Globalisation and sport policy

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Explaining policy stability and change

In the mid-1990s Cerny (1995 among others argued that domestic policy making was increasingly constrained by international economic, political and cultural forces, and Coleman and Perl concluded that globalisation had ‘destabilise[d] traditional divisions of labour between sub-national, national, regional and international authorities’ (1999: 692). Despite the exaggeration that surrounds much of the debate over the nature and the significance of globalisation it remains a central explanatory variable in contemporary sport policy analysis and requires the policy analyst acknowledge the impact of globalisation in blurring distinctions between the international and the domestic.

However, simply to note the general significance of non-domestic forces in shaping sport policy at the national level is of little value. What is more important, and is one of the aims of this paper, is to specify as precisely as possible the nature of the external international influences, and to unpack and examine the concept of globalisation as it relates to the sport policy sector. The paper also aims to explain the differential impact of international forces between countries and between sport policy sectors within countries. This paper is consequently divided into two sections, the first of which discusses the nature and significance of three major forces of change which are either, conceptually at least, external to the domestic policy arena, or straddle both the international and the domestic arenas namely: globalisation, commercialization and governmentalisation. The second section examines the character and importance of domestic institutionalised practices – the weight of history – which can either facilitate or constrain policy change.

However, before discussing the nature and significance of international forces for domestic sport policy and how they are mediated by domestic institutions it is necessary to establish an analytic framework within which the forces can be examined and one that will enable due regard to be given to (more) domestic factors such as social and political culture, governing arrangements, and the machinery of government, that is the specific institutional context in which issues emerge and are defined and in which policy responses are formulated.

One way of constructing such a framework is through the use of a metaphor of levels of cultural embeddedness (Benson, 1982; Sabatier, 1998) where each level is partially autonomous, but embedded in a deeper level which sets limits on the degree of autonomy. While each level is rooted in the culture and history of a country, policy predispositions have a longer history and are more deeply embedded in culture than, for example, the location of responsibility for a particular
service in the machinery of government. Consequently, it is especially important to identify deep rooted policy predispositions, but it is also necessary to acknowledge that while the historical and ideological context of policy will be significant so too will be factors such as the structure of the machinery of government and the pattern of interest group activity.

Beginning at the shallower, but still significant, level there is the pattern of administrative arrangements for a service which refers to the organisational location of, and distribution of responsibility for, sport (among government departments and between levels of government) (see Figure 1). Administrative units affect policy as a consequence of their tendency, over time, to develop a distinctive culture and set of priorities which tends to institutionalise relatively stable preferences for policy tools, perceptions of problems, and modes of working which constrain the response to new issues. Closely related to the pattern of administrative arrangements and also located at the shallower level, is the pattern of interorganisational resource dependencies which is concerned with questions about the distribution among organisations of resources such as expertise, finance, legitimacy and administrative capacity.

Operating within the matrix created by administrative arrangements is a set of interest groups. Adapting Benson’s classification it is possible to identify at least four types of interest groups that are relevant to the study of sport policy namely, demand groups (for example, athletes), provider groups (coaches and PE teachers for example), direct support groups (those groups upon which organisations depend for support, such as funding agencies), and indirect support groups (schools and universities for example). It is the interaction between these interest groups and their competition for influence over policy that provides the sport policy process with an important dynamic.

Interest group activity and influence is both facilitated and constrained by the dominant policy paradigm, the service specific policy paradigm, and what Benson refers to as the rules of structure formation. The dominant policy paradigm is the set of values and assumptions that influence policy choice and administrative practice across a range of services. In the UK during the Thatcher years and in Japan during the leadership of Junichirō Koizumi, privatisation was the dominant policy paradigm just as social inclusion and modernisation have been for the Labour governments of Tony Blair. Located within the dominant policy paradigm will be a service-specific policy paradigm which, in relation to mass sport/Sport For All has, in the UK, moved between the promotion of sport and the promotion of any physical activity (such as gardening or walking to work).

At the most fundamental level there are those deeply entrenched and long established biases within the policy process which set the limits to policy action by defining activities that are acceptable and those that are not. At this deeper level would be found those beliefs and values that are both taken for granted and very slow to change and would include beliefs about the roles of men and women in
sport and the value of sport as a career.

**Figure 1: Forces of change and institutional constraints**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long term forces of change</th>
<th>Constraints on policy</th>
<th>Institutional factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weaker</td>
<td>Administrative arrangements (location of responsibility for sport between levels of government, between central government departments and between government and quasi-government organisations)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patterns of resource dependence (statutory or non-statutory nature of funding; sources and stability of funding – national taxation, sub-national taxation, lottery, charity or commercial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction between interest groups (number, configuration and strength of interest groups; existence and status of professional body for sport providers; access to government and public officials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercialisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominant policy paradigm (privatisation, commodification, social inclusion, nation-building, universalism etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmentalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Service-specific policy paradigm (dominant definitions of problems and preferred solutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger</td>
<td>Deep structural values/’storylines’ (value assumptions about: human nature, the proper scope of government, countries defined as ‘significant others’ etc.)</td>
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**International forces that affect domestic sport policy**

With the above framework in mind there are three major overlapping forces that have permeated domestic policy processes in most, if not all, advanced industrial countries over the last fifty to one hundred years and affected all levels from the
shallowest to the most deeply-rooted, namely globalisation and the more specific forces of commercialisation and governmentalisation (see Figure 1). However, while these forces are evident in most, if not all advanced economies, their manifestation and impact on sport policy varies considerably between countries.

