical overview, it is necessary to show a general picture of the cold war structure which was generated in the late 1940s and terminated in the late 1980s.² There are at least the following four interconnected elements characterising the cold war structure.

Firstly, the cold war structure can be characterised as a prolonged and tremendously critical security dilemma. The existence of nuclear weapons made it unable to resolve the dilemma by an outbreak of a major war as it had been in the first world war. The major actors were, therefore, kept in a state of pseudo-war. Secondly, within the cold war structure, the distinction between the friends and the enemies was formed in ideological terms. In critical periods, generally, actors tend to define their enemies and friends through ideological classification clearly enough to persuade their citizens to prepare for a possible outbreak of war. This was the case in the cold war as a lasting crisis and tensions emanating from the security dilemma. In this situation, the eastern and the western blocs inclined to be haunted by a dichotomy of the evil and the good, which has for long obstructed the communication between them and made the crisis continuous and dangerous.

Thirdly, the cold war structure contained a doubly oppressive order. At the international level, the bi-polar power structure operated as a hegemonic order, where the fate of the allies largely depended on the will of superpowers. At the domestic level, the security dilemma of the cold war power politics placed security interests at the top of the hierarchy of political issues and priority, which tended to suppress various sub-national interests and limit the freedom of citizen's international and transnational activities especially crossing the demarcation line of the cold war. The fate of the citizens also depended upon the will and conducts of the superpowers which their governments followed. To escape from this oppression, the governments and citizens of the bloc members had to dissolve the security dilemma of the cold war. One can find here a great dilemma between the cold war and democracy both in international and domestic levels, which could be more generally characterized as a dilemma between power politics and democracy.

Thus, the cold war structure had a critical dynamism in which the continuous security dilemma, the dangerous ideological structure of 'feind und freund', and the dual oppressive order interacted and strengthened each other. A great paradox of the cold war is that those elements supporting the cold war dynamism were simultaneously the elements potentially eroding it in the sense that the supporting elements were to generate resisting forces against themselves in the political world which had an undeniably dialectic nature. The aspect of security dilemma which could have brought the earth to a total destruction was to evoke an endeavour to get out of itself. For that purpose, one of the most significant obstacles, that is, the ideological 'feind und freund' rhetoric, were to be overcome. The hegemonic structure was

¹ The word 'structure' does not mean just a power structure, or a state of power distribution. I use the word as more descriptive concept indicating a complex of various inter-connected factors: i.e., power distribution, perception, and economic relations, etc.

² It is needless to mention that the general picture of the cold war structure described here is a heuristic one, which should be subject to future amendments as results of the further and thorough empirical historical research to be attempted throughout the whole period of the cold war from the new perspective.

also to be eroded by the allies being horrified by the possible total annihilation, in particular, in the western bloc where the allies became, through the military and economic assistance from the U.S., powerful enough to resist against both internal and external communist threats. At the domestic level, the citizens were to make efforts to dissolve the oppressive and disturbing situations of the cold war, for example, through anti-nuclear movements and the movements for democratization in the eastern Europe.

Thus, the cold war structure had a self-destructive character. As its supporting elements develop, the resisting elements become more stronger. In this sense, the evolution of the cold war history can be interpreted as that of balance between those two kinds of elements. The end of the cold war can be characterized, therefore, as a result of the latter's dominance over the former.

Post-War Planning of the 'Big Three'

At the last phase of the second world war, the war-time leaders of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union were urged to establish and exchange their concrete post-war plans. Inter-relationship between their ideas showed no so clear a divergence as to be seen during the post-war East-West division.

The post-war planning of Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, held that the post-war stable world order should be built on cooperative relations among the so-called 'Big Three'. From his viewpoint, the big power cooperation could be maintained by avoiding possible conflicts among them by drawing border lines between the British and the Soviet spheres mutually recognized, but by keeping them not exclusive and leaving communication channels. In order to maintain the spheres, Churchill regarded the presence of American power in the post-war Europe as essential because of the decline of British power base.³

In a sense, Churchill was one of the champions in the 20th century of European classical balance of power diplomacy or 'realpolitik', the most important principle of which was to maintain a *status quo* of balance of power among the major powers.⁴ In the same context, he was also very well aware of the danger of exclusively closed sphere of influence and emphasised the indispensability of communication channels with the post-war Russia for preventing mutual suspicion among the big powers.⁵ Here, one could see a reflection of the 19th century diplomatic principle of 'congress diplomacy'.⁶

The post-war planning of the Soviet Union was also influenced by the 19th century

³ John W. Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951–1955*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp.14–8.

