Supplementary Pension Funds in Hungary

by Agnes Matits

Managing actuary, MACs Matits&Tőrők Actuarial and Management Consultants,
Budapest, Hungary

Hungary has about ten years history of pension privatization process and the Hungarian experience could be really instructive. This paper is focused on the supplementary pensions trying to prove that no kind of reform of state pension system is able to solve all the problems of insufficient pensions. The paper highlights the main factors what could exert an influence on the level of supplementary pensions. Some basic characteristics of the Hungarian private pension market are presented by means of empirical data and a complex measure of efficiency of pension fund operations is calculated.

JEL : G23 Pension Funds, Other Private Financial Institutions

1. Need for a common language

Many problems derived from some kind of mis-interpretation of the special pension concepts. Some important definitions should be commonly accepted because sometimes the same things are called with different names or inversely the same words are used for different things.

The clear understanding of the following words and expressions is very important in order to explain also the main features of the Hungarian pension system.

Pension plans (pension schemes)

According to a OECD paper (see References [1]) the definition is given as follow: “A legally binding contract, an implicit agreement as part of a broader contract (e.g. employment contract), or a tax qualified savings or retirement programme designed
to provide the plan's beneficiaries (including members) with an income after retirement. The plan must therefore have an explicit retirement objective, or - in order to satisfy tax related conditions or contract provisions - the benefits cannot be paid at all or without a significant penalty unless the beneficiary is older than a legally defined retirement age. Pension plans may offer additional benefits, such as disability, sickness, and survivors' benefits.”

On the basis of the definition above we could call as pension plan (or scheme) any legally regulated arrangements that are projected to provide income after retirement. According to this understanding there are three different types of pension schemes in Hungary:

1. Publicly managed, Mandatory Pension Scheme, generally called as Social Security Pension Scheme (SSPS). Participation and contribution is legally regulated, and it is mandatory for all employees. Contributions are paid both by employees and employers. It is financed in a pay-as-you-go system

2. Privately managed, funded Pension schemes with mandatory contributions. Participation is mandatory for young people of starting their carrier and this scheme is partially substitution to the SSPS, as the contribution to this scheme reduces the mandatory contribution paid into SSPS. The membership in this type of scheme automatically resulted in reduced pension promise of SSPS. Only employees pay mandatory contributions\(^1\) to this scheme, but employers and employees are allowed to pay also some additional voluntary contributions\(^2\). This scheme is a defined contribution system with very limited guarantees.

3. Privately managed, funded Pension schemes with voluntary contributions, where participation is also voluntary. Pension provisions provided by these schemes are supplementary to the SSPS. Minimum contribution is regulated by the special rules of institutions providing pension provisions. Contributions could be paid both employers and employees. All these schemes are defined contributions without guarantees. Tax allowances are available both on contributions (up to a limited amount of contributions) and services provided by the schemes.

\(^1\) In 2004 the mandatory contribution payable to this scheme is 8% of the pensionable income.
\(^2\) The voluntary contribution to the mandatory private funds could be of a maximum of 2% of the pensionable income.
Occupational Pension Schemes

The possible definition of the occupational pension schemes [1] is as follows: “Access to occupational plans is linked to an employment relationship. The plans are organised and possibly administered by employers, industry associations, and the employment or professional association representing a group of individuals for the employees or members of that relevant entity that sponsors the plan. In these plans, the plan sponsor has other responsibilities in addition to paying contributions to the pension plan. Its involvement may include negotiating the design of the plan with the plan provider/administrator (e.g. an insurance company). “

Occupational pension schemes, which are included in employment contracts, are not typical in Hungary. Only a small part of employers undertakes any commitment to pay voluntary contributions into a scheme, and there is really exceptional when the employer takes any other responsibilities than paying contributions.

The main reason of the absence of the occupational schemes derives from the economic environment. First, in the transition period the employers of the Eastern European countries were not forced to set up any comprehensive benefit system. The high level of unemployment, and the short-run thinking on profitability of investors naturally resulted in the lack of social empathy. Second reason of the less importance of the occupational schemes in Hungary, or generally in Eastern Europe is the fact, that the low level of salaries comparing to the high price level results in a clear preference of employees towards immediate incomes rather the deferred incomes. The next possible explanation of the absence of occupational schemes could be that the concept of occupational schemes itself is missing from the concept of the pension reform itself. The role of employers was not clearly expressed and employers had no special advantages in case of establishment of their own pension schemes.

On the other side, the possibility to set up occupational pension schemes is not really precluded from the Hungarian regulation. Some employers, mainly those owned by big international companies having global benefit strategy started to set up their own occupational schemes but only a few use own funds. The most preferred way to operate occupational schemes to pay contributions into an open fund. We have some private funds that were established (and partially managed) by employers, but the founder employers generally did not have any long-term responsibilities to manage any risk of pension fund operations. (See [2])
Three Pillars of Pensions

According to the well-known terminology we could say that the ongoing pension reform process resulted in a so-called three-pillar pension system in Hungary. *The first pillar* is the pension granted by the social security. *The second pillar* consists of pensions paid by the mandatory private pension funds that are built up from mandatory contributions determined as a the ratio of pensionable incomes. *The third pillar* includes pensions that are provided against the pension fund contributions or insurance fees paid voluntarily by the insured person or his/her employer.