Globalisation

Not surprisingly, while there is acknowledgement of the significance of globalisation the concept suffers in its application as an explanatory variable from vagueness, and casual and inconsistent usage (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Houlihan 2007). Scholte, (2003) for example, in evaluating the utility of the concept of globalisation, identifies five common uses of the term: internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, westernisation/ Americanisation and deterritorialisation. Each usage of the term is based on the different weight given to economic, political and cultural aspects.

The breadth of interpretation of the concept of globalisation needs to be borne in mind when examining the impact on sport policy. In the mid 1970s Hechter noted that much of current policy research still assumed that ‘the causes of [policy] development were located within units defined by political boundaries, such as sovereign states’ (1975: 217). By the mid 1990s there was a clear acceptance that an increasing number of policy issues were now embedded in a series of supra-national policy networks and that the problem for the policy analyst was to determine whether actors external to the domestic political system were participants in a national policy process or whether the proper focus should be on the global policy arena to which national actors sought entry and influence.

In sport policy, supranational policy actors can no longer be ignored. Institutions such as the World Anti-Doping Agency, the Court of Arbitration for Sport and Olympic Solidarity, have an impact on the sport policy of both rich and poor countries. Greater account needs to be taken of the globalisation of sport policy instruments, policy and provision which takes three distinct forms – supranational regulation, supranational redistribution and supranational provision. Supranational regulation in sport would include the regulation by international sports federations of the transfer market and of eligibility rules for national teams, the role of the World Anti-Doping Agency in shaping national anti-doping policy and the growing importance of the Court for Arbitration for Sport in settling sports-related disputes. As regards supranational redistribution the clearest examples in sport would be the operation of sports development aid bodies such as Olympic Solidarity and the IAAF sports development programme where the spread of the Olympic diet of international sport is supported with some very modest redistribution of resources. Supranational provision refers to policy measures which give athletes, fans and television viewers of sport an entitlement to a service. In sport the Court of Arbitration for Sport (protecting athlete’s right regarding selection for competition) and the European Union (protecting television viewers’ right to ‘free to air’ access
to nationally important sports events) are perhaps the best current examples.

The above discussion indicates the potential for global or non-domestic factors to impact on domestic sport policy. In order to take the discussion of globalisation forward it is important to distinguish between globalisation as a process and globalisation as an outcome.

Globalisation as a process

Political scientists make the important distinction between democratisation, which is the process of making progress towards democracy, and democracy itself, which is the outcome of the process. There is a need to be aware of a similar distinction between process and outcome when considering globalisation and sport. If we use the term ‘globalisation’ primarily to refer to the process of movement away from a world of discrete nation states and their social systems, cultural patterns, political systems and economies, then there is still the problem of defining the outcome of the process. More will be said about the outcome of globalisation in the next section with the focus in this section remaining on an examination of globalisation as a process.

Because so much of the discussion of sports globalisation focuses on sport as an element of culture, it is important to consider, if only briefly, the relative importance of the various dimensions of globalisation. For most Marxists the answer is fairly clear: economic factors dominate with cultural practices being broadly a reflection of the underlying mode of production. In relation to sport, Marxists would emphasise the commodification of sport and athletes, the domination of sport by powerful media interests which increasingly determine what sport is practised, especially at the elite level, and what sport will reach a global television market. Thus media interests, especially television, and the major international federations (football, cricket, rugby union/league and athletics) share a common concern to produce a marketable global product. Sport is no different from any other product in the capitalist economy where markets are carefully managed and where labour is exploited as the primary source of profit. The spectacular wages of footballers such as Ronaldinho, Beckham and Shevchenko, detract attention from the more modest wages and short careers of most footballers and the ruthless exploitation of footballing talent of many poorer nations, particularly in Africa (Darby, 2001). Support for this argument comes from the work of Klein (1991), who demonstrated how the United States Major League baseball teams undertook a crude form of asset-stripping of talent in the Dominican Republic. Although a number of players from the Republic became major stars in the United States, most of the talented young players who were exported to the US were abandoned when they did not ‘make the grade’. However, such was the exodus of talent that the domestic Dominican Republic league was systematically undermined.

