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The systems of Natural Law are highly rational in construction, and consequently the advocates of them, it is said, have had only a little concern with history or historical thinking. We cannot, however, deny the fact that some exponents of the school were deeply interested in history, and others even dared to attempt to describe history in some meaning. As examples, we have in the sixteenth century Richard Hooker in England and Juan de Mariana in Spain, while in the seventeenth century Hugo Grotius in Holland and Samuel von Pufendorf in Germany, and they are followed in the eighteenth century by such people as Adam Smith in England and Jean-Jacque Rousseau in France. Of course the main task of the study of the thoughts of Natural Law should lie in the clarification of a rather paradoxical situation, in which not only the history of thoughts, but also that of societies were radically influenced by this school of thought, mainly by virtue of their lack of interest in historical considerations caused by their rationalism. Yet, the above-mentioned interest in history on the part of some exponents of the school is, on the other hand, of some help to us in obtaining deeper understanding on the process of their constructing the theory of their own, as well as on the rôle of "historical consciousness" in the generation of social sciences. In this paper, I shall confine myself to the thinking process of John Locke, whose adherence to the thoughts of Natural Law is beyond any doubt. Hitherto almost no observation having been made of Locke from such a viewpoint, I might be blamed for being too fanciful. I am, however, convinced that many of his important theoretical contributions could not have been given birth without his deep knowledge on and concern with history. As pointed by G. N. Clarke, "'history" as understood by Locke is not the same as "chronology", but roughly covers the field which may be nowadays called "ethnography." It is, therefore, the pur-

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1 In his "The Later Stuarts 1660—1714", Oxford, 1949 (repr.), G. N. Clarke made the following statement about the historical description of this period; "...but historians did not yet regard each period of history as a part of continuous process as long as time. It was in fact not uncommon to distinguish history from chronology." (p. 363.) As the ground for the above statement, Clark cites a passage from Locke's "Some Thoughts concerning education," where he discussed the learning of chronology. (foot-note to the same page.)
pose of the present paper to observe the situation, in which "history" in the latter sense contributed to the formation of Locke's original thinking.

As we know, Locke's main contributions consist of the following three, i.e. the denial of the innateness of the notion of god as expounded in his "An Essay concerning Humane Understanding"; secondly the theory of property and the labour-theory of value (in use) closely connected with it, and thirdly the objection to patriarchalism, and the theory of popular sovereignty, as developed in his "Two Treatises of Government." It is well-known that these theories, being at the foundations of his theoretical, economic as well as political philosophy, are the revelations of his original thinking. Now it is to be pointed out that no such contribution would have been made by him without his thoroughgoing acquaintance with history in the above-mentioned meaning. For instance, his discussions against the innateness of the notion of god were definitely originating from his so-to-speak cultural-anthropological observations on the peoples in the West Indies and China. His theory ascribing the property right to labour as well as his labour theory of value which was formed in association with the former, would never have occurred to him, if he had not observed the relations of the wealth and landownership in colonial America. On the other hand, his objection to patriarchalism in political theory was, in the main, supported by the "maternal rights", which were still in existence at that time among natives of the New Continent. Furthermore, his advocacy of popular sovereignty, according to which the civil or political society should be instituted in the organization of a government by the consent of the people, was encouraged by his observations on the rule-system among native tribes in America, which were later fully discovered by H. L. Morgan and brought to the attention of F. Engels.

This was, of course, one of the consequences of the so-called "age of discovery", which much widened the horizon of intellectual scopes of Europeans, confronting them with civilizations quite heterogeneous to theirs. In particular, it was originating in England from the development of mercantilism, and the cosmopolitan inclination on the part of her people which resulted along with it. With respect to Locke himself, we have to take into consideration his contacts with colonial affairs in America, such as his affiliation with the 'Board of Trade and Plantation' and with the drafting of "the Fundamental Constitution of North Carolina." Apart from such a peculiar situation, we shall in the following outline to what extent his theories as above-mentioned are based upon his concern with and knowledge about ethnography. At the same time, we shall try to see, how "history" in this sense became an object of his intellectual concern. For such purposes, we shall avail ourselves in the sequel of "An Essay concerning Humane Understanding" as well as of its two "Drafts", 
"Two Treatises of Government", his "Journals" and "The History of Navigation", which was the last of his writings.

II


These drafts were both found in the Lovelace Collection in the Bodleian Library, Oxford University. The former was filed in a folder, and on a sheet which precedes the text is written by Locke's handwriting, "Intellectus, 1671. J. L." On the sheet, there is written again by his handwriting, "De intellectu humano, 1671, An Essay," which is followed by another handwriting of his, "An Essay concerning Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion and Assent," on the top of the sheet, with which the text begins. The second draft was found at the beginning of "Common Place Books," consisting of 56 th, 57 th, 60 th, 63 th, 70 th, 73 th, 74 th, 76 th, 78 th, 87 th and 88 th sheets of them, and we find on the 56 th sheet his handwriting, which reads, "Sic Cognitavit de Intellectus humano Jo: Locke ann 1671. Intellectus humanus cum cognitionis certitudine, et assensibus firmitate."