⁴ See Kenneth W. Thompson, *Winston Churchill's World View: Statesmanship and Power*, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1983)

⁵ For his emphasis on the importance of keeping the communication channels, see Anthony Sheldon, *Churchill's Indian Summer: the Conservative Government 1951–1955*, (London: Hodde and Stoughton, 1981), p.396. His negative attitude towards the exclusive sphere of influence can also be seen in his initiative for the famous 'percentage deal' with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in October 1944. For the deal, see Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp.74–75. In the percentage deal, Churchill intended to establish the co-existence between British and Russian influence in some regions such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and even in Romania.

⁶ For rules of the game in the congress diplomacy of the 19th century Europe, see Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapters 6 and 7.

diplomacy. Premier Joseph Stalin was willing to accept Churchill's proposal in the percentage deal, and the post-war Russian self-restraining behaviours with regard to civil wars in Yugoslavia and Greece demonstrate that Stalin intended to base the post-war stability and international order on the mutual recognition of the spheres of influence. It should be noted, however, that peculiar historical experiences of Russia and the Soviet Union in the world of power politics significantly affected their post-war planning in eastern Europe. Their historical experiences of being intruded by various external aggressors orientated the Russians towards excessive sensitivity in security considerations. To avoid the repetition of history, it was regarded as necessary for them to establish 'absolute security' by imposing a very firm control over their neighbouring states and making them satellite states. This peculiarity of their sense of security seems to let the Russians rush for building a firm sphere of influence in eastern Europe, which was to evoke American suspicion after the war. In spite of its diplomatic tendency of 'realpolitik', the Russian drives for 'absolute security' were to intensify the security dilemma with the western states and destroy their post-war planning later.

Like Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the president of the U.S., was also in a dilemma between the idea of classical diplomacy and peculiarity of American diplomatic ideology. The latter were the combination of American internationalism, exceptionalism, and isolationism. Post-war stability based on the worldwide international organization, both political and economic, the pet policy of FDR and his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, reflected their internationalist orientations. It was also affected by the exceptionalism that the United States should not take the same diplomatic course as the Europeans. In other words, the American exceptionalism prefers diplomacy within multilateral framework, often described as 'new diplomacy', to diplomacy of balance of power or 'old diplomacy'. The stability through the multilateral framework would lighten the expected burdens on the Americans after the second world war, which would meet their isolationist tendencies, as well.

In a practical sense, or rather a paradoxical way, FDR had to rely on the idea with more classical nature: mutual recognition of sphere of influence with the Soviet Union. In order to make the United Nations operate effectively for post-war stability, it was necessary for the Americans to build up cooperative relations with Russia. For establishing a firm cooperation with Russia, the United States also had to recognize the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. It is well known that FDR had the idea of 'Four Policemen', which was based on the idea of dividing the world into four spheres of responsibility among the big three and China. Here, one should note that FDR showed positive attitudes towards the idea of sphere of influence. FDR understood the oversensitive security consideration of the Soviet leaders.⁷ Although he did not publicly advocate Churchill's initiative for the percentage deal, allowing for its negative effect on American public opinion, FDR implicitly accepted the Anglo-Soviet deal of sphere of influence.⁸ Thus, he was searching a way to materialize the post-war cooperation among the big powers through his personal relationship with the British and Soviet leaders both by building international organizations and by recognizing the sphere of

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) pp.135-6.

⁸ Osamu Ishii, 'Taikoku no gaikou to sengo Europe seijitaisei no keisei—Europe bundanka no katei, 1941-1949' (the diplomacy of great powers and the formation of post-war European system: process of division in Europe, 1941-1949), in Ishii (ed.) *1940 Nendai Europe No Seiji To Reisen* (Cold War and politics in Europe in the 1940s), (Tokyo: Mineruva 1992) pp.18-9.

influence, though his people were sharply negative towards the idea of the so-called 'old diplomacy'. For Churchill, this kind of American tendency was a source of anxiety. The revival of the American retreat from Europe after WWI was a nightmare. He reiterated FDR about the future threats from the Soviet Union.

Thus, all of the three shared the objectives of establishing the sphere of influence mutually recognized as one of the essential conditions for post-war world stability. There were, however, significant dilemmas which were to create the fatal condition for the cold war. One of the dilemmas could be seen between the necessity for classical diplomacy and the straitjacket of peculiarity of the would-be superpowers which was very contradictory to the former. Another dilemma was between the Soviet Union and the United States. In other words, the potentiality of clash between their own peculiarities: between the Soviet efforts to establish firm control over eastern Europe, and the U.S. negative attitudes in her public opinion towards 'realpolitik' or the 'old diplomacy', which were to orientated against the Soviet conducts for the mentioned purposes.

Before the second world war ended, the 'Big Three' did not have to go into serious and inescapable conflicts, because they could rely on the shared aspects of their post-war plannings. But immediately after the second world war, those dilemmas mentioned above gradually became a more salient focus of their attentions and were to lead to the security dilemma.

The Formation of the Cold War Structure: from Cooperation to Security Dilemma

After the V-E Day, there could be seen several significant political and economic conditions emerging as decisive factors which pushed the world from the war-time cooperation towards the world of security dilemma.