For Marxists and others who prioritise economic processes, culture is either a tool
for incorporating economies through the manipulation of values and attitudes – cultural imperialism – or it is mere froth and not worthy of serious consideration. Examples of the former include Hamelink, who refers to a process of worldwide ‘cultural synchronisation’ (1983: 3), and Levitt who refers to the world’s preference structure becoming relentlessly homogenised (1983). According to this view globalisation introduces a single world culture centred on consumerism, mass media, Americanisation, and the English language, which for sport means - a diet of Olympic sport and Western-defined world championships in sports such as soccer, Formula One, athletics and swimming. According to Brohm (1978), the value of sport to capitalism is not just as a source of profit but also as a subtle vehicle for infiltrating capitalist values into a society because awareness of the manipulative capacity of sport is so low. Priority to the economic dimension draws attention to the commodification of sport, the creation and management of global markets for sports products, and the increasing vertical integration between television media companies and the sports they broadcast. Christian Aid (Brookes and Madden, 1995) provided a powerful indictment of the practices of sports goods companies. They found that the manufacture of sports shoes was located in the lowest labour cost countries where employment conditions, especially for children, were very poor and, perhaps most damning of all, that less than 5 per cent of the final retail price was received by the factory workers in South East Asia. As regards the role of sports media in furthering the vertical integration within the industry, companies such as BSkyB, Canal+ and NTL have all sought to purchase football clubs or at least a shareholding (Brown, 2000), thus enabling them to exercise greater control over a key product.

Events such as the Olympic Games are also examples of the careful development of sports products and more importantly the extent to which even an event as profitable as the Olympics is so heavily dependent on American corporations. Around 60 per cent of all income to the Olympic movement comes from US businesses either in the form of sponsorship (eight of the ten largest sponsors are US based) or in the income generated from the sale of broadcasting rights. It is no wonder that the Games have been awarded to US cities four times since 1980 and that a recurring preoccupation for the local organising committee for the Games is how best to schedule events to meet the requirements of US east coast television viewers.

Such is the interconnection between economic power and sport that it should come as no surprise that, with a small number of notable exceptions, the same countries that dominate the world economy also dominate international sport. The G8 countries (USA, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Russia and Japan) share 65 per cent of world trade with the remaining 200 or so other national economies, accounting for the remaining 35 per cent. As in world trade so in Olympic medals where the same G8 countries dominate, accounting for 42% of all gold medals at the Athens Olympics. If China had been included then the nine leading economies would have accounted for over half of all gold medals. In a study of a range of structural factors that might account for success in Olympic
competition, Stamm and Lamprecht (2001) concluded that the structural factors of population size and level of economic development were the primary indicators of Olympic success and were becoming more pronounced.

In the study of the globalisation of sport, economic processes are clearly of central importance. However, this does not mean that culture should be written off as a mere cipher for more significant economic processes. There are a number of students of globalisation who are willing to grant the cultural sphere a substantial degree of autonomy. Hall (1983), for example, arguing from a broadly Marxist position, suggests that despite the clear power of business interests, there is still scope for a reconstruction of everyday practices and a rearticulation of cultural practices, such as in the area of sport. For Hall, capitalist power determines culture in the first, rather than the last, instance. What is significant about granting culture (such as sport) a degree of autonomy from economic processes and interests is that it does not suggest that cultural phenomena are only to be found at the superficial or superstructural level and, second, that in order to ask significant questions about global sport, we need to be able to disaggregate culture and distinguish between levels or depths of embeddedness (see Table 1).

### Table 1: Constituting globalisation: examples of depth of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture as</th>
<th>Deep Structure</th>
<th>Actions of the State</th>
<th>Commodities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>relationships between genders and generations; e.g. attitudes to work and leisure and to the participation of women in sport and recreation</td>
<td>legislation/ regulation concerning, for example, the protection of children involved in sport; doping; racist abuse at soccer matches; and the retention of major sports events for terrestrial television</td>
<td>sports fashionwear; sports bars; individual sports, events and competitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>commitment to democracy; limits on the power of the state and rights of the individual e.g. the right of soccer supporters to travel abroad</td>
<td>administrative structures; degree of public participation, for example, in decisions over the use of lottery funding for sport, the criteria for public subsidy for elite sport</td>
<td>political posturing, including the attendance of politicians at sports events and the vociferous defence of competitive sport in schools when there is little evidence of an attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>beliefs about property rights (access to the countryside for recreation) and profit</td>
<td>regulation of monopoly and competition, for example, the limitation on the proportion of shares in a soccer club that a television company can own</td>
<td>club merchandise; web-based gambling; pay-per-view for sports events</td>
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For example, within the realm of social relations, we could ask whether sport globalisation is evident ‘merely’ at the commodity level or has penetrated to the
level of deep structural values and practices. A number of the major European football clubs have extensive worldwide networks of supporters' clubs with their own local fan magazines and club products. While such a phenomenon is evidence of some form of globalisation, we might be tempted to dismiss it as functioning only at the surface of society as a fashion. Like all fashions, it will exhaust itself and be supplanted by a new passion for a different team, sport or other cultural product and remembered in later years with a degree of fond embarrassment. However, if the support for European clubs were to be extended through the emulation of some of the less attractive patterns of fan behaviour such as hooliganism and racism, it might prompt the government to regulate fan behaviour. The intervention of the state would indicate that the degree of cultural change was of a more significant kind. If the growing popularity of football led to the establishment not only of national men's leagues, but also of leagues for women and, more significantly, to a decline in local or regional sports, then we might have evidence of cultural change of a far more profound kind.