But the meaning of the three pillars of pensions could have different interpretations: According to the common wording of the EU pension directives, the first pillar is the pension provided by the state, the second is the occupational schemes deriving directly from employment contracts and the third one is the so-called personal pension when people realising that the other pillars would not be able to provide satisfactory pensions to insure their old-age income. Confusing this distinction could result in some mis-understanding of the explanations in the comparative pension studies.[4]

Pension Fund

The definition of pension fund [1] says that it is “*a pool of assets consisting exclusively of the contributions to a pension plan and the income earned on them*” but sometimes the financial vehicles itself are mentioning as pension funds. Perhaps the most mis-interpretations of the Hungarian private pension system came from this double meaning of pension funds. If we take into consideration that the meaning of “investment funds” is clear and commonly used also in Hungary, it is quite acceptable if we think that the “pension fund” should be something similar with the difference that the assets are accumulated for a special purpose, namely for retirement provisions. But in fact, in Hungary the new private pension institutions that are called as “pension funds”[3] are operating in a very different way than the investment funds. We could say that it is a problem of the etymology but it is quite important if we would like to make direct comparisons between different pension systems.

---

[3] The official translation of the new Hungarian private pension institution is „voluntary private pension fund” (VMBF) and „mandatory private pension fund”(MPF) But in Hungarian it is mentioned in a German-type name as „Pensionen Kasse”
The Hungarian private pension institutions are autonomous legal entities that were established as financial vehicle of private pension schemes. They are legally own by the members who elect the boards of these institutions. The main governing body is the general assembly of the members or their delegated persons. There are no capital requirements to set up these institutions and the risks of operations are totally bear by the members. The financial returns on the reserves are directly credited on the individual accounts according to special accounting rules. In the accumulation period the individual accounts represent simply personal savings and the situation is very similar to that when members belong to an investment association, or to a mutual fund. Only at the time of retirement might members (or their capital on the individual accounts) become part of a veritable insurance pool, sharing the mortality risk.

The operation of the fund is generally carried out by several appointed persons (e.g. a managing director, an auditor, an actuary, an investment manager, a legal expert, an internal inspector) and outside institutions (bank and custodian service provider are mandatory, while outsourcing asset management, administration, record keeping is optional). The funds have to meet the statutory investment, disclosure, reporting and accounting obligations. The funds must publish a simplified version of their audited annual report. State Financial Supervisory Authority supervises the funds as other financial firms.

Contributions are divided into three parts. A certain part (in practice it is about 5-8 percent of each contribution) covers the operational costs of the fund. About 1-2 percent goes into various risk and liquidity reserves and the remaining part (about 90-94 percent of the contributions) is credited to the member’s personal account, which is inalienable by any third party.

But these features mentioned above are not really against that we could call these Hungarian pension institutions as pension funds as they own and manage “assets consisting exclusively of the contributions to a pension plan and the income earned on them “.
2. The Development of the Private Pension Funds

In Hungary the possibility to establish and operate pension funds has been available since 1993. First the so-called voluntary mutual benefit funds (VMBF) could be formed. To these voluntary pension funds – as their name suggests – members enter on the basis of a voluntary decision and they also determine the amount of contributions – called membership fees – themselves.\(^4\)

The voluntary private pension institutions are one of the possible institutions of self-care for old-age security. But the self-care and the concept of pension planning were totally new in Hungary at the beginning of 90s because people were used to handle the pension as task of the state. As a consequence the very first reactions were often against this new institutions as people were afraid to loose the stable state provision that were almost independent from the past performances of the pensioners. The new institutions for managing pension fund had to first gain people’s confidence for which the tax advantages introduced concerning voluntary pension contributions were very useful.\(^5\)

The new mandatory pension regulation coming into force in 1998 created the new type of private pension funds within the mandatory pension system, which was called mandatory private pension fund (MPPF)\(^6\). The operation of mandatory private pension funds is similar to the operation of voluntary funds in many aspects but the amount of contribution – the so-called membership fee – is prescribed by the law.

In the period of 1993-1997 the development of private pension funds was rather slow. Either because of the lack of information or because of distrust, but the essence is that the majority did not really know what to do with this new institution.\([3]\) Even the interest of individuals who had any disposable income turned towards pension funds slowly. The issues of supplementary pensions were

---

\(^{4}\) The legal background of their operation was regulated by Act no.: XCVI. of 1993. During the period that have passed since 1993 the law and the related regulations have been modified several times, which could only partly derived from the novelty of this regulation. The frequent alterations were really harmful for the trustworthiness of the new institutions.

\(^{5}\) 50 % of contributions paid into voluntary funds was tax deductible between 1995 and 1999. It could sometimes resulted in a net tax saving for people paying membership fees, since even the highest tax paying obligation was lower than the measure of the tax relief. In 2000 tax laws were modify but it remain very generous. (tax relief decreased to 30 % of payments but employer’s contributions became tax-free up to the amount of the minimal wage.)

\(^{6}\) The Act no.: LXXXII. of 1997 on Private Pension and Private Pension Funds has been accepted by the Parliament on July 15, 1997.
practically missing from the strategic decisions of employers as any other long-term strategic considerations. Practically only the tax saving opportunity motivated the interest that arose towards voluntary pension funds from the side both of employers and employees.

