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HOW TO EVALUATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TENDENCIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY TODAY


Iwao KAMOZAWA

The subtitle of this book well suits its contents. The book observes Turkey from new perspectives indeed, including fair criticism of Kemalism. "All the authors belong to the generation of the 1960s, which matured in the liberal environment fostered by the 1961 constitution, and undertook the process of critically reevaluating Turkey's past and present. In that sense, then, this anthology is the fruit of a revisionist school of Turkish history," as is written in the preface. The project of publishing this book began in spring, 1980. The military takeover took place soon thereafter, and many of the authors seem to have suffered hardships in the years that followed. But one cannot find a reproachful tone among the lines of the book. It is purely academic, and largely leftist in viewpoint, a point of view which has been severely repressed in Turkey since September 1980 when the military takeover occurred.

Only two authors among thirteen were in universities in Turkey at the time these essays were written; the others were either abroad or are introduced in the book as formerly working in universities in Turkey.

12. The International Dimension: Trade, Aid, and Debt, by Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak. The Conclusion is written by the co-editors, Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak.

The common advantage of the articles is the wide, profound and emancipated views of their authors. For example, the bureaucracy of the republic is observed along with its Ottoman background; etatism, a fundamental economic policy of the republic from the beginning even till now, is not regarded as an exclusively economic system; and the subject of the Kurds, usually evaded cautiously in articles on socio-economic and cultural matters published today not only inside but also outside Turkey, is written about by many authors.

The purpose of the book, as explained by the co-editors, is “to contribute to a general understanding of different roads to development by focusing on the case of contemporary Turkey. One of the first countries to establish a republic as a result of a national war of independence, Turkey adopted the principles of Western jurisprudence and political institutions by fiat. In that respect, it is a model of experimentation by a westernized modernizing elite, the Kemalists, while continuing to this day to exhibit the contradictions of development strategies imposed from above. The present collection proposes alternative perspectives on this experience.”

The intentions of the authors and the essential characteristics of each chapter with the conclusion will be outlined below, using the original sentences as far as possible.

Taner Timur, the author of “The Ottoman Heritage”, the first chapter, regards the republic as being under the strong influence of the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. The reason he thinks so may be understood when we observe his framework of binary conflict between bureaucracy and liberalism throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey. He points out the close similarity and connection between the Ottoman bureaucracy and that of the republic. He criticizes that Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic, for not giving proper consideration to the Ottoman heritage.

In Timur’s opinion, no fundamental changes were implemented in the social order in the Kemalist period. “By the 1930s, the revolution was officially over, and even the word ‘revolution’ was no longer uttered,” “far from aiming to change the existing class structure” (p. 7). He states that “in much the same way as Ottoman ‘modernization’ involved the placement of its army under Western control, so too the ‘democratization’ of Turkey has been realized through the integration of the republican army into military plans…” (pp. 22-23). According to Timur, “analyses of Ottoman elements in Turkey should constitute a dimension of a broader study of neo-colonialist and imperialist policies in the West; this is only natural in a world of ever-increasing
international interaction” (p. 24).

Caglar Keyder, the author of “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy”, the second chapter, identifies Turkey as a country which occupies “a highly distinctive position within the Third World. Never colonized, the country inherited a rich political tradition from its imperial predecessor” (p. 27). Keyder also does not neglect to point out first that “it is impossible to consider the independence movement as a social revolution from below” (p. 32). Then he describes the socio-economic features of the republic in historical sequence.

In the foundation period of the republic, “as a direct result of Greek and Armenian departures, local notables could appropriate their abandoned business and lands. . . . the prospect of Greeks and Armenians returning to their appropriated lands, workshops, and businesses was the decisive factor in rallying the Anatolian small-town bourgeoisie to the national cause” (p. 31).

“The year 1929,” the chapter continues, “was a turning point in many respects . . . from 1929 until 1933, the Government in Ankara searched for and tried various methods of central control over the economy. . . . Thus the 1930s ushered in an era of etatism” (p. 31). “The economic practice of etatism led to an increase in industrial production, while workers’ real wages and peasants’ terms of trade declined” (p. 36). On the other hand, “during the etatist years . . . state officials of all ranks fared well, benefiting from distribution of goods in kind (shoes, clothing, and the such) as well as a privileged status within the official ideology. At this time popular reaction against the regime could only have been organized from the countryside, but the rural masses were not yet politically awakened” (p. 37). “Again in contrast to the 1920s, the 1930s witnessed a conscious attempt to propagate a nationalist ideology” (p. 36). The ideologies of nationalism and modernization in Turkey are not easily consonant with each other. “Despite these efforts to spread the word of modernization, popular reaction against the all-prevading power of the ruling elite increased during the 1930s. For example, the People’s Houses (Halkevleri), which were meant to serve as centers for propagating the official ideology, remained isolated and served only an immediate circle of bureaucrats. Village Institutes (Koy Enstituleri), designed to carry the revolution [modernization] to the rural masses, were confronted with severe opposition from the local population. The gap between the ruling elite and the masses was at no time more clearly visible” (p. 36).