Similarly, if we were to focus on the political dimension of culture, we would be rightly sceptical of bestowing too much significance on the attendance of politicians, even from countries with a strong football tradition, at major football matches, as this is likely to be an aspect of cheap populist politics rather than an indication of deeply rooted state commitment. However, if the popularity of football were to prompt the government to reorder its funding priorities for sport with the intention of establishing a national professional league or strengthening the chances of the national team qualifying for the World Cup, we would be right to see this as a change of deeper significance. Furthermore, if the state began to undermine the traditional autonomy, that exists in many countries, of sports clubs in order to pursue its policies, then the degree of cultural change would be far more significant. As should now be clear, there is a danger of reading too much significance into the fact that such a high proportion of the world's population watch some part of the Olympic Games or the football World Cup. What is more significant is when the state intervenes to manipulate, support or impose emergent cultural trends. More significant still is when there is evidence of changes to long-established sporting traditions or to deeply embedded societal attitudes and values such as a move closer to the rational-bureaucratic model of sports organisation or an acceptance of women's participation in the same elite competitive sports as men.

There are two conclusions that emerge from the discussion of globalisation as a process. The first is an acknowledgement that the significance of cultural change must be conceptualised in terms of depth of social embeddedness and that we must be wary of granting too much importance to shifts in the popularity of particular teams, sports or events. The second conclusion is that while the political and cultural dimensions have a degree of autonomy from economic processes, it is economic interests that have become much more prominent in sport in the last 25 years as major sports and sports events have become increasingly a focus for private profit rather than state subsidy.
Globalisation as an outcome

If we accept that globalisation is a process then the questions arise of whether the process has an end point and whether the direction or trajectory of globalisation fixed. From the point of view of sport globalisation, there are at least three fairly clearly observable trajectories of globalisation visible in contemporary sport (see Table 2). The first is a globalised sporting world where nation and nationality mean little in terms of defining identity, the provision of funding or the regulatory framework within which sport takes place. Sports teams, leagues and events are deterritorialised and no longer defined primarily by national affiliation, but structured according to some other principle such as commercial opportunity, religion, sexuality or ideology. Professional road cycling, where multinational teams compete in a global competition circuit, is probably the best example of organisation around a commercial principle, although it is interesting to note the extent to which regional and national communities adopt teams as their own, even though the link with the territory is often tenuous.
<table>
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<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Globalised sport</th>
<th>Internationalised sport</th>
<th>Multinationalised sport</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation as the defining unit of international sport and nationality as the defining characteristic of sportsmen and sportswomen</td>
<td>Multinational/ nationally ambiguous teams the norm, as in Formula 1 motor-racing and professional road cycling</td>
<td>Teams defined by their country of origin, e.g. as in the Olympic Games, and inter-national soccer club competitions</td>
<td>The nation is an important, and perhaps primary, reference point for team/athlete definition. However, athletes/teams will represent their nations, but also other politically defined units, whether sub-national (e.g. Quebec’s participation in the Francophone Games or supranational (a European team in the World Athletics Championships)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extent of global diversity in sport</td>
<td>Diminishing diversity and/or the overlaying of regionally/ nationally distinctive sporting traditions with an increasingly uniform pattern of Olympic and major international team/ individual sports</td>
<td>Maintenance of a vigorous national/ regional sporting culture which exists alongside or takes precedence over Olympic and major international team/individual sports</td>
<td>Increasing diversity in terms of opportunities for competitions, although there may be a decline in diversity among sports themselves with those without an international stage being especially vulnerable to margin-alisation through the adoption by governments of selective funding policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of state patronage of elite sport</td>
<td>Minimal, sports are either financially self-sufficient or attract commercial patronage</td>
<td>Substantial, most Olympic and major international sports depend on state subsidy</td>
<td>Substantial, although some wariness regarding the allocation of national funds to support supranational teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which sports businesses and organisations operate within a national framework of regulation</td>
<td>Self-regulation by the industry or no regulation</td>
<td>National framework of regulation, e.g. licensing of clubs, coaches, sports venues and television broad-casting or supranational framework of regulation, for example, by the European Union</td>
<td>National regulatory frameworks important but both businesses and sports organisations operate within multiple regulatory frameworks, especially within the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which international sports federations and the IOC are subject to domestic control</td>
<td>Immune from domestic regulatory and legal systems or in countries where the legal system is ‘protective’ of corporate/organisational interests</td>
<td>Subject to legal challenge and regulatory oversight at state level, but also at supranational level</td>
<td>Subject to legal challenge and regulation at both national and supranational levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Hirst and Thompson, 1999