The first was the devastation of Europe. The deteriorated economic and military situations in Europe raised the serious question: who were going to fill the perceived 'power vacuum' in Europe and how. It can be safely argued that who would assist European reconstruction and how decided the division of Europe. The Truman doctrine in March and the Marshall plan in June 1947 played the role to draw the demarcation line between the western and the eastern Europe.

Secondly, it should be pointed out that though the U.S. became a superpower who seemed to embrace power resources available to set up an stable order, she did not have any intention nor any clear blueprints about the post-war world order. This could be called the problem of 'situational hegemon'.⁹ As having been seen immediately after the first world war, strong isolationist sentiments emerged in the U.S. after the V-E and V-J Days. In order for the United States to be closely and positively involved with the efforts for establishing the post-war international political order, the Truman administration, which succeeded the FDR administration after his sudden death, had to overcome the isolationist trends in the public. It was urgent for it to discover or devise some persuasive rationales, rhetorical or not, to change the isolationists trends in the American public opinion. The rationales were to take a shape of

⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete?: the Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, Summer, 1966, p.873.

ideological rhetorics to be designed to inflame the sense of threats from the Soviet Union. It should be pointed here that there was a psychological afterglow of ideological rhetoric which had been employed during the second world war: totalitarianism vs. democracy. During the second world war, this ideological distinction was used for clarifying the 'feind und freund' structure in the war. This rhetorical distinction was still useful to manipulate the mass in the post-war period, because it had been deeply rooted in their mind during the war.

Thirdly, the change of president in the U.S. government at the last stage of the war enormously affected the development of political process of Soviet-U.S. relations. After the sudden death of FDR in April 1945, Harry S. Truman without any notable diplomatic experiences, who had not at all been informed of details about FDR's grand but subtle design of post-war world order, was appointed the president. This certainly created discontinuity in American attitudes towards the Russian drives for establishing her own security sphere of influence. The death of FDR was, in a sense, the death of the idea of building and institutionalizing big power's cooperative relations based on mutual understanding on the necessity for setting up their spheres of influence. On the other hand, Stalin demonstrated a consistency in his idea of post-war world order. Under these circumstances, both sides of the superpowers could not avoid falling into serious mutual suspicion about each other's intentions.¹⁰

Fourthly, the end of the second world war brought the personal diplomacy conducted by FDR and other war-time leaders to an end. Democratic control over diplomacy was intensified after the end of the war. The post-war diplomacy became more subject to public opinion in the U.S., which had been demonstrated strong antipathy towards the old diplomacy of sphere of influence or the balance of power. This American exceptionalism in her public opinion was to exert more direct influence on Truman's policy towards the Soviet Union. The grave dilemma between the classical diplomacy and American democracy limited the policy options of the post-war U.S. government. In fact, the Soviet conducts for establishing her security zone in the eastern Europe aroused strong accusations in American public opinion after the second world war, which made the administration adopt more hard-liner policies towards Russia.¹¹

Finally, the advent of the Atomic bomb accelerated the process of security dilemma between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In particular, the fact that Truman showed his intention to use U.S. monopoly of the 'winning weapons' during the Potsdam conference undoubtedly stimulated the Soviet suspicion and sense of threat.¹²

Thus, those various factors and condition generated during the transition period from the peace-time to the war-time transformed the relations among the war-time leaders, orientated into a kind of confidence building based on mutual recognition of spheres of influence, into the power political mechanism creating the security dilemma caused and deepened by the mutual suspicion. Europe was to be divided in this development of events.

¹⁰ Voltech Mastny points out that Stalin did not expect to encounter the strong accusation from the Truman administration over the Russian efforts to building a firm control over her own sphere of influence tacitly accepted by FDR. Stalin's surprise reflected the sudden change in U.S. attitudes caused by the discontinuity in U.S. design of the post-war world order. Mastny, 'Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War' *International Security*, winter, 1984/1985, vol.9, No.3, p.111.

¹¹ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, op.cit., chapter 7.

¹² David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

The Western Europe and the Formation of the Cold War Structure

The increasing tensions between the superpowers, that is, the cold war was, in various forms, beneficial for the western European states who were urged to reconstruct their economic viability and their military security. This fact led them support and help American cold war policies. At the same time, however, the cold war imposed serious risks and costs on them, which were regarded by the western Europeans as vital. Within this complicated context of costs and benefits of the cold war, the western Europe sometimes supported but sometimes eroded the cold war structure. In other words, the relations between the costs and the benefits shaped the relations between the United States and the western European states, which could be characterized as the intersection of cooperation and friction.¹³

First of all, thanks to the cold war, the western European states could obtain economic assistance from the United States which was clearly in the isolationistic mood. The U.S. government suspended the lend-lease to Britain on 21 August 1945, which symbolized the negative attitudes of the Americans towards any post-war contribution to European economic re-construction. The intensification of the cold war tensions between the superpowers provided the Americans with a good reason for using the taxes of American people for reconstructing the western Europe.

