

An Interdependent Model for Value Judgments
 between Subjects and Objects:
 J. McDowell's Critique of J.L. Mackie
 on Meta-ethics and the Concept of Intentionality

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It seems that recent discussions of value judgments in jurisprudence presuppose the fact/value dichotomy. I will argue that this dichotomy implies the *scientific realism* of ontology and the *correspondent theory of truth* of epistemology. On the basis of this ontological and epistemological view, some people claim that value judgment is emotion, error, or intersubjective, but I take a contrary view.

John McDowell, with whose arguments I sympathize for the most part, criticizes J.L. Mackie's error-theory in meta-ethics in relation to the point of epistemology of *secondary quality*, the concept of *resemblance*, and his *scientific realism*. Although non-cognitivists in meta-ethics sometimes argue that value is superfluous to the explanation of the world, McDowell claims the explanation of the value needs a subject and an object, that is, the subject and the object are interdependent. The "object" McDowell refers to is not the object in the external world as in the meaning of the Cartesian view; rather, it is the *intentional object*, which L. Wittgenstein and G.E.M. Anscombe sometimes discussed in connection with the function of language. If we accept this view, both experiencing the fact and experiencing the value are *intentional experience*. According to Later Wittgenstein, applying language requires external criterion. If we fail to apply a word about value (this is the same as misjudgment of the value in McDowell's philosophical position), we are restricted to this external criterion, such that we are responsible for explaining the *reasons for action*.

In this paper, I therefore conclude that a value judgment depends on the object

as well as the subject, and we can inquire the *reasons for action* from whomever makes such judgment.