The second trajectory of globalisation leads to an outcome which is characterised by a pattern of intense international sporting competition. In other words the internationalised sporting world is defined by the volume of competition between athletes, squads and teams drawn from clearly defined nation states and where these international competitions are considered, by regional and national
communities, to be more important than domestic competitions. Whether Liverpool FC beat Everton FC and whether Liverpool FC win the Premier League would be clearly of less interest to their fans than whether Liverpool FC won the European Champions League. A third possible outcome is best described as multinationalised sport, where the nation is still an important reference point for identity and the state a key source of resources for sports development, but the pattern of sports participation and fan identification reflects the increasingly common multiple or nested identities that a growing proportion of the world’s population experience, especially in the industrialised countries. In the UK, for example, there has long been a capacity among Rugby Union supporters to support the England team in the Six Nations championships and also the British and Irish Lions (a team drawn from the four home countries plus Ireland, a foreign country) who compete against southern hemisphere countries such as Australia and New Zealand. England supporters seemed quite able to cheer on the Irishman Brian O’Driscoll when he is playing for the Lions even though he regularly plays against England in the Six Nations competition. Furthermore English football supporters of Irish descent seen quite capable of supporting both England and Ireland in international matches and coping with the split loyalty when the two teams have to play each other.

Taking each criterion identified in Table 2 in turn, the first is the role and significance of the nation as the defining factor or reference point in international sport. The extent to which a nation was ever a clear and unambiguous concept is often exaggerated, but it is undoubtedly the case that the reality underpinning the ‘imagined community’ of the nation is often both frail and pragmatic. On the one hand governments have frequently been enthusiastic in allowing applications for naturalisation from elite athletes and have, on occasion, actively ‘bought’ elite athletes from other countries. For example, Fiona May, the British-born long-jumper, was granted Italian nationality and subsequently went on to win a world title in 1995. When May lost her title four years later, she lost it to an athlete, Niurka Montalvo, whose nationality was equally complex. Montalvo originally competed for Cuba but when she took May’s title she was a Spaniard. There are also examples of Ethiopian-born athletes competing as naturalised Turks and Sudanese-born athletes competing as naturalised Qatari.

Merged, blurred and ambiguous national identities would be expected in truly globalised sport. By contrast, under conditions of internationalised sport, the nation would be protected as the defining unit of international sport. The status of the nation as an organising concept for sport is intimately linked to the significance of the state with which it has, in the vast majority of cases, a mutually dependent if not symbiotic relationship (see Houlihan, 1997). Under conditions of multinational sport, the state would retain a central role as a reference point for the organisation of international sport and for the identity of athletes, but it would lose a degree of exclusivity. Increasingly, other geo-political reference points would emerge either based on supranational organisations (such as the European Union) or on geography, with the increasing construction of ‘continental’ teams (e.g. the
European team that competes against the USA in golf's Ryder Cup; the presence of a European team, alongside other national and continental teams, in the IAAF Athletics World Championships.

The second characteristic is the extent of sports diversity throughout the world. Under conditions of globalised sport, one might expect to find that local/regional sporting forms were retreating in the face of a largely European diet of Olympic sports and major commercial sports and the rational-bureaucratic form of organisation with which they are underpinned. In essence it would be the non-national holders of power, such as the international federations and transnational sports businesses, that would provide the direction and momentum for change at the domestic level. By contrast, under conditions of internationalised sport, the dynamics of change in sporting culture would be substantially national. Multinationalist sport would result in an increasing diversity of competition opportunities with, for example, the European Union providing a context for new competitions, but not necessarily any increase in the diversity of sports available at the elite level.

Third, under conditions of globalised sport, one would expect the role of the state as a patron of, and organisational focus for, elite sport to be slight, by comparison with commercial patrons for example. Internationalised sport would be characterised by a key role for the state, which would play a central role in funding and organising elite sport, reflecting a situation where engagement with global sport is determined significantly by nationally set priorities. Under conditions of multinational sport, state patronage would remain important, although supranational state organisations would provide both an additional source of patronage and a further set of constraints on the decision-making freedom of sports governing bodies.

The fourth characteristic refers to the degree to which commercial sports organisations, including professional football clubs, broadcasting companies, and event organising bodies, operate within national frameworks of regulation. Globalised sport would be typified by minimal regulation or a pattern of self-regulation while under conditions of internationalised sport national or regional (e.g. European Union) systems of licensing, certification and training would create a mosaic of distinctive regulatory systems and consequently of sports practices. The conditions of multinationalised sport would be similar to those of internationalised sport, except that there would be clear evidence of dual regulation from the domestic and the supranational levels.

The final characteristic is the degree to which international sports organisations, such as the Commonwealth Games Federation, the IOC and the international federations, are subject to control by the domestic political/administrative/legal system. Under conditions of globalised sport, one would expect these engines of globalisation to be substantially immune from domestic systems of regulation or to be located in countries traditionally protective of corporate interests, such as
Switzerland and Monaco. Within an internationalised system, international federations and the IOC would be open to legal challenge and interest group lobbying and enjoy no privileges arising solely from their status as global sports organisations. Multinationalised sport would be characterised, in Europe at least, by dual-level oversight and regulation.