Although these two drafts were completed in the same year, i. e. 1671, the former (usually called the "Draft B") is not only consisting of about 70,000 words filed in by no means a small folder, but also is nearer the text of the "Essay" with respect to its content, if we disregard the order of chapters. On the other hand, the latter (usually called the "Draft A") only constitutes a part of his "Common Place Books", containing only less than a half of the words contained in the former, i. e. about 30,000 words, and remains a germ of the "Essay". In the light of a passage in its 27 th paragraph, the "Draft A" was probably written in summer, perhaps at the end of June or in July of 1671, while the "Draft B" is supposed to have been written in autumn or winter of the same year. The higher degree of maturity of the "Draft B" is further evidenced by the fact that Locke took with him this draft,¹ when he visited France

for the second time from 1675 to 1679, where he had a chance to further elaborate several subjects of the "Essay", and that he, taking refuge in Netherland in 1683, again carried the "Draft B" with him. At the commencing days of 1685, he declared to continue the study on human understanding by means of revising that draft. From the spring of the year to the winter of the next year, his friends remaining in England were kept informed by Locke of the summary of each book of the "Essay" which were in preparation at that time, and of their relations with the "Draft B". In other words, there is no doubt that the "Draft B" constituted basis for the "Essay". Of course, there should be another draft, which must have preceded these two. In "The Epistle to the Reader" at the beginning of the text of the "Essay", Locke recollects the time, when he first planned the writing of the "Essay" in 1670 or 1671. Judging from it, it seems to us that he had a small study group with his friends for discussing ethics and revealed religion. At a time during this period, he had a feeling that the discussion of this kind could not be of any use without a thoroughgoing study on the limit of human understanding and the proper object of understanding, and penned "some hasty and undigested thoughts" on this new subject. As seen from the afore-mentioned recollection of his, these hasty and undigested thoughts were revealed by Locke himself on the occasion of a meeting, which followed. Therefore, these thoughts could never constitute the essential part of the "Draft A", which contained more than 30,000 words. In other words, it is most probable that the "Draft A" contains not only these hasty and undigested thoughts, but also the results of the discussions which followed the announcement of these hasty ideas, and constitutes the secondary products of them. However, the first and original draft has not been found so far, and the "Drafts A" and "B" are the only texts, upon which our following observations are based.

The most orthodox way of inquiry into these two drafts should, it is needless to say, lie in the analysis of Locke's thinking process, which led him from these drafts to the text of the "Essay". Such an analysis is, however, beyond the power of the present author and is not attempted in the present paper. Our concern in this paper will be confined to the clarification of the fact that his interest in ethnography was mainly responsible for his change of thought from the "Draft A" to "B", and that it was further developed in the text of the "Essay".

Some differences, which exist between the "Draft A" and "B", can be also found where Locke discusses other subjects. Nevertheless, one of the greatest of them appears in his discussion against innate ideas.

In the "Draft A", he ascribes the origin of our knowledge to sensation and experience in (i.e. reflection on) various functions of our mind, declaring, "the objects of our senses and the operations of our owne minds
are the two only principles or originals from which we receive any simple Ideas whatsoever and that all the knowledge we have beyond this is noe thing else but the compareing unteing compounding enlargeing and other wise diversifying those simple Ideas one with an other” (§ 1—7). This fundamental thesis of Locke is followed by his observations on universal words (§ 28), reality of ideas and the truth of propositions (§ 7—11, § 13), demonstration (§ 12), idea of power (§ 14), idea of relation (§ 15—16), sphere of knowledge (§ 27), universal propositions (§ 27—29), judgement (§ 32) and assent (§ 34—42).

