JAPANESE STRATEGY AND 'ZEN' PHILOSOPHY*

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This evening I am very happy to talk about the philosophic basis of the Japanese strategy of peace and war, not in my character as the Chairman of the Tōkyō Conference on the Asian Security Problems, but in my personal capacity as a champion of swordsmanship (kendō).

The spiritual backbone of the Japanese people stays in 'magokoro'. 'Magokoro' literally translated, means 'true heart', in other words, sincerity, faithfulness or fidelity. If such 'magokoro' is only directed to inside ourselves, then it brings forth self-perfection, self-renewal, enthusiasm and 'Zen' (nirvana). I should like to mention here Priest Dōgen's 'Shōbō Genzō', as an example of 'Zen' textbooks written by the Japanese.

If 'magokoro' is directed towards the other party, then it turns out the Japanese rule of challenge and response, or of balance and confrontation. The Japanese rule of challenge and response will be manifested in the tea-ceremony or swordsmanship (kendō).

If 'magokoro' is directed towards the third persons, then it becomes the Japanese drama of 'noh' and 'kabuki'. Concerning 'noh' play, I should like to refer to Kan Zeami's gospel of flower (hana) as its original textbook. According to Zeami's definition, the flower means the most beautiful action on the stage of 'noh' play.

Now I want to explain the Japanese rule of challenge and response by showing a case of 'kendō' (swordsmanship).

The "Bible" of the Japanese swordsmanship is Miyamoto Musashi’s 'Gorin-no-sho' literally translated, the Book of Five Rolls. Miyamoto Musashi (1584-1645) was the invincible champion of swordsmanship at that time. When Musashi was 60 years old, he wrote his remarkable 'Gorin-no-sho' as the Japanese Revelation of swordsmanship.

Musashi taught the Japanese method of challenge and response in his 'Gorin-no-sho.' The third roll of the 'Gorin-no-sho' is called the Roll of Fire. There Musashi pointed out the keys to meet sword-matches. I should like to pick up three maxims in his Roll of Fire.

The first maxim is 'makura-o-osaeru-to-yūkoto' (to hold your enemy at his pillow under your control). Then you will be free and yet lead your opponent always. For example, USA has so strong naval power and missiles that she led her opponent and compelled him to retreat during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

The second maxim is 'teki-ni-naru-to-yūkoto' (to place yourself in your enemy's position). It means that you should take the place of your opponent and imagine every possible course of the game. This is the method of simulation. The Japanese naval staff used to exercise

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this method following the British way, but they were compelled to give it up before they lost the war.

The third maxim is ‘san-kai-no-kawari-to-yûkoto’ (to change your tactics like hills and waves). It means that you may try the same tactics twice but you should change it at the third time. For example, Japan won the Mukden battle of 1905 by sending the Nogi’s army to the left hand of General Kropotkin. Japan won many battles by sending the reserves to the opponents’ rear during the Sino-Japanese war. But Japan used the same method for the third time in the Imphal battle and lost her army entirely.

In addition, I am glad to speak about Takeda Shingen’s strategy of deterrence. Takeda Shingen (1521-1573) was the famous war-lord, wise enough to estimate the political purpose of warfare and founded the doctrine not of defence, but of deterrence, for the first time in Japan. His famous words are as follows; “man is a castle, a stone-wall and a moat” and “no expedition is the best, but mental unpreparedness is the worst.” Shingen did not build fortification around his own domain at the foot of Mt. Fuji. And whenever he was attacked, he would surely respond to every call of confrontation. Shingen employed his cavalrmen. Shingen’s strategy of limited war and deterrence was compiled in ‘Kôyô-Gunkan’ by Obata Kagenori (1573-1663), who lived two hundred years earlier than Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) of Prussia.

Takeda Shingen’s strategy of war and peace was so rational and careful that it was borrowed by Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), who established the Shogunate regime of 300 years’ peace and was deified at the Tôshôgû Shrine of Nikkô here.

Miyamoto Musashi and Takeda Shingen were both Zen Buddhists, but they were solely devoted to the principle of calculation and prudence in the battle-field. Miyamoto Musashi was a swordsman and Takeda Shingen was a statesman, but they were men of ‘magokoro’ and of confrontation.