At the middle of the 1930s, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the notorious economist and financier of the Third Reich, had first-hand contact with Turkey’s economy, and devised a plan of bilateral exchanges with economies complementary to Germany’s. A treaty was signed with Germany in 1935, and Turkey’s foreign trade quickly adjusted to the division of labor envisaged by
the Third Reich (p. 37).

"The etatist policies encouraging industry bilateral arrangements, fostered an economy of corruption and profiteering during the war. The war economy was characterized by shortages, rapidly rising prices, falling real wages and salaries, and, of course, large profits for semilegal black-market operations" (p. 37). "Another policy during that period was the Capital Levy (Varlik Vergisi) of 1942, ostensibly aimed at taxing profiteers. In its application, however, the once-and-for-all tax fell disproportionately on non-Muslims, who were forced to sell their properties at a loss, thus serving further accumulation of wealth by the Muslim bourgeoisie" (pp. 37-38).

"As Turkey received its share of Marshall aid, the Government allowed the foundation of an opposition party, the Democrat Party (DP-Demokrat Parti)" (p. 38). "After 1935, however, the claim of the regime to represent the interests of the peasantry had become increasingly threadbare. Industrial prices controlled by the government (such as textiles) were increased and taxes were imposed on imported items such as sugar and kerosene, while agricultural prices were allowed to stagnate. During the war the absolute deprivation of the mass of peasants was hard to conceal, and contrasted flagrantly with the new wealth of the war profiteers. . . . Thus the RPP attempt to forge an alliance with the poorer peasantry failed and the DP was given an opportunity to attract peasant support" (p. 39).

"The end of monoparty regime in 1950" [when the DP came to power] "also signaled a shift from one pattern of capitalist modernization to another. To use Barrington Moore's terms, Turkey had experienced a 'revoltion from above' leading to a 'reactionary capitalist' modernization under a 'semi-parliamentary' regime" (p. 42).

The military coup of 1960 was possible not only because of the substantial failure of the economic policies of the DP government, headed by Adnan Menderes, but also because of its enforcement of antidemocratic measures.

"Turkish industry grew at an average of 9 percent per annum between 1963 (publication of the First Five-Year Plan) and 1971, in what may be described as an import-substituting fashion. Approximately one-half of the investment in industry was carried out by the public sector. . . . By the end of the decade [the 1960s] 96 percent of imports were capital goods, intermediate inputs, or raw materials for industry. Thus while the government undertook the protectionist regime, it still could not guarantee in securing foreign exchange. Fortunately, the economy gained a reprieve in the form of remittances from Turkish workers in Germany. By 1971, remittances of these migrant workers almost exactly covered the deficit. It was because of this unexpected source of foreign exchange that the 1960 boom could be sustained into the 1970s" (p. 48).

Political instability did not end even when a second military coup
occurred in 1971, and it continued until 1980, when the third military government was formed. In the 1970s, particularly close to the end of the decade, there was confusion on the left on the one hand and proto-fascist mobilization on the other hand. The instability came to an end with the military coup of 12 September 1980. Keyder explains the events of the 1960s and the 1970s in the terms of cause and effect.

Stephane Yerasimos, the author of “The Monoparty Period”, the third chapter, analyzes the structure of the society of Turkey from the viewpoint of ethnic minority. He first points out that “the replacement of the Treaty of Sevres, which expressed the will of the victors of World War I, by that of Lausanne, the result of a laborious compromise between the new Turkey and its old enemies” (p. 66), disappointed the non-Turk ethnic groups in the territory of the Republic of Turkey. He describes the change in the viewpoint of Mustafa Kemal concerning the ‘nationality’ of the republic; “Mustafa Kemal stated from the rostrum of the National Assembly on 1 May 1920: ‘... the people who constitute this high assembly are not just Turk or Circassian, Kurd or Laz. They are composed of all the Islamic elements and constitute a coherent whole. Consequently, the aims pursued by this assembly for the safeguard of rights, life, honor, and reputation, do not pertain only to a single Islamic element... Similarly, in accordance with the principles that we have espoused, these various Islamic elements, which are fellow citizens, are mutually respectful and honor the respective racial, social, or geographical rights of each other. The answer to the question posed above, as to the ethnic composition of the new nation, was then: all Muslims, each safeguarding their own ethnic particularities. But this solution quickly proved to be inadequate when faced with the desire to create a nation-state after Western models. Thus the course was swiftly rectified. In his speech inaugurating the third year of the assembly, on 1 March 1922, Mustafa Kemal spoke of ‘the people of Turkey, unified by race, religion, and culture.’ The next step was taken when ‘the people of Turkey’ became purely and simply ‘the Turkish people’” (p. 69). In connection with the formal class concept of Kemalism, Yerasimos introduces the speech given by Mustafa Kemal “from the pulpit of a mosque in Balikesir: ‘... consequently, as members of different parts of the nation depend on each other, so too it is not possible to divide it into classes; the ensemble constitutes the people.’ This statement was made for all time, and remains the official position even today” (p. 72).

