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CHAPTER VI

Challenge, Reaction, and Reconciliation

At the beginning of the 20th century, secular modernists initiated a political and cultural movement for the modernization of Minangkabau society. They called themselves the kaum muda (Group of the Young or Progressive) as opposed to the kaum kuno (Group of the Old or Conservative) consisting of traditional elites such as penghulus and teachers of the old tarekats. The role of this secular modernist movement as a challenger to the kaum kuno had been surpassed by orthodox-oriented Islamic reformists by the mid-1910s. The reformists were also referred to as the kaum muda. They denounced the heterodoxy of the old tarekats and aimed at social reform in order to create an Islamic society at the expense of the matrilineal adat order. Sumatra Thwalib founded in Padang Panjang in 1918 was the core of their activity. In the 1920s, another Islamic modernist movement, Muhammadiyah, developed rapidly in West Sumatra influenced by the movement in Java. The Islamic modernists were oriented to the improvement of social and economic welfare, as well as social reform directed to an Islamic society. Leaders of these Islamic kaum muda groups often originated from families of highly respected ulama (Islamic scholars), the wealthy class, merchants, and civil servants. Generally speaking, the kaum muda was based on commercial groups and urban dwellers.

After the communist-led uprisings the challenge of the kaum muda to the adat leaders was intensified at the nagari level. However, the response of the adat party was also strengthened at the same time because of their growing influence in the economic field which was based on their control over lineage sawah. These two factors gave rise to a severe conflict between the two parties. In reacting to the challenge of the kaum muda which was explicitly offered at a supra-nagari level the kaum kuno also became organized on a supra-nagari or all Minangkabau level. The revival of the penghulus' authority should, however, be understood to

1. For detailed discussion, see Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra 1927-1933 (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1971), pp. 3-70. I use the term 'kaum kuno' consistently to denote conservative groups in general.
be relative in nature compared with that in the 1910s and 1920s. From a long-term viewpoint it was steadily declining. At the end of the 1930s, the conflict between the kaum muda and kaum kuno was temporarily mitigated by a movement for an Indonesian Parliament. However, this temporary unity was disrupted when the Dutch rejected the establishment of an Indonesian parliament in 1941, and the conflict came to the surface again.

**Challenge**

One of the most significant influences of the communist-led revolt was the politicization of the Minangkabaus in general. The political sensitivity of the population was certainly sharpened through the communist movement, even when not directly involved or sympathetic to it. Although some nagaris gave adat feasts of apology at the end of the revolt, as in the tax rebellion in 1908, the subsequent government suppression gradually exacerbated anti-Dutch sentiment among Minangkabaus. Arrests were sometimes based on false reports. In the Solok division, at least 39 persons including some nagari heads and penghulus were arrested without sufficient evidence or with false evidence. Government forces beat men and maltreated women in the presence of the villagers, especially when they could not find evidence. Many claims of maltreatment were sent to the resident of West Sumatra. This politicization made the challenge of the kaum muda much more nationalistic.

There was a clear-cut difference in leadership between the anti-tax rebellion and the communist-led revolt. In the former the leadership of the kaum kuno was virtually confined to the nagari level, while in the latter communist leadership cut across nagaris. The reduced effectiveness of traditional leadership on supra-nagari issues was further evidenced by a series of protest meetings against the government's intention of introducing the guru ordinance, by which every Islamic teacher was required

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2. Letter of van der Plas, Fort de Kock, 30 May 1927, Mailr.136x/1927.


4. Letter of N. Beets, Weltevreden, 13 September 1927, Mailr.1141x/1927. See also reports in Mailr. 1150x/1927 and 1296x/1927.
to have a written registration paper. At protest meetings, culminating in August 1928, some kaum kuno ulama supported the ordinance in the hope that it would check the influence of the kaum muda. However the overwhelming influence of kaum muda ulama easily suppressed the voice of the kaum kuno ulama. In spite of its superior influence in residency-wide issues, the kaum muda could not overcome the influence of the kaum kuno at the village level. Penghulus accepted kaum muda individuals in the nagari only as advisors but completely excluded them from decision making. Thus, the major struggle of the kaum muda became directed towards the individual nagaris, which unavoidably intensified a conflict between the two parties at this level. The nagari was the most important stronghold of the kaum kuno. The challengers insisted on using Malay at the Friday Service instead of Arabic, which was dominant in the kaum kuno system; they tried to gain control of the mosque, the zakat and fitra, both Islamic contributions, and to set up their own Islamic schools. Of these, the control of the zakat and fitra which had been enjoyed by kaum kuno ulama was important for the expansion of kaum muda activity in establishing branches and schools in the economic depression in the 1930s. The challengers asked penghulus to replace mosque officials by kaum muda members on the grounds that they did not like praying under kaum kuno ulama.

5. Letter of Gobee, Batavia, 19 May 1928, Mailr.100lx/1928; PPO for 1928, Mailr. 316x/1929.
8. For instance, Muhammadiyah decided this policy. PPO for April 1934, Mailr.665x/1934. Conflict caused by this issue took place everywhere. See, PPO for January 1935, Mailr.225x/1935; PPO for May 1935, Mailr.713x/1935; PPO for November 1939, Mailr.178x/1940.
Besides attacking *kaum kuno ulama*, the challengers directed the villagers away from the adat and penghulus. They claimed that the function of penghulus should be taken over either by Western educated Minangkabaus or by *kaum muda ulama*. In the nagari Balai Salasa on the coast, a *kaum muda* Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, established a community with its own Friday Service. The penghulus of the nagari regarded the community as a rival 'state' within the 'state' of the nagari. The penetration of the *kaum muda* into the nagari was facilitated by the fact that young people were becoming less wedded to the adat and more oriented towards Islamic reformism, and Western ideologies.

The influence of the *kaum muda* was particularly strong in regions such as Pariaman, Padang, Padang Panjang, Maninjau, Bukittinggi, and Suliki. It should be noted that these regions were poor in sawah and also were influenced by the communist movement in the middle of the 1920s. Apart from commercial towns themselves, these regions had a common feature during the depression. Many inhabitants of these regions had left their home villages during the export boom, and now they came back home. However, those who returned could not find sufficient livelihood in their home villages. Some of them had to leave again and others became engaged in Islamic and political movements. In the Maninjau region, the latter tendency was noticeable.

The *kaum muda* energetically expanded its influence through education, setting up schools not only in big towns but also in rural and adat-minded areas. Several factors contributed to the development of private schools, including government-subsidized and non-subsidized ones. One factor was the decrease of government subsidies for education. The central government had been curtailing financial subsidies for the government village schools (volksscholen) since the late 1920s, and began to cut them drastically after the economic crisis at the end of 1929.

10. PPO for May 1933, Mailr. 848x/1933.
12. PPO for August 1933, Mailr.1249x/1933.
In 1931, the Minangkabaus generally protested against the policy of economizing in the education sphere, as the curtailment of the subsidies meant the increase of financial burdens on the population. This policy was nevertheless intensified after 1933, when the government applied a self-financing principle to village schools. The government subsidies for the village schools were not a free grant but had to be refunded by the nagaris. The total amount of this refund increased from f.12,600 in 1933 to f.63,000 in 1936 in West Sumatra as a whole. The stagnation of the government schools favoured the private schools.

The economic depression in the 1930s had another impact upon education. A diploma from a government school did not always improve job opportunities in a period of bad economic conditions. Parents came to think the diploma a luxury. Kaum muda schools had a big advantage compared with the government and kaum kuno schools. In the 1930s many kaum muda schools began to provide secular subjects as well as Islamic ones, while the government schools offered only secular subjects and the kaum kuno ones kept concentrating on a purely Islamic education. For the bulk of the Minangkabaus, both subjects were wanted. This was a reason why parents were more willing to send children to kaum muda schools than to the government ones in spite of the fact that private schools were not necessarily cheaper than the government schools in terms of school fees.

The rapid development of private schools can be seen in the case of the Fort van der Capellen sub-division, an adat minded region. At the end of 1937, there were 48 private schools there, of which 39 were inaugurated after 1930, most of them were under the control of kaum muda organizations, namely Muhammadiyah, Sumatra Thawalib, and Persatuan Muslim Indonesia (Permi). In comparison with this, government village

schools increased by only 7 between 1930 and 1937. It must not be forgotten that many Thawalib graduates became teachers in private schools in the 1930s, even when such schools did not belong to a specific organization. Sometimes schools were established by kaum kuno individuals, but became converted into kaum muda schools in substance.

The penetration of kaum muda influences into the nagari by means of education was a direct threat to the power of the adat authorities and kaum kuno ulama. It was not welcomed by the government either, for kaum muda groups were much politicized, and they led the intensification of criticism of the Dutch after the communist-led revolt (see below). Teachers in the non-subsidized private schools were placed under restrictions in 1932, when an applicant was obliged to obtain a certificate from a government or government-subsidized school to show that he would not disturb peace and order, and would not criticize the authority of the colonial regime (so-called Wild School Ordinance, Staatsblad 1932, no.494). This regulation did not restrain criticism but inflamed it by adding new fuel to the opposition movement.

A radical change in the Islamic school system took place in 1936 on the initiative of kaum muda teachers. Considering the inconvenience of the existing system in which each school had a different curriculum and used different textbooks, Islamic teachers decided to establish uniform education. In addition, various types of Islamic schools were classified into three grades; lower, middle and high school. At a conference in Padang Panjang from 2nd to 5th July 1936, 236 representatives attended from 154 boys' and 14 girls' schools, of which

17. Schaufler, M.v.O., pp.75-84.
19. This ordinance was supplemented by two regulations by which the minimum number of pupils of private schools to be entitled to receive government subsidies was stipulated: 30 pupils for the village school; 80 for the standard school; and 40 for the continuation school. Staatsblad, 1932, no.553; Bijbald van Staatsblad, no.12978.
20. PPO for January 1933, Mailr.357x/1933; PPO for February 1933, Mailr.590x/1933.
134 schools altogether decided to adopt the uniform education program. This movement also took place at the local level, as in the Muara Labuh sub-division where 14 Islamic schools agreed to have a uniform system. The standardization of Islamic education kept advancing until the end of the colonial period.

At the beginning of the 1930s, two Islamic political parties were founded in West Sumatra: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islam Association Party or PSII) born out of the Partai Sarekat Islam; Persatuan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Union or Permi) transformed from Sumatra Thawalib. These two parties strongly devoted themselves to kebangsaan (nationalism) as well as to Islamic reformism. Although the Permi first rejected Sukarno's excessive emphasis on secularism at the expense of Islam, it eventually became a promoter of the parties led by Sukarno, Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party or Partindo) in particular, as a result of compromise on both sides. Muhammadiyah had tended to avoid political involvement, and rather concentrated on the improvement of social and economic welfare. However, it also committed itself to the nationalist movement to some extent. After the establishment of Pendidikan National Indonesia (Indonesian National Education Club or normally referred to as PNI Baru led by Hatta) in 1932, Muhammadiyah began to co-operate with the organization in West Sumatra.

In the first half of the 1930s, branches of Java-based parties were gradually established in various places in West Sumatra: Partai National Indonesia (Indonesian National Party or PNI founded by Sukarno in 1927) in Padang, Padang Panjang, Payakumbuh, Maninjau, Pariaman, the

21. PPO for June 1936, Mailr.752x/1936.
22. PPO for July 1936, Mailr.809x/1936.
23. PPO for November 1939, Mailr.178x/1940.
The distribution of nationalist centres shows that the movement was active in towns and regions poor in rice. Despite support from some Minangkabau groups, the purely secular nationalist organizations did not make a remarkable expansion towards the end of the 1930s. For instance, PNI branches in West Sumatra declined to a point where only the Padang branch with 40 members was working effectively. The decline can be explained by the harsh suppression of the nationalist movement by the Dutch, but also in part by the Minangkabau preference for Islamic ideology.

When the Islamic and secular nationalist movements were under severe Dutch repression, a new force was growing in West Sumatra, i.e., the pemuda (the youth). At the beginning of the 1930s, Islamic and educational organizations created affiliated youth groups. In addition new independent youth organizations were also organized as boy scout and sporting clubs. Most youth groups were considerably influenced by the major parties (Permi, PSII, and Muhammadiyah) for a while even when they were not directly connected with them. However, the pemuda became more and more independent of these major Islamic organizations. Although youth groups were not always political at their birth, they quickly became involved in politics as early as in 1932 when the Dutch changed the legal status of youth groups to a 'political party'. Youth groups not only functioned as a seedbed for Minangkabau political leaders but also challenged the leadership of the old generation of the major Islamic

25. PPO for February 1933, Mailr.590x/1933; PPO for April 1933, Mailr.813x/1933; PPO for June 1933, Mailr.1011x/1933; PPO for June 1937, Mailr.632x/1937; PPO for June 1938, Mailr.808x/1938.

26. PPO for June 1933, Mailr.1011x/1933; PPO for April 1935, Mailr.607x/1935; PPO for October 1937, Mailr.1061x/1937; PPO for 2nd half 1939, Mailr.434x/1940.

27. PPO for November 1939, Mailr.178x/1940.

organizations after the middle of the 1930s.²⁹ It was the pemuda who vigorously criticized the Dutch and penghulus from the latter half of the 1930s. For instance, one of the most distinguished pemuda leaders, Chatib Suleiman, bitterly criticized penghulus centring on Bukittinggi at the end of the 1930s,³⁰ and in the closing year of Dutch rule he organized a pro-Japanese movement to facilitate the collapse of Dutch rule (see Chapter VII).

The Reaction of the Kaum Kuno

The reaction of the kaum kuno to the challenge of the kaum muda was not particularly strong and well-organized before the communist-led uprisings. The challenge had tended to be directed to general issues rather than to the power of the kaum kuno in the individual nagari. In addition, both of them were engaged in opposition to the government during the time of political turmoil before the uprisings, although they were motivated by different grievances.

As the challenge descended to the nagari level, however, the reaction of the kaum kuno became stronger. Shortly after the communist-led uprisings, the oldest supra-village adat association, Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau (The Adat Union of the Minangkabau World) reacted to the challenge of the kaum muda by encouraging the idea that the adat was the only weapon with which penghulus could retain their authority.³¹ This was one of the earliest responses by kaum kuno penghulus after the uprisings. In the late 1920s, penghulus of Padang Panjang were persuad-

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ing parents not to send their children to Sumatra Thawalib schools, which were under the influence of the kaum muda.  

Kaum kuno penghulus were greatly encouraged by the effectiveness of penghulus' leadership in the Volksraad (The People's Council) election issue in 1929 (see below), and began to organize adat associations to cope with the kaum muda. In 1931 penghulus of nagari Kota Anau (Maninjau) formed the Barisan Adat Minangkabau (The Minangkabau Adat Front). From this time onwards, there was an immense mushrooming of adat associations everywhere in West Sumatra. The kaum kuno Islamic groups also united themselves. In May 1930 the central organization of kaum kuno schools, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiya (Union of Islamic Schools, Perti) or simply Tarbiyah Islamiyah, was founded. At a conference of Tarbiyah Islamiyah in late 1930 attended by some 1500 ulama, almost all the kaum kuno ulama in West Sumatra, the ulama adopted a resolution espousing co-operation alongside penghulus. Although kaum kuno

32. PPO for August 1933, Mailr.1249x/1933.
34. Examples of adat organizations are: Bond Penghulu Penghulu in Bukittinggi with 300 members, PPO for March 1932, Mailr.493x/1932; Partai Adat Minangkabau (Suliki), PPO for June 1932, Mailr.794x/1932; Parisai Adat (Kota Gedang, Maninjau), PPO for October 1932, Mailr.1227x/1932; Pembela Adat Nagari (Ladang Lawas), PPO for February 1933, Mailr.590x/1933; Persatuan Adat Padang Tarab and Dewang Penghulu Kota Lawas (Agam), PPO for April 1933, Mailr.813x/1933; Dewang Penghulu Pandai Sikat, Paninjawan, Gunung, Pursatuan Sungai Puar in PPO for May 1933, Mailr.848x/1933; Dewang Penghulu Minangkabau, PPO for February 1934, Mailr.480x/1934; Sarekat Orang Djinis Alam Minangkabau (Batu Bakat), PPO for January 1935, Mailr.255x/1935; Bond Penghulu Penghulu Nagari Singakarak and Penghulu Penghulu X Kota, PPO for February 1936, Mailr.316x/1936; Persirakatan Penghulu Penghulu Minangkabau (Payakumbuh), PPO for May 1937, Mailr.490x/1937.
35. Tarbiyah Islamiyah had 36 branches and 4000 members in West Sumatra around 1930. PPO for 4th quarter 1930, Mailr.228x/1931; PPO for 3rd quarter 1931, Mailr.1200x/1931; PPO for 1st quarter 1931, Mailr.540x/1931.
penghulus and ulama had stood on the same platform to resist the kaum muda and co-operated with each other implicitly, the co-operation was not as explicit as this resolution. While reacting against the kaum muda, the kaum kuno consolidated their inner solidarity, in nagari Kambang (Painan), for instance, where the nagari council criticized penghulus who attended a Muhammadiyah meeting.36

The reaction of the kaum kuno caused conflicts in many nagaris penetrated by kaum muda groups, which wanted to establish schools and branches or hold meetings. A new adat association in the Kamang sub-district (Agam) appealed to the Dutch local administration to ban a kaum muda branch there.37 Rejection of kaum muda ulama from other nagaris was quite common everywhere.38 This attitude was intensified by the introduction of restrictions, in 1933, upon meetings of four nationalistic organizations, namely Permi, PSII, PNI, and Partindo. These four organizations were not allowed to hold open meetings, and were obliged to obtain permission from the Dutch controleur beforehand to hold closed meetings. In connection with these restrictions, the resident of West Sumatra distributed a secret circular to all Dutch and Indonesian officials, instructing them to attend meetings, warn speakers, and dissolve meetings when topics were raised which referred to political issues. It is obvious that the purpose of these restrictions was to inhibit the growing nationalist movement in Indonesia.39 Penghulus and kaum kuno ulama abused the restriction measures by applying them to other associations. Even when the restricted organizations had notified the relevant government official and obtained permission, penghulus often banned meetings on their own initiative. Kaum muda groups complained to the government about this illegal intervention by penghulus, insisting that they

36. PPO for 3rd quarter 1931, Mailr.1200x/1931.
37. PPO for September 1932, Mailr.1159x/1932.
38. PPO for October 1932, Mailr.1227x/1932.
39. Instruction of Resident of West Sumatra, Padang, 5 August 1933, no.22/p/F, Mailr.1249x/1933; Instruction of Resident of West Sumatra, Padang, 24 August 1933, no.1784/G., in ibid.
would follow only the state law not the adat. The government faced a dilemma. It had to approve meetings of *kaum muda* groups as long as they were within the legal bounds accorded by the right of freedom of meeting and speech on the one hand, but government officials were on the other hand inclined to support the tactics of penghulus in the hope of preserving the adat and colonial order.

Despite the basic right of freedom of meeting and speech, Dutch officials in fact favoured the *kaum kuno*. At a meeting of the resident with representatives of *kaum muda* groups the resident told them that the conflict between the two parties was quite natural because the *kaum kuno* was conservative and the *kaum muda* was modern. In addition, he pointed out that it was not desirable to replace the adat order by a new one as long as the adat could provide peace and order. This statement encouraged the *kaum kuno*, and its endeavours to preserve the existing order. A *kaum muda* person was fined f.5 solely on the charge that he verbally insulted a penghulu. In Bonjol, adat-minded villagers threw stones at *kaum muda* ulama who entered the nagari. *Kaum muda* branches were sometimes forced to close down. Numerous meetings of *kaum muda* groups had to be cancelled for the same reason. Conservative penghulus, however, not only tried to exclude the influence of the *kaum muda* but also to strengthen adat authority by evoking the glory of the Minangkabau adat.