As Lundestad suggests, the western Europeans invited 'the American empire' for their own post-war economic re-construction. It is known that Churchill sent so many letters to FDR warning against the danger of Russia until his sudden death. Even after he went out of office, Churchill went as far as to try to talk directly to the American people about the Russian menace in the infamous 'Iron Curtain' speech in March 1946. This policy was also inherited by the Labour government of Clement Attlee. The Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan brought what the western European nations needed.¹⁴

On the other hand, it should be noted that the division of Europe confirmed by the Marshall plan inflicted significant costs on the western Europe: the loss of their pre-war market in the eastern Europe. For instance, Britain which had acquired cheap foods and woods from the Soviet Union and the eastern Europe before the second world war lost that commercial channel.¹⁵ In fact, the British government demonstrated their anxiety over the loss and tried to retain the channel by concluding a trade agreement with the Soviet Union at the end of 1947. In January 1948, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, also stated in the parliament that the government intended to continue British trade with the eastern European countries.¹⁶ These imply the British concerns over the possibility of economically divided Europe. Even

¹³ Walter LaFeber suggests that the cold war contained a significant aspect of conflicts between the western Europe and the United States, by raising a question: an end to which cold war. LaFeber, 'An End to Which Cold War?' in Michael J. Hogan (ed.) *The End of the Cold War: its Meaning and Implications*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chapter 2, pp.21–39.

¹⁴ Geir Lundestad argues that one of the most important factors contributing to the beginning of the cold war was the western European efforts to drag the US power into the European theater and that the western European countries also invited American control over themselves. Lundestad called this process 'Empire by Invitation'. See, Lundestad, 'Empire by invitation?: the United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.23, no.3, pp.263–277.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Barker, *The British between the Superpowers, 1945–1950*, (London, Macmillan, 1983), p.87.

¹⁶ Allan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1950*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), p.502.

during the negotiations for accepting the Marshall plan, the British government tried to prevent the plan from dividing Europe. It is well known that Bevin endeavoured by all means to persuade V. I. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, to participate in the plan.¹⁷

The costs mentioned above were the possible future problems after the immediate stage of reconstruction for which the Marshall plan had an overwhelming significance. But after the early 1950s when their first stage of reconstruction seemed successful, the limitation of economic activities in the European continent started to be perceived as a central issue of cacophony in the Euro-U.S. relations.

Secondly, the cold war benefited the western Europe in terms of the post-war security. The issue had a complicated nature. The western Europeans were under the two main sources of future threats: the Soviet Union and the possible resurgence of German militarism. The latter was in particular related to the traditional 'German problem'. Until the former became their central menace, the German problem was more salient common focus for the western Europeans. In addition, the existence of the Soviet-U.S. security dilemma itself was a source of threat. They could not deny the possibility that the dilemma strongly defined by the dangerous ideological rhetoric of moral dichotomy would burst into the third world war over some remote events having nothing to do with the western European vital interests and that the war would be fought in the European theaters. In this sense, the United States was also one of the sources of threat, though in an indirect sense. Especially after the advent of nuclear weapons in the mid 1950s, this anxiety was to be amplified.¹⁸

Under these circumstances, the western Europe was also faced with an intersection of benefits and costs. Firstly, the cold war seemed to solve the long traditional 'German problem' by dividing her. Until West Germany was established in 1949 and even later, France and Britain were anxious about the possible resurgence of the German militarism and the possibility of united Germany being dragged into the communist orbit. The dismemberment of Germany dissolved these possibilities.¹⁹ On the other hand, the establishment of West Germany was to bring the issue of rearming her as an urgent agenda for the western allies in the near future, which would inevitably evoke among the French a vital sense of threat. The increasing pressure from the U.S. government for rearming West Germany and the diplomatic agony felt by the French led to the complication over the issues of the European Defence Community (the EDC) in the first half of the 1950s.²⁰

Even from the viewpoint of West Germany, the cold war was beneficial. As a result of division and U.S.-Soviet confrontation, she was offered a significant amount of economic assistance which, otherwise, she would not be able to obtain. The West Germans were, however, divided and put under a dilemma of divided country between the quest for reunification and the need to demonstrate the loyalty to the western alliance. To solve this dilemma, Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of West Germany, chose to place the first

¹⁷ Among many of the researches on this issue, see, for example, Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Marshall Plan*, (London: Macmillan press, 1988) pp.11-14; Baraker, *op.cit.*, pp.86-88.