Yerasimos criticizes the nature of the Kemalist reforms. For example, he describes the atmosphere of the ‘hat revolution.’ “Mustafa Kemal indeed felt prompted to explain his point of view: ‘It was necessary to get rid of the fez, considered on the head of our nation as a trademark of ignorance, of reaction, and of resistance to progress and development, and replace it by the hat, used
as a headdress in the entire civilized world, so as to show that the Turkish nation is no different from civilized social life in the domain of mentality as well. We accomplished that under the Law for the Maintenance of Order. We would have also done so without it. But if we said that the proclamation of that law eased our task, that would be most correct’” (p. 84).

Yerasimos asks whether the passage of Turkey to liberalism in 1950 should be regarded as setting the stage for the country’s economic takeoff or whether it should be regarded as a counterrevolution that has subjected Turkey to Western imperialism, clearly holding the latter viewpoint.

In conclusion, he insists that “it thus becomes necessary to move on to another level of definition, which would retain in Kemalism the attempt at a transformation of society according to the Western model, perceived as the universal model of civilization and progress, and considering this transformation of social structures—of mentalities—as a necessary, and sometimes sufficient, precondition for economic progress. In its authoritarian—even autocratic—character, this transformation was elitist, if one considers the results achieved and aimed, and despite an ostensible quest for popular roots, it attacked a large part of popular culture” (pp. 91-92).

Cem Erogul, the author of “The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71”, the fourth chapter, in dealing with the principal political tendencies of the first quarter century of Turkey’s multiparty system, emphasizes four basic processes: democratization, liberalization, radicalization, and militarization” (p. 101).

It is interesting to learn the following fact: “On 6 September 1957, Fuat Kopruçu (one of the four founders of the DP) resigned and joined the opposition. . . . The 27 September 1957 general elections were held in this tense climate, and many incidents took place during the campaign. In a speech in Balikesir a few days before elections, Kopruçu said: ‘This electoral struggle is that of an entire nation against a man aiming at reviving the single-party, single-leader system’” (p. 115). The DP is known for its democracy and liberalism; however, under this kind of democracy and liberalism ‘a’ single-party system, single-leader system could be restored.

Cem Erogul is further doubtful whether universal suffrage alone secures genuine democracy: “If democratization is understood as the broadening of political participation, its primary element must be universal suffrage. Indeed, the first condition of participation is that the administrators of the state be determined through general elections. Turkey entered this phase in 1950. The indispensability of the right to vote and the principle of fair elections were inculcated in the people. . . . Yet, universal suffrage is only a first step in achieving political participation. In cases where local notables influence the votes of the entire population in their region, for instance, it is clear that the
voter's level of political participation will be low even though voter participation may be high. In the first twenty-five years of the multiparty system in Turkey, political participation also developed in this qualitative sense, and a tendency was observed toward voting consciously. Interestingly, this qualitative change in political participation manifested itself in Turkey's most developed regions not only as more rational behavior in choosing one party over another, but also as disapproval of all the alternatives and conscious withholding of votes. In other words, the relatively low electoral participation in developed regions is not the sign of a tendency toward political indifference in modernizing Turkey, but an indication of effective political protest" (p. 137).

Ahmet Samin, the author of "The Left", the fifth chapter, seems to recall bitter experiences with severe criticism. First of all, he points out that "the inability of the leftist groups to unite against the fascists has been the most graphic demonstration of their immaturity" (p. 148). In order to identify the factors behind this immaturity, he reviews the history of the communist movement in Turkey. First, he observes the situation under which the first Communist Party of Turkey was founded in 1920. "The CPT was... further confused by Kemalist modernization. Ataturk was commandist toward the peasantry, cultist toward his own personality, and a secular, Western-oriented modernizer who attempted to create some industry based on the state sector" (p. 150).

He goes on to analyze the modern situation of the leftist movements. "While certain articles in the Turkish Penal Code (adopted from Mussolini's) continued to forbid an open Communist Party, the new constitution [promulgated in 1961] specifically allowed for the creation of a socialist party. Thus on 13 February 1961, a group of trade union leaders (some of whom later turned out to be police agents) organized the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT—Türkiye Isçi Partisi). They had broken away from the main trade union federation Turk-Is, and at first their new party had a strictly ouvrieriste ideology, which attracted little support" (p. 154). "The emergence of the WPT as a unitarian socialist party was also partly due to the situation in the international workers' movement at the time of its creation: Khrushchev's de-Stalinization had not yet divided world communism, and the Cuban and Algerian revolutions were still in their 'heroic' stages" (p. 154). He refers to the constituents of the party: "Unlike vaguely comparable groups in Europe or North America, however, the WPT was not merely a collective of intellectuals: it was able to articulate trade-union demands with some program for land reform, as well as embrace the aspirations of the radical sectors of the Kurdish minority" (p. 155). Finally, the WPT could not evolve into a real workers' party. "... in 1965, in the first national elections... the votes
showed that the Workers' Party had not become a workers' party. In Istanbul, where it obtained nearly a third of its votes, its support seemed to have come predominantly from middle-class 'progressives' rather than from the poorer, workers' quarters; in the countryside, WPT support came overwhelmingly from Kurds and Alevis (Shi'ites)” (p. 156).

