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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Takashima, Zenya</td>
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<td>Citation</td>
<td>The Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy, 1(2): 91-103</td>
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<td>Issue Date</td>
<td>1951-04</td>
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<td>Type</td>
<td>Departmental Bulletin Paper</td>
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<td>Text Version</td>
<td>publisher</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://doi.org/10.15057/11803">http://doi.org/10.15057/11803</a></td>
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THE ANNALS OF
THE HITOTSUBASHI ACADEMY

Vol. I No. 2   April 1951

THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PEOPLE IN POST-WAR JAPAN

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I

A study of the social consciousness of the Japanese people will reveal that August 15, 1945, was a decisive day, for the reason that the cold fact of Japan's unconditional surrender served to effect a complete change in the ideological outlook of the people from totalitarianism to democracy. To the majority of the Japanese people, this transition was not a mere change in their direction, but was literally "salto mortale," or a desperate leap, an ideological jump imposed or forced on the majority of the people, regardless of their choice, rather than induced into their consciousness. Outwardly, it might have seemed a godsend from Heaven. Foreign observers who know little of the Japanese masses and their society may have thought the radical transition a priceless gift for new-born Japan. But the crux of the matter lies in the fact that this godsend came to most Japanese far too suddenly and unexpectedly.

For several months after the termination of hostilities, the consciousness of many Japanese was in a state of utter prostration. Although the natural sequel to the sudden release from excessive strain, the situation was complicated because nobody had any idea what the newly-established order would bring to the people. Judging from the attitude of the military clique in power in the past, a goodly number of Japanese jumped to the conclusion that the new order would bring them a much more gloomier prospect, and not a few of them lived on pins and needles in fear and unrest. Such
a state of mind was nothing unusual if one takes into consideration the social consciousness of the people who had become accustomed to the control of darkness for more than a score of years since 1931.

However, what was the situation after the arrival of the Occupation authorities, headed by General Douglas MacArthur? First, the military and Government officials who had been directly responsible for the war were purged, together with all institutions of a military and war-criminal nature, and then all influences deemed helpful for the freedom and liberation of the people were given free scope. To correct excessive centralization, for instance, the Occupation authorities effected a reform of the bureaucratic organization, and the financial cliques, "Zaibatsu," were in like manner dissolved in order to eliminate excessive economic power centralization. The farmland reform and the liberation of the farmers were equally important tasks accomplished by the Occupation authorities, and freedom of thought, discussion, and organization was at the same time recognized officially, and discrimination between the sexes eliminated. As a result, the number of labor unions and their membership radically increased. All political parties including the Communists were legally recognized. All these accomplishments received the closest attention of the Japanese people as well as the fact that the Emperor, once considered sacred and inviolable, renounced his divinity and became a human being.

More adequate perhaps to term these achievements a revolution rather than reforms, they paved the way for a democratic way of life for the first time since the beginning of Japan's history. Of all these reforms none will have such a lasting and profound influence on her development than the new educational system based on the new 6-3-3 principle, the significance of which on the formation of the new social consciousness of the Japanese people, who, in their new Constitution have renounced war forever, will be tremendous, because although the Constitution may be revised or transformed, depending on changes in the international situation, the new educational system implemented on a nation-wide scale can never be revised or changed so easily.

Needless to say, all these reforms gave the Japanese masses a feeling of relief; at the same time, however, they brought about great confusion in their social consciousness. Greatly relieved when they found that General MacArthur was not their enemy, especially when they learned all that he was planning to do for them, contrary to the warning of their military leaders that once their country was defeated, they would be enslaved by a foreign nation forever, the people found for themselves that such fears were unwarranted and groundless. But to be freed from military control and secure a social consciousness out of a state of void, the Japanese masses were given too many gifts. It is true that they have been given freedom, but freedom is something which must be won rather than given. It must be
both "freedom from" and "freedom to." Among a large number of the
Japanese one seldom found that they had entertained self-created desires for
freedom, chiefly because they had been wont to feudalistic submission for
the past several ages. Like submission to dictatorship, submission to free-
don is an enemy of democratization. To many Japanese, General MacArthur
was an apostle of freedom. But in this case, the apostle of freedom was
an apostle of authority at the same time.