The case of the establishment of Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (Supreme Adat Council of the Minangkabau World, abbreviated as MTKAM) deserves to be investigated as an important example of the response of the *kaum kuno*, especially penghulus, to modern innovations.

40. PPO for May 1933, Mailr.848x/1933.
41. ibid; PPO for August 1933, Mailr.1249x/1933.
42. PPO for May 1935, Mailr. 713x/1935.
43. PPO for January 1937, Mailr.220x/1937.
44. PPO for September 1938, Mailr.1089x/1938.
When the government was trying to introduce the marriage registration law into West Sumatra in September 1937, both kaum muda and kaum kuno groups held a joint meeting to protest against the law. The planned law stipulated that marriage registration should be undertaken by a governmental or government authorized office instead of by a mosque as was the case at that time. The implication of this law was that a marrying couple and its families could avoid permission from their penghulus and customary payments to mosque officials. Those who attended the meeting, including many penghulus, insisted that marriage registration and celebration should remain within the realm of adat and Islam, and not be regulated by the government law. Although this meeting was organized on the initiative of a kaum muda association, the members of this association were enthusiastic not because they shared common interests with penghulus and mosque officials but because they wanted to increase their influence by making use of the general antipathy to the law. Soon after this meeting young penghulus of the Pariangan Padang Panjang sub-district, the legendary cradle of the Minangkabaus, set up the Comité Pertimbangan Ordonnantie Kawin Bercatet (Committee for Discussion of the Marriage Registration Ordinance). A conference held on 31 October 1937 was attended by 400 penghulus and nagari heads and it was decided to enlarge the committee into an all Minangkabau adat council. This committee called all penghulus to join. By the end of that year a new adat council, MTKAAM, had been inaugurated. Although there were some modernistic leaders in the council, its character was essentially adat-oriented, as can be seen in slogans adopted by members of the council like 'the supremacy of the adat and the responsibility of the penghulus to their fellow lineage members'.

45. PPO for February 1933, Mailr.590x/1933. Dutch officials in West Sumatra were generally negative to the intention of Batavia to introduce a marriage registration ordinance into West Sumatra, which plan was eventually dropped. See, Letter of Resident of West Sumatra (Gonggrijp) to Governor General, Padang, 28 January 1930, no.1103, and a circulation, dd. Padang, 16 January 1930, no.60, both in Mailr.135x/1930.

46. PPO for December 1938, Mailr.244x/1939.

47. PPO for October 1938, Mailr. 1061x/1937.
The movement by MTKAM to strengthen the adat spread quickly to other places. By September 1938 branches were founded in Talago (Suliki), Payakumbuh, Muara Labuh, Padang Panjang, Batusangkar, Lubuk Basung, Sungai Batang, and Lawang III Balai (the last three were in Maninjau), with a total membership of 1500, mostly penghulus. In the wake of this development, the activity of the organization gradually moved towards political issues. After the government abandoned the implementation of the marriage registration ordinance, the Council played an important role in advocating the participation of penghulus in the Minangkabau Council (see below). In 1939-1941 it was involved in the Indonesian Parliament movement. The fact that MTKAM changed its concern from the adat to more general and political issues symbolizes the direction in which most Minangkabau people were proceeding.

Reconciliation

The 

kaum muda did not spend all its time attacking the 

kaum kuno, and was sometimes prepared to compromise. A politicized 

kaum muda organization, Sumatra Thawalib, decided to co-operate with penghulus to struggle against colonial rule soon after the communist-led uprisings. For this purpose it organized the Persatuan Kebangsaan Minangkabau (Minangkabau National Union). A 

kaum muda Islamic organization (PSII) invited penghulus and 

tarekat ulama to a meeting held on 19th-20th January 1933 in Padang Panjang, at which the chairman said:

If peace is to come in Minangkabau, the adat and Islam must co-operate again with each other as was so previously under the leadership of Datuk Parapatih and Datuk Katumanggungan. The Minangkabau land fell into the hands of foreigners because the 

kaum adat and Islam lost the spirit of co-operation. Bite the hands of foreigners (the Dutch)!

These two cases clearly show that the reconciliation from the 

kaum muda's

48. PPO for December 1938, Mailr.244x/1938.
50. PPO for January 1933, Mailr.357x/1933.
side was strongly motivated by nationalism.

There were other, more practical, reasons for reconciliation. One of the most important kaum muda organizations, Muhammadiyah, consistently tried to acquire the trust of the government and penghulus. At the end of the 1930s, this organization adopted a policy of consulting penghulus on important issues, for instance, the inauguration of schools. This policy had some success in Pariaman and Painan, both on the coast. 51 Another kaum muda organization deliberately invited an adat leader to be chairman of its branch to mitigate antagonism between the two parties. 52

Adat authorities and kaum kuno ulama were generally more reluctant to compromise than the kaum muda. Nevertheless, there were some cases in which kaum kuno individuals initiated a reconciliation. Some kaum kuno ulama set up a committee to bring the kaum kuno and kaum muda together on a platform appealing for the exemption of Islamic teachers from corvee obligation. At the end of the 1930s, some kaum kuno ulama came to believe that if the conflict between the two could not be stopped, Minangkabau might be Christianized. 53 A meeting was also organized so that both the kaum kuno and kaum muda could meet to discuss what were real differences and where it might be possible to compromise. 54 These attitudes created an atmosphere of compromise in some areas such as the nagari Tapan, south of Padang, where both groups had the separate Friday Service first in their own way, and then had joint prayers. 55 Despite some compromises on both sides, the overall conflict between the two parties continued and was even deepened at the village level towards the end of Dutch rule.

51. PPO for January 1938, Mailr.187x/1938; PPO for May 1938, Mailr.609x/1938.
52. PPO for May 1932, Mailr.774x/1932.
53. PPO for May 1939, Mailr.759x/1939.
54. PPO for May 1937, Mailr.490x/1937.
55. PPO for September 1938, Mailr.1089x/1938.
Why was the *kaum kuno*, especially penghulus, able to put up such firm resistance to the ideas and demands of the *kaum muda* and the nationalists: what was the reason for the strengthening of the power of penghulus in the 1930s? One important factor was the much stronger suppression of not only politicized but also non-political *kaum muda* groups by the Dutch. The West Sumatran administration was always suspicious even of organizations such as Muhammadiyah, which was basically oriented to Islamic modernization, not to politics. From the government viewpoint, however, any movement which might threaten the adat order was dangerous. Another reason was the fact that the leadership of penghulus was strengthened by their stronger economic role in securing food, as described in Chapter V. The reaction of the *kaum kuno* was noticed everywhere except for commercial centres where the leadership of penghulus in agriculture was less. It was logical that the reaction was particularly strong in Tanah Datar, one of the three nucleus regions of the Highlands, Solok which had extensive sawah, and regions which had so far not been influenced by the *kaum muda*.

The Dilution of Adat and Changes in the Attitude of Penghulus

We have already discussed the fact that adat regulations on communal land (*harta pusaka*) remained relatively unchanged, and the leadership of penghulus within the nagari was even strengthened in some respects during the 1930s. However, these facts do not mean that the traditional type of nagari as a whole was maintained or restored. The adat kept irrevocably being undermined and the coherence of villagers was increasingly disintegrating, either because of Dutch administration or internal social change, as a long-term trend. In the old system, the primary concern of penghulus was the maintenance of adat and the internal harmony of their own nagari. However, penghulus had come to act politically not only at

56. There are numerous reports on the reaction of the *kaum kuno*; in the series of PPO between 1929 and 1940, at least 40 refer to the reaction. To quote but a few, PPO for 1929, Mailr.316x/1929; PPO for February 1933, Mailr.590x/1933; PPO for January 1940, Mailr.505x/1940.
the village but also at the supra-village level.

Part III of the West Coast Report, published as a result of the communist-led uprisings, concluded that nagari 'autonomy' should be regarded as a reality not a fiction. It recommended the policy of 'leaving it alone' for the nagari and adat administration, and therefore argued that government intervention in nagari affairs should be minimized, because the Commission thought that the instability and unrest in West Sumatra had been caused by the government's artificial intervention. However, this recommendation was not followed rigidly by the central and West Sumatran administrations: instead, intervention continued as before and even intensified in the wake of the development of nationalism and the conflict between the kaum muda and kaum kuno.

A pending issue for nagari administration was how to improve the collection of the uang nagari, which had been a virtual state tax from which the salary of the nagari head and nagari public expenditures were met. After a long discussion beginning in the late 1910s, the Dutch finally introduced a law which gave the nagari a legal right to punish those who neglected the payment (Staatsblad 1929, no.100 and 101), and this was implemented from the beginning of 1930. This new regulation converted the uang nagari into a pure state tax. The collection of the uang nagari was, however, not improved by such a punitive measure. The nagari head could neither put pressure on or punish villagers, even when they neglected the payment. As economic conditions deteriorated in the 1930s, the tax collected declined in value and payment in kind increased. Thus, most nagari heads received very little cash salary. In the middle 1930s, a Dutch official noticed that the government's policy of 'financial autonomy' for the nagari had made no progress in 20 years. The indigenous nagari treasury system, as a pillar of nagari autonomy, was destroyed by the Dutch and penghulus largely lost their customary enjoyment of adat dues. The decline of nagari autonomy was a natural consequence of the 'financial autonomy' policy, as the concept of 'autonomy'

57. Westkust Rapport, Deel III, pp.30 (no. 9), 90 (no. 2).
58. Meulens, M.v.O., p.29; Pauw, M.v.O., p.32.
59. Lapre (controleur of Painan), M.v.O., pp.43-44.
60. Cator, M.v.O., pp.33-34.
manufactured by the Dutch was not intended to foster the traditional nagari treasury system but aimed at making use of the nagari treasury for their administrative purposes. The appropriation of state income tax and commutation money for corvée by nagari heads and penghulus occurred as before to cover their decreased income. In 1938, the West Sumatran administration expanded the terms on which use could be made of the uang nagari from the purposes stipulated in the nagari ordinance of 1914 to whatever the nagari council decided (Staatsblad 1938, no. 49). However, there was no evidence that the 1938 regulation was widely applied by nagaris.

The position of the penghulus was much influenced by the economic depression. Apart from the growing leadership of penghulus in local matters, there was a trend towards 'rationalization' of the penghulu-ship. Penghulus were not necessarily orang kaya or rich people, but were individuals also in search of income like ordinary villagers. Throughout the 1930s, the vacancies in penghuluships considerably increased all over West Sumatra because candidates had financial difficulties in meeting the cost required by adat for the installation. In the Batusangkar area, for instance, a penghulu candidate had to slaughter at least one buffalo, contribute 100 gantang of rice, about f.24, to the nagari treasury, prepare all costs for the formal ceremony in the village council hall, and provide food and drinks during feasts which lasted 3 to 7 days. Thus, the total cost of installation sometimes exceeded f.1,000 before the depression. The costs had previously been met from the private incomes of penghulu candidates, who might possess cash crop gardens and cattle, or who engaged in commerce, or pawned family property, mostly sawah, which was allowed by the adat in an exceptional case. There were also contributions from the family members in the same suku or extended family. The last-mentioned contributions had to be refunded as early as possible.

61. Letter of Assistant Resident of Solok, Sawah Lunto, 4 April 1934, no. 100/9, in Korn Collection, no. 326; Stalk, M.v.O., p. 6.
these methods to meet costs became more difficult.  

It became obvious that the time had come to reduce the burden on the penghulu candidate and to simplify the adat regulations on the penghulu installation. Sometimes nagaris set a fixed amount in place of the traditional requirements. The nagari Tanjung (Batusangkar) decided on the fixed amount of f.100, to be used for maintaining the mosque, council hall, village market, and schools. In the Lima Puluh Kota division, the slaughtering of a buffalo was replaced by a goat, and the fixed amount system was also applied in many nagaris, f.30 being the cheapest, in the Suliki sub-division.

Despite these devices of simplification, the financial burden on the candidate seems to have been still too heavy. In the Sungai Tarab area (Batusangkar), 67 per cent of penghuluships were vacant in 1938, of which 80 per cent was caused by lack of money. Although no overall figures in West Sumatra are available, it is likely that other areas had also a high proportion of penghulu vacancies, since economic conditions were similarly severe in other areas. In addition, it must be noted that the Sungai Tarab region was a cradle of the Minangkabau adat and an adat-oriented centre. In any case, it is evident that economic hardship compelled the adat on such an important event as penghulu installation to adjust itself to the new economic environment. There must have been a general consensus among the villagers on the change in the methods of penghulu installation. This suggests that one symbolically significant component of adat order was fading away.

Conflict was growing within the nagari between authorized and unauthorized penghulu, the nagari head and penghulu in general. The privileges which the nagari heads and authorized penghulu enjoyed in terms of tax and corvée exemption were hard to bear for unauthorized penghulu, particularly in the period of economic hardship in the 1930s. The administrative power of the nagari head had been strengthened ever
since the introduction of the nagari ordinance in 1914 and this was at the expense of all other penghulus. From the early 1930s, therefore, penghulus were asking the government to revise the nagari ordinance so that all penghulus could participate equally in the nagari administration. As far as the government was concerned this was unacceptable; if all the penghulus were allowed to have seats in the nagari council, it would become an administrative body in no way different from the adat council.67 It was logical for non-authorized penghulus who could not obtain seats in the nagari council to seek outlets for their increased influence elsewhere. This desire of non-authorized penghulus certainly contributed to the demand for participation in supra-nagari administration, as well as to the mushrooming of adat associations.

After the great defeat in debates over the guru ordinance in 1928, the first chance that the kaum kuno, and especially the penghulu, was given to exert its leadership on administrative issues was the election for a Minangkabau representative in the Volksraad, which was to take place in 1930. The election system in West Sumatra was very unfair for the bulk of the population, for it was carried out by four city councils (gemeenteraad) in Padang Panjang, Padang, Bukittinggi, and Sawah Lunto, all of which were administrative bodies with some legislative power in municipal affairs within the framework of residency administration. Of these, the Padang Panjang council had 27 Minangkabau seats, while the rest had only 3 each. Thus, the representative was in practice decided by the Padang Panjang council.68

Penghulus of areas other than these four cities had requested that all penghulus in West Sumatra should be entitled to vote for the representative after the first election.69 Two adat associations were particularly enthusiastic about this issue, namely SAAM and Perkumpulan Adat Alam Minangkabau (Adat Association of the Minangkabau World). These two associations jointly held a meeting in August 1926, attended by 500


68. Report of Kiewiet de Jong on the election of Volksraad members, in Mailr.1186x/1929, Bijlage II.

69. Letter of LeFebvre, Padang,6 July 1918,no.7846, in Mailr.1664/1918.
penghulus. The meeting requested that the Minangkabau representative should be a penghulu who knew the adat well. However there was no response from the government.

After the communist-led uprisings dissatisfaction with the election system came not only from penghulus but also from Islamic leaders, Western-educated individuals, merchants, and peasants. The Minangkabaus as a whole were discontented with the fact that they could elect only one representative, though they had produced many national leaders and intellectuals. Penghulus of the Highlands were more enthusiastic about this issue than any other group. They wanted to monopolize the right of voting at the expense of other groups. Many committees were set up by penghulus in the Highlands in 1929 to demand that the Minangkabau representative should be a man from the Highlands and not the Lowlands because the latter contained heterogenous elements and thus could not represent Minangkabau.

The requests of non-penghulu groups were entirely neglected by the Dutch. The request of penghulus that the right to vote be given to all penghulus was also rejected because of the larger number of voters: the number estimated in 1926 was 17,428 including chiefs in Korinci. The Dutch authorities in West Sumatra once considered giving the right to all core-penghulus but finally dropped this idea for fear of possible quarrels over the core-penghuluship, which had occurred at the establishment of the nagari council in 1914 and 1915. When the Minangkabau Council was instituted in July 1938 (see below), the election was entrusted to this Council in which Minangkabau officials, nagari heads, and penghulus occupied the majority seats. Mohammad Yamin was the first Volksraad member elected by this Council.

The issue of the right to vote for the Minangkabau representative in the Volksraad stimulated the growing desire of penghulus to

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71. See note 60.
73. Letter of de Jong, 6 March 1931, no.15/4, Mailr.268x/1931.
74. See note 68.
expand their political influence. However, other groups mostly became disinterested in this issue when their demands were totally ignored by the Dutch in 1929. In comparison with the Volksraad issue, the participation in local and West Sumatra-wide councils drew the interest of broader circles. As has been mentioned in Chapter III, the Dutch East Indies government had been implementing the decentralization programmes since the middle of the 1910s, which were intended to give the Indonesians a training in administration and to transfer the financial and administrative burdens to local communities. The nagari ordinance was the first implementation of the decentralization policy in West Sumatra.

As for supra-village administrative bodies, the Dutch authorities in West Sumatra began considering their establishment in 1923. Faced with the rising communist movement the Dutch felt the necessity of instituting an administrative link between the government and the nagari council. This idea was recommended by the West Coast Report, which suggested a district council (larasraad) to give the population a chance to express their opinions and to alleviate dissatisfaction which might otherwise develop into a popular revolt such as the communist one. Investigations in 1929 and 1930 showed that 243 out of 331 nagaris surveyed wanted to have some sort of supra-nagari administrative apparatus. In view of this strong desire, the resident of West Sumatra drafted an ordinance for the district council, in 1931, the council to consist of one chairman to be elected from among the members of the council, all the nagari heads in the respective district, and members of the nagari council as advisors. This resident's plan was to make use of adat mechanisms as far as possible at the expense of the existing district (demang) and sub-district head system created in 1914 which had no basis in adat. The drafted ordinance was however rejected by Batavia which had been considering a council higher than the district council and feared financial difficulty.

Penghulus, nagari heads, and ex-district heads who had the position of larashoofd in the pre-1914 system were especially interested

75. Westkust Rapport, Deel III, pp.23-29.

in the district council even after Batavia's rejection. Penghulus and nagari heads were anxious for the council because they had been so discontented with the demang and sub-demang who had greater power than them. Ex-laras heads, who were appointed from among distinguished adat chiefs in the pre-1914 system, hoped for the revival of their old position. Under the leadership of the nagari head of Sungayang (Tanah Datar), penghulus near the nagari formed a Rapat Selaras (Laras Council) in 1931 as a demonstration. A Minangkabau newspaper suggested to the government that Minangkabaus were ready to meet all the costs involved. Except for penghulus, nagari heads, and ex-laras heads, however, the Minangkabaus were not always sympathetic to the council, as they themselves had no chance of seats in it.

In contrast with the district council, the issue of the Minangkabau Council attracted all Minangkabau groups. Originally the establishment of a Minangkabau-wide council was discussed by penghulus who gathered in Padang Panjang in November 1923. The Advisor for Native Affairs investigated the political situation of West Sumatra in the following year. In his report to the Governor General he insisted on the urgency of a Minangkabau Council as an outlet for popular movements, especially the communist one which he witnessed there. However, the idea of a Minangkabau-wide council disappeared both among the penghulus who discussed it in 1923 and Dutch officials for a while, because of political turmoil. After the communist-led revolt, there was a group of Dutch officials who argued that it was too early to institute the Minangkabau Council and that the district council should come first.

77. Gonggrijp, M.v.O., pp.92-93.
78. PPO for November 1933, Mailr.29x/1934.
80. Persamaan, 27 April 1936, in PPO for April 1936,Mailr.50lx/1936.
This idea was not considered seriously either. It was only in 1931 that the Dutch East Indies government decided to set up supra-village rural councils for the Outer Provinces as a long-term project (Staatsblad 1931, no.507). Although this decision did not mention a Minangkabau council especially, at least the legal possibility of such a council was established. In the following year, some response appeared in West Sumatra. For instance, the nationalistic-Islamic organization, Permi, urged that if a Minangkabau Council was to be founded penghulus belonging to or sympathetic with the organization should become the members. By 1935 the central government had almost finalized the introduction of a regional council in some residencies of the Outer Provinces. This council was designed to represent the groepsgemeenschappen (Group Communities), e.g., the grouped nagaris in Minangkabau, and was promulgated in 1937 as the Group Community Ordinance in 1937 (Staatsblad, no.464).