A cursory reflection on the pattern of engagement between sport in the UK and international sport would quickly indicate that it corresponds neatly to none of the three ideal types, but rather exhibits a mixed profile. The nation clearly remains the primary reference point for sports identity, but paradoxes and ambiguities abound. Celtic FC (in Scotland) still attracts passionate support from over 60,000 fans for each home game as well as from the many thousands who are not able to attend matches. Yet Celtic regularly field a majority of non-Scottish players including Nakamura from Japan. In tennis and boxing there is the strong impression that the British public is more willing to support Andy Murray and Amir Khan than Greg Rusedski and Lennox Lewis. Similarly, in Formula One motor racing the fact that many of the top teams are based in Britain is given little weight if the driver is not British. Thus it appears that for some sports (e.g. football), place is important in affecting the public's sense of identity, while for others (Formula One) it is not; for some sports the nationality of the players does not prevent strong identification while for other sports (e.g. tennis and boxing), nationality, or at least accent, remains important.

>From the foregoing discussion of the threefold ideal typology, it should be clear that, as in the discussion of the process of globalisation, the state commands a central position in any discussion of the outcome of globalising processes. Whichever examples of globalisation are selected, anti-doping efforts, the development of sports broadcasting, the movement of sportsmen and women between clubs and countries, or the response to football hooliganism, the state is of central significance in determining the pattern of engagement between national and global sport and is far from the residual institution that is sometimes suggested (see Houlihan, 2003). This is not to argue that the state is a natural adversary of globalisation. Indeed some states, especially those with an ideological commitment to liberal economics, may well be the primary source of momentum for the intensification of flows between the national and the international.

In summary, it can be argued that sport globalisation as a process has no pre-determined outcome. Indeed there are a variety of possible outcomes which would conform to the conventional definitions of globalisation, which stress the more extensive and intensive connections between people and places due to the increasing transnational flow of people, ideas, information, commodities and capital. However, a significant determinant of the trajectory of globalisation in general and of sport globalisation in particular is the behaviour of states.
There are three interrelated elements to the commercialisation of sport: first, the transformation of many sports events, clubs and athletes into valuable brands and commodities; second, the growth of sport as a source of profit for non-sports businesses through, for example, sponsorship and broadcasting; and third, the growth of sports-related businesses such as sportswear and equipment manufacture (Slack 2004; Amis & Cornwell 2005). The growth in the commercial value of sport has been spectacular. In the United States the sport industries were valued at $47bn in 1986 increasing to $152bn in 1995 and $213bn by 1999 (Slack 2004). In the United Kingdom there has also been rapid growth with the value of sport to the economy rising from £8.9bn in 1990 to £15.2bn in 2000 (Gratton & Taylor 2000). Both countries are part of an estimated $324bn global sports industry (Silk et al 2004). While the growth in the size of the sports industrial sector is significant in its own right it is the implications of this growth for the development of sport, for those involved in sport and for the state that is of especial concern.

Of particular importance is the extent to which governments acknowledge sport as an economic sector that they need to foster and also the extent to which the buoyancy of the sports sector is a resource that they can use to help achieve other non-sporting objectives. The perception of sport (along with other cultural services) as part of a cultural industrial sector rather than simply as a recipient of public subsidy has taken a long time to work its way into the consciousness of governments, especially those of a more neo-liberal persuasion. Recognition has come most obviously in respect of bids to host major sports events. For Norway (1994 Lillehammer Olympics and proposed bid for the 2018 winter Olympic Games), Germany (World Cup hosts in 2006), Canada (winter Olympic hosts in Vancouver in 2010), and the UK (hosts of Euro’96 and of the 2012 Olympic Games) the economic benefits to the national balance of payments and to the local and regional economy have featured prominently in the rationales for government support of bids.

Commercialisation has also affected the way in which athletes relate to their sports with the most obvious impact being the increasing number who see sport as a career. The rapid decline in elite level amateur sport in track and field, tennis and, most recently, in rugby union, and the steady increase in the number of national Olympic committees which routinely give financial rewards to their medallists are both indicative of this trend. Countries, especially in Scandinavia, and organisations, such as the European Union, in which there is a lobby to retain, what the EU refers to as, the ‘European model of sport’ in contrast to the commercial model typified by the United States, face an uphill struggle to hold back the neo-liberal commercialisation of sport. Canada (in relation to football, track & field, and hockey) and Norway (particularly in relation to soccer) have both tried to resist, or at least manage, commercialisation but with only limited success and have consequently seen many of their elite players move abroad and, in the case of Canada, their domestic leagues taken over by their more powerful
neighbour, the USA, as well as seen the standard of play in their domestic competitions fall.

Finally, commercialisation has had an impact upon the ethos and management practices in sport and demonstrates the extent of overlap with *governmentalisation*. In Canada the sometimes painful transition from ‘kitchen table to boardroom’ for national sports organisations has been well documented (see for example, Kikulis et al., 1995; Auld & Godbey, 1998; Slack & Hinings, 1992). In the UK the Labour government’s modernisation agenda has had significant consequences for how national governing bodies of sport are managed and, more importantly, manage themselves (Green & Houlihan 2006). In order to access sponsorship funding and develop their sports, events and teams as brands and marketable commodities national sports organisations have increasingly had to import business practices and expertise of the corporate sponsors they are trying to impress. For example, targets and performance indicators are imposed from the centre. Audit and inspection regimes now proliferate, and are supported by sanctions imposed on those organisations that “fail” to meet these centrally imposed targets.