Where the weakness of the mind toward authority is overwhelming,
free authority is fraught with danger of transforming itself into dictatorial
authority. While dictatorship invokes authority, freedom repels it. For
this reason, those who have been used to the law of dictatorship find
it hard to discover an effective cure for their ills in the prescription of
freedom. The Japanese people were given the prescription, but it is prob-
ably not amiss to say that herein lies the cause of the tremendous confusion
in the social consciousness of the people in post-war Japan. More important
factors for creating such a confusion may be found in the uneasiness over
the daily livelihood, especially the poverty in economic and material life,
and the like. The four-year-long war occasioned a tremendous drain on the
national economy of the country, it wrecked her productive power, and
furthermore, involved the loss of all overseas territory and colonies. What
was worse, several million Japanese nationals were returned from these
colonies, so that the population became excessively large, both relatively and
absolutely, in reverse proportion to the declining productive level of the
country. The advance of inflation was a natural sequel to the accumu-
lation of these unfavorable factors. The tempo of monetary inflation quickened
after the termination of hostilities, and shortly before Mr. Joseph Dodge
visited Japan in the spring of 1947, bringing with him an economic stabiliza-
tion plan, the note issue of the Bank of Japan reached a height of ¥350
billion, or more than two hundred time the pre-war average. Needless to
say, inflation caused prices to soar, made the people's livelihood uneasy and
cut down productive activities, thereby preventing the restoration of national
productivity. Although inflation did not reach the limits anticipated, thanks
to the material aid from abroad and domestic economic controls, there is
no denying that it made the daily life of the people extremely precarious
and their thoughts extraordinarily confused. Behind the abnormal develop-
ment of Japan's labor union movement after the termination of hostilities
lay not only such a negative factor, freedom from the old order, as has
been mentioned, but also a strong feeling for self-defense against the pre-
vailing unstable life among the working masses.

In short, labor's offensive against capital found expression in the forma-
tion of the labor unions in post-war Japan, providing a foothold for labor
to launch economic offensives and political struggles against capital. The
formation of the Katayama Cabinet, headed by Social Democrats (1947-48),
can be understood only in the light of such economic and political conditions. This was the first Administration to be steered by the Social Democratic party in Japan, and its advent is considered representative of the strong labor offensive against capitalism.

Thirdly, another reason complicating the social consciousness of the Japanese people after the war was the change in the international situation, that is, the change in the relationship between the two world camps. As is well known, the second World War was a war waged by two forms of democracy against fascism, or a war staged by international democracy against totalitarianism. From the stand-point of social sciences, the waging of such a war between the two camps, regardless of its outcome, had decisive significance on world history in the latter part of the twentieth century, in that it meant that the capitalistic system was confronted with the danger of an internal split and that any capitalistic country, if it failed to subdue this crisis, inevitably had to face the issue of socialization. Differing from the First World War, it involved the issue of contact and rivalry between the two conflicting systems. Victory on the international democratic front over totalitarianism left in its wake the historic problem of such contact and rivalry for the latter half of the twentieth century. Even if the part to be played by the Japanese in a solution of such problems should be insignificant, it must be remembered that destiny falling on their society is so profound that no one can foresee it. Japan was flung into the midst of world events on August 15, 1945, hence, Japan and her people have been in the turmoil of the conflicting two systems of the world ever since.

Consequently it is not strange if the social consciousness of the post-war Japanese should constantly shift between the two world systems or move about in a state of confusion. Vanquished Japan has become the arena where world systems stand poised against each other. It is no exaggeration to say that Japan is a miniature world today, and that it is being tossed around between the two world systems is candidly reflected in the mirror of the political, economic and ideological phases of her domestic life and in the social consciousness of the post-war Japanese. World history is now being written before their face, although it is beyond their reach, and this is a decisive factor as far as the Japanese people are concerned.

Explanation has been made of the three important causes or conditions that have complicated and confused the social consciousness of the post-war Japanese. In a nutshell, it was as if four quarter-days had come all at once as a result of the lost war. Hurled into the social discipline of citizenry at once bound, out of the living habits and conditions of pre-citizen society, at the advent of their liberation, there waited for them another type of ideology and consciousness, namely, socialism and communism, that is a popular revolution and a social revolution hand in hand appeared on the ruins of totalitarian Japan. All the debris has not yet been cleared from
the ruins; old consciousness and feeling still smoulder in the depths of the minds of the Japanese people. Although democracy has been accorded them in form, factors needed to give it substance are not simple and clear. What then are the factors that are making the substance of Japan's democratization so complicated and obscure? I will endeavour to answer this question.