The most characteristic feature of the “Draft A” is seen firstly with respect to the place of his discussion against innateness of ideas. In fact, he discusses this subject only after the observations on the above-mentioned problems in the concluding three chapters (§ 43, § 44 and § 45). The “Draft A” is, further, featured by the content and character of his discussions. There he mentions, “The objections that I have hitherto met with against what is before said are only these following,” and takes care of as such that the proposition ‘that every number is either even or odd’, and the positive knowledge on infinity, are both not obtainable from sensations. With respect to the former, Locke first elaborates his view, saying, “To this I answer, That I never said that the truth of all propositions was to be made out to use by our sense for this was to leave noe roome for reason at all, which I thinke by a right traceing of those ideas which it hath received from Sense or Sensation may come to the knowledg of many proposition which our senses could never discoverd. But that which I laid downe was this, that we have in our mindes noe simple Ideas at all which we have not either felt as the operations (not objects of our owne faculty of thinking) or received from without by our senses nor any complex Ideas but what are derived from those simple Ideas by the power which the minde hath to construct enlarge compound and abstract etc. but not to make any new ones.” Then he proceeds with checking the assertion that three simple notions, i.e. number, evenness and oddity occurring in that statement, are all not beyond our sensation and perception, and comes to the conclusion that the afore-mentioned opposition “doth not at all shake the foundations I have laid” (§ 43). The defence made by Locke against the second opposition is as follows: the notion of infinity is derivable from that of extention, number and force, in such a form as infinite connection or infinite force. In other words, infinity and finiteness being both concerning continuous or discrete quantity, the notion of infinity is the outcome from simple notions originating in sensations. Moreover, finiteness is nothing but the provision of an end of quantity, which means the negation of further production or extention of it. Infinity, being the negation of this negation, is now of a positive character. It is further pointed out, that
the erroneous assertion that any positive notion on infinity can not be obtained from sensations, is all originating from a popular view that the end is a cessation of existence. The end is truly, a cessation of duration, namely nothing but the last moment of existence. The end does not remain existing after the cessation of existence. It is, therefore, never the negation of existence itself. Now again it follows that the positive notion on infinity is certainly based upon sensations. From such observations as above developed by Locke, we see that his arguments in the "Draft A" are highly of logical character, and in some cases even confined within the sphere of formal logic. This is the point, which we should take into consideration in comparison with the general trends of the "Draft B", which will be taken care of in the sequel. Thirdly and lastly, our attention is called to the fact that no argument is consciously developed in the "Draft A" against the innateness of the notion of god. In fact, only three passages are devoted to the notion of god in it. The first one of them reads, "...the best notions or Idea we can have of god is but attributing the same simple Ideas of thinking knowing willing existence without beginning, power of motion, and all those powers and operations we finde in our selves, and conceive to have more perfection in them then would be, in their absence, to him in an higher and unlimited degree," (§ 2). The second one is on the notion of morals as one of the notions of relation, and reads, "...because we cannot come to a certain knowledge of those rules of our actions, without first making knowne a lawgiver with power and will to reward and punish and 2 without shewing how he hath declard his will and law I must only at present suppose this rule till a fit place to speak of those, god the Law of natur and revelation,..." (§ 26). The third one is devoted to the description how people receive in their infancy various notions on god from their parents, nurses and other surrounding people and become to "rather disbelieve their owne eyes renounce the evidence of their senses and give their owne experience the lie...", helping to generate "quite contrary opinions though (many times) equally absurd in the various religions of mankinde" (§ 42). We may take that the first one later developed into his discussion on the existence of god in the text of the "Essay", while the second and the third were respectively responsible for the fundamental principles of Locke's moral philosophy, and his discussions in "The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures", (1695). It should, however, be pointed out here that these ideas of his are still in an undeveloped stage, and his discussions on the notion of god is already exhaustive in the preceding descriptions. In other words, Locke was never conscious of the repudiation of the innateness of the notion of god, when he wrote the "Draft A".

It is quite different in the "Draft B". Locke first of all attaches much importance to the critical study of understanding, which according to him
does not necessarily mean physical or metaphysical inquiry into mind. And immediately after outlining the method to be taken in such a study, he sets out with the scrutiny of the innateness of notions in § 4, and the subsequent about forty pages (about 15% of the whole manuscripts) are devoted to the related discussions. In other words, the "Draft B" opens with the elaborate discussions against the innateness of notions, which appeared only at the end of the "Draft A". Next it should be noticed that Locke's arguments are mainly against practical, not speculative, notions. And here he, availing himself of that statement, "Without the notion of god, neither law nor regulation is thinkable as stipulating our actions or practices", which he told in the "Draft A", tries first of all to make a demonstration against the innateness of the notion of god, in order to repudiate the alleged innateness of other notions. Namely, the "Draft B" opens with his repudiation of the innateness of practical notions, which is according to Locke a sure basis for arguments against the innateness of notions in general, and the arguments against the innateness of the notion of god are given as an attempt to reject these innate practical notions. Indeed, while no discussion whatsoever is found in the "Draft A" of the innateness of the notion of god and Locke himself was not even conscious of it, the discussions about this subject plays a predominant rôle in the "Draft B".

Thirdly, the author wishes to point out as one of the most important points that Locke's discussions against the innateness of the notion of god are for the most part based upon his ethnographical observations. This is best evidenced by his following statement, which he gave first and foremost in discussing about the innateness of notions: "It is well to be considered, whether it be true that there are certain κόσμῳ ζήτων, first principles, in which all mankind do universally agree. They that are of this mind assert it as both practical as well as speculative, and of the former chiefly of the two. And if in either of them they shall be found to be mistaken, there will be ground to suspect them in both, their reasoning being alike concerning both speculative and practical:... Now, whether there be any such practical principles wherein all to a man do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Are there not whole nations as at the Bay of Soldania, in Brazil, the Caribee islands, etc., amongst whom is not to be found so much as the notion of a deity, without which it is hard to imagine any law or rule of our actions or practical principles. And perhaps, if we should with attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many in more civilized countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a deity upon their minds;..." (§ 4).

Of course, he advanced many other arguments than these against the
innateness of the notion of god and other practical principles. Along with the above quoted passages, Locke further develops the following discussions, which are, however, essentially to the same effect.