As the ordinance stipulated only the outline of the council, details had to be decided according to regional characteristics. One of the sensitive issues for West Sumatra was a government plan to exclude Padang from the groepsgemeenschappen, for the town was originally not an indigenous community but was created by the Dutch as a commercial and administrative centre. The people of Padang immediately opposed this on the grounds that their ancestors came from the Highlands, they shared the adat with other parts of the Highlands, and Padang could greatly contribute to the council's finance. It was noteworthy that penghulus of the Highlands were unsympathetic to the Lowlands in general and Padang in particular throughout the argument over the Minangkabau Council. The site of the council's office was also a significant issue, for the Minangkabaus would regard it as the capital of Minangkabau. Despite alternative proposals by penghulus of the Highlands, the government decided on Padang. The most important issues, however, were the comp-

83. PPO for April, 1932, Mailr.659x/1932.
85. For instance Bukittinggi was proposed as the site. On this argument, see, Handelingen van Volksraad 1937-1938, Vergadering Zaterdag 5 February 1937, pp.1264, 1617-18.
position of the membership and the manner of election. Non-government officials suspected that the largest proportion of seats might be occupied by government officials, in which case the Council could not exercise any autonomy. They wanted to fill at least half of the seats and the position of chairman from among non-government official groups.

The Dutch suggested in February 1937 that about 75 per cent of the membership would be given to government officials. Critics cynically labelled the Council the B.B. Council (Council of Department of Interior). A tentative program in September 1937 enumerated only 8 Minangkabau seats to be elected by the population. By this time it was clear that the Dutch intended to create a government-controlled Council rather than an autonomous Council. Although this number was very small, all groups showed a great interest in attaining the right to vote and to stand. Penghulus proposed three alternative methods for election: that the right should be given to all penghulu, to core-penghulus only, and to one representative penghulu per nagari. However, the first two were refused by the government on the same grounds as in the case of the election of a Volksraad representative; too many penghulus and quarrels over the core-penghuluship. The last alternative was opposed on the grounds that the Bod-Caniago nagari which regarded all penghulus as equal might have difficulty in deciding who was eligible.

In reaction to the penghulus' leadership, non-penghulu circles began to nominate their own candidates. A kaum muda Islamic teachers' association chose three candidates. In Pariaman, Permi and Muhammadiyah, though these two groups had a competitive relationship in other fields, jointly formed a committee for presenting candidates. Western-educated individuals advanced their suitability as members because the Council was a Western device.

86. Radio, 7 June 1937 in PPO for June 1937, Mailr.632x/1937.
89. ibid.
90. PPO for March 1938, Mailr.378x/1938.
91. PPO for 1938, Mailr.470x/1938.
The final decision of the Dutch in 1937, was in favour of government officials and penghulus. Of the total seats in the Council, 9 were for Dutch officials including the resident as chairman, 38 for Minangkabau representatives, and 2 for non-Indonesian Asians. However, holders of all the Minangkabau seats were to be appointed by the government in the first instance until the method of election was decided by the first Council. At the same time, the Dutch revealed the composition of the Minangkabau seats for the second Council's election. Of the 38 Minangkabau seats, 22 were to be appointed by the Dutch based on the list of candidates who were nominated by the population from among 'trustworthy people's chiefs', i.e., loyal penghulus and nagari heads. In addition, the Dutch could appoint 6 Indonesian officials (district heads) and 5 non-penghulu persons. Thus, only 5 seats were to be left for election once the method was decided. 93

The Minangkabau Council was officially inaugurated in July 1938 as a legislature with limited power to allocate budgets which were given by the Dutch for public works (roads, irrigation, water supply, and so on), public schools, health programs, and agricultural spheres (Staatsblad 1938, no.132 and 166). As the gap between the Minangkabau Council and the nagari council was so large, the Sub-Division Council (Onderafdelingsraad) was founded in September 1939, a body consisting of the assistant resident as chairman, nagari heads, and some pasar directors. 94 This was an administrative body to implement the decisions of the Minangkabau Council as well as those of the government.

Although most Minangkabaus were already sceptical, some Minangkabaus initially expected the Council would have considerable power. For instance, nationalist groups hoped it would abolish the law restricting meetings. 95 They were disappointed when they found that the Council had no such power. Instead, the Council introduced health programs, installing 12 Indonesian doctors, setting up a public hospital, and some


94. Bijblad van Staatsblad, no.14072; Berita Officieel Minangkabau, Djilid 26, 10 October 1939.

95. Perantaran Kita, 1 July 1938 in PPO for July 1938, Mailr.889x/1938.
emergency hospitals. During the famine in the 1938/39 harvest year mentioned in Chapter V, it enacted a law for forced cultivation of second crops and encouraged the cultivation of perennial crops as far as possible. It was unable to do more because in only a little more than two years Dutch rule ended.

The increasing demand for participation in supra-nagari administration and the arguments over this had created two basically different ideologies regarding the identity of the Minangkabaus. One searched for identity beyond the scope of the Alam Minangkabau and sought it within the wider Indonesian world, which was greatly influenced by the nationalist movement. The other welcomed the development of the supra-nagari world, but wanted to preserve the uniqueness and supremacy of the Alam Minangkabau. An adat champion around 1936 and a Minangkabau representative in the Volksraad, Datuk Tumenggung, argued that the idea of Indonesian unity was utopian because Indonesia consisted of many ethnic groups. However, more and more Minangkabaus were interested in an Indonesian identity. One of the most important reasons for this trend may have been the fact that the Minangkabaus were criticizing the Dutch for being responsible for the economic hardship (see Chapter V), especially in relation to the gold standard which made the export of Indonesian crops very difficult. The Minangkabaus were also bitterly disappointed by the complete inability of the Minangkabau Council to satisfy any of their hopes and the lack of Minangkabau power in it.

The Minangkabaus were increasingly interested in the Indonesia Berparlemen (Parliament for Indonesia) movement which was initiated in 1939 as a result of the Indonesian People's Congress in Java sponsored by Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Federation of Indonesian Political Parties)

96. *Berita Officieel Minangkabau*, Djilid 27, 12 June 1940.
97. PPO for January 1940, Mailr.505x/1940.
and attended by representatives of ninety different nationalistic, social, and economic organizations. This movement demanded that the Netherlands Indies government institute a genuine Indonesian parliament within the framework of the Netherlands Constitution and co-operating with the Dutch temporarily in view of the growing threat of Japanese invasion. Responding to the movement in Java, a big conference was held in West Sumatra at the end of 1939, attended by some 2,000 representatives of all sorts of West Sumatran organizations. This conference decided to send Minangkabau delegates to Batavia to contact representatives of other regions. Significantly, the conference chose two Minangkabau representatives, one from MTKAAM and the other from Persatuan Tarubiyah Islamiyah, the former being an adat organization and the latter a kaum kuno Islamic body.  

The conflict between the kaum kuno and the kaum muda plus nationalists and the pemuda was much narrowed centering on the issue of the Indonesia Berparliemen movement. This superficial compromise on the part of the challengers of the kaum kuno does not mean that the conflict itself was resolved. The temporary and superficial co-operation between the conflicting parties at the end of the 1930s should be attributed to the tactics which the challengers to the kaum kuno had adopted: the challengers tended to withdraw from violent attack of the kaum kuno in order to avoid the suppression of the government. Thus, the rivalry was submerged with considerable potential to erupt again in the event of the removal of the common Dutch oppression.

**Conclusion**

The challenge of the kaum muda and nationalists in relation to the kaum kuno was intensified at the village level. However, the reaction of the kaum kuno, the adat leaders in particular, was also strengthened at the same time because of their increasing importance in the economic field. These two factors created an unprecedented conflict between the two

101. PPO for second half of 1939, Mailr.434x/1940.
parties. In reacting to the challenge of the *kaum muda* which was explicitly universal or supra-nagari, the *kaum kuno* also became organized on a supra-nagari or all Minangkabau level. At the end of the 1930s, the conflict between the *kaum kuno* and *kaum muda* was much narrowed. The development of the nationalist movement certainly contributed to this. Regardless of whether they were *kaum muda* or *kaum kuno*, the Minangkabaus generally tended to attribute the economic hardship to the government. Although the *kaum muda* and *kaum kuno* wanted to participate in the administration through the Minangkabau Council, both of them were bitterly disappointed by the complete dominance of the government and the inability of the Council to satisfy their hopes. This disappointment led Minangkabaus to a new object of identity beyond the Alam Minangkabau, i.e., Indonesia, by the end of the 1930s. However, the rival groups in West Sumatra did not necessarily have the same picture of their identity and their interests were not in accordance with each other, both hoping to seize the leadership at the expense of other groups. The *pemuda* groups, which were also oppressed by the Dutch were quickly coming to the fore in the closing years of Dutch rule.
Japanese Staff Officers for the Southern Areas: front from left to right, Nishiooeda, General Tanabe (Head of the 25th Army), General Terauchi, Yano (a civilian officer, the shu-chokan of West Sumatra).

Yano invited Indonesian leaders to the Hotel Indes, Jakarta, February 1943; from left to right, (person unidentified), Yamin, Haji (?), Yano, Hatta, Soekarno.
Yano in 'Pakaian raja' in front of the shu-chokan office in Padang, December 1942. Yano was fascinated by Minangkabau culture.

Minangkabau ladies in formal dress with Kenzo Yano (left) and Yoshichika Tokugawa (right), Padang 1943.
CHAPTER VII

Minangkabau Under the Japanese Occupation

Despite its brevity, the three and a half years of Japanese occupation had a great impact upon Minangkabau social and economic life. Japanese forces in Indonesia were ordered to achieve self-sufficiency in daily necessities there and in foodstuffs in particular. The self-sufficiency policy resulted in the concentration of the Minangkabau economy on food cultivation much more intensively than in the 1930s and also resulted in the impoverishment of the population who had to sacrifice their own consumption of goods for the Japanese. The basic guideline of the Japanese administration was the 'winning of hearts and the minds of the people' in order to make the people of Indonesia co-operate with Japanese war efforts. This policy was strongly pursued in West Sumatra by chokan (Resident) Yano. The Japanese mobilized the major Minangkabau rival groups, namely, the adat, Islamic, and nationalist, though with some preference for the adat party, for different purposes; the adat party for administration, nationalists for propaganda, and the Islamic party to arouse among the population the emotion of a 'holy war' against the Allies at the end of the occupation. On the part of the rival groups, each endeavoured to take the initiative in society, securing their position within the military regime. It is noteworthy that the Japanese preference for the adat party and the concentration of rice cultivation enhanced the relative position of that party which had been attacked by the other two groups at the end of Dutch rule. By the end of the occupation, these rival groups had secured their influence in different spheres with some continuing rivalry: the adat party in the administrative spheres, mainly at the village level but also to some extent at the West Sumatran level; the nationalists in political and administrative fields at the West Sumatran level; the Islamic party in mobilizing the masses through widely established Islamic organizations and schools.
Minangkabau Shortly Before the War

The Minangkabau interest in Japan dated back to 1905 when Japan achieved victory over Russia. At that time many applauded the victory, regarding it as a sign of a new era for Asia, but some viewed it as the 'yellow peril'. The Minangkabaus developed an interest in Japan after 1930, but in a critical manner. They became increasingly suspicious of Japan after the invasion of China in 1931. In 1935 Minangkabau newspapers were wondering why the Volksraad would not introduce obligatory military service in Indonesia so that Indonesia could defend itself against Japan which was casting a greedy eye on Indonesian oil. The Japanese propaganda, 'Asia for Asia', was criticized as nothing more than 'Asia for Japan'. A Minangkabau newspaper constantly warned against the Dutch adopting a careless attitude to Japan, relying too much on British help in an emergency. Although some Minangkabaus made an effort to promote pro-Japan sentiment, suspicion of Japan was generally stronger.


3. Radio, 10 November 1937, PPO for November 1937, Mailr. 6x/1938; Persamaan, 3 June 1939, PPO for June 1939, Mailr. 885x/1939.


5. For instance, Madjid Oesman returned from Japan to West Sumatra in 1937 with his Japanese wife. Madjid Oesman tried to introduce the Japanese language and propagated pro-Japan sentiment in Padang. In spite of his efforts he was unable to obtain the position of editorship of Minangkabau newspapers. However he established considerable influence among editors of a nationalistic newspaper Radio in 1937 when a substantial change was made in the composition of the editors. See, Letter of S. Mijdman to Governor General, Padang, 3 April 1937, no. XIV/X.G. in Mailr. 325x/1937; PPO for February 1937, Mailr. 279x/1937.
than favour until 1941. The Dutch rejection of the demands of the Indonesian Parliament movement in May 1941, however, changed the situation. Although the Minangkabau rival groups had so far withdrawn from an open conflict over the issue of the Indonesian Parliament movement, this Dutch rejection disrupted the temporary unity and stimulated anti-Dutch sentiment. Some Minangkabau groups, probably the pemuda, began to attack penghulus shortly before the Japanese invasion. At the same time, the Minangkabaus came to wish for the overthrow of Dutch power with the help of Japan.

Japanese propaganda through Radio Tokyo steadily permeated the population in 1941 and 1942. The broadcasts concentrated on telling Indonesians that Japan would free them from Dutch rule and that Indonesians could buy cheap Japanese goods when they were 'liberated' by Japan. Impressed with the Japanese slogan of 'liberation of Asia', expectation of the coming of the Japanese was heightened among Minangkabaus as among other Indonesian people. In January 1942, the first Minangkabau mission was sent to West Sumatra by the Japanese special task force (Fujiwara Kikan) to organize a pro-Japan movement there. About this time, Chatib Suleiman, a leader of a youth group, was promoting a secret organization centring on Padang Panjang to facilitate the collapse of Dutch power.

6. I obtained this information from Dr. Penders who heard the story from Mr. S.L. van der Wal, a resident in West Sumatra at the end of Dutch rule.


By the time of the Japanese invasion of Sumatra, reception bodies for the Japanese had been set up everywhere in West Sumatra. This situation was observed in most other regions.

The Establishment of Military Administration

Japanese paratroopers landed at Palembang on 14th February 1942 aiming at the seizure of oil facilities there. After that, the Japanese Army successively established military control over all regions of Sumatra. The Army declared the whole of Sumatra had been placed under the control of the 25th Army in charge of Malaya and Sumatra by 28th March. In West Sumatra, the army division (Imperial Guard Army) stationed in Padang was instructed to restore the administration, to maintain order, and to seal all properties belonging to hostile countries until Japanese specialists arrived. In the performance of these tasks, the division was ordered to respect local customs and religion. At the beginning of April the temporary administration by the military was superseded by a joint body consisting of military personnel and four Japanese civilians, of whom one had long lived in Malaya and another in Java. The four civilians specialized in general affairs, finance, industry, supervision of captured property, and education, while the military carried out police, transportation, and the municipal affairs of Bukittinggi.


11. Dates of Japanese capture of Sumatran residences are: Palembang by 14 February; Bengkulu, 24 February; Aceh and East Sumatra, 25 February; West Sumatra, 19 March. I could not find the dates for Lampung and Tapanuli.


The general orders for the Sumatran administration as in other regions were issued in July 1942 stipulating: the maintenance of order; 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' (minshin haaku); recon- struction of important industry, especially oil; and consolidation of transportation, harbours and administrative organizations. For the execution of these orders, the existing administrative apparatus was to be used as far as possible.  

By August 1942 Sumatra had been divided into ten shus, equivalent to former Residencies, and the shu chokan had been installed in each shu. Kenzo Yano arrived in Padang on 9th August as head of West Sumatra together with 68 other civilians. The Japanese administration in West Sumatra started working systematically from the beginning of December. At this stage the Residency administration in Sumatra was a branch of the Civil Administration Department (gunseikanbu) of the 25th Army, the headquarters of which was located in Singapore. Malaya and Sumatra were put under the single military command because they were considered jointly to form the nucleus for the Japanese management of Southern Areas. However in view of the difference in the character of the two, and the economic importance of Sumatra, Sumatra was separated from Malaya in April 1943. In the wake of this separation the headquarters of the 25th Army moved to Bukittinggi after a series of arguments among the military officers. Bukittinggi was finally chosen by General Tanabe, head of the 25th Army, in view of its geographical suitability for fighting a guerilla war in case of the landing of Allied forces on Sumatra.


15. The official appointment of Yano was July 1942, but Yano arrived in Padang on 9 August. I. Wakamatsu, "Sumatora Gunsei no Gaiyo", op.cit., p.271.

16. Sumatora Shomukitei (General Affairs of Sumatra), p.421. This is the yearbook of Tomi gunseikanbu for 1942, published in April 1943.

17. Tokusaburo Ichikawa, "Gunzoku Nikki Yori" (From a Diary of a Civilian attached to the Army), Sekido Hyo. (This is a newsletter of the Sekido Kai, issued almost monthly from 1957 to 1975. To distinguish this newsletter from the book with the same title, (N) is suffixed to the newsletter) no.1 (1957).
Thus, West Sumatra happened to become the administrative centre of Sumatra during the Japanese occupation.18

The military administration in Sumatra had been consolidated by May 1943. The headquarters of the 25th Army consisted of the gunsireibu (Chief Military Command) and the gunseikanbu. The gunseikanbu was obliged to support the military and military police (kempei). In the gunseikanbu ten departments were set up under the somu bucho (Chief of General Affairs) including Justice, Police, Internal Affairs, Industry, Communication, Transport, Construction, Finance, Propaganda, and Research and Planning. Under the gunseikanbu stood Residency administration (shu seicho) headed by shu chokan and equipped normally with four sections: general affairs, industry, finance and police. The shu was further divided into bunshu, equivalent to the afdeling in the Dutch period, headed by a bunshu cho. The kantokukan, the Japanese translation of the Dutch controleur, was appointed only occasionally to some areas corresponding to onderafdeling, called fuku bunshu. The bunshu or fuku bunshu was divided into districts (gun), which in turn was divided into sub-districts (fuku-gun) headed respectively by an Indonesian district head (guncho) and sub-district head (fuku guncho). The lowest administrative unit was the son or village. Although the village head (son-cho) was not paid by the Japanese he was burdened with administrative tasks as in the Dutch period.19

After the Japanese capture of the Southern Areas, the Ministry of the Army in Tokyo asked the Research Section of the Manchurian Railway Company, the biggest centre in Japan for strategic study of Asia as a whole, to focus basic research on the areas. In late 1942, about fifty researchers were sent from Manchukuo to Malaya and Sumatra, and thirty to Burma. They were appointed to various sections in the respective

18. "Malei Sumatorano Bunri" (The Separation of Malaya and Sumatra), n.d.

19. "Sumatora Gunsei Jisshi Yoko" (The Summary of Execution of Sumatran Administration, the gunseikanbu of the 25th Army, April 1942); Masamichi I, Gunsei no Kiko (The Organization of Military Administration), in Sekido Hyo, op.cit., pp.419-21; Dai Nijugogun Soshiki Rei (Orders of Organization of the 25th Army), Gunseikanbu, Bukittinggi, 11 September 1943.
gunseikanbu, mostly to the research and planning section, and were quite independent in their activity of ordinary hierarchical order. Their major roles were to prepare data based on research, give advice by submitting administrative policies to the gunseikanbu or residency administration, and occasionally check the activity of shu-chokan. As the headquarters of the 25th Army was located in Bukittinggi, West Sumatran administration was greatly influenced by the ideas of these researchers as well as those of the chokan.20

Although the capitulation of Sumatra was completed without any military resistance from the Dutch side, the Japanese suspected the existence of an underground anti-Japanese movement led by escaped Dutch, pro-Dutch Indonesians, Chinese, who could have been hostile to Japan because of the latter's invasion of China, and communists. To check their activity, tokko (special police for political affairs) were installed in Aceh, East Sumatra, Palembang, West Sumatra and Lampung - two or three for each residency - perhaps because these regions were regarded as sensitive areas. In addition, a few Japanese intelligence officers were sent to East Sumatra, Palembang, and West Sumatra after November 1942.21 At the outset of the occupation, the Japanese employed all the existing Indonesian police including the head of the local police office as a temporary measure unless they were apparently hostile to Japan. However, the training of Indonesian police was also started in the Police School in Singapore soon after the occupation. In July 1942, there were 93 Indonesian police training in the school from all over

20. Daisuke Nishimoto, "Sumatora Seikatsu ni Omou" (Retrospect on Sumatran Experiences), Sekido Hyo (N), no.83 (May 1967). D.Nishimoto was one of them. I was able to meet and exchange correspondence with two other researchers relating to West Sumatra (Sakae Hirano and Ryutaro Akiyama). There was at least one researcher in West Sumatra, who participated in the independence struggle and died there. See, Ryutaro Akiyama, "Junsho Kadir no Saigo" (The Final of Commander Kadir), Sekido Hyo (N), no.109 (July 1969), no.110 (August 1969), and no. 111 (September 1969).