II

If a study of the social consciousness of the post-war Japanese from the standpoint of their thinking attitudes is conducted, it will probably lead to five classifications, namely, liberalism, modified capitalism, cooperative-ism, socialism and communism. The following is a consideration as to how these ideological types have been handled in the consciousness of the post-war Japanese and what realistic significance they have come to have therein.

First, liberalism can be interpreted in a narrow or broad sense. In a broad sense it holds that developments in the cooperative society of mankind can be expected only under conditions where freedom of human thought, discussion and activity prevail. As a natural premise this view anticipates humanism which respects man as man or an individual as a personality or individuality; in short, it coincides with a citizen-like outlook on the world, the basis for modern society. Needless to say, this constitutes the spirit of the new Constitution, which has replaced the old one granted by the Emperor. What has most influenced the reconstruction of post-war Japanese society, however, is liberalism in a narrow sense, especially in the economic world in Japan, and playing a leading role in the confusion of the social consciousness was this economic liberalism.

In the parlance of the textbook, economic liberalism can be said to be a form of thinking that believes in the realization of an economic natural order during the free pursuit of profits by individuals. None of the dyed-in-the-wool liberals, however, probably believed that Japan's economy, on the brink of collapse, could be reconstructed on the basis of a let-alone policy. But liberals in post-war Japan basically never differed from those in the West in the nineteenth century, believing that no matter what great destruction and confusion actually occurred, they merely expressed what may be called the process of economic disturbance and that hence the establishment of a natural economic order is possible. In reality, it was undoubtedly necessary to enforce a considerably high degree of control to subdue inflation and restore productivity. But liberals in Japan thought and hoped that Japanese economy would return to the main highway of liberal economy as a result of a gradual removal of controls, such a line of thought and policy being supported by the greater number of Japanese throughout the six years following the end of hostilities. Accordingly, note
must be taken of the fact that political parties, representing such ideas almost always have taken a leading role in Japanese politics and government.

Secondly, like cooperativism referred to hereafter, modified capitalism has gained in influence not only as a principle but also as a policy of actual leadership. This is especially true in the latter part of the last six years following the war. However, while economic liberalism as a theory seeks to return to the old order of capitalism, modified capitalism aims at the reconstruction of capitalism. Although economic liberalism generally takes little cognizance of historical and material changes that have taken place, modified capitalism shows a comparatively clear understanding of historical shifts. Among protagonists of modified capitalism, there are some who frankly admit that present-day capitalism has fallen into a state of semi-paralysis. While not necessarily refuting the fundamental principles of capitalism, they hold that a regeneration principle of a new nature is needed for capitalism at a new stage, though no clear discussions have been presented as to what the regeneration principle in a new form is. The overwhelming popularity of the economic theory of Keynes in post-war Japan is considered to indicate that the theory clicks with the sensibility of advocates of modified capitalism. Like the Keynesians in the United States in the 1930s, however, the disciples in Japan have not grown so practical as to link the theory of Keynes with actual policies based on modified capitalism. In other words, the exposition of the Keynesian theory in Japan has not gone beyond the exposition of its ideological aspects.

Aside from these Keynesians, some of the protagonists of modified capitalism have proposed a formula of management deliberative council as a means to reconstruct capitalism on the brink of collapse. Manned by representatives of both management and labor, the council seeks to engineer the management of enterprise, but underlying this formula is the basic way of thinking that capital and management are two different things, and that management should not be pitted against its employes in the lower brackets. In other words, the basis of this thinking is found in the separation of capitalism and management, embodied in which, however, is the idea that an enterprise should be operated "for the public welfare" rather than for the benefit of capital alone. In short, modified capitalism, discontent with the conservative nature of economic liberalism, seeks on the strength of its sensibility to adjust the class relations between capital and labor that have been worsening as a result of spiraling inflation. More explicitly, modified capitalism tries to choose a third road between capitalism and socialism.

This idea of modified capitalism drew considerable attention from various quarters in Japan during the first two years after the termination of hostilities. Many enterprises individually established a management deliberative council, and hence the political party, backing this school of thought, carried considerable weight when expressing its opinions on national affairs.
but in the following three years, ceased to exercise any influence. The reason for this will be understood more clearly if explanation is given first to the thought of cooperativism. Both modified capitalism and cooperativism are the third body of consciousness that is bent on pursuing a middle-road between capitalism and socialism.