In the first place, he argues that the name for god, which is in use in various countries and regions, does not necessarily mean their possession of the notion of god. Secondly, even one and the same name for god, it is indicated, does not necessarily give an evidence of the innateness of the notion of god universally accepted by all the people using the name in question. For according to Locke, the meaning of the name is in most cases different or contradictory from person to person, from people to people. This fact, he thinks, has the effect to annul the statement, "...it is suitable to the goodness of God to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself." If this statement were valid, he argues, the notion of god, which each of them holds, would be clearer and identical to each other. Thirdly, he points out, we are provided with faculties and means to find out the moral principles for ourselves, which are supposed to have been imprinted upon us by god. If so, it would not have been necessary for god to imprint such principles in advance upon our minds. Fourthly, it is contended, we could not be ignorant about god, if the notion preexisted imprinted upon us in advance. This is however clearly contrary to the fact.

Similar to the above are the discussions, which are advanced by Locke to the effect that moral principles of ours are also not innate whether they be accompanied by the notion of god or not. If they were innate, he argues, we could not be against them. Secondly, it is pointed out, the moral codes are not the same throughout various countries, being contradictory to each other. If they were innate, such a thing could not occur by all means.

As is seen from the above, Locke's arguments advanced in the "Draft B" against the innateness of notions are based upon remarkably empirical observations, while he confines himself in the "Draft A" in more logical discussions. And indeed, in view of his indication of the discrepancy and diversity of the notion of god and practical principles existing among nations, it is further pointed out these empirical observations are much helped by his acquaintance with ethnographical ones.

Moreover, this is also endorsed by the following statement of Locke, which reads, "Next to the acknowledgment of God what more universal principle can be imagined, or that should be rather firmly imprinted on and hidden in the mind of man, than that of self-preservation. And yet he that shall but read the histories of the East Indies will find quite the contrary accounted a principle even of their religion, and self-murder a very necessary and glorious duty. I shall not need to instance any more" (§ 6). This is but an elaboration of the following more general
statement, which reads, "He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifference survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself that there is not that principle of morality to be named, nor that rule of virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general practice of a whole society of men, governed by quite opposite practical opinions and rules of living" (§ 5). Moreover, in expounding the principle that the difference of practical principles is originating from that of their use of faculty of acquiring them, for if they be innate, they could not be remoulded by custom or education, Locke makes the following statement, which is also reproduced in the text of the "Essay". 

"Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the savage [Hottentots] that inhabit there; and had Tottpottemay [the Virginia king Apochancana] been educated in England, he had perhaps been as zealous a Christian [knowing divine] and as good an architect [a mathematician] as any in it" (§ 12). (Words in [ ] are as in the text of the "Essay.")

The preceding discussions of Locke are now summarized as follows: Firstly, it is pointed out that the innateness of practical principles presupposes that of the notion of god, on which the former is based. But as we know from ethnographical observations, there are people not provided with the notion of god. Secondly, the innateness of practical principles, he argues, is based upon the assumption that these principles are universal throughout all nations. Ethnographical observations tell us, also, that practical principles are different by nations and tribes and their moral codes are even sharply in contradistinction to each other. Thirdly, ethnographical observations suggest that the difference in uses of faculty of finding practical principles is responsible for difference in these by nations and tribes. It is, therefore, concluded that ethnographical observations were always resorted to, whenever Locke advanced his arguments against the innateness of the notion of god and practical principles as well as speculative notions. And, as touched above, it should be remarked as the second point of our characterization of Locke's arguments that his critical study on understanding itself was strongly motivated in the "Draft B" by his acquaintance with these ethnographical facts.

According to Locke, those who advocate the innateness of the practical principles are without taking the trouble of scanning the origins of the notions in question; and they call them innate utterly in disregard of their formations by customs, characters and education of the people. The discovery of the diversity and discrepancy of these notions found in existence throughout different nations will, therefore, lead us to a more critical examination of the process of their formation, which was not taken care of by the afore-mentioned popular view. We are probably not
in a position to conclude that Locke was fully conscious of such a situation and resorted to ethnography as a support to these discussions. It is, however, beyond any doubt that the ethnographical facts which he quoted as evidences against the innateness of practical principles functioned to the effect of helping him to examine and critically study the formation of several human notions. As was mentioned above, this is because Locke ascribed the discrepancy and diversity of practical principles to the difference in employing the faculties of finding out these principles. Certainly Locke failed to follow up the mental processes, through which these principles were differentiated, and confined himself to the observation of the difference as such. He, observing that the practical principles were never "writ by the finger of God" and "engraved" and "imprinted" upon the minds of men, came to the conclusion that they could be "acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of men's faculties" and attained "by a right and careful employment of their senses and thoughts in...as well as other things true notions" (italic by H. S.). In other words, the discrepancy and diversity of practical principles are supposed to have their origin in either a right or a wrong use of men's faculties to find these principles. With this respect, Locke is certainly neither cultural-anthropologist nor social psychologist, but a critical philosopher of the age of enlightenment. This is, however, by no means inconsistent with the fact that his acquaintance with ethnographical facts induced him to inquire into the use or process of men's faculties to employ understanding. In fact, at the introductory parts of the "Draft B", he concentrates upon the repudiation of the innateness of practical principles availing himself of ethnographical observations, while immediately after it he sets out in the subsequent parts to examine the process of employing the faculties to acquire these principles through empirical means.