The establishment of mandatory private pension funds as of January 1998 meant a real turning point. The introduction of the new mandatory pension system brought out merely new issues like self-care, non-state ensured pension and old-age existential risk. The appearance of the second pillar theoretically enforced the majority of employees to deal with the issue of their own pension: namely employees of an active age had to decide whether they want to enter into the new, mixed pension system or stay only in the traditional social security system. And all people who decided or were forced to enter the new private system also had to decide to which mandatory private pension fund they wish to enter. But in practice neither the partial contracting out of the state system nor the fund selection was not a real conscious action in many cases. The main problem was the non-satisfactory public communication and the lack of the financial culture of the people. As a consequence the interested persons entered the private funds practically according to the strength of the agents of the funds.

Many people were afraid that the appearance of mandatory private pension funds could devalue or even disable voluntary funds. But it didn’t happen, indeed, the development of voluntary funds got new drive from the improvement of mandatory private pension funds, probably because it became more evident that the voluntary fund is not only a tax saving institution. Though fear was not even justified theoretically since the target groups of the two different pension funds were different: mandatory private pension funds could primarily mean an alternative decision for the younger generations, while entering voluntary funds was a form of saving worth considering for the generations closer to pension.

Nowadays, practically from the beginnings of the 2000s the third period of development could be detected when the membership both in the voluntary and mandatory funds stagnates despite that there might be some more developing potential in the third pillar.
But finally figures certify really convincingly (see Chart 1. and Chart 2.) that the Hungarian pension fund “industry” has grown up. By the end of 2002 from the 4.1 million economically active members of the population more than 2 million entered into a mandatory private pension funds. The number of members of voluntary private funds also exceeded 1.1 million. By the end of 2002, the assets handled by the whole sphere were near to HUF 365 billion (near to 2 billions of US dollar) and it is increasing rapidly. By the end of 2002 the reserves accumulated in the private pension funds represented about 5 % of the total savings of households.

Chart 1  **Membership in The Private Pension Funds in Hungary**

Chart 2  **The Assets Managed by the Private Pension Funds in Hungary**
3. The Market Structure of Private Pension Funds

There are three typical segments of pension funds in Hungary. The biggest group of funds consists of funds that were established by employers or their groups. The strongest group consists of funds that have financial institutions in the background and there are only few funds out of these two groups. At the beginning of the process many funds were established but only one third of the registered funds survived the first five years. But the termination rate was significantly different in the three groups of founders. The most chance for surviving could be seen in group of funds which have financial institutions in the background meanwhile two thirds (or more) of the funds established by employers has been stopped. (See Table 1.)

Table 1  Market Segments of the Private Pension Funds in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of founders</th>
<th>Number of funds established</th>
<th>Number of funds operating in 2003</th>
<th>Surviving chance</th>
<th>Average size (members/ fund) at the beginning of 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mandatory</td>
<td>voluntary</td>
<td>mandatory</td>
<td>voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial institution</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A strong concentration could be detected in the market of private pension funds, especially in the mandatory market. At the end of 2002 one third of the funds dominates more than 85% of the market and more than 60 % from the nearly 2,21 million fund members belong to the biggest 3 funds, and these 3 funds posses assets that represent also about 60 % of all mandatory private pension fund assets.

Concentration is slightly different in the voluntary fund market (see Chart 3.) but the concentration process itself is increasingly strong. The three biggest have only the 37% of the membership, but one third of the total number of funds concentrates more than 93% of members. The 11 funds those of financial institutions in the background from the 82 voluntary funds operated at the end of
2002 united 73 % of the membership, and the assets of these 11 funds have reached near to 65 % of the total asset.

Chart 3

**Market Concentration Curve of the Voluntary Pension Funds in Hungary in 2002**

We have to note that the concentration of the private pension fund market is similar or stronger in most of the EU member states.

At the beginning a relatively large number of small pension funds were founded, which caused a lot of arguments among professionals. There is a viewpoint, according to which it was ab ovo wrong to allow the establishment of small size pension funds\(^7\). The most serious argument against small pension funds was the uncertainty of long-term operation. These funds – practically without exception - are heavily person-dependant organizations that can get into deep management crises after the key person’s position is terminated. At the same time, the financial characteristic of pension funds’ activity, the necessary professional skills and the strict customer protection requirements all pointed to the direction, that the institutions established for the management of pension purpose funds cannot be operated with quasi-amateur management. And the micro-organizations cannot really ensure the necessary professional level.

---

\(^7\) The act allows the foundation of a voluntary pension fund with 15 persons, while in case of mandatory private pension funds the lower headcount limit is 2000 persons.
In spite of this kind of rationality there were and there are funds established with a few tens of members who considered the foundation of an independent pension fund could be the best vehicle to act for specific community interest of fund members. In most cases these funds were established upon the initiation and with the support of the employers but there are examples when natural communities founded small pension funds that fulfilled the technical tasks of operation by contracting with professional organizations and that were imagined on the basis of real municipalities. These small funds are able to operate only if professional service companies are offering expert services at competitive prices. But the current market climate in Hungary is not favourable for these funds that eventually – as it has been indicated by the figures previously – resulted in their smaller and smaller weight in the pension fund market.

But even now the size of voluntary\(^8\) funds is typically small and the size distribution is skew. (See Table 2) Only 15 funds managed to collect more than 20,000 members and all of these funds operate both voluntary and mandatory funds.