Thirdly, cooperativism, as has been already discussed, is substantially similar in nature to modified capitalism, the only difference being that cooperativism is more anti-capitalistic and more critical of the outlook on the natural order of profit-seeking pursuits than modified capitalism. Criticism of it, however, cannot escape being more ideological and abstract. The ideal of cooperativism is the establishment of a cooperative system based on the fundamental principles of a cooperative society, “Gemeinshaft,” in the place of the capitalistic structure which it regards as hopeless and which is based on the basic principles of what sociologists call profit-seeking society, “Gesellschaft.” The issue, however, rests on a realistic means designed to translate such an abstract idea into reality, that proposed by cooperativists for such purposes being nothing but a formula of cooperative union, for the reason that the cooperative union is considered a formula capable of effecting personal solidarity among men while subduing the irrationality of class rule within a capitalistic system.

Supporters of cooperativism are found among small enterprisers in cities, small-scale farmers in rural communities and the intelligentsia (educators), being especially strong in farming villages. The Cooperative movement and cooperativism, it must be here pointed out, undoubtedly are not identical. The former, whether livelihood cooperative or production cooperative seeks to facilitate the mutual welfare and convenience of its membership and nothing more. Cooperativism as referred to here, on the other hand, is not content, if expressed in a more clear form of principle, with such a negative achievement as the mutual assistance of the members; it represents a unity of thought bent on going in principle beyond the capitalistic structure. In other words, cooperativism is defensive in nature against capitalism; furthermore, it tries to induce the will for making positive efforts to subdue capitalism. This does not imply, however, that cooperativism has developed in Japan to such an extent as to back up this idea. The truth is that it has found expression in an exceedingly hazy consciousness of the cooperative structure. Politically, it has exerted only an infinitesimal influence on the reconstruction of the national economy and the formation of social consciousness in post-war Japan.

Better or worse than modified capitalism, cooperativism has been losing ground in the life of the Japanese today, for the reason that its authors attempt to answer the questions posed at the outset of this article all at once, for the simple reason that: First, there was a sudden labor offensive against capitalism. Furthermore, since there was a serious threat to the
actual livelihood of the people at large, modified capitalism or cooperativism was more fit than liberalism to win their interest and sympathy, which explains the situation in Japan during the two years following the war's end. The projected general strike on February 1, 1947, was banned by SCAP, but paradoxically, it shows how suddenly social consciousness changed and what resultant great shifts took place in post-war Japan. Second, the national economy after the war's end, floundering in the midst of unrest and confusion, took the path to recovery. During the period of 1949 to 1950, productivity was raised to 70 per cent of the 1931 level; in some phases of industry, it is said to have passed the 100 per cent mark. With such a notable rise in productivity, modified capitalism and cooperativism lost actual ground on which their theories were based. Looking a little deeper into the situation, it will be found that such a productive increase was the result of capital's offensive, in the form of enterprise rationalization and other measures, and that this industrial phenomenon not only served to turn economic liberalism into a principle of economic controls in a substantial sense, but also to narrow the gap between itself and modified capitalism and cooperativism. Aside from their ideological nuances, these three economic principles cannot differ radically in their standpoints, at least as formulas for economic reconstruction in Japan.

Fourthly, socialism could be an issue of great significance and force in the formation of social consciousness in post-war Japan. It is convenient to treat it together with communism, a fifth social factor, for the reason that both socialism and communism basically stand for the same social consciousness and social principles. It would not be proper to treat them separately or to regard them as conflicting principles, like fire and water, as is forcibly done in Japanese politics today. Such a political situation arose after the Communist regime was firmly established in China in the fall of 1949. Since then, however, a clear-cut line has been drawn between socialism and communism in Japan. It is not the Communists alone who deliberately pointed out and stressed the existence of such a demarcation between the set of ideologies, for even other ideologists, ranging from liberals to cooperativists, and the Japanese people at large, followed suit. Such a distinction was made politically and consciously, but did not attract serious attention until the Socialist-dominated Katayama Cabinet fell in the spring of 1948.