¹⁸ For this complicated structure of 'friends and enemies', see my 'Indoshina Kainyu wo Meguru Bei-Ei Seisaku Tairitsu: Reisenseisaku no Hikaku Kenkyu' (The Anglo-American Policy Divergence over the Intervention in the Indo-China War: a Comparative Approach to the Cold War History), *Ikkyo Ronso* vol.114, no.1, 1995, pp.60-61.

¹⁹ A.W. DePorte, *Europe Between Superpowers: the Enduring Balance*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), chapter 6.

²⁰ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980) chapter 9.; Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (London: Thanes and Hudson, 1957).

priority on becoming a loyal ally to the western bloc and to achieve the reunification later on that basis.

As for the threat from the Soviet Union, the western European states made the best use of the cold war. Lacking sufficient resources for their own defence, they had to and could rely on the dominating military power of the United States. At the latest in 1948, the center of threat to the western Europe shifted from Germany to the Soviet Union. Even for the French, the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 became a watershed.²¹ The establishment of the Brussels Treaty Organization in 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, and the Western European Union in 1954 clearly divided Europe but confirmed their security against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-U.S. security dilemma was also utilized by the western European states in some of their regional conflicts not necessary within the context of the cold war. Britain and France in the process of the decolonization tried to drag U.S. military presence into the regions such as the Suez Canal and Indo-China in the mid 1950s. The French government managed in 1953 to persuade the Americans to get involved in Indo-China by putting the colonial war against the Vietminh led by Ho Chi-min into the context of the cold war. The Eisenhower administration responded the French appeal by proposing the tripartite intervention with Britain, which was in vain because of the British opposition.²² The Eden government also rhetorically defined the British relations with Nasser's Egypt as in the cold war struggles and tried to drag the Americans into the conflict, but the Eisenhower administration at that time was not persuaded.²³ The British government failed to obtain the needed support from the U. S. and their expedition to Suez came to an end as one of the greatest fiascoes in the British diplomatic history.

On the other hand, the western European states were under great strains generated by the cold war, from which they attempted to escape. As mentioned above, the dangerous security dilemma itself was regarded as a source of threats. The establishment of the western collective defence systems in the western Europe evoked anxieties among them. Before the NATO was concluded, there had emerged a sharp disagreement between Britain and the U.S. over the nature of the Brussels Treaty Organisation. While the U.S. insisted that the defence system be a multilateral one like the Rio Pact, the British objected that it would inevitably irritate the Russians too much and preferred a combination of bilateral security treaties among the western European countries.²⁴

What Britain and France adopted in those situations was a policy guideline called 'the third force thesis'. Bevin asserted that Britain manage to contain the East-West tensions by standing between the superpowers by consolidating her relations with France and mobilizing

²¹ Georges-Henri Soutou, 'France' in David Reynolds (ed.) *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 4, pp.96–120, esp. p. 106.

²² See, Tanaka, *op.cit.* in footnote 18. Also see, James Cable, *The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

²³ David Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis*, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1988).

²⁴ Geoffrey Warnter, 'The Labour Government and the Unity of Western Europe, 1945–51' in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945–1951*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), chapter 4, pp.61–83; John Baylis, 'Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment', *International Affairs*, Vol.60, No.4, 1984, pp.615–29.

supports from the British Commonwealth countries.²⁵ The French government showed more shaky attitudes reflecting the uncertainty in the domestic politics, they were to succeed the British in the 1960s when De Gaulle finally put to an end the domestic instability.

The purposes of the third force option were for the British and the French to diminish the danger of Soviet-U.S. security dilemma by acting as honest brokers between the superpowers and to regain European influence in the world politics. It reflected the European historical experiences of traditional diplomacy in the 19th century and their distrust towards diplomatic immaturity of the United States which did not know how to use her overwhelming physical power and could destroy Europe by misusing it. The distrust had been amplified as the U.S. was increasing her ideological rigidity against Russia.²⁶ Thus, it can be argued that the third force option had the nature of a resistance against the security dilemma and the domination or hegemony by the United States. In other words, the western Europe which had invited the American physical power did not intend to accept her power political idea but to control the U.S. The pressure of the lacking resources and the urgency of reconstruction forced, however, the western European states to abandon their pet policy. They had to be content with a temporary retreat from the third force option and to support the American initiatives in the Marshall plan and the building of the western defence systems.