**Table 2**

**Size Distribution of the Supplementary Private Pension Funds in Hungary, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Funds</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Assets (millions HUF )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>micro</td>
<td>less than 500</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6 027</td>
<td>5 584 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small</td>
<td>501-5,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52 770 5%</td>
<td>26 653 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>5,001-50,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>365 695 32%</td>
<td>134 338 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large</td>
<td>more than 50,000</td>
<td>7 9% 722 305 63%</td>
<td>184 619 53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | 82 | 1 146 797 | 351 193 |

4. The Necessity of Supplementary Pensions

The history of funded pensions did not start with the reform of 1990s in Hungary.\(^9\) There were several pension funds in Hungary also in the past but all Hungarian pension schemes collapsed during or after the Second World War, due to the damage sustained by real estate that the funds owned and to hyperinflation. As the only immediate solution, a unified, un-funded PAYG system was introduced around 1950 for wage and salary earners. Initially, this covered about half the population,

---

\(^8\) We use wording of supplementary fund and voluntary fund as synonyms.

\(^9\) More details see [6]
but the coverage and range of benefits were gradually extended. By the mid-1970s, the system was approaching maturation, with almost 100 per cent coverage and a comprehensive range of old age, survivors’ and disability benefits.

Expansion of the system, rising wages and retirement by successive cohorts with entitlements from increasing numbers of years of employment raised the proportion of aggregate pension expenditure (including all disability benefits) to GDP from 3.5 per cent in 1970 to 6.9 per cent in 1980 and 8.8 per cent in 1990. By the late 1970s, the system was under increasing strain from problems of rising wages and prices. Pension increases were inadequate and sporadic, so that only the lowest pensions kept pace with wages and inflation, while medium-sized and higher pensions were steadily eroded, at first only relative to wages, but later in real terms, relative to prices.

The transition period created even more difficult situation. The fall in employment was decreasing the number of contributors while the number of pensioners was increasing sharply, as many employees close to the statutory retirement age were sent into early retirement or volunteered for it. Thus the system dependency ratio—the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of contributors—jumped from 51.4 per cent in 1989 to 83.9 percent in 1996.

Several measures were introduced in order to handle the problems within the existing system that restored the immediate financial viability of the pension system, but they did not improve the microeconomic transparency or the fairness of the system. If anything, they went against equity among retiring cohorts, by making individual pensions strongly dependent on inflation-rate fluctuations in the years preceding retirement, and weakened confidence in the ability of old-age pensions to provide income security. Furthermore, anxieties persisted about the projected increase in the old-age demographic dependency ratio from 2020 onwards.

The prime inadequacy of the existing system was its design. It embodied an almost impenetrable mix of social assistance (solidarity through redistribution) and social insurance (partial but fair replacement of previous income, based on contributions). Pensioners had little idea why their pensions were exactly what they were or how they related to their previous contributions.
To summarize, the pension system as a whole did not collapse during the transitional economic crisis. It continued to give albeit meagre support to pensioners and on average to sustain equity between the working and retired generation: at least until 1996, the real values of the average pension and the average wage sank in parallel. The system favoured the poorest pensioners at the expense of those with higher previous incomes and longer service. The system had become gradually too complex, illogical and unattractive. Citizens had decreasing incentives to contribute properly to its financing, at a time of increasing opportunities to evade contributions through the so-called black and grey economies.

By 1995, it was generally agreed among experts and politicians that a comprehensive reform was necessary. There should be a new pension system that created strong personal incentives for earners to pay contributions.

Two essential requirements for this were fair calculation and individual record keeping. The ideas about how to achieve these goals, however, differed fundamentally. After long debates the main concept of the blueprint advanced by the Ministry of Finance was introduced. This blueprint concentrated on introducing a mandatory, private, funded scheme, while largely neglecting the internal systemic problems of the public scheme. The contribution-related, public PAYG system was sustained, so that the privatization was only partial. The expectations of the plan’s proponents were along the lines of the World Bank’s argument. It was to foster economic growth, deepen capital markets, and for pensioners, produce returns on capital higher than the internal rate of return in the PAYG system. Additionally, there was emphasis on the advantage of putting one’s eggs in two baskets (splitting risks between two pension schemes).

The reform offered a choice to those already employed. They could either remain full members of the SSPS or join an MPPF (Mandatory Private Pension Fund) of their choice, while retaining membership of the SSPS with diminished contributions and pension rights. (Exclusive membership of an MPPF was not an option.) Those who opted for membership of the latter solution, known as the MS (Mixed System), surrendered 25 per cent of the pension rights that had accrued to them hitherto in the SSPS. No alternative was offered to new entrants to the labour market, for whom the MS became compulsory, implying that in the very long run, the Mixed System would become universal.
One of the most important changes in social security pension is that a new pension formula was introduced. The after-reform pension could be calculated according to a plain formula: Years in service multiplied by average annual pensionable earnings multiplied by a pension multiplier. The pension multiplier is 1.22% for participants of MS and 1.65% for others. It means that pension promises of the SSPS for persons in MS is about 25% less than those who did not join to an MPPF. But in theory they will get a part of their pension from these MPPFs.