Anyhow, it is worthwhile noting that the Katayama Cabinet, based on socialism, emerged as a political party regime in Japan, though it remained in power for the short period of only several months. This was the first time any socialist party had taken over the reins of government since the institution of constitutional government in Japan following the Meiji Restoration. The Katayama Cabinet, as a Social Democratic administration, is important in studying the social consciousness of post-war Japan,
in that the party became the leading political organization as a result of the general elections in 1947. Some may regard this as a reactionary phenomenon arising out of the lost war, and this view is not wrong, because in studying Japan during the last six years, it will be found that the Social Democratic Cabinet, in the saddle for only several months, represented a mere episode in the history of Japanese politics, and that the political situation has been controlled by economic liberals. But the issue in point is not what political party holds power, but what actual significance socialism has in the consciousness of the Japanese people. In this respect, we can not be over-optimistic.

The number of votes garnered by the socialist parties in Japan is virtually insignificant if compared with those won by the conservative parties, but this does not imply that the socialist movement has little future. It is true that production has recovered during the last six years and that merchandise of all varieties are seen piled up in the stores, but effective demand is insufficient to absorb such large quantities of goods for sale. Such a lack of effective demand means lack of purchasing power among the masses, the root of which is to be found in the distribution of national income among the people. It is, of course, hard to expect an increase in the absolute national income and a rapid expansion in the accumulation of capital in the national economy, which cannot stand on its own feet, but one cannot overlook the fact that disparity and injustice appear mounting in the distribution of national income with the recovery of productivity. Let us take a familiar example. A hue and cry have been raised among the masses concerning the shortage of their daily necessaries, especially basic necessities such as clothing, food and housing. The housing difficulty still remains as acute as ever, but aside from this shortage, the masses unanimously complain against the heavy burden of taxation and its unjust distribution. Positive efforts for the reconstruction of the national economy in the period of inflation resulted in compelling the middle class in the rural and urban communities to go downhill. By reorganizing various classes in society, such efforts seem to be intensifying the conflict between the rich and poor. Together with the fact that the basis of Japan's economic independence is extremely weak, this social phenomenon serves to turn the country into a hotbed of socialism and communism. No fair and impartial observers fail to detect in the living conditions of the working people in Japan the existence of a certain degree of sympathetic feeling toward socialism.

It may be said in this connection that socialism and communism stand on common practical grounds. In Japan a socialistic ideology has been nurtured since 1890. By and large, it was led by anarchistic elements until the first World War, after which Marxism grabbed the leadership, thereby giving rise to mounting interest in socialism among the masses. In what part of the world, with the exception of Soviet Union, have treatises on
Marxism been published so abundantly as in Japan since then? This holds true during the last six years following the end of hostilities. It is not incorrect to say that this phenomenon explains why the Japanese masses have hardly recognized the basic difference between socialism and communism, or why they did not see the need for stressing the difference if it should have been recognized.

However, it is well-known throughout the world that there has been a radical change in this respect since the spring of 1950. The change started with the Cominform criticism of the Japan Communist party. Another factor intensifying the change was the serious influence occasioned by the outbreak of the Korean war in June, 1950, and its developments ever since have exerted on Japan. With this as a turning point, leading public opinion in this country apparently began drawing the attention of the people at large to the adoption of a pro-communist or an anti-communist stand. As a result, the five ideological groups that had characterized the social consciousness of the people in post-war Japan, seem now to be divided into two distinct schools. During the Pacific War, the Japanese were forced to choose between totalitarianism and democracy. Playing a similar role during the Meiji Restoration was the slogan, “Loyalty to the Emperor or to the Shogunate.” Hence, one feels that there exists in the changes of ideological trends in Japan a factor peculiar to the social consciousness of her people, quite detached from international developments. To choose between two things in such a manner is to solve problems on the strength of slogans, but such a solution robs the people of their latitude to pass their own judgment, standing between the two extremes, which can make no contribution to the healthy development of the social spirit of the citizenry. Herein, therefore, is found an exceedingly interesting problem concerning the peculiarities of Japanese society and the social consciousness of the people. A brief study on this issue follows.

III

Looking back at the changes in social consciousness during the last six years since the end of the war, one is surprised to find how serious they have been. In less than three years after the Japanese people turned from the right to the left, they already have started moving from left to right again, this radical ideological whirlwind of action and reaction graphically indicating that Japan is suffering from pains in the process of rebirth as part of world history.

One fact deserving careful attention as a whole is the old element in its original form that still remains in the social consciousness of the Japanese people, despite this radical ideological whirlwind. In other words, a
strong wind causes billows on the surface of the sea of thought, but hardly affects the currents running below the surface where old Japanese water is still flowing. It may be called the current of pre-social thought and feeling rather than social consciousness. If one observes movements on the surface alone, forgetting the existence of under-currents, he is unable to grasp correctly the social consciousness of the Japanese people.