Even so, the third force option continued to be held by European leaders and it came up to the surface in the 1950s when they came to accomplish the reconstruction. For example, when the Truman administration suggested the atomic attack on the North Koreans and the Chinese at the first stage of the Korean War in November 1950, Attlee and Bevin flew over to Washington and warned the president.²⁷ The Soviet success in developing the Atomic bombs in 1949 and the increasing cold war tensions reflecting it pushed the British more in the direction. In 1950, Prime Minister Churchill made a proposal for convening an East-West summit meeting.²⁸ Three years later, Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, firmly rejected the American request for British participation in military intervention in the Indo-China war to save the Dien Bien Phu. Instead, Britain took the co-chairmanship with the Soviet Union in the Geneva conference and restrained the Eisenhower administration to terminate the war in Indo-China.²⁹ Moreover, the Eden administration took the initiative to hold the Geneva Summit in July 1955 by persuading the reluctant president.³⁰ After the mid 1950s, Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister, visited Moscow and tried to keep negotiating channels with the Soviet Union open, during the second Berlin crisis. Then, in the 1960s, De Gaulle, the president of France, acted in the same vein and decided to walk out of the military

²⁵ For 'the third force thesis', see John W. Young, *Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe 1945-51*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984); John Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49,' in Anne Deighton (ed.) *Britain and the First Cold War*, (London and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990)

²⁶ Terry H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947*, (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1981, p.85.

²⁷ Chihiro Hosoya, *Sanfuranshisuko Kouwa eno Michi*, (The Road to the San Francisco Peace Treaty) (Tokyo: Chuokouron Publishers, 1984), esp. chapter 6; Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-1953*, (Manchester and N.Y.: Manchester University Press, 1997), chapter 11.

²⁸ For example, Churchill made a statement of the proposal on 14 December 1950 in the House of Common. See Robert Rhodes James (ed.) *Churchill Speaks: Winston S. Churchill in Peace and War, Collected Speeches, 1897-1963*, (New York and London: Chelsea House, 1980), pp.935-936.

²⁹ Robert F. Randle, *Geneva 1954: the Settlement of the Indochinese War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969)

³⁰ David Reynolds, 'Great Britain' in Reynolds (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.77-95, esp. pp.90-92.

organization of the NATO in 1966.

Thus, Britain and France were in a serious dilemma on the security issues. Although being gravely concerned with the spiraling tensions in the security dilemma, they chose to be protected by the U.S. and to make use of the cold war to drag the American physical power for their own merits. But this fact does not lessen the significance of British and French efforts to keep communication channels with their communist adversaries. It may be said that these efforts for crisis management were continued in various manners to contribute to the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE), which played vital roles for ending the cold war in the 1980s. This being so, one can suggest that the western European resistance against the cold war itself was one of the potential factors leading the cold war to its termination.

I have so far tried to analyze the western European attitudes towards the formation of the cold war structure within the context of power politics. What has been described is their efforts and quests for limited autonomy and security in the emerging hegemonic order, by employing the policies and ideas derived from their historical experiences of the 19th century classical diplomacy. It should be noted, however, they also started the efforts which had anti- or post-power political characteristics in the same period of the formation of the cold war structure: the European integration.

The European Integration and the Cold War

The European Coal and Steel Community established on 19 March in 1951 is assumed as a starting point of the process creating 'non-war community' in the western Europe.³¹ From then on, the western Europe has been achieving the political dynamism and rules of the game saliently different from those of power politics which characterize the cold war, through the trials and errors of learning process towards the European Communities and the European Union.

The international history of Europe has mainly been a history of power politics. Criticisms of power politics have been, however, very often announced as results of experiences of great wars. During the inter-war period from 1919 to 1939, movements for lasting peace by establishing a European federation or the united states of Europe, such as Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Movement, progressed so much as to lead to the more concrete and official appeal by Aristide Briand, the French prime minister in the 1930s.³² The ideas with anti-power political nature were undoubtedly one of the most significant elements promoting the European integration. But one should not ignore the paradox of history that the cold war provided great opportunities and suitable conditions accelerating the integration of western Europe.

³¹ Takehiko Kamo, *Yoroppa Tougou*, (The European Integration), (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1992), chapter 3. The concept of 'non-war community' was devised by Karl W. Deutsch. See Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), chapter 2. Also, Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 2nd ed, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), chapter 18.

³² Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: a History of European Integration Since 1945*, (London and New York: Longman, 1991), pp.4–6; Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1992), chapter 6.

The Marshall plan was proposed by the Truman administration on condition that Europe compose an integrated reconstruction programme for utilizing the aid. This conditional offer by the U.S. encouraged the Europeans to establish the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and to develop economic integration through deepening their cooperation there.³³

The cold war division also created a suitable condition to consolidating the ties among the western European countries. The existence of common enemy, the Soviet Union, contained possible fatal conflicts and hostilities among them. The American military protection of them also facilitated their economic activities by lessen their burden of military expenditures. The Europeans could concentrate on economic reconstruction and expansion. The rapid revival of economic vitality in the western Europe certainly encouraged the 'informal integration' at the economic and social level as suggested by William Wallace.³⁴ The western part of Germany was more wealthy and apt to accept democratic rules than the eastern part. Although the separation of Germany did not completely wipe away the French anxiety over possible resurrection of German militarism, it certainly diminished the sense of German threat and made it easier to integrate the past enemy. In addition, the division offered the precious opportunity and incentives for the western Europeans to keep 'Germany' weak by firmly integrating the western part into the western alliance.