The groundwork for the defeat of the left in Turkey in the 1980s was prepared in the 1970s, Samin declares “The CPT [Communist Party of Turkey] leadership, however, was more concerned with the selfish preservation of its own dominance within the CRWU [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions, known as DISK] and refused to unite with other left-wing currents. Indeed, it joined with right-wing organizers and bureaucrats to purge other leftist elements—especially WPT supporters in CRWU unions; it acted as virtually a political police force within them to prevent all other socialist 'inflation’” (p. 166).

In general, according to Samin, the left has stuck to the centrality; “There are many spontaneous local movements which revolutionary socialists should help articulate at a national level, without the exigencies of centralized decisions undermining democracy at the base level” (p. 171).

Mehmet Ali Agaogullari, the author of “The Ultranationalist Right”, the sixth chapter, examines the subject against its Ottoman background. “Having started as a romantic vision, Turanism acquired a totally political character with the onset of World War I. The Germans saw both Turanism and Islamism as favoring their interests the former because it undermined the Russians, and the latter the British” (p. 184).

Agaogullari comments on a changing relationship between Turanism and Kemalism. “Having been defeated abroad, the Turanists were soon dealt another blow, this one domestic ... The War of National Liberation was a bridge leading from Turanism to motherlandism (vatancilik).’ Speaking in Eskisehir as early as 1921, Mustafa Kemal had declared: ‘Neither Islamic Union nor Turanism may constitute a doctrine or logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of the new Turkey is to consist of living independently, relying on Turkey’s own sovereignty within its national frontiers’” (p. 184). “Gokalp nevertheless could not help expressing the hope that Turan ‘may perhaps materialize in the distant future.’ Akcura, for his part, maintained that the Republic of Turkey was the embodiment of all Pan-Turkism’s desires. The Turkish Hearth (first founded by Turkists in Istanbul in 1911 as a semi-secret club, and officially established on 12 March 1912) too resumed its activities in 1924 (after having been shut down by the British in 1920); organized to propagate the official state ideology, it boasted 257 branches and 32,000 members by 1930.

Yet, although coopted by Kemalism, it had not been able to completely wean itself from Turkist and Turanist tendencies. . . . a substantial consonance
is evident between these Turkist tendencies and government policies. . . . the distant past of Turks was glorified. . . . In numerous statements, Mustafa Kemal used phrases that exalted Turkishness and even provided material for racists, while justice minister Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) said in 1930: ‘This country is in itself Turkish. Those who are not pure Turks have only one right in the Turkish motherland—to be servants and slaves.’ The administration also implemented a campaign of assimilation, especially among non-Turkish Muslims as Kurds, as had the Young Turks before them’’ (pp. 185-186).

Agaogullari’s conclusion about why the Kemalists implemented such measures is as follows: “The Kemalists wished to create a national consciousness, defeat the feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis Europe” (p. 186).

Now, “the junta that led the military coup of 27 May 1960 included a number of Turkist officers—notably Colonel Alparslan Turkes. . . . returning from exile in 1963, Turkes . . . set out to take over the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP-Cumhuriyetci Koylu Millet Partisi). . . . Turkes was elected commissar, and used his position to establish direct links with the local party organization. . . . The RPNP congress meeting in Adana on 8-9 February 1969 renamed the party in order to better reflect the changes that had occurred since 1965, and called it the Nationalist Movement Party” (p. 193).

“Racist-Turanist ideology was dropped from official NMP doctrine in order to address a wider electorate and increase the party’s audience; at the same time, however, the publications of youth branches articulated it so as to respond to the expectations of some militants, as well as competing with certain other Turkist-Turanist circles” (p. 197).

“Numerous documents in the NMP indictment drawn up after the 12 September 1980 coup show that the idealist youths involved in bomb-throwing and armed activities were directed and protected by the party leadership” (p. 205). “Following the military coup of 12 September 1980, the activities of the NMP were banned, along with all other parties” (p. 205).

Binnaz Toprak, the author of “The Religious Right”, the seventh chapter, analyzes the relations between the secularists and religious circles. “The fear that Islam carries within it the power to oppose central political authority is not, of course, without basis. To begin with, Islam is a religion that does not differentiate between sacred and secular. . . . Second, Islam has a unifying appeal for mass political mobilization. . . . Third, the Islamic impact on Ottoman social and political life serves as a reminder that Islam can indeed be a base of resistance to modernization efforts that follow the Western pattern. . . . Finally, the early history of the republic demonstrates how Islam can indeed serve as a major source of protest and revolt against central political authority” (p. 219).