The Hungarian pension reformers argued for the new system by estimating about 2 percent real rate of return and they asserted that only for people under age 40 might be advised to join the new (mixed) system. After more than 25 years of accumulation in the private pillar and at a projected real rate of return above 2 percent, the pension expectation is higher for people who get pensions from both the public and the private mandatory pillar. However, there are no built-in protections in the system for the case when the effective performance would be worse. The final decision on the two-pillar system was not really aimed at targeting significantly higher pensions but at achieving other goals. Interestingly, at higher levels of income the projections of relative replacement rates from the two types of pension systems are not significantly different (see Chart4)\textsuperscript{11}

Looking at the Chart 4 on pension promises of the Hungarian Mandatory Pension System we have to realize that above the cap of pensionable income the pension substitution rate (initial pension as a percentage of the final income) is decreasing sharply and above the level of annual income of 25 thousands of EURO\textsuperscript{12} the expectable substitution is less than 40% percent. It means that the pension substitution could be called satisfactory only at the very low level of income. But at a low level of income even a higher level of pension would not be satisfactory to maintain the former living standard. People of higher income are generally know

\textsuperscript{10}The reform has left the public old-age pension scheme practically unchanged or postponed corrections in it until around 2010. Rules of eligibility and measures concerning old-age entry (first) pensions, received in the beneficiary’s own right, have been sustained with a few minor exceptions. The new pension promises will be in force only after 2010.

\textsuperscript{11}In this calculation the tax and contribution rules are considered according to the legislation valid in 2003. We assume that the cap of the pensionable income increases with inflation (In 2003 the maximum of the pensionable income was cc 15000 EURO/year). We calculate with 2% of real income growth during the contributing period.

\textsuperscript{12}25000 EURO is less than the average income in the present member state of European Union.
very well even now, that they could not expect satisfactory pension from the mandatory system. But it is not sure that they also have realized the need to protect themselves from the drastic fall of their income in time of retirement.

As a consequence it could have been highly advisable for people to learn that there is a clear need for supplementary pension savings practically at any income level.

But the facts show that only very few interested persons realized this and the present level of contributions does not give good chance for satisfactory supplementary pensions provided by the voluntary funds in Hungary.

To explain the statement above we are going to consider some elements of the effectiveness of the voluntary pension funds in Hungary.
5. The Results of the Supplementary Pension System in Hungary

If we would like to estimate the expectable pensions provided by the supplementary funds we should take into consideration the factors that might affect the final outcome of the system. In this case the factors could be summarise as it follows: How many interested people are participating, how many contributions they pay and how effective is the management of the funds.

Participation

As it was previously mentioned the voluntary private pension funds started their operation only in 1993 and voluntary pension savings could have been accumulated in institutionally regulated way only since then. The operation of voluntary funds was supported by significant tax measures. Paying contribution was tax favoured both for employers and the individuals. As a result by the end of 2002 the number of members of voluntary funds has reached about one quarter of the number of the population in active age.

To judge whether the participation could be called satisfactory or not is a bit ambiguous. The membership itself is impressive. We have to take into consideration also that decades of state paternalism diminished the general acceptance of necessity of self-care. It could means that the high level of membership is a good signal of changing mind. But we should realize the role of employers: in 2002 on an average about 70% of total contributions were paid by employers. In more than 55% of funds the share of employers’ contribution is higher than 80%. It means that a lot of member joint to the voluntary funds only because they wanted to get the employers’ contributions. Some or more of them is probably going to withdraw their accumulated capital form the fund as soon as it is possible.\(^\text{13}\)

At the same time multiple membership is allowed in the supplementary pension schemes. It means that the effective number of fund member might be really lower with about 10-15%.

\(^{13}\) After 10 years of waiting period the benefit reserves could be withdrawn but the payments would be taxed.
Contributions

Satisfactory pensions could be likely only in case of appropriate level of contributions. But the level of contribution paid into the supplementary funds in Hungary could hardly be called appropriate for satisfactory level of pensions.

In 2002 the average contribution (the total sum of contributions paid into voluntary pension funds divided by the total number of members) was less than 200 EURO/year.\(^\text{14}\) The average contributions are especially low at the big funds. It could be a consequence of that these funds often paid high commissions for new entrance members and these commissions should have not been linked with the future contributions.

Table 3
**Distribution of the Average Annual Voluntary Pension Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average annual contribution to the fund (in EURO)</th>
<th>1-1000</th>
<th>101-500</th>
<th>501-1000</th>
<th>251-500</th>
<th>101-250</th>
<th>100-&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of funds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of funds in the group (in ths)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This low level of contribution might be explained that the most participant use the pension funds as tax saving institutions and they practically do not mind the pension expectations. Probably only few interested persons know that their projected supplementary pension would be lower than 1.000 EURO/year\(^\text{15}\) (in real term) if they continue to contribute in the current level. According to the figures showed by the Table 3, more than 75% of members belong to those funds where such kind of pension level might be estimated on the basis of the current level of average contributions over a period of 30 years.

The level of contribution is derived also from the low level of income and the lack of disposable income. As a comparison we could see the level of contributions in the

\(^{14}\) Of course the level of contribution can not be seen independently from the length of the accumulation period. The age distribution of voluntary funds is varying from fund to fund, but as an average we could say that the future accumulation period of the present members is less then 20 years.

