<table>
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<th>項目</th>
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<td>タイトル</td>
<td>第2次日米繊維紛争（1969年-1971年）（2・完） 迷走の1000日</td>
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<tr>
<td>著者</td>
<td>石井 修</td>
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<td>雑誌名</td>
<td>一橋法学</td>
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This is the second and concluding segment of the article. At a November 1969
summit meeting in Washington, D.C. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato promised President
Richard M. Nixon to limit Japan’s exports of chemical fiber products. Furthermore,
the Prime Minister gave the President a strong impression that the former would be
able to settle the matter by the end of that year. The promise seems to have been
made out of Sato’s appreciation for Nixon’s decision to return Okinawa to Japan.
When Sato couldn’t fulfill his promise, prolonged, off-and-on negotiations went on,
and in the meantime the bilateral relations were exacerbated.

In October 1970 the Japanese Prime Minister made another promise to the US
President to resolve the issue by the time of the US elections in November that year.
Sato failed again.

The new development in March 1971 truly infuriated Nixon. The Japanese
Federation of Textiles suddenly announced unilateral restrictions of textiles.
However, the fact that the proposed restrictions were not a kind that the President
wanted and that the Federation acted with the understanding (through lobbyists)
with the powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur
Mills of Arkansas, whom Nixon considered to be a potential rival in the coming 1972
presidential election. Nixon flatly rejected the Federation’s declaration. He was
reported to have uttered the words, “Japs’ betrayal.”

In the summer of 1971 the Japanese were shaken by the two successive “Nikuson
Shokku.” In the fall an annual bilateral cabinet-level meeting was held in Washington,
D.C. Prior to the official meeting, the Japanese Foreign and MITI Ministers were given an ultimatum — the “October 15” deadline — by the top US negotiator. This strategy had been decided by the President and his inner circle at Camp David on July 15.

Faced with a threat of US unilateral action, the Japanese negotiators subsequently succumbed to the threat. On that very date a memorandum of understanding was initialed in Tokyo, thus, ending the one-thousand-day turmoil, for which primarily Sato should be held responsible. (The formal signing of an agreement took place in Washington, D.C. in January 1971.)