“A study based on survey research conducted in 1968 among workers of
the Sumerbank factory in Izmir found that 38 percent of those interviewed defined themselves as Muslims rather than as one of the alternative choices on the questionnaire—"Izmır residents, persons from their place of origin, workers, or Turks" (p. 221).

"In the final analysis," the author writes, "this is perhaps the most significant accomplishment of Kemalist secularism: it has succeeded in relegating Islam to the position of a purely individualistic faith" (p. 221). "There are, however," he continues, "those for whom this syncretism is not acceptable. Some are deeply pious, and continue to see Kemalist reformism as blasphemy, especially in matters concerning the place of women in modern Turkish society. For others, the disappearance of traditional Islamic community has paralleled the disappearance of traditional economic activities. Here is the typical case of small traders, artisans, and the like, who believe that their economic activity increasingly leads them into a squeeze between organized labor on the one hand, and organized business on the other. Such men are usually drawn to ideologies on the Right, which attack big business as well as the labor movement and the Left" (p. 222).

Semih Vaner, the author of "The Army", the eighth chapter, focuses on the cleavage in the military of the republic: radicals vs moderates.

"The 1950s were a turning point for Turkey: with the establishment of multiparty rule, the reign of the single party ended... The change in ruling elites, which derived from important social transformations and reflected a shift in political structures, was perceived by the army as the degradation of its own institutional prestige and a challenge to its image within society. This was further aggravated in 1954 by the electoral success of the incumbents, who placed the military bureaucracy under their control; thus for the first time in Turkey, military power was subjected to civilian authority. For the army, the coup of 1960 marked the beginning of the process of its affirmation in the political arena, and thus the definition of its identity" (pp. 237-238).

"According to general opinion, the Turkish military institution has harbored since 1960 a conflicting dynamic between two 'parties,' those of the 'moderates' and the 'radicals'—these latter having sometimes been qualified as 'neo-Kemalists' or 'Nasserists' during the 1960s. The cleavage appears to originate in the very preparation of the 27 May 1960 coup, opposing the initial conspirators to officers rallied more belatedly to the idea of a military intervention against the government of Adnan Menderes. It is commonly agreed that the debate essentially concerned the extent and duration of that intervention; the 'moderates' supported as rapid a return to parliamentary democracy as possible, while the 'radicals' favored prolonging the military regime in order, they said, to institute a number of 'structural reforms' prior to returning the ballot box" (pp. 241-242).
"The land army has in the past been considered more 'progressive' than the air force or the navy in view of its deeper acquaintance with the social reality in Anatolia, especially through the 'eastern service' to which its officers are subjected. . . . Yet, an analysis of the military interventions since 1960 necessitates a considerable refinement of these theses; it appears that the navy and air force, more open to civil society, are, if not more 'progressive,' at least more liberal and respectful of parliamentary democracy, and more unconsenting to ideologies of the extreme Right than the land army" (p. 245).

Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, the authors of "Agrarian Change", the ninth chapter, point out that "the agrarian structure inherited by the Turkish republic was characterized by two fundamentally important, historically determined features: the overwhelming numerical predominance of small, owner-cultivated peasant holdings, and the considerable—albeit regionally uneven—development of commodity production" (pp. 269-270).

In the prewar period, the authors write, "it is safe to assume that large holdings were of two main types. The first were divided up through renting and sharecropping, and would therefore not appear in the statistics as a single 'holding'; they were largely located in the east, distinguished from the rest of the country by a historical background of tribal relations. The second were fully commercialized and export-oriented, and were concentrated essentially in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions" (p. 275). On the other hand, "a larger segment, undoubtedly constituting a majority of all holdings, produced around the subsistence level, marketing a small surplus in good years, and sinking further into debt in climatically unfavorable years. Normally the small producers were able to do little more than reproduce their means of existence and production" (p. 276).

Toward the end of the war, as "the internal terms of trade turned increasingly in favor of agriculture until 1944", mercantile profits had risen dramatically, not only for the middlemen of foreign trade based in the big cities, but also for the provincial profiteers speculating on the markets of staple agricultural commodities, as well as the leading figures of commercial agriculture at the local level" (p. 277).

After 1960, "the agricultural sector clearly retained its function as a generator of export revenues, but it now also took on the roles of consumer and supplier for domestic industry" (p. 279). "During the period 1945-70, the increases registered by the latter [industrial crops], however, were more rapid" (p. 279). "It seems safe to argue, in conclusion, that the dynamic of commodity production had thoroughly penetrated Turkish agriculture by the early 1970s: all sectors of agriculture, regardless of crop, region, or size group, were subject to the logic of market relations" (p. 280). The authors describe the progression of mechanization of agriculture, and go on to treat production
relations involved in the agriculture of Turkey, 1950-60. Interestingly, they point out, "the fact that land reclamation was generally undertaken communally at the village level, and that the easy availability of credit enabled farmers without financial resources to purchase tractors, meant that new lands were distributed among large numbers of peasants rather than seized by large, politically powerful landowners" (p. 283).