Indonesia, of whom 13 were Minangkabaus. By early 1943, the head of the local police office had been replaced by a Japanese and Minangkabau graduates of the Japanese Police School had been appointed to various posts.

The Japanese applied the same judicial system as the one in the Dutch period changing only the names of institutions; Raad van Justitie of Padang, Palembang and Medan into Koto Hoin, and Landraad into Chiho Hoin. Indonesian judicial staff who had been working since the Dutch period were also employed by the Japanese. For civil cases, the Japanese staff, very few in number, performed nominal functions in West Sumatra in view of their limited knowledge of the adat. Examinations in courts were in practice carried out by Indonesian officials and representatives of ethnic and religious groups relevant to the parties concerned. For criminal cases, the Japanese used the Criminal Law of the former Netherlands Indies government as a basis, but gradually added new regulations. In short, the Japanese administration

22. "Sumatora Keisatsukan (Keisatsu Gakko Zaigaku 93 Mei) wo tsujite Mitaru Ippan Minjo Chosa" (Research on the General Sentiment of the People Sampled by Police from Sumatra - 93 police Attending the Police School), Shonan Gunseikanbu, Keisatsu Gakkō, December 1942. The distribution of 96 Indonesian police in the Police School was: 37 Javanese Muslims; 3 Javanese Christians; 5 Batak Muslims; 1 Karo Batak; 1 Madurese; 1 Menadonese Christian; 2 Jambis; 13 Minangkabaus, and others.


24. Interview with the former head of Padang Koto Hoin (Keinji Okada), Fujisawa, 3 August 1974. According to Okada, he had nothing to do in the court except general administrative affairs. In Aceh, the Japanese set up Kaikyo Hoin (Islamic Court) and Son Hoin (Village Court) at the end of occupation. The Village Court created much social unrest there because the villagers tried to get their land back from local rulers to whom it had been mortgaged. See, Eigoro Aoki, Ache no Minzoku Undo (National Movement in Aceh), 1955.
in West Sumatra was an indirect one as far as its organizational framework was concerned, obviously because of the scarcity of Japanese administrators. However, the Japanese began to contact the population more directly and extensively after early 1943 when the Japanese war position began to deteriorate.

The Minangkabau response to the Japanese was generally calm and warm in the early months of occupation. Three incidents, however, are reported between May and October 1942. On 10th May three teachers demanded that the nagari head of Junjung (Sijunjung?) resign from his position. When six Indonesian police tried to stop the argument between the two parties, about 300 villagers shouted at the police. This almost caused a riot, but the crowd was dispersed by the Japanese military. On 8th August, a villager of nagari Tayer Baruh (Payakumbuh), who had been dissatisfied with the nagari head, was asked to pay tax by the latter. In refusing the demand the villager resorted to violence with the help of other villagers. Their conflict was also suppressed by police before it developed into a riot. The third and last case is quite different from the above. On 10th October, an Indonesian policeman in the nagari Lubuk Basung arrested a villager on the charge of violating a road regulation. An ex-policeman 'in favour of the Dutch' opposed the arrest, calling on other villagers for support. However, the villagers, including the ex-policeman, were ordered home by the police. 25

Of the three incidents above, the first two suggest that there was general dissatisfaction with nagari heads among villagers, even though it did not erupt in the form of open hostilities. Indeed opposition to local chiefs was noticeable at this stage in some other regions in Sumatra such as in Aceh and East Sumatra. In East Sumatra the peasants revolted against local rulers, demanding land. The peasants also began to cultivate plantation plots which had been leased by the rulers to Europeans but then were under Japanese control. A series of

uprisings in East Sumatra represented a class struggle of the peasants against the local rulers. The relatively calm situation in West Sumatra derived from its less sharp class distinctions than East Sumatra in terms of land holding. The Japanese experience in each residency at the early stages of the occupation influenced their attitude to the respective residency in the later years; for example, the Japanese in West Sumatra were less cautious with the people than in other residencies.

'Winning the Hearts of the People' (Minshin Haaku)

The first priority of the military administration was to make the Indonesian co-operate with Japanese war efforts. It was common for the civil administration to seek popular support through 'winning the hearts of the people' or minshin haaku (lit., to grasp or understand the minds of the people, but by implication, to manipulate them). However, there was a considerable difference in the implementation of this policy in various regions. It was not rare for the civil administration to foresee that the imposition of too many demands by the military would cause resentment among the population. The solution was usually entrusted to the civil administration of each residency, the shu chokan. When a shu chokan put too much emphasis on 'winning the hearts of the people', he might conflict with the military because the latter tended to view him as being too sympathetic to the people at the expense of military demands. Such was the case with chokan Yano of West Sumatra.

The Japanese in West Sumatra quickly developed an extremely paternalistic sympathy for the Minangkabaus from the outset of the occupation. They were enormously pleased to hear a story from some Minangkabaus:

Three Gods descended on the top of Mt. Merapi. Then, the first went West, the second went 'East', and the last remained here. The first God is surely Allah and the last is ours. The second must be yours. Thus, we are brothers.


27. Most memoirs of Japanese ex-administrators contain this story, with some difference in detail.
This is a version of a well-known myth concerning Minangkabau origins, cited by William Marsden, for instance, but a significant point is modified, i.e., one of the three brothers is referred to as having become the sultan of China in the original instead of having gone 'east' and became 'the God of Japan'. Perhaps the Minangkabaus who told this story deliberately twisted this point to please the Japanese. On the one hand the Japanese were very happy with this story because they possessed a similar myth concerning the origin of the Japanese, and this story became famous among Japanese familiar with Minangkabau. On the other hand this story was intensively used by the Japanese when they asked the population for co-operation with the Japanese, stressing the fictitious affinity between the two peoples.

After a Japanese team from Singapore made a trip of investigation to Sumatra, the team recorded its first impressions in a Japanese newspaper; it was alleged that the Minangkabaus were highly intellectual among Indonesian ethnic groups. This favourable view of the Minangkabaus did not, of course, stem only from the similarity of the myths and the impression of the investigation team but essentially from Yano's strong emphasis on the 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' policy, the general Japanese perception of the Minangkabaus, and the fact that political disturbances were less severe in West Sumatra than in other residencies of Sumatra.

On 1st October 1942, Yano's administration set up the Majelis Kurukunan Minangkabau (Consultative Council of Minangkabau), supposedly as the successor of the Minangkabau Council; the aim of the organization was to obtain information and to increase Japanese understanding of the area. The members varied from 10 to 20, representing district and sub-district heads, nagari heads, adat, ulama, nationalist, youth, and educator groups. The new Council was a semi-official body with no


29. Dai Mai, 3 October 1942, quoted in Umeji Jukai, Sumatora no Tochi, Jinshu to Keizai (Taipei, Taiwan Sansho Do, 1943), Appendix II.

30. Kita Sumatora Sinbun, 23 September, 8 and 11 November 2603 (1943).
legislative power. Although the extent of the presentation of each group in the Council is not clear, Yano seemed to favour government officials and adat-oriented individuals in number. However, the leadership of discussion was in the hands of nationalist and youth representatives, notably Mohammad Sjafei and Chatib Suleiman. Yano's preference for the adat party was in evidence when he instituted the Balai Penyelidikan Masyarakat Minangkabau (Institute for Research into Minangkabau Society) in early 1943, consisting of 56 adat authorities who were to study the adat for administrative purposes.

Although the Japanese initially declared respect for local customs and religion, they banned the practice of the fasting month and connected festivities, and they were allowed only in September 1942 probably because of fear of disturbances. The first practical manifestation of the favourable Japanese attitude to Islam appeared in the Malay and Sumatran Islamic Representative Conference on 5th and 6th May 1943 in Singapore, though the conference was not promoted by the West Sumatran administration. Sumatra sent 44 representatives and Malaya 47. The guidelines of the conference were:

1. To explain the Japanese world view;
2. To make Muslims understand the necessity of co-operation with Japan;
3. To make the conference a gathering solely of Muslims.

It goes without saying that the second point was most important for the

32. This body was neglected after Yano left West Sumatra in April 1944. See, Kanahele, The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, op.cit., pp.85, 290 note 116 and 117.
33. Senji Geppo, September 1942.
34. "Kaikyo Taikai Shorui" (Documents on the Islamic Conference), 5-6 April 1943, Shonan Gunseikanbu.
Although the gathering was called a conference there was no formal discussion among the representatives. It consisted mostly of speeches by the Japanese. A speech by Marquis Tokugawa illustrated the Japanese intention and the character of the conference:

You must understand the discipline of the Army towards Islam. The Imperial Constitution stipulates the freedom of religion but also encourages and fosters it. 37

After emphasizing how Japan could favour Islam, the speech appealed for the co-operation of Muslims with Japan in a very emotional way:

Allah, tell the 130 millions of Muslims to cooperate with Japan under the blessing of Allah. Tell the Muslims to live with (Japan) and die with (Japan) for the construction of New Asia. Make Islam prosper, tell the Muslims to respond to the noble spirit of Japan. 38

To win further popularity the Japanese also presented awards to 17 Muslims at the conference who had contributed to the promotion of Islam. All the five representatives from West Sumatra were among those given awards. Although it is not clear why the Japanese selected so many from West Sumatra, they deliberately chose non-politicized Islamic


37. Speech of Tokugawa, in ibid.

38. ibid.
leaders from Perti and Muhammadiyah.\footnote{39} Putting aside the question of whether the Japanese could achieve popularity through the conference, it provided the representatives from various regions with an opportunity to meet and exchange opinions privately for the first time, because direct contact among Indonesians at the supra-residency level had been practically banned by the Japanese.

After the conference in Singapore a gradual change in Japanese policy towards Islam in West Sumatra was observed, with a swing from 'neutrality' to the utilization of Muslims by winning their popularity. In June 1943 Yano officially allowed the flying of the Islamic flag on Islamic holidays.\footnote{40} By September he had instituted the Majelis Islam Tinggi Minangkabau (Supreme Islamic Conference of Minangkabau) as an all-Minangkabau body of ulama. According to Yano's idea this body, combined with the Institute for the adat study, was to form one of two pillars of Minangkabau culture.\footnote{41}

\footnote{39} Names and positions of representatives from West Sumatra are:

1. Soeleiman al-Rasoeli (Bukittinggi) The head of Tarbiyatur Islamiya School.
2. A.R. Sutan Mansoer (Padang Panjang & Bukittinggi) The branch head of Muhammadiyah School; establishment of Islamic elementary schools orphanage houses, bodies for the relief of the poor.
5. Sirayudin Abbas (Bukittinggi) The head of Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiya.

As these carriers show, they were politically not active. Perti was a conservative Islamic association co-operating with adat groups. "Kaikyo Taikai Syorui", op.cit.

\footnote{40} Asia Raya, 15 June 1943 (1943).

\footnote{41} Kita Sumatora Sinbun, 25 November 1943 (1943).
Soon after the establishment of the Supreme Islamic Conference, a religious section was instituted in the West Sumatran administration (shu seicho). The selection of a person for this office was first referred to the Consultative Council which nominated Mohammad Junus but passed on the final decision to the newly established Supreme Islamic Conference. About 20th September, Muhammad Junus, one of the five West Sumatran representatives to the Islamic conference in Singapore, was officially appointed. These favours to Islam were not necessarily implemented at the expense of adat and nationalist groups because the latter had already been given concessions. Moreover, the preference for Islam was not intended to create a counter-balance to the so-called kerajaan (traditional rulers) in the West Sumatran case, as would have been possible in Aceh in the late occupation period. On this point M.D. Mansur may be misleading when he says that from the beginning the Japanese consistently favoured Islam in West Sumatra. It is more likely that the West Sumatran administration realized that the 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' policy, with an emphasis on the adat and nationalist groups, was not enough to achieve broader support. As will be shown later the Japanese launched the full-scale mobilization of various Islamic groups only in the last stage of the occupation.

In September 1943 the Sumatran military at last introduced the Shu Sangi In (Residency Advisory Council) which had already been working in Java. This delay in Sumatra compared with Java can be explained by the general reluctance of the 25th Army to allow Indonesians' participation in the administration. In West Sumatra, however, such an institution was not an entirely new experience, for the residency had had experience of the Consultative Council since October 1942. There were

42. Kita Sumatora Sinbun, 20 November 2603 (1943).


of course differences between the Consultative and Advisory Council. The earlier one was only a semi-official body chaired by the shu chokan while the latter was an official body led by Indonesians. In addition, the members of the Advisory Council received enormous allowances. Half of the members were 'elected' or, more precisely, chosen from among those recommended by district, sub-district and nagari heads, while the other half were appointed by the shu chokan from among officials, nagari heads, adat leaders, members of religious organizations, 'popular leaders', and so on. Although the figures for the total number of members and their distribution among various groups are not available, the total number may have been about 25 and the great majority of the members were officials, nagari heads and adat leaders, judging from the situation in other Sumatran regions and the procedure used to select the members.45 The chairman was Mohammad Sjafei and the vice-chairman was Chatib Suleiman, the most important political nationalist leaders.

It is clear that the Japanese thought the two nationalist leaders the best vehicles to carry out their 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' policy, since few Minangkabaus would reject their nationalistic ideologies. As in the Consultative Council, nationalists took the initiative in the new council in spite of their numerical inferiority. Thus it was nationalist who benefited from the new council.

Chokan Yano was especially enthusiastic about the minishin haaku policy of establishing the Consultative Council in 1942 and the Supreme Islamic Conference earlier than other residencies in Sumatra. This enthusiasm may have been related to his previous career;46 as a senior official in the Interior Department for a long time and as the governor of a Japanese prefecture at one stage, he was aware of the


46. Yano's career is described in Kenzo Yano, Juko no Maeni Tatsu (Standing in front of Guns, Shin Seikai, 1961).
possibility of keeping order by forestalling the demands of the people. However we must not forget that the West Sumatran administration also reflected Indonesians' demands as well as the minishin haaku policy. Next we will discuss the Indonesians' demands and the Japanese responses to them as focussed in the independence issue.

Indonesians' Demands and Japanese Responses

Although the Japanese did not express this overtly, there is no doubt that at the outset of the occupation they wanted to colonize Indonesia or to make it a de facto colony of Japan. However, this intention became unstable after early 1943 when the Japanese war situation began to deteriorate. The Japanese may have started thinking of the independence issue as a tool for obtaining popular support from this time onwards. The Sumatran military was in favour of the independence of Sumatra separated from other regions of Indonesia, perhaps considering that Sumatra would be very important for Japan in future because of its rich natural resources, and that the Sumatran people were easier to manipulate than people in Java. The military on Java, however, was thinking of the independence of Indonesia as a whole with Java as the centre. Part of the Navy had the same idea as that of the Java military. In addition to this cleavage, there were also some differences within Sumatra.

West Sumatra happened to be the place of residence of the outspoken nationalist leader, Soekarno, at the outset of the occupation, for he moved from Bengkulen, where he had been detained, to Padang. During his stay in West Sumatra between March and May 1942, he travelled all over the residency telling the population to co-operate with Japan and strive for independence from the Dutch. Soekarno, accompanied by a Japanese who was the adjutant of the military head for West Sumatra, was also allowed to set up Komité Rakyat (People's Committee) there. 47

47. K. Yano, "Sumatora Zuihitsu", op.cit., p.275. Kanahele says Soekarno set up the Komite Rakjat prior to or immediately after the Japanese invasion on 17 March although a Japanese source says the first troops entered Padang on 10 March. In any case it is clear that Soekarno continued his activity after the establishment of military control. See, Kanahele, Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, op.cit., pp.28-29, 259, note 65; pp.206-207 of this thesis. A Dutch controleur who was in Natal at the Japanese invasion mentioned Komite Rakjat exited around the border between West Sumatra and Tapanuli on the coast (Natal) in April 1942. D.J. Hoogkamer, "Rapport Japansche Bezitting der onderafdeeling Mandailing en Natal", dd. 4 April 1946, Korn Collection, no. 473.
About the same time Chatib Suleiman, the youth leader who had prepared the pro-Japanese movement (F-movement) at the end of Dutch rule, set up Pemuda Nippon Raya (The Youth of Great Japan) to unify all Indonesian groups. These two movements were, however, soon banned and Chatib Suleiman was briefly arrested. Although the period was brief, the Japanese allowed the two nationalist movements for a while. Perhaps they needed to show a superficial sympathy with nationalism, at least at the beginning of the occupation, for they had promised, through radio propaganda and the F-movement, independence for Indonesia. However the movements had to be suppressed when they exceeded the Japanese propaganda purpose.

The Japanese attitude towards independence began to change in West Sumatra after the purely military control of administration was superseded by a civilian administration in July 1942. The new head of the West Sumatran civil administration, Yano, contacted nationalist leaders such as Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad Sjafei after his arrival in West Sumatra. In February 1943, Yano talked with General Tanabe about the establishment of giyugun or voluntary corps (or tentera sukarela in Indonesian, but more commonly known as laskar rakyat) in view of the worsening war position. He proposed a strategy to Tanabe for the setting up of giyugun, giving the Indonesians the hope of independence, which Yano thought the best way to win popular support. This proposal was accepted by Tanabe as a personal agreement between them. After this agreement Yano left for Jakarta and met Soekarno, Hatta, Yamin, and some other national leaders to exchange opinions with these leaders on independence and related matters. Yano's sympathy with independence, of course within the framework of 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' policy, stimulated the independence movement among Indonesians in West Sumatra more freely than in other residencies, but caused conflict with the military except for Tanabe.49

In spite of the general reluctance of the military in West Sumatra to promote the independence course, nationalists in West Sumatra succeeded in winning the favour of the local officials there. In July 1943 Mohammad Sjafei and Chatib Suleiman announced the inauguration of Membangun Gerakan Rakyat (Preparatory People's Movement) as a counterpart of Putera (Pusat Tengah Rakyat or Concentration of the People's Power) in Java - understandably with the consent of Yano. Furthermore the two leaders managed to publish an article in a local newspaper (Sumatra Sinbun) advocating the introduction of the Putera movement to Sumatra. At this stage there was no such body elsewhere in Sumatra. These nationalist achievements were however suppressed by the gunseikanbu.

On the other hand the gunseikanbu tried to make Tanabe keep aloof from Yano, but in vain.

Although the Putera movement was suppressed in West Sumatra, the activity of nationalists developed rapidly with the creation of a volunteer corps. On 27th September 1943 the West Sumatran administration held a meeting with nationalist leaders to tell them that they should share the same task as Japanese soldiers in defending their tanah air or homeland. The Minangkabaus immediately responded to Yano's speech, understanding it as an encouragement of giyugun before the gunseikanbu officially announced its permission in October. The raising of volunteers was already a fait accompli for the Minangkabaus.

50. Sumatra Sinbun, 4 and 13 July 2603 (1943); Kanahele, Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, op.cit., 138-39.