\(^{15}\) 1000 EURO is less than 50% of the monthly minimum income in Europe.
mandatory funds where the contribution level is compulsory\textsuperscript{16} and we realise that there is no real difference in the contribution level between the two segments of the private pensions in spite of the fact that the level of contribution is not limited by law in the voluntary funds. (See Chart 5)

\textbf{CHART 5}

\textit{Average Monthly Contributions to the Private Pension Funds in Hungary}

Our finding is that the voluntary contribution has no upward trends mainly because the limits of tax incentives remained unchanged during the period investigated. The tax saving intention might be reflected also by the periodicity of the payments.

\textit{Cost Efficiency}

Administrative charges in the Voluntary Private Pension Funds could be proportional to contributions and proportional to the value of assets.

The front load fee, that is the charges proportional to contributions is levelled by the market as the biggest funds sometimes argued for members saying that they charge less front load fee than others. But it was not a healthy competition as the real cost of operation – especially at the starting period - was often far more than it could be covered by the front load fees. The funds could start and develop their operations only with strong financial support of their background institutions. In case of open fund the supporting institutions took this kind of financial supports as

\textsuperscript{16} In 2001 and 2002 the contribution was 6\% , in 2003 is 7\% of the pensionable income.
an investment in order to keep the future asset management service. By now these supporters realise good profits from the asset management fees charged by them for the funds.

The typical measure of charges proportional to contributions is 5%. Only some closed funds charge significantly fewer (sometimes no when employer pays the operational costs) and some open fund charge up to 10% trying to cover all the costs of operations.

In spite of the fact that the charges proportional to contributions are levelled there are significant differences among funds how much costs they use for their operations. (See Chart 6) The funds sometimes cover these costs above their charges on contributions with direct or indirect financial support of their founders. At the starting period these financial supports had important role in coverage of operational costs but nowadays the big funds have become self-supporting organisations. To have a chance for comparisons between administrative cost and costs connected to the asset management activities we should measure the administrative charges also as a percentage of assets measured. (See Chart 7)

Chart 6
Costs of Operations in the VMBFs in Hungary 2002

The biggest 15 funds all operate with a cost of less than 4500 HUF/member/year which prove that the size is important factor of the level of costs of operations, as it
is far more in the smaller funds. On the other side, in the fund of the most expensive operation (where the annual per capita cost of operation is above 10,000 HUF) is even far cheaper than the average annual cost of a bank account in a Hungarian registered bank, meantime the administrative obligations of a fund is far more comprehensive.

**Chart 7**

**Costs of Operations as a Percentage of Asset Value of Funds in 2002**

The charges proportional to the asset value were significantly different in the funds. (See Chart 8) The highest costs proportional to the asset value\(^\text{17}\) can be observed in the funds of financial institutions in the background, namely in the biggest funds. That is somehow against the economic of scale. But previously we mentioned that at the same time these funds are managed with relatively low operational costs. We should consider that the different level of total management costs could be realized in different structures of charges.

To make real comparisons between funds, it is reasonable to investigate the total management cost as a whole. This comparison could be also reasonable if we would

\(^{17}\) Costs proportional to the asset value consist of the fees paid for asset management and custodian services and the transaction costs as well.
like to compare the management costs of pension funds and other kind of investment fund where the total costs are charged generally as a percent of the asset value. The sum of the charges proportional to contributions and the asset value could be called as total management cost. In 2002 the total management costs of voluntary funds in Hungary as a percentage of the total asset value was 1.98% what is a reasonable cost level. If we take the funds individually we could find that less than 10% of the funds is managed with a cost of more than 3%. But the economic of scale does not work again: the total management costs of the bigger funds are not really less than that of the smaller ones. (See Table 4) Only the very tiny funds of less than 1000 members seem to be significantly more expensive than others.

Chart 8

Charges Proportional to the Assets Managed in the VMBFs in Hungary 2002
Table 4
The management costs of the Hungarian VMBFs in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of membership</th>
<th>fund operated in 2003</th>
<th>members</th>
<th>Market value of assets* m HUF</th>
<th>operational costs</th>
<th>cost of asset mngm as a percentage of assets manged</th>
<th>total mngm. cost</th>
<th>operational costs</th>
<th>cost of asset mngm</th>
<th>total mngm. cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>above 100.000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>148 612</td>
<td>32 105</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
<td>1,0%</td>
<td>2,3%</td>
<td>2 995</td>
<td>2 198</td>
<td>5 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.000-100.000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83 447</td>
<td>17 398</td>
<td>1,4%</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
<td>2,8%</td>
<td>3 001</td>
<td>2 522</td>
<td>5 523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.000-50.000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26 813</td>
<td>8 105</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
<td>2,0%</td>
<td>3 643</td>
<td>2 070</td>
<td>5 713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000-10.000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3 444</td>
<td>1 534</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>1,7%</td>
<td>4 479</td>
<td>2 447</td>
<td>6 926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below 1.000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1,4%</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>2,0%</td>
<td>12 480</td>
<td>4 485</td>
<td>16 965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>262 708</td>
<td>59 363</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
<td>0,9%</td>
<td>2,2%</td>
<td>3 324</td>
<td>2494</td>
<td>5 818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* at the beginning of the year

Investment returns

The Hungarian supplementary pension funds are funded schemes of defined contributions. As a consequence, the level of pensions depends very much of the real rate of return of investments. (See Chart 9). The same level of contributions could result in very different pensions due to the effective returns on investments. According to a rough estimation in case of 4% of real rate of return the pension expectation is about doubled in a period of 30 years of accumulation comparing to that case when the real rate of return is only 0%. This means that we have to pay high attention to the investment performances.