*Governmentalisation*

Governmentalisation consequently overlaps with and reinforces many of the pressures exerted through commercialisation. However, the most important aspect of governmentalisation is the development of a state apparatus for the delivery and management of sport. In many countries in this study government involvement has generally expanded, often with the government working in conjunction with voluntary sports associations, but also with the steady accrual of functions to itself and the consequent development of specialist administrative units and agencies at national and sub-national levels, and the allocation of responsibility for sport policy at ministerial level. By the early part of the twenty-first century sport has become so well established within the machinery of government and within the portfolio of government responsibilities that governments are able to influence significantly the pattern of sporting opportunities within communities, success at elite level and the scope and activities of both the commercial and voluntary sectors.

Clearly, the extent to which these three forces are recognised as external to particular domestic policy processes will vary considerably. For a number of countries, especially the more neo-liberal, the international ideological environment will appear far less alien than for countries where the commodification of sport is more limited and where the capacity of government to expand its role is also limited. Thus, referring to Figure 1, external forces may, in some countries, be reinforcing national administrative patterns, dominant policy paradigms, and deep structural values whereas in others there may be a higher level of conflict at some or all of these levels. The next section discusses the institutions at the domestic level that constrain or mediate the impact of international forces.

**National level institutional constraints**
In all countries factors such as the accumulation of previous policy decisions, the organisation of the machinery of government, the history of relations with other countries, religious values, the distribution of function between national and sub-national government, the political party structure, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive all combine to provide a series of institutionalised constraints on the scope of policy choice. For Thelen and Steinmo, institutions ‘shape how political actors define their interests and ... structure their relations of power to other groups’ (1992: 2) and are seen as significant constraints and mediating factors in politics, which 'leave their own imprint' (1992: 8).

Although the concept of an institution is defined in a wide variety of ways there are two broad orientations in the literature, one emphasising the significance of institutions as organisational entities (agencies, departments, parliaments etc), and the other, cultural institutionalism, which highlights shared values, norms and beliefs. Both variants have a historical dimension which emphasises the ‘relative autonomy of political institutions from the society in which they exist; … and the unique patterns of historical development and the constraints they impose on future choices’ (Howlett & Ramesh 1995: 27). Examples of institutions as organisational entities would include the structure of government (whether unitary or federal, whether centralised or decentralised) the relationship between the executive and the legislature, the extent of separation of powers and the structure and stability of the political party system. Cultural institutionalism is perhaps most clearly reflected in the dominant religion of a country, but would also be affected by the history of relations with other countries, the behaviour of previous governments etc which would affect key values such as trust in government and in other people and beliefs about the role of women in society.

Institutions constrain sport policy choice through their capacity to shape actors’ perception of both problems and acceptable solutions. For example, in Japan what is the impact on sport policy of responsibility resting with the Education Ministry? Is the fact that Japan came 5th in 2004 Olympic Games with 16 Gold Medals a problem – a cause for concern? More broadly how does Japan’s history affect its resistance or openness to international influences arising from globalisation, commercialisation and governmentatisation of sport? Is the re-instatement of traditional sports in the school curriculum a reaction against the homogenisation of the global school sport curriculum? How would we explain Japan’s initial resistance to involvement in the work of the World Anti-Doping Agency be explained?

One attempt to explain the impact of domestic culture on broad social policy has been provided by Esping-Andersen (1990) who, in his well-known analysis of welfare states distinguished between three welfare regimes: liberal, conservative and social democratic. Liberal welfare regimes ‘reflect a political commitment to minimize the state, to individualize risks, and to promote market solutions’ (Esping-Andersen 1999:74ff). Liberal welfare regimes include Canada, the United
States and the UK. According to Esping-Andersen (1999:78) the social democratic welfare regime is ‘virtually synonymous with the Nordic countries’. The social democratic welfare regime is ‘committed to comprehensive risk coverage, generous benefit levels, and egalitarianism’. It is distinct for its active ‘effort to de-commodify welfare’, for the ‘fusion of universalism with generosity’ and its ‘comprehensive socialization of risks’. The social democratic regime is ‘inevitably a state-dominated welfare nexus’. Germany and Austria represent what Esping-Andersen (1999:81ff) labels a conservative welfare regime. The ‘essence’ of this regime ‘lies in its blend of status segmentation and familialism’. In some countries ‘a significant part of health care is […] non-state but this is chiefly due to the role played by non-profit, ‘voluntary’ associations, frequently affiliated with the Church’. The family is the central care-giver and ‘ultimately responsible for its members’ welfare’.