Then what flows under the social consciousness of the Japanese people? In short, it is a factor that may be called an instinctive weakness toward authority. To make it more clear, it is the feeling in the daily life of a feudalistic or a semi-feudalistic nature, that may be called pre-social consciousness rather than social consciousness.

As has been already discussed, there practically existed no such thing as social consciousness in Japan excepting for a short period immediately after the First World War. In its stead, however, there existed nationalistic consciousness or its incarnation, namely, the consciousness of loyalty to the Emperor and the love of the country. Although real social consciousness requires, above all, the liberated consciousness of the individual and the individual consciousness of liberation, such necessary conditions have been lacking in Japan. While there was a consciousness of the family and the state, there was little consciousness of the individual and society among the Japanese people. In a country like Germany, different from England and France, conflict between the state and society, and the subjugation of society by the state, were serious problems in social science since the nineteenth century. It is not too much to say, however, that in Japan there hardly has even been a consciousness of conflict between the state and society since the Meiji Restoration. In Germany a society of citizenry was considered to exist between the state and the family and the individual, as a personality was regarded as the basis for the family, but in Japan the state was considered an expansion of the family itself. The Japanese people were only remotely concerned with such matters as public opinion, citizenship and public morals in their feelings in daily life.

Such a general character trait found in the Japanese is not peculiar to their race; it was nurtured under the feudalistic rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate and became part of the national traits through long practice, hence, it is nothing but a product of historic and social circumstances. This historical and social heritage was taken over by the Meiji Government as it had existed. Accordingly, although Japan had adopted the systems, laws and regulations of advanced countries in form, the real substance of these institutions was not assimilated in the life of citizenry.

Attention, however, is focused on the post-war period. No matter how great a leader General Douglas MacArthur may be, he cannot remove the dark currents that flow under the social consciousness of the Japanese people at one stroke, for it is a task beyond human reach. It is true that sur-
prising achievements have been made in the vanquished Japan. Suffice to show that the period of compulsory education was extended from six to nine years immediately after the lost war, something which has never been realized elsewhere in the world. There is no room for doubt that Japan has been advancing in the direction of democratization, but what matters here is not democratization for the sake of institution or form, but democratization in substance. To effect a substantial democratization, however, it is necessary to change the social consciousness of the Japanese people, and for this reason, liberalism, modified capitalism, cooperativism, socialism or communism can be compared to a wind causing ripples on the surface of water as far as the majority of the Japanese people are concerned. Consequently, they veer from one ideology to another without much ado as if they were drifting in a wind. The same can be said of the intelligentsia, who should be independent in thought as shown during the last six years.

To permit Japan to make substantial progress in democratization under such circumstances, competent leaders well versed in her actual conditions are needed, who should make it their first duty to write a Japanese version of democracy. This cannot be done, however, by relying on a slogan urging a choice among capitalism, socialism, liberalism or communism. Nor can it be achieved by the sheer force of ideological diffusion or propaganda. In no time in her history has Japan waited so much for the emergence of great leaders as today.

If such great leaders should appear, as we fervently hope they will, they would be those who have a material grasp of social consciousness in post-war Japan. What is meant by a grasp of social consciousness in a concrete manner is the closest observation and full realization of the historical and social sacrifices that have clung to the social consciousness of the Japanese people, on the one hand, and in the correct evaluation of the special forms of post-war social consciousness leading from liberalism to communism, on the other. The five forms of social consciousness as already referred to seem to present the following three problems to those who aspire to the democratization and independence of Japan. To the author's way of thinking, they are the problems of system, race and class.

The first concerns the issue of capitalism versus socialism, and the issue of race concerns that of the independence of the Japanese race. The last question of class, in basic principle, is linked with that of capital versus labor. The issue of system seems to form the ins and outs together with that of class, but the problem of race appears to be one related with a delicate psychology and consciousness, independent of the issue of system or class. Five representative social consciousness, ranging from liberalism to communism, may not escape from intermingling with one another with changes in the relationship between two systems and two classes. But only those leaders who have a grasp of the issues of system, race and class
jointly in a concrete manner are considered capable of accomplishing the task of Japan's democratization. Apart from standpoints, this much can be said for certain. In this final point is to be found the conclusive reasons why social consciousness in post-war Japan should be made a vital topic of study today.