52. K. Yano, "Yozui Soho", op.cit.

53. The Japanese deliberately used the term 'tanah air' to obscure the concept of Indonesia. Some Japanese civilians were confused when they were told to evoke 'minzoku ishiki' (racial sentiment) whether to refer to Minangkabau or Indonesia. Interview with an ex-administrator, Mukai, 26 July 1974; Kita Sumatora Sinbun, 30 September 2603 (1943). Cf. Kanahele, Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, op.cit., pp. 128, 300 note 40.
The Minangkabau enthusiasm for the volunteer corps was evident in all groups. In early October penghulus opened an office of the Barisan Sukarela (Volunteers' Front) in Padang as the first official office of giyugun in West Sumatra. About the same time ulama held a large meeting in Bukittinggi, which resulted in the establishment of the corps. On 11th October 1943 a women teachers' association (Perguruan Menengah) which was later absorbed in Pemuda Angkat Baru (Youth Task Force) was inaugurated. In the same month a group of penghulus and young people, sixty altogether, marched from Muara Labuh, an area in the south of the Highlands, to Padang to join the corps. Before a crowd of people in Padang, Sjech Djamal Djambek, an ulama leader and one of the founders of the Minangkabau giyugun, announced that he was letting his three sons enter the corps to encourage others. It is likely that penghulus and ulama competed with each other in establishing the corps to secure the key position.

A big push for the development of giyugun was made by Yano at a meeting on 20th November 1943 in Bukittinggi. Before 460 nagari heads and some 10,000 Minangkabaus, Yano pleased nagari heads and penghulus by stating that the Dutch had undermined their authority, making them only messengers and tax collectors for the Dutch, and by so doing had caused conflicts between ninik mamaks and kemanakans or lineage heads and their subordinates. In the end he suggested that 20,000 penghulus in Minangkabau could organize at least 20,000 soldiers if each recruited one from his lineage. In effect penghulus were performing similar functions during the Japanese occupation to those performed in the Dutch period. Nevertheless this speech appealed to penghulus considerably, and caused wide repercussions. At the meeting, a wellknown adat leader, Datuk Majolelo, joined the corps to show off the supremacy of adat groups. On that night, a leading adat association (MTKAAM) and

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55. *Kita Sumatora Sinbun*, 20 October 1943 (1943).
an Islamic body (Supreme Islamic Conference) separately held meetings
to organize the volunteer corps, perhaps in the context of rivalry
between these two organizations.

Japanese propaganda in West Sumatra was intensified in 1944.
In February that year Yano gave a speech in front of a large crowd
alluding to independence and the prior conditions which had to be met
in order to materialize what was then 'the people's dream'. When he
printed the contents of the speech and distributed the pamphlets within
West Sumatra, he was severely criticized by the military for stirring
up nationalist sentiment. However, once inflamed, the enthusiasm for
independence could not be damped down by the military. Later Premier
Koiso officially promised in September to allow Indonesian independence
although without stipulating the date.

With the Koiso promise the Japanese launched the total
mobilization of the population. Various Indonesian corps were united
into Hokokai (Patriotic Service Organization) led by Mohammad Sjafei
and Chatib Suleiman from the nationalist movement, Datuk Parapatih
Baringek and Datuk Majo Uang from the adat group, and Sjech Djamal
Djambek and Sutan Mansur from the Islamic party. Of these, Mohammad
Sjafei was the central figure for all the groups. Besides these central
organizations, new bodies to co-operate with Japan were established,
such as Seineidan (Youth Unit), Bogodan (Defence Unit), Hahanokai
(Mothers' Association), Fujinkai (Women's Association), Jikeidan (Self
Defence Unit), and so forth, all of which were copied from equivalent
bodies in Japan. Nagari and kampong heads were given military training
and the spirit of 'Asia Timur Raya' (Great East Asia) was inculcated.
However, all these activities were strictly confined to the residency
level, which was to become a serious obstacle for the Indonesia-wide
movement in the independence struggle.

59. Asia Raya, 24 July 2605 (1945); PST, op.cit., pp.540-41; Hadji Abdul
Karim Malik Amrullah (HAMKA), Kenang-Kenangan Hidup (Usaha Penerbitan
The Japanese began to take cautious steps to form Sumatra-wide bodies in 1945. The West Sumatran Supreme Islamic Conference was extended to other residencies and all of these were finally unified into Pusat Persatuan Umat Islam Sumatra (United Centre of Sumatran Muslims) in June, with Djamir Djambek as the advisor on Islamic affairs for all Sumatra. The Japanese announced their intention to institute a Chuo Sangi In (General Advisory Council) of Sumatra in January, but it did not eventuate until June. The Council consisted of 15 elected and 25 appointed members led by Mohammad Sjafei as chairman, two vice-chairmen, and one permanent secretary. Three Japanese advisors were attached to the Council. The inaugural and only session was held in Bukittinggi from 27th June until 2nd July. Knowing that the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence had been working in Java since May, the Indonesian members anticipated that the Japanese would raise the question of independence formally. However this did not happen, and it was left to A. Gani and Hamka to take the initiative. In reality private talks were more important for the Indonesian members than official resolutions and arguments for cross residency contacts.

61. Asia Raya, 24 July 2605 (1945); Anthony Reid, "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra", op.cit., p.29.

62. Asia Raya, 8 January 2605 (1945).

63. For the complete name list of the members, see, Anthony Reid, "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra", op.cit., Appendix I, pp.43-44; Kanahele, Japanese Occupation, op.cit., pp.228-29.

64. Asia Raya, 30 June and 3 and 5 July 2605 (1945).


66. The contents of resolutions are given in Asia Raya, 14 July 1945; Kanahele, Japanese Occupation, op.cit., p.230; Atjeh Sinbun, 29 June and 3 July 1945, and Penan Sinbun, 11 July 1945 (both of these newspaper articles are quoted in Anthony Reid's, "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra", op.cit., p.28); Mohammad Sjafei, Menjatue-Padoekan (Proceedings of the conference, n.d.), pp.41-44. There are some differences on the contents of the resolutions among these sources.
had been virtually impossible because of the Japanese policy of segmentation, and because of communication difficulties during the war.

The inaugural meeting was significant also in providing an opportunity for the Japanese to test the response of Indonesian leaders to a secret plan of the 25th Army, i.e., 'Sumatran independence'. Shortly before the session, the Military Command of the 25th Army began to draw up a blueprint for 'Sumatran independence', in order to conform, particularly, with Singapore and Tokyo plans for Indonesian independence. During the session, one of the three Japanese advisors to the Chuo Sangi In, a researcher from Manchukuo, unofficially asked all the members in turn which they preferred - Sumatran independence or Indonesian independence - but of course no details of the plan were disclosed to them. Quite unexpectedly as far as the Japanese were concerned, all the members answered that independence should include Indonesia as a whole. 67

Despite the Koiso promise in September 1944 which looked forward to Indonesian independence, the 25th Army does not seem to have given up its plan entirely until the surrender. The 25th Army adopted an ambiguous position in August 1945. 68 On the one hand, they selected

67. Sakae Hirano, "Sumatora no Omoide", op.cit., p.434. Hirano was the person who put this question to Indonesian members, and who took the three Sumatran representatives to Java on 14 August 1945.

68. Letter of Sakae Hirano to me, dd. 16 July 1976. It must be noted that the 25th Army, like the Japanese in Java, were thinking of 'independence', though 'Sumatran independence', and were not necessarily taking a politically neutral stand on the independence issue. Kanahele, for instance, repeatedly mentioned that the Sumatra gunsei did not promote independence, relying on interrogation documents of former Japanese officers such as General Tanabe, General Shimura and Hamada (the last Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Sumatra gunsei). See, Kanahele, Japanese Occupation, op.cit., pp.217, 232. However the letter from Hirano quoted above says that Hamada was especially enthusiastic for 'Sumatran independence'. In using Japanese statements under interrogation, we must be careful on two points. Firstly, Dutch interrogators were trying to find evidence to prove that Indonesian independence was a Japanese creation. Secondly, all the Japanese interrogated clearly knew this Dutch intention, thus, tended to falsify their position on the independence issue.
three Sumatran delegates for the first Indonesia-wide conference of Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence) to be held in Jakarta about the middle of August. On the other hand, the Army had almost completed a modified independence plan stressing Sumatran autonomy. After the three Sumatran delegates left for Jakarta, another envoy of the Army was about to leave Padang to join the Sumatran delegates in Jakarta with the modified plan. However, the Japanese surrender transformed it into a genuine independence committee of Indonesian leaders, and accordingly the envoy did not leave Padang. As a result, the 25th Army's plan disappeared into oblivion without being disclosed.69

Economic Conditions

At the end of Dutch rule the Indonesian economy was gradually recovering from the prolonged depression due to an active rearmament movement in the world. Producers of war materials, particularly rubber, tin and oil may have enjoyed profits but as long as the production of these war materials remained in the hands of Europeans, the rearmament movement benefited the bulk of the population very little. In West Sumatra, rubber was grown in indigenous small gardens in some outlying areas in the Highlands. The peasants may have profited from rubber, though the number of rubber growers was not large (see Chapter V, section for Rubber). The main endeavour of the peasants was directed towards food cultivation. However, the Minangkabaus were struck by a disastrous crop failure of rice in 1938/39. The majority of the population were suffering economic hardship before the Japanese occupation.

1. Economic disturbances: military currency and the control of food.

The Japanese brought a huge amount of military currency into Indonesia to pursue their economic policies. As soon as Sumatra was captured, the Army started confiscating all Dutch currency owned by

69. This envoy was to be led by Daisuke Nishimoto. Letter of Daisuke Nishimoto to me, dd. 15 July 1976.
people of hostile countries. With the Indonesians and people of non-hostile countries, they exchanged Dutch currency for Japanese military currency. Money exchange was facilitated by the establishment of Japanese-owned banks. In July 1942 branch offices of a foreign currency exchange bank (Yokohama Shokin Ginko) were set up in Padang and Palembang. For the first eight months or so, both Dutch and Japanese currencies were circulating side by side. In the meantime, exchange was made easier due to the increased number of Japanese banks set up in Sumatra, such as Taiwan Ginko (Taiwan Bank) and Nanpo Kaihatsu Ginko (Southern Development Bank). By the end of 1942 the change-over had been completed.

The preliminary fiscal policy was drafted in May 1942. At this stage all direct taxes were to be incorporated into a single new 'temporary special tax' based on income during the Dutch period. According to the revenue budget for five years (1942-1947), the total sum of 300 million Japanese guilders (Jf.) was to be collected in Sumatra as a whole, of which West Sumatra shared 20 per cent. The standard assessment differed considerably according to the race concerned, Indonesians being taxed the lowest and citizens of hostile countries being taxed the highest. In addition to the 'special tax', all indirect taxes levied during the Dutch period were also to be collected. Another significant source of revenue for the Japanese was 'contributions' from Chinese.

70. Senji Geppo, April 1942.


72. "Rinji Tokubetsu Kazei Jisshi Yoko" (Instructions for the Implementation of Temporary Special Tax), the 25th Army, 1 May 1942; "Kinyu Taisaku Jishhi Yoko" (Instructions for the Implementation of Finance Policy), 1 May 1942. There were six categories with different rates of assessment: (1) Indians to be levied 30 per cent surtax; (2) Chinese, no surtax was to be levied for one or two years considering their contributions; (3) Malays (Indonesians) to be reduced by 10 per cent; (4) citizens of hostile countries and Jewish to be levied 200 per cent surtax; (5) Japanese civilians, normal; (6) Japanese military and civilian personnel related to the administration were to be exempt from taxation.
The collection of the only direct tax, i.e., 'special tax', was soon proved to be impossible except for government officials who received fixed salaries. In September 1942 the Japanese authority in Sumatra issued an instruction not to collect the special tax any more than necessary for fear of resentment. As a result the budget for the latter half of 1942/43 financial year (September 1942 - March 1943) was reduced to about half of what had been planned in May. However, in view of the large economic capacity of West Sumatra and East Sumatra, these two residencies, sharing 52 per cent altogether of the total, were to transfer part of their revenue to other residencies of Sumatra in case of deficit in the latter.

Although the bulk of the Sumatrans were in effect exempt from direct tax, their economic conditions kept worsening because of inflation and scarcity of goods. At the beginning of the occupation the Japanese bought up war materials such as rubber, tin and iron with military currency. Despite the quick reduction of rubber purchases, the currency issued to buy these goods could not be absorbed again but only increased the quantity already in the market.

At a meeting of shu chokans of Sumatra in November 1942, the chokan of East Sumatra pointed out that the military currency was not trusted in the residency and its value would inevitably decline, since it was not based on the availability of goods but only on military power. In spite of this warning, the military was optimistic, suggesting solutions such as: to encourage saving, to absorb the military currency as far as possible, and to increase production. Apart from the last,

73. "Senryochi Zaisei Tsuka", op.cit.
74. Sumatora Shomukitei, op.cit., pp.211-32,335; Senji Geppo, September 1942.
75. "Kinyu Taisaku ni Kansuru Yoko" (Summary of the Establishment of Financial Policy), the 25th Army, n.d.
76. "Chiho Chokan Kaigi ni Okeru Shitsugi Oto" (Questions and Answers at the Meeting of Local Chiefs), Shonan Gunseikanbu, 28 December 1942.
the measures were in practice unrealistic. The value of military currency could be maintained to some extent when the Japanese could transport goods from Japan and other occupied regions. As a temporary measure the Japanese used captured Dutch properties instead of military currency to obtain goods from the population. To maintain the credibility of the currency, gold was mined - at the Simau mine in Bengkulen for instance. However, these measures did not solve the fundamental problem. When shipping became difficult after the middle of 1943, there was no way of rescuing the situation apart from increasing production within Sumatra, or, in later years, in each residency.

The rise in food prices was noticeable as early as April 1942,

<table>
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<th></th>
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<td>224</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>266</td>
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<td>125</td>
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<tr>
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<td>320</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and became pronounced by August, especially in towns. At the end of that year price control started over important commodities such as rice,

77. Interview with an ex-administrative staff in West Sumatra (Ogata), Tokyo, 4 August 1974.


79. Senji Geppo, August 1942.
clothes, petrol, kerosene, and this was strictly implemented by May 1943.80 As Table I shows, the price for foodstuffs rose an average 240 per cent in less than one year of the occupation.

As for rice, its price rose more than 300 per cent because the flow of this commodity was much reduced by the Japanese controls. The relatively small increase in sarong prices in Padang is attributed to the fact that merchants in the town still had stocks from the Dutch period and the Japanese also brought large quantities from Japan when they completed the occupation. The Japanese control over price and distribution not only hit town inhabitants but also the peasants in rural areas, depriving them of income opportunities. By early 1944 the amount of military currency in circulation had been doubled and average prices amounted to three times those before the war.81

Smuggling was one form of response to the tight economic controls. Textiles were smuggled from Singapore into Sumatra via Pakan Baru, mainly by Chinese. Japanese officials quite often detected the smuggling and confiscated the goods which were either stocked in the gunseikanbu or distributed on the market at low prices.82 Black marketing was widespread. An investigation at all railway stations near Padang exposed that confiscated goods were piled 'like a small hill' at each station. Further enquiries disclosed that the black market route was systematically organized with the co-operation of producers, merchants, and railway personnel. The detected merchants were later summoned to the local office concerned to promise not to involve themselves in illegal trade. For instance, the Padang Panjang office summoned about 30

80. I consider this the date on the grounds that the Police Department of the 25th Army classified 'black market price' in its report dd. 1 May 1943, "Keimubu Kankei Shorui" (Documents concerning Police Affairs).

81. Kenzo Yano, "Saigono Kaigi" (The Last Meeting), Sekido Hyo (N), no.82 (April 1967). Yano criticized the military's accusation that the civil administration was responsible for the inflation saying that Japanese companies and military were responsible.

82. Interview with an ex-administrator in West Sumatra (Ryutaro Akiyama), Tokyo, 20 August 1974; "Keimu Bucho Kaigi ni Okeru Koen Yoshi" (Summary of Speech made by the Director of the Police Department), Malei Gunseikanbu, 12 May 1943.
detected merchants every week. The Japanese did not punish these merchants severely, perhaps because they had to admit the inevitability of smuggling given the extreme scarcity of goods and also because the Japanese could use confiscated goods for various purposes, for instance, as awards to villages which fulfilled deliveries of rice (see below).

2. Self-sufficiency policy

The Japanese aimed at obtaining necessary supplies from the local regions, including food, fuel, cement, medicine, oil for machines and so forth. In addition, they were required to send surplus materials such as rubber and tin to other regions. Self-sufficiency for the Japanese therefore meant the reduction of Indonesian consumption. The population was impoverished because of this Japanese policy, but open dissatisfaction was not expressed, as it was too dangerous under military occupation.

Although rubber was one of the main products of Sumatra, its processing soon became difficult due to the scarcity of coagulants and chemical stuffs necessary for it. In addition, shipping to other regions was very dangerous after early 1943. Thus rubber tapping had to decline. The Japanese assigned only an average of 19 per cent of pre-war production to Sumatra and 18 per cent to West Sumatra in May 1942. Even with this small percentage, unprocessed latex accumulated. Research was done to utilize the latex for purposes other than rubber, for instance, to extract some sort of oil. However, this research was not very fruitful. Although big rubber estates in East Sumatra were maintained by Japanese companies, small holdings were neglected. In either case, rubber gardens were gradually used for food cultivation in the later years of the occu-

83. Letter of an ex-administrator in West Sumatra (Goto) to me, dd. 29 August 1974.
84. Senji Geppo, March 1942; "Chiho Chokan Kaigi ni Okeru Shitsugi Oto", op.cit.
86. Nanpo Kagaku Tenroku, no. 1, March 1944; "Chiho Chokan Kaigi ni Okeru Shitsugi Oto Jiko", op.cit.
West Sumatra had two strategic products for the self-sufficiency policy, i.e. Ombilin coal and Indarun cement. The Ombilin coal mine was one of the most important of Indonesia's mines and the Indarun cement works was the biggest in Indonesia. By the end of 1942 the mine had recovered to more than 80 per cent of pre-war production, employing 60 Japanese and 3,600 Indonesians. In spite of great Japanese efforts, Indarun cement could recover to only one-third of pre-war production because the machinery was destroyed when the Dutch evacuated. These two products were distributed not only within Sumatra but also sent to Singapore and other parts of Indonesia as long as shipping was possible. However these were not commodities the Indonesians needed in daily life.

Among manufactured commodities, textiles were the most in need. The Japanese ran ten textile factories in West Sumatra including one originally owned by the Dutch and some established by the Japanese after the capitulation, which altogether produced 10,000 sarong pieces per month at their peak. These factories used cotton and yarn imported from Japan for the first year or so. The factories, however, faced enormous difficulty when the import of materials became restricted. The experimental cultivation of cotton was tried all over Sumatra and eventually Palembang was found to be the most suitable area. The problem here was

87. Sumatora Shomukitei, op.cit., pp.302-3; Ryutaro Akiyama, "Junsho Kadir no Saigo" (The Death of Commander Kadir), Sekido Hyo (N), no.109 (July 196); Interview with a former administrator in West Sumatra (Yamazaki), Tokyo, 29 July 1974.