In economic terms, the division of Europe urged the western Europe to develop and increase their economic transactions by removing any obstacles to smooth inner-regional commercial activities, in order to compensate for the loss of the eastern European market. The process of development of economic integration seems to be accelerated by this fact.

Thus, the cold war provided many of favourable conditions contributing to the European integration. It should not be overlooked, however, that the cold war put the western European countries into dilemmas of various kinds and that they operated as the factors encouraging the integration which contained a vector in the opposite direction of power politics of the cold war.

As the international tensions were intensified, it became necessary for the western world to place West Germany into the framework of their alliance as a reliable state with sound economic power. Given the remnants of anti-German sentiments, the French was put under a contradictory pressure. They needed a strong West Germany which would no longer threat their security. To contain the German menace, France had traditionally build up an alliance with Britain. Around 1950, however, France could not rely on the traditional method because of undesirability of military confrontation in the western Europe. In these situations, the idea of an European integration pronounced by Jean Monnet appealed the French policy makers, in particular, Robert Schuman, the foreign minister of France. The option of setting up a supranational organization controlling the commerce and production of coal and steel in Europe was chosen as the best method to escape from the French dilemma. They expected that this option would deprive the reconstructed Germany of the opportunity to rise again as a strong military power by utilizing the strategic materials. The option of integration was also regarded as favourable and necessary to European economic recovery. In consequence, Schuman issued the statement which came to be called 'the Schuman plan' and the ECSC was

³³ Michael Horgan, *The Marshall Plan*, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)

³⁴ William Wallace, *The Transformation of the Western Europe*, (London: RIIA, 1990), pp.21-28.

established along the line of the plan, in 19 March 1951.³⁵

In the same vein, another efforts for more intensive integration came from France in the military security field, which at this time became aborted: the attempts to create the EDC and the European Political Community from 1950 to 1954. As mentioned above, the international tensions intensified by the outbreak of the Korean war pressed the Truman government to urge the western Europeans in September 1950 to accept the rearmament of West Germany. France was again thrown into a serious dilemma and again proposed to set up a supranational European military organization, which was announced by Rene Pleven, the then French defence minister in October 1950 as the Pleven plan. The Plan was embodied as the EDC treaty signed in 1952 by the ECSC members. But the EDC was aborted because the French national assembly refused to ratify the treaty. The French nationals decisively rejected renouncing their sovereignty over their national defence and security. They were not yet so ready for the integration in the high political issues as in the case of the ESCS. This case clearly demonstrates that the European integration was not entirely promoted by the cold war. The cold war could not hasten the European off to an integration not supported by internal dynamism of the western Europe.

The cases of the ECSC and the EDC faced the West Germany with the reality that they could restart as a legitimate partner to the rest of the western European states only by placing herself very firmly within the framework of European integration. As mentioned above, the Germans had to be recognized as a nation different from one in the Hitler period, in order to reunite their forcefully divided country. In this sense, there was an interesting paradox here that they tried hard to promote the European integration for their own nationalist aim. In other words, to reunite their nation, they had to transform themselves in the direction to a post-power political nation-state or 'civilian power'.

This being so, it should be argued that the European integration itself was generated a condition eroding the cold war confrontation in Europe. It has been already suggested that the German reunification in 1991 could not be materialized without the widely recognized alteration of the past nature of Germany and the Germans. Because that West Germany accumulated through her positive activities within the European Communities the proofs that she would no longer behave like the Nazi Germany. The Europeans and the Russians finally came to realize that they would no more have to be threaten by Germany which enormously lost her power political nature in the process of the integration. Thus, the European integration clearly prepared the condition for reunification of Germany, in other words, the end of the symbol of the East-West confrontation in Europe.³⁶

One of the more significant eroding factors in the integration was the European desire for regaining autonomy from the American control. The real author of the Schuman plan is Jean Monnet, who is famous as the most influential founding farther of the European integration.

³⁵ Roy Pryce emphasises the significance of the fact that France did not adopt the traditional anti-German security method. For the historical process making the ECSC, see Allan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992).

³⁶ Takehiko Kamo, 'Kokusai Tougou: Tougou Riron no Shusei to Kadai' (International Integration: Amendments and Problems of Integration Theory), in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.) *Sekaiseiji no Kouzou Hendou 2: Kokka* (Structural Transformation of World Politics Volume 2: Nation-State), (Tokyo: Iwanami Publisher, 1995), pp.113–117; Barbara Libbert and Rosalind Stevens-Strohmman, *German Unification and European Integration: German and British Perspectives*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), chapter 2.