The history of Hungarian supplementary is not too long. At the same time, the developing period of the capital market in Hungary made the investment measures also a bit dubious if we take into consideration all the data from the very beginning period of the funds’ operation. But the latest five years might give us some valuable information.

The first finding is that the average performances of teh latest 5-years are very much diverse. (See Chart 10) The mean of average real returns is 2,3% which is not too high but acceptable. But the standard deviation is close to the level of mean. It means that the fund selection had quite an important role in what size of benefit reserves was accumulated in the period investigated.
The first natural explanation could be the different investment policy of the funds but it is not the real case. Of course there are differences in the portfolios but these are not explanatory enough. The portfolio of almost all the funds consists of more than 75-80% of state bonds or other domestic bonds with some guarantee and the risky assets are generally below 10%. As a consequence the investment policy could hardly give satisfactory explanation on the very different investment performances.
If we are looking for some other explanatory factors we should note that there are significant differences in the performance of funds of different way of asset management. Some funds works in-house asset management. The regulation is rather weak concerning the in-house asset management: It requires qualified experts employed by the funds but there is no capital requirement. In case of in-house asset management the funds’ managers should take the responsibility of investment activity which is generally far out of their competencies. Because of this fact most fund decided to outsource the asset management. The financial institutions which established funds generally have their own investment institutions and the main reasons of the establishment was even to acquire this asset management service. As a result – in spite of the fact that according to the legislation the funds have to call for tender in order to select the asset manager(s) - there is no any fund with financial institutions in the background which use other asset managers than their only asset manager company in the same financial group. In theory it could be natural and even have more rationality. But the lack of the market competition in the selection process could be harmful. We suspect that it could be one of the possible explanations of the differences of investment performances. (See Table 5)

Table 5
**Investment Performances of the Groups of Hungarian VMBFs in the Period of 1998-2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Asset management in 2002</th>
<th>number of funds</th>
<th>assets managed billion HUF</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>number of members (ths)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>average of annual real rate of returns 1998-2002</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>MAX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-house asset management</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing outsourced asset manage</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-competing outsourced asset management</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We should not forget that even the largest funds belong to the group of funds of non-competing asset management. It means that many members belong to the group of funds of the lowest investment performances.
6. Internal Efficiency of Private Pension Fund Operations

The voluntary pension funds are basically one of the possible financial vehicles for pension savings. In this context the efficiency of the pension savings could be measured in a way of financial effectiveness which means that in order to measure the internal efficiency we should consider all the money put into the system within the period investigated and the final claims of the members at the end of the period.

The internal efficiency could be measured on individual level, on fund level and also on the level of the whole system. The method is very similar, but the Cash-in-flows, Cash-out-flows and the final outcome should be differently defined.

a) On individual level the cash in-flow is the contribution what was paid, as a benefit of a member. In practice there is no out-flow in the accumulation period. The final outcome is the market value of the personal account of the member at the end of the period.

Let us suppose that a member paid the same sum (in this example 100,000 HUF/year) into a voluntary fund between 1995 and 2003. The balance available on his personal account at the end of the period depends on the charges proportional to contributions and the net rate of returns on investments which was credited on his account.

Table 7 illustrates the calculation in case of 5% of charges proportional to contributions and 1% real ROI.

We should consider the influence of the front load fees and the investment performances on the individual internal efficiency. (See Table 8) First we should realize that taken into consideration the tax allowances on the contributions the payments into voluntary pension funds were very good investments on individual level. On the other side we could see that charges of 5% proportional to contribution could be balanced with 1% positive real rate of return in order to retain the value of money paid in. If front load fee increases

18 Members are allowed to ask member’s loan but it was not typical in the period investigated.
19 In the previous chapter we could see that both of the two factors was very much different among the funds.
20 In the rough calculations we suppose that all the contributions were paid in the end of the year. If data are available more sophisticated calculations could be done.
with 1% of contributions the value of the personal accounts (namely the benefit reserves) has changed also about 1% in the period investigated. But changes of 1% in real rate of return resulted in changes of about 5% of final outcome of the system. As a consequence, in this period of 9 years (which is not a long one for pension savings) in a fund of good performance the balances of individual accounts could be higher with about 50% than in the worse fund of having the same contribution structure.

Table 7
Calculation of Empirical Internal Efficiency of Pension Fund Operations In Hungary in the period of 1995-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>inflation *</th>
<th>Tax allowance on contributions</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Current Value of the contribution indexed by the future inflation rates</th>
<th>Rate of return on investments</th>
<th>Value of the personal account at the end of the year</th>
<th>Personal Cash Flow</th>
<th>Cash Flow with tax allowances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>245 341</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>108 870</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>198 496</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>94 337</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>167 790</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>55 392</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>146 798</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>55 392</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>133 453</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>71 706</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>121 542</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89 641</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>111 302</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1 085 740</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>105 700</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1 252 134</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1 434 209</td>
<td>-100 000</td>
<td>-70 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 900 000 1 330 423 1 434 209 1 434 209