"The development of the 1960s—rapid commercialization, mechanization, rising productivity and output—would lead one to expect changing relations of property and production. However, the findings of the 1970 Agricultural Census indicate continuity rather than change in these relations" (p. 285).

Concerning the massive emigration of peasants, "the continuity depicted by the statistics conceals a tendency toward differentiation for which evidence may be found elsewhere. In 1963, for instance, the smallest holdings rented out most land, and those between 5 and 50 hectares rented it in. In fact, all rented land was rented out by holdings under 2 hectares, half of it by peasants who did not themselves cultivate any land. What this indicates is a divergence between ownership and cultivation, as the owners of the smallest plots rent them out (without relinquishing their ownership) and move out of agrarian production. These holders either remain within the agricultural sector in nonagrarian jobs, or, more importantly, leave the sector altogether to join the reserve army of labor in the cities" (p. 285).

Caglar Keyder, this time as author of "Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-80", the tenth chapter, analyzes the causes of the crisis which came to the surface in the 1970s and 1980s. "By the early 1970s, the contradictions of import substituting industrialization had already begun to weaken the optimism of the 1960s. The success of industrialization had accelerated the differentiation within social classes"... "Thus, an economic as well as political rift was forming between organized labor and much more numerous groups employed by small capital or within the marginal sector. This rift essentially paralleled conflicts within the bourgeoisie that had surfaced with the growth of the modern sector. The traditional petty bourgeoisie was increasingly threatened by the encroachment of large-scale industry, and the social consequences of this encroachment and centralization of capital were most apparent in provincial towns. These conflicts were overlaid by increasing regional differentiation as a few 'growth poles' emerged in the Istanbul-Izmit, Bursa, Izmir, and Adana-Mersin areas. Most of the interior and the eastern parts of the country remained subordinate to the rapid transformation emanating from such centers; provincial towns experienced the onslaught of large capital on their traditional social structures, preparing for the popularity of extremist political movements" (p. 303).
Alpaslan Isikli, the author of "Wage Labor and Unionization", the eleventh chapter, points out first that unionization in Turkey has been based on ideas of foreign origin.

Under the monoparty phase, "in accordance with its overall democratic nature, the constitution adopted in 1924 allowed the establishment of unions within the framework of the freedom to assemble and to found associations. . . . The legal and political environment allowing union activity and apparently conducive to the development of union rights did not last, however. The Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Suukun Kanunu) of 1925 was a turning point for unions, as for many other aspects of social life. Under this law, all workers' activities were effectively banned. . . . Finally, the 1938 Law of Associations banned the foundation of associations 'based on social class,' re-inforcing the anti-union nature of the legislation. . . . Yet, among the principles of Kemalism was the assertion that Turkish society was a unified mass without class or privilege. . . . Under these circumstances, a 'patriarchal state' protecting everyone's interests was seen for a long time as a political and legal model sufficient for the resolution of all social problems. As a natural consequence of this mentality, union activity was seen as superfluous, and indeed harmful" (p. 313).

"No efforts were spared during this period [the 1946-61 period] to put Turkey on the international scene as a fully democratic nation; accordingly, the wish to take part in the International Labor Organization (ILO, tied to the United Nations) with a full delegation including workers' representatives was important in paving the way for the establishment of unions. . . . The years following World War II witnessed the establishment of the Ministry of Labor. Foundations were laid for social insurance. The Law of Association was amended in 1946, eliminating the article banning the establishment of 'associations based on social class,' and thereby removing a legal obstacle to the establishment of unions. Unions were founded in the industrialized areas of the country — starting with Istanbul — soon after this legislative action" (p. 314).

"Union activities were curtailed by the Unions Law (5018); while it allowed unions to enter into 'general contracts' in the name of their members, thus appearing to permit collective bargaining, strikes remained banned, effectively neutralizing this provision. On the other hand, Article 5 prohibited unions from engaging in political acts, and was used to limit their range of activity. . . . The [then] opposition Democrat Party, on the other hand, was able to use the promise of the right to strike as an effective tool in influencing the unions" (p. 315).

"When the DP came to power in 1950, workers covered by the provisions of the Labor Law numbered nearly 374,000, of whom about 78,000 were trade union members, according to Ministry of Labor figures" (p. 315).
"Harmonious relations between the DP government and a large segment of the trade union movement were not long-lived: the DP shelved its promises in the right to strike soon after its rise to power" (p. 315).