But Monnet was deeply involved in the post-war reconstruction of France.³⁷ Here again, one can see the amalgamation of nationalist purposes and the integration which was to make the nation-state unable to be called so in the traditional terms. More importantly, the nationalist purpose contained his quest for autonomy from the U.S., or more broadly saying, from the predominating structure of the cold war. In order to escape from the cold war shackle of this kind, it was necessary for the Europeans to go as far as transforming their nation-state and promoting the European integration.

It is easily realized that the European integration was in the same context as the third force thesis in that both were aimed to resist against the cold war hegemonic power structure. But, more importantly, the former had a clearer anti-power political implication than the latter. The political dynamism emerging within the integrated western Europe was against the power political dynamism. In this sense, the European integration prepared an alternative model of power political world politics. By showing how to create a 'non-war community' in non-coercive ways, the European integration seems to have played a significant role to erode the cold war power politics. It is an urgent academic task for us to conduct empirical researches to prove any direct causal connections between the abovementioned fact and the end of the cold war. But it is worth presenting the hypothesis as above with regard to the impacts of European integration on the cold war.

I may have over-emphasized the significance of the cold war to the European integration. In fact, there was the essential condition for integration which had nothing to do with the development of the cold war, which was the widely shared doubts and disappointments about the nation-state. Immediately after the second world war, the Europeans realized that their state had not at all protect their possessions and lives. In particular, compared with the Americans, they found out the difficulty in distinguishing the victorious and the vanquished. In addition, antipathy to nationalist sentiments was evoked because of the fact that the Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan were brought into the war by their ultra-nationalist ideas. Indeed, it should not be ignored that the European people expected the revival of their own countries after the end of the second world war. But what they really expected from their state was not the same as what they had been. They came to put the first priority to welfare, rather than military security. The decision by the British to elect the Labour party and Clement Attlee, not the war-time hero Churchill, for their prime minister immediately after the V-E day proved it. As Milward suggests, the post-war European states had to reform and transform themselves into what could not be characterized as the traditional nation-state, in order to succeed in their reconstruction.³⁸ This suggests that the European integration was the phenomenon developing in much broader context of the history of nation-state system. In other words, the citizens' disappointment towards their nation-state of power political nature supported the European integration and, it means, indirectly eroded the double oppressive structure of the post-war world. Thus, it can be said that the big historical tide of democracy in Europe gradually created the conditions to demise the cold war structure.

³⁷ Kamo, 'Kokusai Tougou' *op.cit.*, p.112; Francois Duchene, *Jean Monnet: the First Statesman of Interdependence*, (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), chapter 5.

³⁸ See Milward, *op.cit.* I must emphasize that Milward's phrase, 'the European rescue of the nation-state', is too rhetorical. It seems more appropriate to say that the Europeans tried to rescue the nation-state but for the purpose they altered the nation-state so much as to realize that they lost the original and traditional version of nation-state. In short, again paradoxically, they destroyed the nation-state by trying to rescue it.

Conclusions: the Origins of the Cold War as the Origins of its Termination

If the analyses developed above was correct, what does the forming process of the cold war structure imply in the context of the 20th century world order?

The world order was built up in the process where the post-war planning based on the mutual recognition of spheres of influence and the big power cooperations was degraded to the power struggles over the confirming their own spheres, lacking efforts for confidence building and institutionalization of crisis management. Then, the cold war started. To escape from the dilemma between the classical nature of policy for sphere of influence and domestic assertion of democracy, the Truman administration employed rigid ideological rhetoric, which intensified the mutual distrust between the superpowers and deprived the East-West security dilemma of any easy way-out.

Although the western European states were gravely anxious about the dangerous security dilemma, they had to follow in substance the American cold war policies for their reconstruction. But they simultaneously made efforts to create various potential factors denying the cold war as a legitimate order. What were supporting their efforts were, firstly, their knowledge, based on their historical experience of power politics, about how to tame the security dilemma, and, secondly, their post-power political tendencies which was also derived from their experience of futility of power politics in their long history of diplomacy since the Westphalian peace. The former was embodied in the third force thesis, and the latter in the European integration. In this sense, the western Europe accepted the cold war as long as the cold war benefited them, but when the threat and the costs of the cold war went beyond the benefits, they started to play a role to demise the cold war order. In other words, the formation process of the cold war order developed around the following two interwoven sets of confrontations: 'the classical European diplomacy of the 19th century' vs. 'the American democratic diplomacy of the 20th century', and 'the cold war power politics' vs. 'post-power political trends created by the European integration'.

The cold war ended because the superpowers and the world tried to dissolve and escape from the security dilemma. In addition, the interdependence and transnational relations, and the polycentralization of the world politics were enhanced under the cold war structure and then demised the hegemonic structure of the cold war power politics. One can easily see its most crystallized case in the European integration. If so, the divergence between the U.S. and the western Europe seen during the period of the cold war formation could be characterized as a prelude of the end of the cold war and a feature of the post-cold war international political order. The cold war structure already contained from its beginning the factors ending and replacing itself.