88. Senji Geppo, August 1942; Sumatora Shomukitei, op.cit., 336 ff.

89. Besides textiles, the following factories were run by the Japanese in West Sumatra: paper (Padang Panjang); nails (Baso); bricks (Padang Panjang); carbite (Padang); machine oil from palms (Padang); cigarettes (Padang); ice (Bukittinggi); alcohol (Padang); medicines (Padang); steel mills (Padang); soap (Padang); charcoal (Kayu Tanam); wooden pushing bogies (Kayu Tanam); fishing nets (Padang). Personal material of an ex-administrator in West Sumatra (Tadatoki Yoshida). On the paper factory in Padang Panjang, see Suguru Aikata, "Padang Panjang no Seishi Kojo" (The Paper Factory in Padang Panjang), Sekido Hyo, op.cit., p.325; Sumatora Shomukitei, op.cit., p. 409.
that Palembang cotton could hardly satisfy the demands of Sumatra as a whole. For a substitute, kulit tarok, fibre taken from the skin of young twigs, was extensively used in West Sumatra. Despite all these efforts, the scarcity of textiles was not alleviated. 90

3. Rice

According to a rice allocation plan at the beginning of the occupation, West Sumatra was categorized as a rice surplus residency and was obliged to deliver the surplus to areas of shortage such as East Sumatra. When rice was in deficit in Sumatra in general, it was to be imported from Burma and Thailand. Modification of this original plan was necessitated in the latter half of 1942 because floods damaged the rice harvest in Thailand. With this unexpected incident the Japanese banned the transfer of rice from a surplus to a potentially self-sufficient residency, 92 and in November 1942 priority in rice distribution was given to important factories and mines. In the following month the distribution and price became controlled by the Japanese. 93

West Sumatra produced rice enough for itself but not export. Increased rice production was definitely necessary. New varieties of rice were introduced and agricultural specialists were called in from Japan. The Japanese specialists were at first quite confident of their higher skills in rice cultivation because Japan had twice the productivity (from 3 to 4 tons per ha.) of Sumatra. To their surprise, the specialists found that the Minangkabaus had been practising rice culti-

91. Sumatora Shomukitei, op.cit., p.409; Interview with an ex-administrator in West Sumatra specializing in agriculture (Jimba), 18 August 1974, Tokyo.
92. "Chiho Chokan Kaigi ni Okeru Sangyo Bucho Koen Yoshu" (Summary of speech made by the Director of Industry Department), dd.27 November 1942, the 25th Army.
viation with a high degree of skill and that their methods could not be improved upon. In practice they could advise only intensive work, conversion of uncultivated land into rice fields, and setting up of irrigation works.  

At the beginning of 1944 the Sumatran Army began to prepare for a decisive war with the British forces, which they expected to take place around Sumatra. To increase food provisions for the war, forced deliveries of rice were imposed in West Sumatra in that year. Similar to the Dutch coffee Cultivation System in West Sumatra, the delivery system required the population to sell rice at a low price. However, its implementation was very unsystematic. It was first applied to the Korinci area where the villagers had to deliver about 10 per cent of their produce. Soon this increased to 20 per cent. In the course of 1944, the system was applied to all areas of West Sumatra at higher rates. Although accurate figures are not available, the rate seems to have reached 50 per cent in some places.

The delivery system destroyed the people's economy. Nagaris around Padang Panjang complained of the excessive demands. There was a case in which a nagari head committed suicide presumably because he could not fulfil the requirement. The Japanese sensed a strong dissatis-


95. One of the main reasons which made Yano resign from his position was that he thought it absurd for the Army to fight a decisive war in and around Sumatra to defend Japan and for this purpose to increase food provisions, which inevitably would oppress the population. In spite of Tanabe's persuasion, Yano 'temporarily returned to Japan with a firm determination not to come back again, though he was officially to come back to Sumatra'. Kenzo Yano, "Saigonon Kaigi", op.cit.

96. Interview with Jimba.

97. Interview with Akiyama.

faction among the population, which could have developed into political disturbances. Several methods were used by the Japanese to encourage the increase of rice production and also to appease the dissatisfaction at the same time. In addition to the low fixed price, the Japanese gave cloth, salt, copra, and confiscated goods to nagaris which completed their assignment. An all-Sumatran contest was held to praise villages which increased production and delivery, the prizes being gold and silver medals. Japanese civilians visited nagaris persuading penghulu to speed up deliveries. On such occasions 'independence' was deliberately discussed to give the villagers hope. Pressure and encouragement made it possible for the Japanese to collect almost the total quantity of rice assigned to West Sumatra, but at great sacrifices by the population.

4. Labour problems

The capitulation of Sumatra to Japan caused extensive unemployment by disrupting the normal labour market. Many labourers on plantations and in European enterprises lost their jobs. Indonesian merchants and industrialists could not carry on their businesses. The gunseikanbu of the 25th Army adopted four measures to solve this problem at the beginning of the occupation: (1) keeping control over dispersed rubber plantation labourers; (2) acquiring manpower for strategic factories; (3) recruiting manpower for transportation of military equipment; and (4) keeping wages low. Of these, labourers for rubber plantations lost importance for reasons referred to above. The implementation of these measures took two forms: the restoration of the disrupted labour market by Japanese initiative and the introduction of forced labour service.

In August 1942 the gunseikanbu instituted the bureau of labour policy supervision which was absorbed into the General Affairs office in the following month. The West Sumatran office for labour recruitment was

100. Letter of Sakae Hirano, op.cit.; Interview with Akiyama.
established on 11th August that year in Padang. By the following year, the office had registered 4,465 persons who wished to work.\textsuperscript{102} Probably the importance of this office declined as time went on because the Japanese intensively used forced labour for military purposes.

The forced labour system was implemented unsystematically. As in the case of forced deliveries of rice, the number of workers to be delivered was assigned to each village through its head. The main works were construction of roads, railways, air fields, and fortifications along the coast or in the mountains. The Japanese called the service \textit{gotong royong}, exploiting the Javanese concept of communal labour service, but the Minangkabaus called it \textit{pekerja rodi}, the same name as for corvée under Dutch rule. Wages in principle were to be paid either in cash or in kind, including rice, clothes, and other daily necessities.\textsuperscript{103} On the other hand, when a family could not provide labour they had to commission somebody on their behalf.\textsuperscript{104} In this sense the '\textit{gotong royong}' was in practice corvée for the villagers.

\textit{Social Impact: 'Japanization' Policy}

The Japanese introduced few social innovations except those which could assist in 'winning the hearts and minds of the people'; or help Japanese

\textsuperscript{102} ibid.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Fujita (Osaka, 19 August 1974), an ex-military officer in charge of finance of the 25th Army. He says that the military paid about 1 Jf. a day, thus, many people came to the military asking for work. A letter of Hirano and Nishimoto also confirmed the payment. However we must take into account the labour done by the heihos (auxilliary corps) who were in practice performing free labour for the Japanese military. Furthermore, many Sumatrans were taken to Java as labourers only provided with food. A former Staff General claims in his memoirs that 92,700 Sumatrans were transferred to Java in 1944. See, Shizuo Miyamoto, \textit{Jawa Shusen Shoriki} (Memoirs on the Dealing with the Surrender), Jawa Shusen Shoriki Kanko Kai, Tokyo, 1973, p.41.

\textsuperscript{104} 'Chiho Chokan Kaigi ni Okeru Shitsugi Oto', op.cit.
war strategies. This, however, does not mean that the occupation had no impact upon the indigenous social structure of Minangkabau. At least we need to examine the impact of the 'Japanization' policy. Other Japanese policies may also have caused social repercussions among the population.

The term 'Japanization' implies, first of all, the encouragement of Indonesians to work for Japan as 'Japanese citizens', and, secondly, to help them adjust to thinking and behaving in the Japanese social and cultural context. On the first point, the Japanese propagated the view that all Asians should be united into the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of the Japanese Emperor. In line with this ideology, Japan had promoted the kominka (lit., converting into 'Emperor's children') in Korea and Taiwan where the inhabitants were forced to have Japanese names and to speak in Japanese. However it is doubtful that the Japanese seriously tried to apply this ideology to Indonesia which had a quite different social and cultural background.

The Japanese did not specify the status of Indonesian people. At a meeting in 1943, a representative of the Sumatra military mentioned to shu chokans: 'Indonesia cannot be treated as a Japanese colony in the purely legal sense of the term. Thus, we must treat the people as sekimin' (a very unusual Japanese term approximately translatable as 'half-citizens'). However this terminology was not used to represent the official status of Indonesians. Indeed Indonesians were variously referred to in official documents as: Indonesia-jin (a neutral term equivalent to 'Indonesian people'), genjumin ('natives'), jumin (inhabitants), senryochi-jumin ('inhabitants of occupied areas), and quite frequently by ethnic and geographical names, e.g., Minangkabau-jin ('Minangkabau people') and Sumatora-jin ('Sumatran people'). From the Indonesian point of view, 'Japanization' in the sense of kominka was out of the question, for Japan was important only to release them from Dutch rule. In the second area of Japanization, the Japanese did show some enthusiasm for encouraging the acceptance of Japanese culture. We will

105. Interview with Akiyama.
examine this in the education field.

Two orders on education were promulgated in October 1942: the application of the kyoiku chokugo (Emperor's instruction on education), an Emperor-centred ideology; and 'neutrality' in religion. The Japanese tried to teach their language to Indonesians as quickly as possible, unlike the Dutch who limited the opportunity to learn the Dutch language to a small elite group only. Perhaps the Japanese needed Indonesians who could speak Japanese for administration, since most Japanese could not understand Indonesian or local languages. In addition, the Japanese language was considered to be an important basis for inspiring acceptance of Japanese culture.

The village school (sekolah nagari) and continuation school (sekolah sambungan) came under Japanese supervision in October 1942. The teachers were recruited from those who had taught in the Dutch period. However all the teachers had to receive some training in basic Japanese (to read and write katakana, one of three writing systems of Japanese, which was considered easiest for Indonesians to learn), singing of Japanese songs, and raijo taiso or physical exercise following the radio, as was prevalent in Japan. Japanese were to inspect the schools twice a year.

The curricula of these schools were prepared by the Japanese, who stressed the learning of Indonesian and arithmetic including anzan, a Japanese method of mental calculation. The Japanese language was taught only one hour per week in the first year of the village school, two hours in the second year and three and a half hours in the third. It was taught for three hours a week in the continuation school. Although Japanese songs were introduced in addition to formal instruction, the

106. Interview with the former president of the Teachers' Training School in Padang Panjang (Mukai), Fujisawa, 10 August 1974. See also his memoirs, "Document; Jyokyu Shihan, Nishikaigan Shuritsu Shihan", Sekido Hyo, op.cit., p.425.


total length of instruction in Japanese was still short. Indonesian teachers demanded the dropping of instruction of the Minangkabau dialect which had been introduced in the formal course of village schools since the end of the 1920s, to concentrate on bahasa Indonesia or the Indonesian national language. These teachers' preference for bahasa Indonesia, obviously motivated by nationalism, may have been common throughout Indonesia and contributed to its spread.

109. **Curricula in the Village and Continuation Schools**

(hours per week)

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<th>Continuation School</th>
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<td>2nd</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 14:00 14:00 22:00 22:30 23:30


110. ibid.
In July 1943, nine months after the Japanese takeover of education, an investigation was made into the effect of teaching the Japanese language at the village and continuation school level. The resulting report was pessimistic, concluding that it was impossible to make Indonesians understand Japanese culture through the language. Moreover, it warned that the enforced use of hiragana and kanji (two other Japanese writing systems) might invite resentment, as it might be too heavy a burden for children. Judging from the context of that report Japanese language teaching seems to have been rejected as a means of promoting 'Japanization' at these low levels. In 1945 the Japanese were preparing a more general education curriculum for the village and continuation school level. However, this project was not completed by the time of the surrender.\(^{111}\)

For higher education, former public schools were taken over and run by the existing teachers and some Japanese. Three schools for higher education were initiated by the Japanese in Batusangkar, Bukittinggi, and Padang Panjang. In these schools the Japanese showed much greater enthusiasm for making Indonesians think and behave in ways appropriate to the Japanese socio-cultural context, especially the inculcation of industrious attitudes and a sense of communal purpose which subordinated the interests of the individual. The communal purpose was referred to as 'tanah air' (homeland) or more specifically Sumatera Baru (New Sumatra) which concept was intensively advocated by the Japanese in Sumatra as a whole.

Jokyu Kanri Gakko (Higher Officials' Training School) in Batusangkar was the most important among the Japanese-created schools in Sumatra. The principal purpose of this school was to produce new Indonesian leaders. Its students were recruited from all over Sumatra on the recommendations of respective shu chokans regardless of their birth and social status. This Japanese method of selection was completely different from the Dutch one which had taken considerable account of birth. Unlike other schools in Sumatra, all the teachers were Japanese and instruction was given exclusively in Japanese for history, geography,

\[^{111}\text{H.Benda, Japanese Military Administration, op.cit., p.213-21.}\]
Japanese language, ethics and military training. There were two courses, one for three months and the other for six months. It is worth noting that the Japanese built this school in Batusangkar rather than Bukittinggi, regarding the place as the cultural centre not only of Minangkabau in relation to the capital of the old Minangkabau kingdom but also of Sumatra as a whole, as the Japanese in Sumatra tended to think the Minangkabaus intellectually the most advanced among Sumatran people.112

Jokyu Shihan Gakko (Higher Teachers' Training School) in Padang Panjang had also quite different characteristics from Dutch educational institutions. For the entrance physical strength was one of the most important requirements as well as intelligence, and birth had no importance. Students of both Jokyu Kanri Gakko and Jokyu Shihan Gakko lived within the campus together with Japanese teachers. This situation created close contact between Indonesian students and Japanese staff, which had never been the case with Dutch staff during the Dutch period. On the whole, education in these Japanese-created schools appears to have been felt by the students to be more 'democratic', and more frank in terms of teacher-student relationships than had been the case in Dutch schools. Through these intimate relationships Japanese teachers seem to have succeeded in inculcating the Japanese patterns of behaviour mentioned before and also in obtaining popularity among the students. A Minangkabau graduate of Jokyu Shihan Gakko recalls that she had never thought of working for Sumatra under Dutch education but was influenced by her Japanese education to think that this might be possible. Despite the fact that the Japanese intention was to educate able Indonesians who could co-operate with the Japanese, their new education also stimulated nationalism among students, though the nationalism was much imbued with an anti-Western sentiment. Another significant impact of Japanese education in these higher schools was an increase in social mobility to produce new elites.113


Outside schools the study of Japanese was encouraged by every means. For instance, Kita Sumatora Sinbun (North Sumatran Newspaper), successor of Sumatra Sinbun issued in Medan, published Indonesians' compositions in Japanese at the end of 1943, using Latin letters. Although rudimentary Japanese spread quite widely among Indonesians, it was hardly feasible for the bulk of Indonesians to think in Japanese socio-cultural terms because of the language difficulty.

Ironically, the ban on using English and Dutch in favour of the Japanese and Indonesian language seemed more to stimulate "Indonesianization" than 'Japanization' because Indonesian teachers preferred bahasa Indonesia to Minangkabau. In fact the Japanese directed the education policy for all schools to 'Indonesianization' at the end of the occupation, probably having realized the failure of the 'Japanization' policy, particularly in lower schools, and the necessity to win popularity. 114

Besides education, military training for heihos (auxiliary soldiers) and giyugun seems to have inculcated the same mental attitude as did the above-mentioned Japanese-created schools, as well as some military skills. In the social context the Japanese military training also eliminated barriers among the trainees in relation to birth and status, training them equally. The 'Japanization' policy appeared in the enforcement of the keirei or the Japanese style of formal salute facing Tokyo on occasions such as the Japanese national celebration and the Emperor's birthday. Although the Japanese tried to persuade the population that the keirei with deep bow did not involve Muslims in polytheism, this practice was very unpopular among the population. Devout Muslims thought it an insult to be forced to honour the Emperor in place of Allah. The keirei also violated the initial rule to be 'neutral' in religion. 115

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the Dutch refusal to concede to the demands of the Indonesian Parliament movement disillusioned those who participated in the movement, and broke down the temporary unity between the adat party and the challengers. Shortly before the Japanese invasion, the challengers began to attack penghulus again. On completing the occupation, the Japanese prohibited political activity of the population for security reasons. Open and direct conflicts between the adat party and the challengers had to be submerged again. Thus, the rivalry manifested itself in the competition to secure positions within the Japanese administration. We will discuss the rivalry and changes in the social and political power struggle first at the village level and next at the supra-village level.

At the village level the Japanese did not introduce any new administration. However the power of nagari heads and penghulus was heightened as a result of the Japanese reliance on these people for passing on orders such as those for the delivery of rice and manpower to the Japanese, orders that the villagers could not refuse under the military regime. In addition, the activity of challengers to adat authorities was restricted by the Japanese not necessarily because they were antagonistic to the challengers, but because they feared social disturbances, as exemplified by their repressive reaction to the challengers in the early months of the occupation, which we have discussed before. This was a de facto protection of adat groups at the expense of other groups within the nagari.

The virtual disappearance of cash crop cultivation and the intensifying of rice cultivation certainly enhanced the penghulus' leadership in the socio-economic sphere. As the lineage heads, they could wield a greater influence over rice cultivation on sawah which normally belonged to family communal property than over cash crop cultivation in private gardens. As happened in the 1930s, penghulus sometimes prohibited the sale of foodstuffs to villagers of other nagaris for fear of food shortage within the nagari.116 The recovery of the

Penghulus' authority both in the administrative and socio-economic fields was an unmistakably important change at nagari level during the Japanese occupation.

As for changes in social structure, two significant signs of change in adat regulations at nagari level appeared during the occupation. Firstly, penghulus and mosque personnel in the Padang Panjang area decided to simplify the ceremony of marriage. According to custom a bridegroom-to-be had to bring some rice when he visited his prospective bride. This custom was dropped because of economic hardship. The penghulus and mosque personnel further recommended the simplification of traditional ceremonies as far as possible.117 Probably the simplification of traditional ceremonies spread widely in Minangkabau during the occupation. This may partly be attributed to a spontaneous adjustment of the villagers to the abnormally difficult economic conditions. It is also likely that the Japanese deliberately encouraged these simplifications to promote economies in private consumption, as seen from the fact that the Padang Panjang case was publicized in a newspaper and that such tendencies were quite common in Japan during the war.

The situation was somewhat different at the supra-village or West Sumatra-level. At these levels, both the adat and its challenger groups were given high positions in the Japanese administration, though it cannot be denied that the Japanese had a slight preference for the adat party. From the Japanese point of view, showing preference for a particular group was a matter of winning popularity. For the Minangkabaus, however, it was a question of which group was to seize the initiative. Thus, the rival groups competed with each other to acquire influential positions within the Japanese administration from the beginning. The youth groups, which had already launched an attempt to assume the initiative at the end of Dutch rule by establishing the Pemuda Nippon Raya and promoting the F-movement, retained leadership of the independence movement together with the nationalists throughout the occupation. They also

117. ibid, 9 September 1943.
succeeded in securing the highest positions in West Sumatra and also Sumatra-wide councils.

The efforts of adat groups for leadership were, however, also remarkable. It was penghulus who set up the first office for the giyugun in West Sumatra. In August 1943, many adat notables gathered in Padang dressed in pakaian raja or 'king's clothes'. They raised a 'Minangkabau adat flag', showing the Koto-Pillian adat in yellow and the Bodi-Caniago adat in red. After this ceremony, they marched to Yano's office 'to pray for peace for those who died for the Greater Asia'. There is no doubt that their real intention was to vaunt the greatness of Minangkabau adat or the Alam Minangkabau. The names of leaders announced in the ceremony suggest that they were claiming to be descendants of Minangkabau 'royal families'; Tuanku Titah from Sungai Tarab, Engku Datuk Bandaharo Koening from Lima Kaum, Jang di Pertuan Datuk Malenggung from Muara Labuh, Tuanku Gedang from Batiphui, and so on. Such adat chauvinistic events had never taken place before. The Japanese occupation gave adat groups a chance to revive their social and political influence which had been undermined by Western-educated individuals, nationalists, and Islamic reformists and modernists.

At the end of the occupation nationalist groups had acquired the greatest potential for influencing and leading Minangkabau politics. They had secured the top positions in West Sumatra and Sumatra-wide councils, represented by Mohammad Sjafei (the chairman of Shu Sangi In and Chuo Sangi In) and Chatib Suleiman (the vice-chairman of Shu Sangi In). In addition, both of these nationalists took the initiative in the Hoko Kai together with representatives of other rival groups. The adat party, led by Parapatih Baringek and MTIKAM leaders, strengthened its administrative power both at village and supra-village level. The Islamic party had also secured the leadership, represented by Sutan Mansur and Dr. Djamil, both members of Chuo Sangi In) and Djamil Djambek (the advisor on Islamic affairs for all Sumatra).