"By 1960, the number of workers covered by the Labor Law had risen above 800,000, nearly 300,000 of whom were in trade unions. . . . Influenced by the experience of the West, a number of intellectuals—whose main concern was to achieve the provision of workers' right without going through social struggles and upheavals—played an important role in the formulation of constitutional articles concerning those rights, and in the adoption of the constitution by the Constituent Assembly. The influence of this group was also felt two years later, in the drafting of laws regulating the rights granted to workers by the construction. Bulent Ecevit, minister of labor at the time, spoke as follows upon presenting these laws to parliament: 'In almost all the Western democracies, the rights we are about to grant the Turkish worker with this law were only acquired after long and bloody struggles. . . . There can be no doubt that by granting the Turkish worker these rights without necessitating such struggles you will have rendered history and society a great service. . . . In the countries of the West, application preceded the laws . . . with us, the laws will come first and application will follow'" (pp. 317-318).

"Benefiting from the substantial atmosphere of freedom following the 27 May takeover, the unions—and the CTWU [Confederation of Turkish Workers’ Unions], which for a time was the only confederation—gained considerable dynamism. That unions now enjoyed the right to strike and could undertake collective bargaining on behalf of their members, led to much livelier interest in them on the part of workers.

Civil servants’ unions, particularly the Confederation of Teachers Unions’ of Turkey (Tecmaye Ogrtmenler Sendikalari Konfederasyonu), also made their presence felt as pressure groups—even though they did not have the right to strike" (p. 318).

"American influence on the CTWU was most notable in the adoption and implementation of the tenet of 'nonpartisan politics.' Based on the same tenet as American unionism, this prevented trade unions from becoming a political force in favor of their own democratic inclinations, and, in effect, put them into a position of support for the forces of capital. Yet, while the Unions Law prohibited unions from establishing organic and financial links with political parties, it nevertheless provided a legal framework within which unions could function as effective forces for democracy in the political sphere" (p. 319).

"It was in 1961 that trends opposed to nonpartisan politics first appeared in Turkish unionism, when twelve unionists, most of them members of the CTWU, founded the Workers’ Party of Turkey (WPT—Turkiye Isci Partisi). The conflict between this trend and the line that gained the upper hand within
the CTWU culminated in a split, and the establishment of the CRWU [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Union] in 1967.

The government was quick to respond and intervene against the currents opposed to ‘non-partisan politics.’ The first major intervention was the amendment of the Unions Law in 1970. At the same time, efforts to amend the Law on Collective Bargaining, Strikes, and Lock-outs were abandoned when it became clear that the Constitutional Court was opposed to the proposed amendment” (p. 320).

“The military coup of 12 March 1971 came in the aftermath of the 15-16 June events, at a time when social democratic trade unionism was gaining momentum. The constitution was amended in ways that concerned unions both in general sense, through the curtailment of basic rights, and more directly, through specific pieces of legislation” (p. 320).

“In the years following the 1971 coup, elections were held and civilian rule was restored; however, the electoral balance resulted in a series of unstable coalition governments. During the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) coalitions of 1975-77, continuous conflicts occurred between the trade unions and government” (p. 320).

“The street violence of the pre-1980 period generally found little reflection within the working class. Indeed, it became clear in several instances that workers were not the source but one of the main targets of the violence, as in the cases of the May Day massacre of 1977...” (p. 321).

“The 12 September 1980 military takeover represented the end of an era for trade unionism that had started with 27 May 1960” (p. 321).

Irvin C. Schick and E. AhmetTonak, the coeditors of the book and the authors of “The International Dimension: Trade, Aid, and Debt”, the twelfth chapter, try to summarize “Turkey’s relations with international financial institutions and advanced capitalist countries, in the domestic political context” (pp. 333-334).

“In Turkey, the implementation of each stabilization package was followed by a military takeover. While one should be wary of seeking causal links between the two, this much is certain: the policies pursued by post-coup regimes were invariably more in line with the demands of international financial institutions than those of governments originating in the ballot box” (p. 335).

“Ataturk’s plan for the consolidation and modernization of the new Turkish republic had almost entirely been based on the Western model... Turkey turned once again to the West for a solution to its economic woes. The West itself, however, was undergoing important changes in the aftermath of World War II and the Bretton Woods conference... From the point of view of the Turkish bureaucracy, the choice between the two camps, was clear...
The United States government was unsympathetic to the etatist regime of the RPP [Republican People’s Party]” (p. 338). Nevertheless, “the last years of the RPP regime witnessed a number of decisive developments in Turkey’s economic and political ties with the advanced capitalist countries”, because of the substantial changes in the socioeconomic and political circumstances both at home and abroad after the Second World War.

“More and more, the RPP government turned to massive foreign loans and foreign investments as the backbone of national development... The Democrat Party victory in the 1950 elections is sometimes regarded as the beginning of foreign-subsidized economic policies, and hence in some sense as the start of Turkey’s enserfment by the international financial institutions. Proponents of this view stress that it was the Turkish comprador bourgeoisie, rather than the ‘nationalist-etatist’ bureaucratic elite of the RPP, that was responsible for theTuekey’s eventual subservience to the advanced capitalist countries. As shown above, however, the policy of heavily financing development by foreign credit and trade deficit began during RPP rule” (p. 340).