Summarizing the above, we see that the advancement, or rather turning made in going over from the "Draft A" to the "Draft B" is characterized firstly by the newly appearing arguments for the repudiation of the innateness of the notion of god and practical principles, secondly by his leaning upon ethnographical observations in advancing these arguments, thirdly by their appearance at the introductory parts of his study of human understanding, and lastly by their location constituting the central parts of his study on understanding.

As is well-known, the discussions Locke advanced for the repudiation of the innateness of notions are much enlarged in the text of the "Essay", constituting its first part. The part is in turn divided into three chapters, the first and second of which are devoted to rejections of the innateness respectively of the speculative and practical principles, while the 3rd chapter gives other proofs against innate principles, most of its space being given to the desposition of the innateness of the notion of god.
Now, first of all, our attention is called to a much larger amount of ethnographical observations, which Locke makes use of in the 3rd chapter of the text in rejecting the innateness of the notion of god. As an evidence for such a statement, we quote the following statement of Locke: "If any Idea can be imagin'd innate, the Idea of God may, of all others, for many Reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate Moral Principles, without an innate Idea of a Deity: Without a Notion of a Law-maker, it is impossible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to observe it. Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation discovered, in these latter Ages, whole Nations, at the Bay of Soldania, in Brasil, (in Boronday) [Added in the 4th edition], and the Caribee Islands, etc. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God, no Religion. Nicolaus del Techo in Literis, ex Paraquaria de Caiugurum conversione, has these Words, Reperi eam gentem NULLUM Nomen habere, quod Deum, & Hominis animum signifet, nulla sacra habet, nulla Idola. (These are Instances of Nations where uncultivated Nature has been left to itself, without the help of Letters, and Discipline, and the Improvements of Arts and Sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the Idea, and Knowledge of God. 'Twill I doubt not be a Surprise to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, let them consult the King of France's late Envoy thither, who gives no better account of the Chineses themselves.) [Also added in the 4th edition.] (And if we will not believe La Loubère, the missionaries of the Chinese, do all to a man agree, and will convince us, that the sect of the literari, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheists. Vid. Navarette, in the Collection of Voyages, vol. i., and Historia Cultus Sinensium.) [Added in the French version by P. Coste.] And, perhaps, if we should, with attention, mind the Lives, and Discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much Reason to fear, that many, in more civilized Countries, have no very strong, and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds;

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3 cf. the next chapter.
4 La Boubère, who is mentioned in the sequel.
5 cf. the next chapter.
7 cf. the next chapter.
8 "Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain, où l'on montre, quelle est l'entendue de nos connaissance certaines et la manière dont nous y parvenons, traduit de l'Anglois de Mr. Locke, par Pierre Coste, sur la 4e édition, revue, corrigée et augmentée par l'auteur." Amsterdam. 1700.
and that the Complaints of Atheism, made from the Pulpit, are not without reason," (Ch. 3, § 8). Another evidence is furnished by the statement, which is as follows, "And he that will consult the Voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, 9 c. 13. (not to mention other Testimonies) will find, that the Theology of the Siamites, professedly owns a plurality of Gods: Or, as the Abbé de Choisy more judiciously remarks, in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 10 it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all," (Ch. 3, § 15).

Of course, it is true that several other evidences are mentioned of by Locke in the text of the "Essay" than those directly based upon travelers' journals. But, except those concerning the non-existence in children's minds of the notion or knowledge of god, they are nothing but the repetition of what have been told in the "Draft B", and may be said to be based upon ethnographical observations. If there is anything at all to add to the above, it is that while Locke's rejection of the innateness of the notion of god is advanced in the "Draft B" directly for denying that of practical principles, in the text of the "Essay" he takes the trouble of showing the notion of god to be acquired through people's employment of understanding faculties. In other words, the admission of the innateness of the notion of god would pave the way not only for the innateness of practical principles, but also by itself for the innateness of one of the important speculative notions, and it would constitute an obstacle to the consistent development of Locke's theory. In fact, it is the biggest obstacle, because no other notion than that of god is more at danger of being admitted as innate, and the success of his theory depends upon that of his rejection of the innateness of this notion. Although Locke's arguments concerning the innateness of the notion of god are placed in a much different part in the text of the "Essay" from that in the "Draft B", yet, as we see, they still constitute the same amount of the bulk as devoted to the denial of the innateness of speculative notions and practical principles. All these things took place as a result of such a situation as above-mentioned.