Esping-Andersen’s research remains a landmark in the development of the comparative analysis of welfare/social policy, as much for the stimulus it gave to similar research as for the initial identification of the three distinct types of welfare systems. Siaroff (1994), who developed a cluster analysis of welfare states in developed countries based on the extent to which they met women’s needs, provided one of the most interesting critical re-analyses of Esping-Andersen’s work. Women’s needs were defined in relations to three criteria: the general family welfare orientation of policy, the desirability of female work (e.g. the extent to which the state supports women’s employment with subsidised child care facilities), and which parent receives child benefits. Interestingly, Siaroff’s analysis produced clusters very similar to Esping-Andersen’s but added the new category of ‘late female mobilisation’. Table 3 provides a summary of the most recent attempts to categorise welfare regimes.

Table 3: A typology of welfare regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare regime type</th>
<th>Typical country</th>
<th>Entitlement basis of benefits</th>
<th>Distributional impact of benefits</th>
<th>Extent of meeting women’s needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism (Protestant liberal)</td>
<td>USA, UK</td>
<td>Commodified</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation (advanced Christian democratic)</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
<td>Semi-decommodified (insurance)</td>
<td>Status differential maintained</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic (Protestant social democratic)</td>
<td>Sweden, Denmark, Norway</td>
<td>Decommodified (citizenship)</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late female mobilisation</td>
<td>Japan, Spain</td>
<td>Semi-commodified (insurance)</td>
<td>Status differential maintained</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State bureaucratic</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Russia</td>
<td>Decommodified (work loyalty)</td>
<td>Proletarianised but privileges</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Deacon 1997: 42

The typologies summarised by Deacon are accepted as snapshots of a dynamic
policy field and there is considerable debate about the direction of change and whether there are signs of a convergence around a neo-liberal commodified model of welfare. However, of particular importance for this discussion is whether sport policy conforms to the typology outlined in Table 3. It is suggested that while there are clear pressures for convergence around a neo-liberal, market-led model of sport distinct sports cultures and models still persist and continue to be defined by national boundaries.

**Concluding comments**

In the light of the discussion of international influences on domestic policy and the mediating role of domestic organisational and cultural institutions how would we describe and explain the contemporary pattern of Japanese sport? Table 4 provides a suggested assessment using the structure outlined in Table 1.

**Table 4: The context of domestic Japanese sport policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional factors</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative arrangements</strong> (location of responsibility for sport between levels of government, between central government departments and between government and quasi-government organisations)</td>
<td>Centralised decision-making, especially for elite sport; mass sport mainly a responsibility of municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patterns of resource dependence</strong> (statutory or non-statutory nature of funding; sources and stability of funding – national taxation, sub-national taxation, lottery, charity or commercial)</td>
<td>Heavy dependence on state funding (tax and lottery); some corporate funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction between interest groups</strong> (number, configuration and strength of interest groups; existence and status of professional body for sport providers; access to government and public officials)</td>
<td>Weak interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant policy paradigm</strong> (privatisation, commodification, social inclusion, nation-building, universalism etc.)</td>
<td>Neo-liberal; suspicion of state intervention; concern with national prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service-specific policy paradigm</strong> (dominant definitions of problems and preferred solutions)</td>
<td>Sport important for international prestige and for developing positive social values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deep structural values/storylines</strong> (value assumptions about: human nature, the proper scope of government, countries defined as 'significant others' etc.)</td>
<td>Sport has low status as a career; women’s sport has low (or lower) status than men’s; long established rivalry with other major powers in the region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There can be no doubting the importance of current debates concerning
globalisation in aiding our understanding of a number of key issues in sport, including: the significance of sport in the cultural fabric of a community; the interpenetration of sport with business in general and the international media in particular; and the significance of sport to governments and supranational governmental organisations. Yet, as this paper has demonstrated, the analysis of globalisation and the consequent refinement of the concept is still in its infancy. As a result there is a need for caution both in the use of the concept and in the conclusions drawn about the nature and consequences of globalising trends.

This chapter has touched on two key debates over the nature of globalisation: globalisation as process and globalisation as outcome. In both of these areas there is a notable lack of consensus which reflects not only the shortage of empirical study, but also the complexity and multifaceted character of the processes under consideration. As regards the process of globalisation, the significance of economic power in sport must be acknowledged, but simply to treat global sport as a cipher for, or a tool of, economic interests is an overextension of the limited evidence available. Moreover, claims that sport is capable of penetrating and altering deeply rooted local cultural practices must also await more substantial evidence. This scepticism is not to deny the possibility that sport may be a leading factor in, for example, bringing about greater equality for women, but rather to suggest that while sport may indeed be in the vanguard of cultural change, it may also be simply a highly visible reflection of change which has originated elsewhere – in the workplace for example.

The discussion of globalisation as an outcome highlighted the importance of treating globalisation as an open-ended set of processes which do not necessarily lead to a fixed destination. Globalisation is a complex and contingent set of processes within which the state plays a key role in shaping their pace, character and trajectory. The state is still the primary reference point for international sport and a central actor in determining the pattern of engagement between domestic sport and international sport.

References

**It Anyway?** London: Mainstream Publishing.