The authors stress that “although there were numerous political reasons for the coup [of 1960], its economic dimensions must not be neglected. The bourgeoisie had become disaffected by the DP’s agriculture-centered policies, which subsidized the peasantry at the expense of industry” (p. 342).

“In 1970, production was at its lowest level ever compared to Five-Year Plan predictions. The yearly growth rate of the GNP was the lowest in half a decade... Once again the situation had become desperate and Turkey was forced to turn to the international financial institutions for relief. The price of their assistance, however, was again the promulgation of the usual set of stabilization measures” (p. 347).

In the 1970s, “the most important factor in the economic changes to come, however, was undoubtedly the oil embargo and OPEC price increases that followed the 1973 Middle East war. This affected Turkey in two ways: indirectly, primarily through inflation in advanced capitalist countries and the resulting increases in the prices of various import goods, as well as through the recession in Western Europe, which resulted in unemployment and a decline in workers’ remittances; and directly, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in the cost of oil and petroleum product imports” (p. 349).

In conclusion, the authors try to disclose hidden consequences behind the policies. “Controlling government deficits, for instance, is a goal with which few would disagree; yet, forcing state economic enterprises to be fiscally self-sufficient would necessarily cause a decline in the standard of living of the working class, since they provide it with many standard consumer items (textiles, leather, sugar, etc.) at low cost. Moreover, in a country where unemployment and underemployment are chronically extremely high, state
economic enterprises provide many thousands of jobs that can hardly be sacrificed on the altar of productivity and profitability. Finally, since the level of social welfare expenditures and services is already far below that of industrialized countries, curbing them further would give rise to cruel consequences which are not hard to imagine” (p. 353).

On the whole, the “key to improving a country’s balance of payments is increasing foreign exchange revenues. Stabilization measures advocate a turn from import substituting to export-promoting industrialization, a position that has found broad support among different circles in Turkey. At the same time, export orientation necessitates specialization in the world market, that is, adaptation to the international division of labor. This, in turn, requires a specific course of planning and resource allocation. Since the international division of labor is imposed by the advanced capitalist countries, however, the likelihood is high that adapting to it will not be in the long-term interest of the developing country in question. The difficulties incurred by concentrating on the exportation of agricultural goods in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, are well known. Moreover, in order to boost exports, the cost of export goods must be kept down; but since many of the inputs to nontraditional export products are imported, that is unlikely to happen. Indeed, since the easiest factor to regulate in export prices is the cost of labor, export orientation requires wage control. This may entail banning strikes and possibly even outlawing all union activity; the social effects of such measures are once again not hard to imagine” (p. 353).

“The Turkish experience vividly illustrates the political and social outcomes of these policies. But the case of Turkey is far from unique; rather, it is only one of many examples of the skewed relations between developing countries and international financial institutions” (p. 354).

In the final chapter, “Conclusion”, Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak review the articles in the book as a whole. Here, I wish to reproduce a few passages from “Conclusion” chapter, which are especially meaningful for understanding the socioeconomic character of the society of Turkey today.

“If there ever was a time in Turkish history when an elite ruled more or less autonomously of the socioeconomic base, there can be no doubt that this period was eclipsed in the measure to which capitalism developed and new ruling classes increasingly assumed power” (p. 365).

Relevant to the conditions of the intellectuals, including the contributors to this book, are the activities of the YOK: “Numerous judicial and institutional measures were implemented, with the aim of centralizing authority and reducing popular participation. A Higher Education Commission (Yuksek Ogretim Kurulu) was established to oversee the academic and administrative operation of universities: the number of faculty members dismissed by the
commission or the Martial Law Command, or forced to resign by the new policies, has been estimated to be close to 2,000” (p. 372).

Regarding the leading circle of businessmen, it is interesting to hear, even considering the political atmosphere, the remarks of Mr. Rahmi Koc, one of the leading personalities in the top business circles of Turkey. He declared: “Before the 12 September operation, we were obliged to do everything within a democratic system. Thus, months were needed to secure resolutions or pass laws and regulations. In other words, everything was accomplished with difficulty and in a long period of time, and everything was viewed from the political perspective, the economic outlook always lagging behind. The difference under military rule is that—since there is no need for decisions to be sanctioned by parliament—rapid movement is possible, and even if the military administration errs, it can take corrective action quickly. And most importantly, there is no question of political considerations, because the military administration is not concerned with losing parliamentary seats or votes” (p. 374).

Finally, the co-editors conclude as follows; “It is no doubt fair to say that conflicts between the working class and the bourgeoisie have played a secondary role in Turkish politics so far, the basic battles being waged instead within the ruling alliances: the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, the urban and rural bourgeoisie, big organized industrial capital and the traditional and petty bourgeoisie. With the development and establishment of capitalism, this must change; in the long run, therefore, one might expect the political presence of the army to wane, and new modalities to develop for the securement and preservation of the hegemony of ruling classes. The emergence of social democracy in the early 1970s is but one facet of this process” (p. 376).