Turning to his repudiation of the innateness of practical principles themselves, the arguments of Locke become in the text of the "Essay" more and more dependent upon ethnographical observations, of which much use has already been made in the "Draft B". Particularly in Ch. 2. § 9, where Locke rejects the innateness of moral codes on the ground that no violation of them would take place if they be innate imprinted upon the minds of people, he refers the barbarous conducts such as robberies, murders and rapes at the sacking of a town; or as in some place "the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice;". That such deeds are as little scrupled

9-10 cf. the next chapter.
by conscience as the bearing of a baby; that in some country, the mother who dies in childbirth is buried with her living baby, while in another, the children born under astrologically ill-fated stars are killed and the similar fate befalls the parents, who attained at a certain age, and that these things are carried out without any remorse at all. In a certain region of Asia, Locke continues, the sick are left outdoors on the ground, when they come to be thought desperate, while among the Christians in Mingrelia, they bury their children alive without any remorse. These instances are further enriched by a habit of eating their own children, and similar one, which Locke describes as follows, "the Caribees were wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them," together with a quotation from Garcilasso de la Vega, which reads, "a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, ...and when they were past breeding, the mothers themselves were killed and eaten." To the list of these barbarous deeds are further added a habit among the Tououpinambos in Brazil of respecting a person in accordance with the frequency of his eating enemies, as well as the fact due to the journal of the voyage of Baumgarten and a letter of Pietro della Valle telling that the saints who were canonized amongst the Turks lead lives which one could not with modesty relate.

What Locke tries to endorse by these instances of barbarous deeds is supposed to be the thesis in the preceding § 8, that conscience is not the evidence of the innateness of moral codes, because "some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what other avoid." This supposition is also evidenced by his descriptions of the above-mentioned instances. Yet, what is intended for by Locke by these instances is still the presentation of the mutual discrepancy and diversity of the practical principles. This is surely endorsed by a passage almost identical with his generalization of this fact in the "Draft B", i.e., "He that will carefully peruse the history of Mankind, and look abroad into the several Tribes of Men, and with indifference survey their Actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that Principle of Morality to be named, or Rule of Virtue to be thought on, (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold Society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct Societies) which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general Fashion of whole Societies of Men, governed by practical Opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others" (§ 10). This proposition, which remains a basic one all throughout from the "Draft B" to the text of the "Essay", does not in the latter play a rôle so essential as in the former, due to the appearance of another important instances

11-14 cf. the next chapter.
there. However, it is beyond any doubt that it still remains predominant in the Ch. 2. of the text of the "Essay", which is concerned with the rejection of innate practical principles.

As is clear from the above, ethnographical observations were quite helpful to Locke, sometimes along with other proofs and sometimes preponderant over them, in denying the innateness of the notion of god as well as that of practical principles. This is further evidenced by his additions of similar observations in the 4th edition and French version of "Essay".

As seen in the passages of the "Draft B" and the above quotations from Locke's writings, ethnography was probably meant, when he spoke about the "history of mankind." It is also evident from the above observations of ours that the development of Locke's thinking from the "Draft A" to "B" would never have taken place without his thorough-going acquaintance and concern with history in this sense, and even in the text of the "Essay" Locke's rejection of the innateness of notions could have not been so persuasive.

It is true that an appraisal from a viewpoint peculiar to the period of enlightenment was made by Locke of the difference in contents of a notion, as well as the lack of some notions, and specially of difference in modes of thinking as revealed by ethnography. It is, however, more important for us to remark that such an appraisal lead him by no means to the narrowing of the concept of mankind, but on the contrary so much to its enlargement, as made possible by his acquaintance with "history." In fact, civilized people are certainly superior to those less civilized, with respect to the completeness of the use of their understanding faculties. Yet, the degree of civilization has nothing to do with the essential property of human beings consisting in the possession of the faculties to employ understanding. In other words, civilization reveals the superiority in the use of understanding faculties, but not their possession itself. Probably being thought in this way the diversity in the use of understanding faculties of mankind was the conclusion drawn from Locke's ethnographical considerations, bringing about the enlargement of the concept of mankind.

III

As is easily imagined, Locke's interest in ethnography, whose implications were outlined in the preceding chapter, was aroused directly by a large number of documents on travels and voyages, which had remained in full swing at the time of Locke ever since the so-called age of discovery. In fact, we have "The Whole History of Navigation from its Original to
this time,” which was supposedly the last publication of Locke being published in 1704. It not only contains numerous documents on travels and journeys, but also provides us with the best evidence of his utmost care and scrutiny, with which he selected these documents. The publication is at the same time leaving a clue to the selection of ethnographical evidences, which he made use of elsewhere.

This publication of Locke was written as a preface to “A Collection of voyages and travels, some now first printed from original manuscripts, others now first published in English etc.”, compiled by Awnsham & John Churchill, the owner of a publishing house, who brought out many chief works of Locke. Locke's preface is divided into three parts; in the first part Locke describes the history of navigation, while in the second part enumerations and annotations are made of the outstanding publications on travels and voyages so far made available, and in the third part, the same things are made of the documents in the afore-mentioned collection by Churchills. More specifically, in the first part Locke gives a brief outline of the history of navigation in primitive and ancient times, which is followed by the description on the navigations during the period from 1344 to 1698 with the explanations on the regions discovered by these navigations. These descriptions are all based upon the documents. In these are included, 10 documents concerning the northernmost parts of the world including Russia, 51 concerning Africa, Central and South West Asia and Far East including China and Japan, 90 concerning North and Central America from Canada all throughout to Mexico, 6 concerning South America, and 7 concerning East and West Indies.