118. ibid, 21 August 2603 (1943).
What then was the impact of the Japanese occupation upon the Minangkabau rivalry after all? In this connection, the widely shared view that the Japanese were responsible for widening, and even creating, dangerous chasms between the adat (or kerajaan), Islamic, and nationalist parties by their deliberate policy of 'divide and rule' should be questioned. In fact the primary interest of the Japanese was how to draw the most support from the population for Japanese war efforts. An ex-Japanese administrator, who was in charge of drafting policies for West Sumatra and also Sumatra as a whole confirmed that the Japanese at first tried to encourage the adat party. When this proved to be inadequate, they promoted nationalists and the independence ideology, and finally the Islamic groups calling for a 'holy war'. This statement provides evidence that the Japanese were more influenced by the needs of circumstances than a 'divide and rule' policy.

It is true that the rivalry among the adat, Islamic and nationalist groups grew during the Japanese occupation. However, as Anthony Reid argued in the case of North Sumatra, this should be attributed less to Japanese policy than to attempts on the part of the rival Minangkabau groups which tried to advance their respective visions and claims, taking advantage of the change of regime. It could even be argued that it was the rival Minangkabau elites who manipulated the Japanese, rather than the Japanese manipulating the rival Minangkabau groups. After the Japanese surrender, the leadership structure at the West Sumatran level, forged during the Japanese occupation, continued to exist without being challenged. This situation proves that the leadership structure reflected the desires of the rival groups, otherwise direct conflicts must have been inevitable immediately after the Japanese surrender, to alter the leadership structure.

There were at least two groups which were excluded from the competition of rivals during the Japanese occupation, namely Western-


educated pro-Dutch individuals and communists. These two groups must
have been dissatisfied not only with the Japanese but also with the
major rival groups which 'collaborated' with the Japanese. Although
the leadership structure at the level of the top rival elites was not
upset, the rivalry and conflicts broke out in violent ways in the
independence struggle in 1945-1949, involving pro-Dutch elements and
the communists.

The Japanese Surrender and After

It is not the purpose here to describe how the Minangkabaus fought the
independence war and joined the Republic of Indonesia, as both military
and political aspects have already been studied extensively by many
scholars. However, several points deserve to be restated. The
construction of the Republic of Indonesia was not completed without
difficulties. The central government in Java faced obstacles in
integrating Sumatra into the Republic because the three and a half
years of Japanese occupation had created a distinctively Sumatran
political structure. On the Sumatran side or at least from the point of
view of West Sumatra, there was a fear of too much Javanese domination
in the course of the establishment of the Republic. Even within Sumatra
and also West Sumatra the desires of various ethnic and rival groups were
not always in accordance with each other. Despite these difficulties,
the Minangkabaus were generally sympathetic to the Republic because many
Minangkabaus were included in the central government. West Sumatra was
closely united with other parts of the Republic in 1949, though not all
problems were settled. Instead of discussing the details of this process
we will examine how the Minangkabau rival groups reacted to the post-war
political situation: what were the economic conditions during the inde-
pendence struggle and its relationship with political and social circum-
stances?

As far as the political leadership at the West Sumatra-level was
concerned, it was assumed by those who had gained power and high positions
during the Japanese occupation for a while, representing the major groups,

121. For instance, Audrey Kahin, "Some Preliminary Observations on West
Sumatra during the Revolution", Indonesia, no. 18 (October 1974),
p. 76-117; Anthony Reid,"The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra",
Indonesia, no. 12 (October 1971), pp. 21-46.
namely Mohammad Sjafei of the nationalist, Chatib Suleiman of the pemuda, Datuk Parapatih Baringek of the adat, and Sutan Mansur of the Islamic. However, the challenge to penghulus and Minangkabau colonial elites in the Dutch period was intensified during the 'social revolution' period, shortly after the Japanese surrender until early 1947, at the local levels. At the end of 1945, Patih (an adat authority) and Datuk Tumenggun (an ex-Volksraad member and also an adat champion) were murdered.122 This challenge was carried out by republicans, and particularly the pemuda and communists. At a meeting of the pemuda in February 1946, the members passed a resolution to attack penghulus on the grounds that the latter were not 'revolutionary'.123 Pro-Dutch ex-colonial officials (demandans and sub-demands) had been discharged as early as by the beginning of 1946.124

After the violent 'revolusi social (social revolution)' to eliminate traditional authorities and ex-colonial elites, the republican administration in West Sumatra launched a profound change in village administration in order to achieve the administrative centralization. Nine months after the Japanese surrender the Resident of West Sumatra proclaimed new regulations on nagari administration (Order no.20/21, 1946) to be implemented from July 1947. The new nagari administration consisted of the nagari representatives' council (Dewan Perwakilan Negeri) and its executive body (Dewan Harian Negeri), both led by the nagari head (Wali Negeri). Of these, the members of the representatives' council and the nagari head were to be directly elected by the villagers above 18 years of age. In contrast to the Dutch-created nagari council consisting of core-penghulus, opportunity to participate in the village administration was opened to everybody. The candidates were to be nominated by each of the following five groups: (1) the penghulus and alim ulama; (2) the nagari branch of the KNI (Komite National Indonesia), a republican organization; (3) a meeting of the local branch of the KNI

attended by at least 100 male members of the electorate, (4) a meeting of at least 100 female electors, (5) the political parties. The conflict between the adat party and its challengers seems to have been intensified again by this new policy. Opposition to the new system came from various adat groups and individual penghulus. The MTKAAM meeting in April 1946 adopted a resolution to oppose the new measures. There were many nagaris in which penghulus were reluctant to accept the measures. Although no comprehensive statistical data are available, it seems that the adat party (penghulus) was disadvantaged in the elections, for nominations were largely controlled by republicans and nationalists, and also penghulus were not organized as political parties at nagari level. However, a more important factor in the defeat of penghulus in the elections may have been the widespread dissatisfaction among the villagers with penghulus and nagari heads who had ruled them with the support of Dutch and Japanese colonial power. In addition, there were cases in which village heads who had been elected from among penghulus were suddenly dismissed by republicans. In any case it is clear that penghulus for the most part lost their administrative position through the elections. For instance, only one out of 44 penghulus was elected as a member of the representatives' council of nagari Lubuk Bergalang, though this nagari might be an extreme case.

After the reorganization of nagari administration, the republican administration of West Sumatra prepared to institute the district council (Kabupaten Council). The members of the district council were elected by the inhabitants of each kabupaten (an area administrative unit equal to the afdeling during the Dutch period), the number depending on the population. By the end of 1949, all the council members had been elected, totalling 174 representatives in 8 kabupatens. Table II clearly shows
TABLE II

The Distribution of the Members in the Kabupaten Council*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parties and groups</th>
<th>the number of representatives</th>
<th>percentages (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPII</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perti</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia, Propinsi Sumatera Tengah (Jakarta, 1953?), pp.367-37.

* PSI = Partai Socialis Indonesia. GPII = Gabungan Pemuda Islam Indonesia. 'Adat' includes MTKAM, Coordinasi Penghulus Penghulu Tanah Datar, Partai Adat Rakyat.

how small was the adat party representation in the district council (only 6 per cent). The representation of Masyumi which had absorbed the great majority of Islamic groups (see below) is by far the largest. In the course of the independence struggle the adat party was largely excluded both from the nagari and district administration.

In spite of the intensive challenge to penghulus, their authority was not entirely taken away but retained to some extent. Next we will examine the reasons for this, the economic circumstances, internal conflicts on the part of the challengers, and the social and cultural position of penghulus during the independence struggle.
As discussed before, cash crop cultivation was largely neglected during the Japanese occupation in favour of rice. This resulted in disastrous damage to cash crop gardens, particularly coffee and rubber. In addition, many factories for processing copra and rubber were destroyed or had become unusable by the time of the Japanese surrender.\footnote{130}
The republican administration began to control the export of cash crops in the middle of 1946 in order to secure financial resources.\footnote{131} It tried to buy up cash crops such as coffee, rubber, copra, cassia, and so on, but could obtain only a small quantity of rubber not from West Sumatra but from Tapanuli by the end of 1946.\footnote{132} In 1947, the administration was able to buy up only a meagre quantity of copra.\footnote{133} Foreign trade was gradually recovering after 1948. However, the population could not increase production due to political turbulences. In 1949 West Sumatra (except for the Padang area which was controlled by the Dutch) exported 2.7 tons of maize, 6.4 tons of coffee, 77 tons of gambir and 27 tons of tobacco.\footnote{134} However, copra and rubber, two of the three major export crops of West Sumatra before the war together with coffee, were not exported at all, although 60 tons of rubber was sold to Padang. Considering the production capacity of rubber in the pre-war period, about 170,000 tons a year, it can be said that rubber cultivation almost died out.\footnote{135} A Dutch investigation into the stock of export crops in 1949 revealed that the Solok market possessed 50 tons of cloves and cassia respectively and 5 tons of coffee; the Padang Panjang market, only 50 tons of cassia, and the Bukittinggi market, 200 tons of cassia.\footnote{136} These figures show the major cash crops had no importance during the independence struggle.

\footnote{130}{Letter of P.C.F.K.Textor to Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon in Indonesia, Padang, 14 November 1949, Mailr.991x/1949.}
\footnote{131}{Politiek Verslag over 2de half Juni 1946, Mailr.1153x/AGSU/1949.}
\footnote{132}{Report of Amcab te Padang, Padang, 1-15 June 1946, Mailr.1070/AGSU/1946; Mailr.281x/Bijlage III.}
\footnote{133}{Mailr.50x/AGSU/1947.}
\footnote{134}{Haluan, 19 March 1949, in Archief Algemeen Secretaria, Tweede Zending, new entry no.504.}
\footnote{135}{See note 130 above.}
\footnote{136}{Letter of Straten, Padang, 10 January 1949,no.12/G, in Mailr.104x/1949.
The acquisition of food was indeed much more important for the population than cash crops. The shortage of rice immediately after the war was largely due to the Japanese policy of self-sufficiency which reduced the stock of rice among the populated. During the independence struggle, this problem became acute because many able-bodied men joined the fight against the Dutch and British at the expense of agricultural work, and because an extensive area of rice fields was damaged and deserted. In 1946 hunger uprisings occurred in many places such as Talu, Air Bangis, Pariaman, and towns of Padang Panjang and Batusangkar.

The instability caused by the shortage of rice brought in new problems for the republican administration which wanted order and had to secure food for the republican army. This was a point where the republican administration tended to compromise with penghulus who had much influence over sawah cultivation. In April 1946, thus in the midst of 'social revolution' and before the new nagari administration was established, the Minangkabau assistant resident of Padang Panjang issued an order that 10 per cent of the rice harvest be contributed to the administration by 'free will' with the co-operation of penghulus and nagari heads. In December 1948, the republican administration in West Sumatra introduced a 10 per cent 'war tax' (Order of the West Sumatran administration, no.2/DPD/P-1st). For the collection of this tax, it appealed for the co-operation of 'penghulus and ninik mamak'.

The above makes it clear that penghulus were able to retain some leadership through controlling power over lineage sawah and the necessity of the penghulus' co-operation with the republicans for collecting the war tax, securing rice and maintaining order. In addition to the reasons

137. PST, p.328.
138. Mailr.3398x/AGSU/1949; Mailr.52x/AGSU/1947; Archief Algemeen Secretarie, Tweede Zending, new entry no. 118.
139. Mailr.345x/AGSU/1946, Bijlage IV.
140. Persoverzicht, in Mailr.702x/AGSU/1946.
mentioned above, the attack on penghulus was somewhat mitigated by internal conflict among the challengers, which will be discussed below.

Among the challengers to adat authority, the Islamic party stood on the same platform as the republicans and secular nationalists. At the end of 1945 the largest Islamic body (Majelis Islam Tinggi, M.I.T.) in West Sumatra favoured the co-operation with the Sjahrir Cabinet. By February 1946, almost all Islamic groups had been fused into the M.I.T., which was changed into Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslim Indonesia - Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) in that month. Some components of the Masyumi, especially Permi and PSII, attacked penghulus and those who were colonial officials during the Dutch period. However their challenge may not have passed the point where social and political order was seriously disturbed, since the Islamic groups formed the great majority in local councils within the framework of the republican administration which wanted to keep order. In any case it is clear that the challenge of Masyumi was less severe than that of communists and radical constituents of the pemuda.

Communists appeared on the surface immediately after the Japanese surrender, centering on Payakumbuh. The communists in West Sumatra, together with their sympathizers, were determined to achieve independence but in a far more radical way than the republicans and Islamic groups. The communists expanded their influence in the Volksfront (People's Front) which was founded by the residency's legislative body (Komité National Indonesia - Indonesian National Committee) in March 1946. The communists and their sympathizers challenged penghulus most vigorously in the 'social revolution' in 1946 and thereafter. At the beginning of 1946, penghulus lost most of their power in rural areas, particularly where the communist challenge was strong such as the regions

143. ibid., p.566; Mailr.991x/1949; Mailr.203x/1947.
144. The Volksfront consisted of radical groups, members of the pemuda, labour groups, socialists and communists. Audrey Kahin, "Preliminary Observation", op.cit., pp.90-91.
between Sijunjung and Solok, around the Singkarak lake, the coastal area south of Padang and the area between Korinci and Muara Sakai on the coast. The communist influence was further strengthened after the middle of 1946 when the Volksfront began to control the National Funds (funds of the Republic in order to achieve independence), Japanese currency and the finances of military bodies. By the end of 1946, the communists and young radicals had almost succeeded in eliminating local adat authority through the 'red army'. As well as pursuing 'social revolution', the communists spent much energy on the improvement of the economic conditions of the masses, knowing that the improvement was one of the most vital issues to be solved, and that they attracted the masses through their effort to increase production of food. In early 1946, the communists in West Sumatra declared the perang cangkul (the battle of the hoe).

Because of their remarkable success in eliminating penghulus and in increasing influence in rural areas, the communists encountered the suspicion of the republican administration which needed the cooperation of penghulus. Moreover, the republican authorities wanted order which was endangered by the communists. The conflict between the communists and republican authorities was acknowledged when the former openly accused the authorities in 1946 of being supported by the kaum saudagar (fig. influential merchants) who strengthened economic power during the Japanese occupation. As the republican politicians were unable to solve economic problems shortly after the Japanese surrender, they tended to rely on the kaum saudagar. The kaum saudagar appeared as members

145. Mailr.281x/1946, Bijlage IV; Resume Politieke Verslag, April 1946, Rapportage Indonesie, no.4; Mailr.716x/1949; Mailr.639x/1949.
149. Mailr.281/AGSU/1946.
150. Mailr.945x/AGSU/1946.
of various councils of the West Sumatran administration from the beginning. It was widely believed by the communists and masses that the kaum saudagar were in practice the leaders of Minangkabau internal politics. It was also known by many Minangkabaus that both the kaum saudagar and republican authorities were exploiting the population by corruptly taking advantage of their position.  

In April 1946, the republican administration arrested 6 communist-influenced leaders of the Volksfront, 2 leaders of the 'red army' and discharged the assistant resident of Padang and Painan on the charge of their communist tendencies. A few months later, members of the PKI abducted Dr. Djamil (resident of West Sumatra) and 3 members of the kaum saudagar regarding them as being corrupt. By repressing the communists and radicals, the republican authorities, intentionally or unintentionally, helped penghulus, alleviating the communist attack on penghulus. The conflict between the republican authorities and the PKI continued until June 1948, shortly before the Madiun rebellion in Java in September, which resulted in the massacre of communists by the republicans.

At a meeting in June, the PKI in West Sumatra agreed to co-operate with the republican administration, perhaps in the face of imminent Dutch attack. However, the Masyumi, by far the greatest power in the local councils, rejected the co-operation with the PKI in spite of the mediation of top republican politicians.

The temporary unity between the republican administration and left-wing parties broke up again shortly after the Madiun rebellion, as the Masyumi began to arrest members of the PKI. The opposition to the republican administration by left-wing parties was intensified by the establishment of Partai Murba (Proletarian Party set up by Tan

151. See note 148.
152. Resume Politieke Verslag, April 1946, in Mailr.1153x/AGSU/1946.
153. Mailr.945x/AGSU/1946.
radical groups launched an intensive attack on republican officials and adat chiefs by murdering and abducting them, for instance, in Painan, Bukittinggi, Kota nan Gedang (Payakumbuh), and several nagaris in the Sijunjung region. However, the challenge to the republican administration was again suppressed.  

In addition to the conflict between the republicans and radicals, it is likely that the republicans did not eliminate penghulus rigorously for fear of penghulus running to the Dutch side or organizing an anti-republican movement. In fact some penghulus, threatened by their challengers' attacks, escaped to Padang in the hope of Dutch protection during the 'social revolution'.

There was an anti-republican movement which inaugurated Parati Autonom Minangkabau (Minangkabau Autonomy Party) in early 1948 with the aim of establishing a 'Minangkabau state'. This party consisted mainly of ex-colonial elites, but also some penghulus, and pro-Dutch individuals. By the time of its inauguration, the party had organized guerrilla troops with some 900 armed men, supported by the Dutch in Singapore. Although the majority of penghulus wanted some autonomy for Minangkabau within the framework of the Republic, they criticized an independent state of Alam Minangkabau.

We have discussed the reasons for some continuation of traditional authority from the viewpoint of the necessity for increasing rice production, the utilization of penghulus by the republican administration, and the internal conflicts among the challengers. In the social sphere,


160. For the anti-republican movement in West Sumatra, see an extensive report, "Anti-Republichiense activiteit in Sumatra's Westkust aan leiding tot openlijke samenwerking van de Republiek op Sumatra met het communisme", in NEFIS documents, JA148/JA66, Raportage Indonesie Sumatra's Westkust, no.4.
the republican administration did not abolish the adat council, a body entirely in the hands of penghulus, although its jurisdiction was confined to 'adat affairs'. Despite this limitation penghulus held onto social influence in the nagari through the adat council. As well as the adat council, the land tenure system remained untouched, so that penghulus continued to function as supervisors of lineage landed property. Thus the more crucial aspect of the authority of penghulus was preserved.

In 1975 Keebet von Benda-Beckman reported that the authority of penghulus was still crucial in politics and social affairs in West Sumatra. The West Sumatran administration had been consulting Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (Institute for the Adat of Minangkabau World), an unofficial body of penghulus, prior to introducing its policies. This institutions was established shortly after the unrest of 1965 - an abortive coup of communists and successive massacres of communists - at the instigation of the provincial government, realizing that the co-operation of penghulus was indispensable for the development of West Sumatra. This suggests that, as was the case during the independence struggle, the administration needed and utilized the authority of penghulus in attempting to exclude the communist influence. As for land, the West Sumatran administration had succeeded in measuring and registering only 5 per cent of the total (arable) land by 1972, presumably as a compromise with penghulus who would claim that family land was undividable.

161. PST, op.cit., p.328.

162. It was symbolic that the MTKAAM passed a resolution at its conference in July 1946, that is in the midst of 'social revolution', that marriage, inheritance and land transaction should follow the adat. This resolution shows that penghulus were well aware of the importance of controlling these three social and economic occasions as a vital source of their authority. See, Mailr.127/AGSU/1946.
However, Benda-Backman also observed that the sale of family land was not rare in 1974, although the buyers were almost exclusively the people of the same nagari. 163

CONCLUSION

For the analysis of historical change it is essential to clarify what has changed and what has not changed. If we focus only on the elements of change, one might gain the impression that the whole system has changed. Furthermore a change in some part of the system does not necessarily constitute a long-term trend but could be a temporary phenomenon. Thus, it is reasonable to examine each of the features of the Minangkabau village presented in the PREFACE of this thesis.