average weighted by assets 9,2%
Internal Rate of Return on Contributions 10,2%

*Hungarian National Bank, Annual average

Table 8
Individual Internal Efficiency of Hungarian Voluntary Pension Funds in the period of 1995-2003 as a function of Front Load Fee and the net ROI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credited part of contributions</th>
<th>Real rate of interests credited on personal accounts</th>
<th>IRR with tax allowances</th>
<th>Value of the personal account at the end of the period (ths HUF)</th>
<th>Account value as a percentage of the basis case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22,8%</td>
<td>1 581</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21,5%</td>
<td>1 482</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22,6%</td>
<td>1 565</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>23,7%</td>
<td>1 649</td>
<td>104%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1 180</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1 366</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1 833</td>
<td>116%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supposed Annual contribution: 100Ths of HUF
b) The internal efficiency rate of funds could be a complex measure to compare the performances of the funds. This measure would be suitable to make classes of efficiency and could have been calculated according to the data of the annual reports by the supervisory agency or any other independent parties and it could be published in order to help the transparency. But in this moment the data required for this kind of comparative studies are not available for public.

Measuring the internal efficiency on fund level would have required time series of data of total sum of payments for members paid into the fund in a year and all the payments delivered by the fund to the members. The outcome could be measured as a value of benefit reserve of the fund at the end of the period. If the internal efficiency would have been measured in a special period the initial value of the relevant Cash flow should be the market value of the benefit reserves of the fund at the beginning of the period. 21

As an illustration Table 9 show the calculation for two funds. In this example the figures shows that Fund I. had better performance in the period of 1998-2000 than the Fund II.

Table 9
Two Examples for Calculation of Internal Efficiency of Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Net CF</th>
<th>Market value of benefit reserves at the end of the year</th>
<th>Relevant CF for the period of 1998-2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FUND I:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>18 716 700</td>
<td>19 959 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21 328 721</td>
<td>47 524 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>27 404 924</td>
<td>89 326 000</td>
<td>89 326 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>26 700 000</td>
<td>145 862 000</td>
<td>26 700 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>33 428 755</td>
<td>197 110 000</td>
<td>33 428 755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>47 506 383</td>
<td>265 604 000</td>
<td>47 506 383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>88 525 646</td>
<td>365 064 000</td>
<td>88 525 646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>59 036 822</td>
<td>480 609 000</td>
<td>-421 572 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FUND II:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>703 750 574</td>
<td>703 750 574</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>478 963 397</td>
<td>1 278 566 142</td>
<td>478 963 397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>532 751 232</td>
<td>2 078 622 861</td>
<td>532 751 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>726 340 716</td>
<td>2 981 709 551</td>
<td>726 340 716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>875 924 389</td>
<td>4 124 085 589</td>
<td>875 924 389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>889 723 927</td>
<td>5 405 346 198</td>
<td>-4 515 622 271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 The signs of the element of the relevant Cash Flow should be determined as appropriate.
c) Finally the internal efficiency could be calculated also at sector level. In this case the initial value of the relevant CF would be the total amount of market values of the benefit reserves of each fund at the beginning of the period investigated. All annual CF would be calculated as the sum of annual net CF of each fund. And the outcome would be the total amount of market values of the benefit reserves of each fund at the end of the period investigated.

By means of this measure we could compare for example the efficiency of the mandatory and the voluntary systems or we could follow the dynamics of internal efficiency of the system. Unfortunately the time series necessary for this kind of comparisons are not available in this moment.

We calculated the system efficiency in case of voluntary pension funds in Hungary in the period of 1994-2002. (See Table 10.)

Table 10. System Efficiency of Voluntary Pension Funds in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash in-flow</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>6611</td>
<td>14043</td>
<td>25441</td>
<td>39789</td>
<td>52887</td>
<td>58443</td>
<td>63998</td>
<td>71240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash outflow</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>11589</td>
<td>15039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members' claims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>351193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net CF</td>
<td>-350</td>
<td>-6111</td>
<td>-13491</td>
<td>-24928</td>
<td>-38375</td>
<td>-49367</td>
<td>-52943</td>
<td>-52409</td>
<td>294992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{IRR} = 7.22\% \]

To evaluate the result, namely that the IRR is equal to 7.22% is a bit difficult. We could take into consideration the average inflation as a minimum of required annual rate of return. As in the period of 1995-2002 the average inflation weighted by the cumulated net Cash-inflow was 9.4%, we could state that the efficiency of the system of voluntary pension funds was not satisfactory. It means that the Hungarian Voluntary Pension Fund was a good financial vehicle for voluntary pension savings only if the possible tax savings were taken into consideration also.
7. Conclusions

In the first decade of introduction the pension reform Hungary did rather well in this big examination. If we take into consideration that the period of the economic transformation was not really favourable for a long term project like pension reform and the under-developed capital market gave adverse conditions for developing a funded pension system the results could be appreciated.

But the real situation should be improved in several fields as follow:

First, the interested parties should be educated to learn the self-care conception.

Second, the market competition should have been reconsidered. It should be clear that to force building up a funded pension system could be dangerous in unfavourable environment. In case when the market prices are not able to fulfil their natural role and the market does not control the performances, the pension expectations of the private system could be eroded. After a couple years of inadequate performances members could hardly be convinced that they could rely on this young pension institutions. Especially when they could not find any guaranty for the protection of their own interest.

Third, the public information on performances of the funds would be necessary, as members should know about the differences in their final outcome as a result of the differences in complex performance of the funds. The internal efficiency could be an informative complex measure of performance of the funds.
REFERENCES