In the second part, Locke lists up in accord with the language all the descriptions on navigations and travels and their collections, which were made available to him. Of each of these entries, he makes a brief résumé with the appraisal of his own. In these are included (a) 15 documents in Latin, (b) 9 in Italian, (c) 76 in French, (d) 90 in Spanish and (e) 45 in English.

Lastly in the third part, Locke gives an account of the each volume of “Collection” edited by Churchills, describes each entry of it with the appraisal of his own and introduces the authors.

As was observed in the first part of the present paper, Locke's rejection of the innateness of god is supposedly based upon many of these documents of ethnographical nature. According to a marginal note in the 4th edition of the “Essay”, the description on Soldanian Bay was taken from a document by Thomas Roe (1580—1644). The document is listed by Locke in (e) of the above-mentioned classification. But from the note given by Locke himself, it is also clear that his information on this document was originating in Thevenot's collection listed in (e): it is entitled “Mémoire de T. Rhoë, ambassadeur du roy d'Angleterre
austrès du Mogol pour les affaires de la Compagnie angloise de Indes-Oriентales." Thevenot's Collection is known as "Relations de diverse voyages curieux, qui n'ont point esté publiées: ou qui ont esté traduits d'Hackluyt, de Purchas, et l'autres voyageurs Anglos, Hollandois, Portugais, Allemands, Espagnols; et de quelques Persans, Arabs, et autres auteurs Orientaux. Enrichies de figures de plantes non décrites, d'Animaux inconnus à l'Europe, de cartes géographiques de Pays dont on v'a point encore donne de cartes. Ed. par Melchisedec Thevenot. 4 pars. 1663—1672." On the other hand, in Vol. 1. Bk. 4. of Purchas' Collection listed in (e), which is known as "Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and others, by Samuel Purchas. 5 vols, London. 1625—1636", an extract of the above-mentioned document of Roe is contained as its Ch. 16., entitled "Observations Collected out of the Journall of Sir Thomas Roe, Lord Ambassadour from His Majestie of Great Britaine, to the Great Mogol: Of matters occurring worthy memorie in the way, and in the Mogols Court. His Customs, Cities, Countries, Subjects, and other Indian affairs." Whether or not these three documents are identical with each other, is not known to us, but it is certain that there is in Purchas' Collection a statement of Roe, which reads, "they [people in Soldanian Bay] know no kind of God or Religion."

With respect to his description on Brazil, Locke notes in a remark that it was taken from Ch. 16. of a book by de Lery, which is, of course, "Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil, autrement dite Amérique...par J. de Lery. La Rochelle, 1578." Again it is not known to us which was the direct source of the said description of Locke, de Lery's book itself, or "Theodori et Johannis de Brye India orientalis et occidentalis, 6 vols. Frankfurt. 1624," which is listed in (a), Vol. 4. of which contains de Lery's document in question, or the above-mentioned Purchas' Collection, Vol. 4., Bk. 7., Ch. 3. of which consists of an extract in English of a document, entitled, "Extracts out of the Historie of John Lerius a Frenchman, who lived in Brasill with Mons. Vallangagnon, Ann. 1557. and 58." But in the extract in English, we find as quoted from Ch. 16. (by a marginal note) a statement, which reads, "Although that saying of Cicero, be held for a most certaine Axiome by the common account of all men, that there is no Nation so savage, no so fierce, that doth not know that they are to have a God, although they be ignorant what manner of God they ought to have: yet, how this may appeare to be true in our Tououpinambaultti, I doe not sufficiently knowe. For, they are ignorant of the true God, and neither acknowledge nor worship any false

1 Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes, etc. [repr. 1905.] Glasgow. vol. 4. p. 311.
Gods, either celestiall or terrestriall." It is also certain that there is another statement in the extract, "I doe not beleive that there is any Nation in the whole World, which may be more estranged from all Religion", which was made by de Lery in reference to the difficulty of explaining the idea of god to them.

According to a remark by Locke, the description on Borandy added in the 4th edition of the "Essay" is based upon "Voyage des pais septentrionaux. Dans lequel se void (sic) les mœurs, maniere de vivre, & superstitions des Norweguiens, Lappons, Kiloppes, Borandiens, Syberiens, Samojedes, Zembliens, & Islandois, enrich de plusieurs figures. Paris 1671", by Pierre Martin de La Martinière (1634—1690), and "A Voyage to East-India. Wherein some things are taken notice of in our passage thither, but many more in our a-bode there, within that rich and most spacious empire of the Great Mogul, etc. London. 1655", by Edward Terry (c. 1590—?), as well as on "A Voyage to Suratt, in the year 1689: giving a large accout of that city and its inhabitants, and of the English factory there. Likewise a description of Madeira, St. Jago, etc. London. 1696," by John Ovington (?—?). Of these, that by La Martinière is found nowhere in the list of Locke, but that by Terry is also contained in Vol. 1. of above-mentioned Thevenot's Collection as well as in Vol. 2., Bk. 9. of Purchas' Collection, while that by Ovington is listed in (e). Yet the statement by Terry being not found by us in Purchas' Collection, and Locke himself making no reference to Thevenot's Collection with regard to his source, it is probable that his source on that statement was the aforementioned book by Terry listed in (e).