1. Political and judicial system

These aspects can be represented by the authority and the effectiveness of the adat council. As a basic trend these two aspects continued to be undermined throughout Dutch and Japanese rule, though the process was not always constant but involved some revival. The authority of penghulus was first challenged by the padris at the beginning of the 19th century. Because of their success in changing the existing political and judicial system, their movement was crushed by the Dutch who wanted to see the continuation of the existing system, as this facilitated their own administration. During the Cultivation System (1847-1908), the administrative authority of penghulus was augmented by the colonial administration, since the Dutch used the penghulus intensively to collect coffee and for general administrative purposes. On the other hand, the authority of penghulus was undermined and the cleavage between the penghulus and the villagers was widened in various respects. Firstly, the Dutch created the position of the district head as a supra-village office and the nagari head as a government official, neither of which existed before as indigenous institutions. Although there had been a sort of nagari head (pucuk nagari), he was based on the adat and found only in the Koto-Piliang nagari. Secondly, the pressure of penghulus upon the villagers to deliver coffee caused hostility among the latter. Thirdly, the villagers became more interested in cash crops other than coffee which yielded only low prices under the Cultivation System. The development of cash crop cultivation in general made it possible for the
villagers to be more independent of the penghulus, because they could
now earn income from cash crops other than rice on sawah which was under
the supervision of penghulus. Fourth, the Islamic reformists again
launched an attack at the end of the 19th century on the authority of
penghulus and on the Islamic mystical sects (the tarekats) which were
assimilated in the matrilineal social order.

It is of note that both the padri and 1890s reformist movement
erupted against a similar economic background. When the padri movement
occurred at the beginning of the 19th century, coffee growing for export
had just begun to spread widely in the Highlands, though coffee was
grown there much earlier not for export but mainly for consuming its
leaves. In the 1890s cash crop cultivation and a commercial economy was
developing rapidly all over West Sumatra. The timing of the Islamic
reformist movement and the development of a commercial economy was not an
accidental coincidence. The existing communal and subsistence economy
bounded by matrilineal family ties was an impediment to such a new
economic pattern.

It was fortunate for penghulus and tarekat Muslims that the
reformists were suppressed by the Dutch by the beginning of the 20th
century, as this allowed these two traditional leadership groups to
revive their authority. After the reformists were suppressed these groups
began to take the initiative in opposing the introduction of monetary
taxation. In fact the anti-tax rebellion was led by penghulus and tarekat
Muslims. On their part, the rebellion was an adat-revival movement as
well as being for the protection of fellow villagers from new economic
burdens. For the bulk of the villagers, it was a reaction to the further
penetration of Dutch colonial power in addition to an opposition to an
extra financial burden.

The defeat of the anti-tax rebellion considerably damaged the
authority of penghulus. The rebellion was the biggest and the last to
be led by penghulus as village leaders. It was obvious to everybody that
the penghulus could not protect the villagers from the Dutch. The
penghulus' nagari-based leadership was gradually taken over by other
Islamic and secular organizations which were not rooted in the nagari
but cut across West Sumatra. The Dutch introduced the Nagari Ordinance in 1914 creating another source of authority in the nagari, i.e., the nagari council as a government organ on top of the traditional adat council. This new system not only split the penghulus into two groups, authorized and unauthorized, but also deprived them of their privilege of receiving adat dues. In addition to the laws of the Netherlands Indies and governmental courts, this ordinance encroached upon the authority of the adat council.

The development of a monetary economy accelerated in the 1910s and 1920s owing to increasing demands for tropical products. The villagers moved out wherever they could find opportunities to earn money, and concentrated on cash crop cultivation rather than rice. This new tendency weakened the penghulu-villager relationship and encouraged individualization. Cash crop cultivation was expanded in individual gardens. Penghulus wielded less authority over such gardens than over rice cultivation on lineage sawah. The spread of a commercial economy forced the closed village society to adjust to a new economic and social environment. The disintegration of social cohesion in the village advanced.

The great trade depression in the 1930s changed the situation. The villagers returned home in order to obtain food from sawah. The penghulus' authority again revived. In the 1930s they organized numerous adat associations to cope with the challengers: Western-educated intellectuals, Islamic reformists and modernists, nationalists, and other political parties. This revival was based on their supervisory power over lineage sawah which became much more important, since cash crop cultivation was declining. The Japanese occupation further strengthened the authority of penghulus. The Japanese in West Sumatra favoured penghulus for their administration. The activity of penghulus' challengers was deliberately suppressed by the Japanese as long as it threatened order. Economically, rice cultivation was encouraged at the expense of cash crops partly for increasing food supplies to the Japanese and partly because cash crops in practice became unsaleable except for rubber which soon also declined because of the lack of coagulants within Sumatra and difficulty of transportation to other places. Penghulus became key figures for sawah
cultivation and deliveries of rice to the Japanese, perhaps causing antipathy against penghulus among the villagers. It was in part for this reason that their authority was greatly reduced by the challengers after the Japanese surrender.

The revival of the authority of the penghulus does not necessarily mean that they recaptured the same importance in the village during the great depression and the Japanese occupation as they had possessed before a monetary economy prevailed in West Sumatra. This revival was, of course, relative in nature compared with their authority in the 1910s and 1920s. Nevertheless, the realization of this revival is significant. If one assumed that the decline in their authority was continuing at the same rate as that described by B.J.O. Schrieke in his West Coast Report (Part I), one might suppose that the penghulus had lost all power in the nagari. However, that was not always the case as we have seen in the last part of Chapter VII.

2. Social continuity

This aspect may be measured by the persistence of matrilineal family ties including inheritance regulations. Father-child-relationships became more and more important, at the expense of uncle-nephew and uncle-niece relationships. The 'nuclear family' system was becoming common. As far as individual property was concerned it is true that children had stronger rights to inherit than nephews and nieces, which situation had been observed at least by the 1910s. These trends seem to have continued even during the depression and the Japanese occupation period, since there is no indication that the trends towards the increasing inheritance rights of children over their fathers' individual property was reversed in those periods. Despite these clear signs of the decline of matrilineral family ties nobody would deny that Minangkabau society could still be regarded as matrilineal even after World War II because the descent system did not change at all; children belonged to their mother's family. As the family system and inheritance of communal property, especially sawah, are so closely related to each other we will examine this in terms of the land tenure system below.
3. Village finance, territorial rights and landholding system

In Chapter III we discussed how the Dutch began to control the nagari treasury and adat dues after the introduction of the Nagari Ordinance in 1914. From the government point of view the control of the village treasury was one way to transfer its financial burden to the nagari. However, for the nagari, this new regulation was a serious blow to its financial independence. Thereafter the nagari had to rely overwhelmingly on the distribution of government funds. It is not clear whether the adat dues and the old nagari treasury revived during the Japanese occupation or not. Perhaps the latter was the case because the villagers would be very reluctant to pay the adat dues in the extremely difficult economic conditions, and because most of the dues had been removed by the Nagari Ordinance. Even if they were collected it is unlikely that the nagari treasury was re-established as systematically as before. The virtual disappearance of the nagari treasury was one of the clearest indications of the decline of nagari autonomy.

The territorial rights of nagari (hak ulayat) and the landholding system were also bases of village autonomy. Despite government pressure, the nagari retained much of its territorial rights. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Netherlands Indies government was unable to apply the Domain and Agrarian Law strictly to West Sumatra even as late as the 1930s. A Dutch company could not overcome the nagari territorial rights in government courts. The Dutch had to compromise and pay compensation to the nagaris for exploiting forest products from 'domain land' under the Solok Reglement in 1927, though legally the Netherlands Indies government was not obliged to do so.

The general opposition of the Minangkabaus to a government plan to bring Javanese immigrants to West Sumatra in the late 1930s shows that the Minangkabaus kept an exclusive attitude towards non-Minangkabau people. Even among Minangkabaus, immigration from other nagaris was very hard or in practice impossible in the 1930s. These facts indicate that the nagari defended its territorial rights strongly against outsiders in general, be they Minangkabaus or non-Minangkabaus including the Dutch government.
The restrictions upon land alienation were relaxed slightly within the nagari. Pawning of family land without the general consent of family members was constantly taking place after the introduction of monetary taxation. Family land was occasionally divided among the members. However we have no evidence which proves the sale of family land in the commercial sense during the Dutch period. During the Japanese occupation there seems to have been at least one case in which family land was sold in this sense, although details on motives, price, and conditions are not clear.\footnote{Hadji Muhammad Hadjerat, "Sedjarah Negeri Kurai 'V DJORONG'" (c.a. 1947), quoted in Isamu Kurata, "Sumatora, Minangkabau Shakai" in Kishi and Mabuchi ed., Indonesia no Shakai Kozo (Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo, 1969), pp.29-43.}

The relative stability of the land tenure system is also relevant to the maintenance of matrilineal social organization. It is likely that old family ties would disintegrate when family land was distributed among the members, each of whom had the complete right of disposal. When land was under communal control, all the family members would not give up their rights to enjoy the output of it, since land was the most important means of income for the bulk of the Minangkabaus when they became old or disabled. The adat of matrilineal inheritance was the legal expression of a Minangkabau form of social assurance system.

Reasons for relative stability of village and social structure

Minangkabau experienced many political and religious movements and uprisings in the 1920s as well as the development of education. Why did the matrilineal family and land tenure system, given these dynamic changes, still retain many of their essentials? J.S. Kahn described this seeming paradox:

The student of modern Minangkabau society is, however, faced with a curious paradox. While Schrieke, writing of the period after the turn of the century, discussed the breakdown of matriliney, and while predictions of its demise are frequent, matrilineal organization seems to retain an important place in modern Minangkabau.
This 'survival' has been described for urban areas in West Sumatra (cf. Evers)...

Kahn's basic argument is that the matrilineal social system and the authority of penghulus were based on subsistence economy, and the Dutch tried to keep the economy subsistent, especially by means of the Cultivation System. In the post-independence period, 'truly capitalist-istic development of rural economy failed to take place'. This argument complies with our previous discussion in this thesis. In fact cash crop cultivation substantially declined in the 1930s, and it did not revive again during the independence struggle period. The present rural economy in West Sumatra still remains subsistent, resulting in the 'survival' of the matrilineal social system and the authority of penghulus. However we need closer historical investigation into the reasons for the superficial paradox.

The padri movement at the beginning of the 19th century had a two-fold effect upon subsequent Minangkabau history. On the one hand the military suppression of this movement by the Dutch colonial authorities crushed a great potential for socio-economic change. Moreover, similar reformist movements that occurred in later years were likewise suppressed by the Dutch. On the other hand because of the fierce resistance put up by the padris the Dutch became somewhat wary of possible resistance not only from the reformists but also the Minangkabaus in general. The Long Declaration in 1833 was a Dutch compromise for fear of resistance. Only in West Sumatra did the Dutch consult the villagers before introducing monetary taxation at the end of the 19th century because of this previous compromise. After the padri war, the Dutch always regarded West Sumatra as a politically sensitive region.

The Dutch fear of popular resistance, which basically stemmed from the padri movement, affected land policy as well. The Dutch promulgated the Domain Declaration in 1874 for West Sumatra, but it was kept...

secret from the population for fear of resistance. In addition the Agrarian Law, which had been introduced in the 1870s in other regions, was applied to West Sumatra only in 1915. In practice, the Dutch were unable to apply these land laws rigidly in West Sumatra towards the end of Dutch rule, so that the nagari largely retained its territorial rights. This had a manifold effect. Had the Dutch imposed these land laws, and leased 'domains' to European capitalists, the existing socio-economic structure would have changed more drastically than was the case. For instance, the villagers would have to use food cultivation land to expand cash crop cultivation instead of planting cash crops in forest reserves and uncultivated land. This would have upset the whole agronomic social system as occurred in various places in Java.

Weak control of Minangkabau land by the Dutch resulted also from the failure to introduce a land tax in 1923. If land tax was to be introduced in West Sumatra, land had to be measured on the basis of each household which had usufruct within communal ownership of land. Land tax, had it been introduced, might have strengthened individual ownership of land. The Dutch tried to measure land but were unable to carry it out. There could be several reasons for this. Firstly, the Dutch fear of popular resistance was intensified after the Padri war by uprisings in the 1840s and the anti-tax rebellion in 1908. Secondly, the unanimous criticism of land tax by the Minangkabau also contributed to the failure to introduce a land tax. Numerous meetings involving communists who had just begun to expand their influence at the beginning of 1923 made the Dutch cautious about introducing the tax. Finally, as was the case in the Domain Declaration, the main interest of the Dutch was directed to Java and areas where plantations had already developed such as East Sumatra. Among these possible reasons, the memory of the anti-tax rebellion and communist expansion may have been the immediate cause for withdrawing the plan.

Why did European capitalists and the Dutch government not apply the land laws rigidly to West Sumatra? Was West Sumatra less attractive than elsewhere for them to do so? As there is no doubt that their most
important interest lay in Java, we will compare West Sumatra with East Sumatra. In the 1870s when Europeans began to invest in Indonesia on a large scale and the Dutch established land laws for these capitalists, West Sumatra must have been no less attractive to them for starting plantations, since West Sumatra had rich soil and also quite large areas of land reserves. European plantations in East Sumatra developed after the turn of the century concentrating on rubber and tobacco. Why could Europeans establish one of the biggest plantation areas in Indonesia in East Sumatra, while they were unable to do so in West Sumatra? As far as geographical location was concerned, both regions were equally peripheral in relation to Java as the centre of Indonesia. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, I consider it to have been an important factor that if the Dutch government and Europeans really wanted to control land in West Sumatra they had to negotiate with each nagari instead of through contacts with supra-nagari authorities, such as the sultans and princes of East Sumatra.

Internal and institutional factors also contributed to the 'survival' of the matrilineal social and land tenure system. The population of West Sumatra considerably increased after 1930. However, estimated figures of the rate of emigration out of West Sumatra also rose; 11 per cent of the total population in 1930, 31.6 per cent in 1961, and 44 per cent in 1971, the highest rate of emigration in Indonesia in the last year. The extremely high proportion of emigrants must have reduced population pressure upon the shortage of land. If the increased population had remained within West Sumatra, the population pressure may have resulted in an extreme segmentation of land on which many households could not live, in turn causing the sale of land as occurred in Java. In short, the high proportion of emigration has reduced the pressure for social change to some extent. Also the distinctive matrilineal social principle of the Minangkabaus might have discouraged non-Minangkabau people from settling down there. Thus, West Sumatra could maintain a highly homogenous society.

The strong territorial rights of the Minangkabau villages contributed to defending the villagers' economic interests against the Dutch and Europeans. However the rigid regulation against the alienation
of land, to outsiders in particular, reduced the potential for social change as well, restricting social mobility. Even within the village the sale of lineage land seldom occurred, although there seems to have been at least one case of this sale during the Japanese occupation period. This situation in turn allowed the continuation of matrilineal social organization, since the land tenure and social system were inseparably related to each other. The authority of penghulus was steadily declining during the Dutch and Japanese rule. However, the decline was slowed down by the colonial powers which suppressed the challengers to penghulus on the one hand, and supported penghulus for administration purposes on the other. It must be noted that even the republican administration after the Japanese surrender in effect maintained the authority of penghulus in order to collect taxes and keep order.
GLOSSARY

Adat                      Local custom or traditional law.
Alam Minangkabau         The Minangkabau World.
Anak Buah                 A person's followers or dependent clients. In Minangkabau it usually denotes the constituents of the penghulu suku or the mamak.
Balai                     The village council hall.
Bodi-Caniago             One of two Minangkabau political traditions. It regards all penghulus in a village as equal.
Chokan                    The Resident in the Japanese military administration.
Controleur                Sub-division (onderafdeling) head in the Dutch administrative hierarchy.
Darat                     The heartland of the Padang Highlands.
Datuk                     Title of address for a penghulu.
Demang                    Indonesian head of a district in the post-1914 Dutch administrative hierarchy.
Giyugun                   Volunteer corps.
Gunseikanbu               The Civil Administration Department during the Japanese military occupation.
Haji                      Title for a person who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Harta Pancarian           The goods and wealth which a man acquired by his own labours during his lifetime.
Harta Pusaka              The goods and wealth which belonged in common to one matrilineal family unit.
Isi Adat                  Adat taxes levied by the nagari.
Iyuran                    Contributions from suku or extended family members to the family of their penghulu on occasions such as marriage, funeral, and the installation of a penghulu.
Kaum Kuno (Tua)           The 'Old' group or 'Conservative'.
Kaum Muda                 The 'Young' or 'Progressive' group.
Kebangsaan                Nationalism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kemanakan</td>
<td>Kinship term in Minangkabau meaning nephew and niece. This term also implies the relationship of a person to his leader. In case of inheritance, this term is used for legitimate heirs of uncles legacies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemerdekan</td>
<td>Independence and freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerajaan</td>
<td>Traditional rulers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koto Piliang</td>
<td>One of two Minangkabau political traditions. It recognizes the hierarchical ranking of penghulus in a nagari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladang</td>
<td>Dry field area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laras</td>
<td>Traditionally refers to the two political systems. Under the Dutch administration until 1914, the term was referred to the administrative unit (district).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhak</td>
<td>Traditional geographic division of the Minangkabau heartland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamak</td>
<td>A kinship term for material uncle. Also refers to the relationship of a lineage head to his followers, e.g., mamak-kemanakan relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>Majelis Syuro Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Council).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mondalami</td>
<td>Double pledging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merantau</td>
<td>Going out of one's home village in search of fame and fortune.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minshin Haaku</td>
<td>To win the hearts and minds of the people. This policy was adopted by the Japanese in their military administration in Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.I.T.</td>
<td>Majelis Islam Tinggi (Supreme Islamic Council).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTKAAM</td>
<td>Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (Supreme Adat Council of the Minangkabau World).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagari</td>
<td>Minangkabau village. It may have been more than the village before the Dutch administration which gradually converted the nagari into an administrative unit, sometimes incorporating several nagaris into one, and sometimes dividing one nagari into several penghulu kepalaschappen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partindo</td>
<td>Partai Indonesia (Indonesia Party).</td>
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<td>Term</td>
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<td>Pasar</td>
<td>Market.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pemuda</td>
<td>Youth Groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penghulu</td>
<td>Lineage head.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pengulu Suku Rodi</td>
<td>A Dutch-created Minangkabau official position mainly in charge of the supervision of coffee cultivation and delivery under the Cultivation System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permi</td>
<td>Persatuan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Union).</td>
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<td>Perti</td>
<td>Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putera</td>
<td>Pusat Tengah Rakyat (Concentration of the People's Power).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rantau</td>
<td>Outlying regions including the coast and fringe areas of the Highlands, when used as contrasted to the darat. It also means the world outside one's home villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawah</td>
<td>Irrigated rice fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serayo</td>
<td>Originally, mutual help or communal labour, but the Dutch used it for labour service for lineage chiefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Air</td>
<td>Homeland. The Japanese used this term deliberately instead of 'Indonesia' to obscure the aim of independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Suku</td>
<td>Clan land in a nagari over which a particular suku had superior land rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarekat</td>
<td>Literally, the 'way' or 'path' referring to the mystical brotherhoods in Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uang Nagari</td>
<td>The Dutch-instituted village taxes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>Islamic scholar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulayat</td>
<td>Territorial rights of the nagari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>Islamic contributions.</td>
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v.14 November 1912, no. 32 v. 6 May 1914, no. 80
v. 6 April 1915, no. 28 v. 4 March 1919, no. 23
v.30 April 1923, no. 4 v. 6 May 1925, no. 55
v.21 June 1927, no. A10 v. 1 July 1927, no. S10
v.15 January 1927, no. N9 v. 9 February 1927, no. U2
v.22 June 1935, no. 8 v.11 March 1940, no. 11
B. Memorie van Overgave.

A.R. = Assistant Resident; C. = Controleur; G. = Governor;
R. = Resident; T = Tropen Museum; B = Binnenlandse Bestuur
Archive; K = Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volken-
kunde.

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