Nicolaus del Techo (Nicolas du Toichts, 1611—1685) left two records on Paraguay. One is "Caaiguarum gentis mores, coepta conversio, ex literis R. P. N. del Techo. In Relation triplex de rebus Indicis. Anvers. 1654," while the other is "Historia Provinciae Paraquariae Societatis Jesu. Liège. 1673." Judging from a marginal note by Locke, "Literis ex Paraquaria, de Caiguarum conversione" referred to by him, is clearly the former, while the latter was translated into English under the title of "The History of the province of Paraguay, Tucumany, Rio de la Plata, Parana, Guaia, Urvaica, and Chili," being included in Vol. 4. of Churchill's Collection. A note attached to this translation by Locke shows that he is also well-informed of its details.

A remark given by Locke shows that a record by Simon de La Loubère (1642—1729) on Siam and China, which is added in the 4th edition and French version of the "Essay," is "Du Royame de Siam, par M. de La Loubère, Envoyé extraordinaire du roi aupres du Roy de Siam en 1687 & 1688. 2 tom. Paris. 1691." A similar record, which is referred to

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2 Halnytus Posthunus, etc. [repr.], vol. 16. p. 549.
3 Hakluytus Posthumus, etc. [repr.] vol. 16. p. 550.
by Locke as the "Voyage of l'Evesque de Beryte (Pierre de Lamotte Lambert) (?) is perhaps "Relation du Voyage de Mgr. l'Evesque de Beryte par la Turquie, le Perse, les Indes, etc. jusques'au Royaume de Siam, et autres lieux. Paris. 1666," which was written by Jacques de Bourges. As is clearly indicated by Locke, the record by François Timoléon de Choisy (1647—1724) is "Journal du voyage de Siam, fait en 1685 et 1686, par M. L. D. C. [i.e. F. T. de Choisy]. Paris. 1687." The above three publications are all listed in (e) of the list of Locke.

Lastly, a record on China by Fernandez Navarette (?)—1689), which is attached to the French version of the "Essay", being contained in Vol. 1. of Churchill's Collection, is his "Tratados históricos, políticos y religiosos de la Monarchia de China : descipcion breve de aquel imperios...con narracion...de varios suceso, y cosas singulars de otros reynes, y diferentes navegaciones...Madrid. 1676." Judging from Locke's remark attached to the Collection, Navarette's "Historia Cultus Sinensium" indicated by him, deals with the discussions on the worshiping forms of Chinese people among missionaries.

Again judging from a remark given by Locke, the exposure in the fields of desperate patients, which was referred to by Locke as taking place in a region of Asia for rejecting the innateness of practical principles, is based upon a record of Johann Grüber (?)—(?), which is included in Thevenot's Collection, while the instance of the Mingrelians is taken from another record by Arcangelo Lamberti (?)—(?), which is also in the same Collection. From another remark by Locke, we are further informed that the habit of eating their own children is based upon "De Nili et aliorum fluminum origine. Den Haag. 1666," by Isaac Vossius (1618—1688), while that of Caribees was taken from "De orbe novo decades. Alcalá de Henares. 1516 (—1530)" by Pietro Martire d'Anghira (1455—1526). As indicated by Locke himself he made use of Garcilasso de la Vega's (1539—1616) "Prima parte de los Commentarios reales que tratan del origen de los Yncas, reyes que fueron del Peru, de su idolatria, leyes, y gobierno,...y de todo lo que fue aquel Imperio...escritos por el Ynca Garcilasso de la Vega, natural de Cozco...Lisaboa. 1609", in particular "Historia general del Perú, trata el descubrimiento del, y como lo ganaron los Españoles,...Escrita por el Inca G. de La Vega,...Córdoba. 1619", which constitutes the second part of the former. As imagined from the name of the native tribe "Tououpinambos", as well as from a remark by Locke, the custom of respecting the eater of one's enemy was

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5 The original edition: "Relazione della Colchide hoggi detta Mengrelia, nella quale is tratta del'origine, costumi e cose naturali di quai pasei, etc." Napoli. 1654.
6 An extract of this is included in Vol. 3. of Ramusio’s Collection above listed in (b) i.e. "Delle navigazioni & viaggi, raccolte da M. Gio. Ramusio." 3 vols. Venezia. 1613.
known from the same Ch. 16. of the afore-mentioned record of de Lery. Lastly, the record by Martin von Baumgarten\(^7\) about the Turkish saints is included in Vol. 1. of Churchills' Collection, being translated into English. It is, however, unknown to us what kind of relation is in existence between a letter of Pietro della Valle (1586—1652) attached to the French version and his well-known "Viaggi...divisi in tre parti, cioè la Turchia, la Persia, e l'India. 3 pti. Roma. 1650," contained in Thevenot's Collection. (To be continued.)

\(^7\) The original edition: "Martini a Baumgarten in Braitenbach, equitis germani...Peregrinationio in Ægyptum, Arabiam, Palaestinam et Syriam...opera M. Christophori Donaveri,...Præfixa est quisque vita, eodem auctore..." Nuernberg. 1594.