HAS THE EU BECOME UNCONTROLLABLY DIVERGENT?:
ANALYSIS OF EU GOVERNANCE, FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO THE TREATY OF LISBON

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Abstract

Political will has been essential to European Union (EU) projects; economic integration projects are no exception. The experiences of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Customs Union, the Common Market, and the Economic and Monetary Union indicate that European economic integration projects have also been driven by political will. Thus, in facing economic difficulties such as economic underdevelopment, lowered competitiveness, and financial and fiscal turmoil, it is fairly persuasive to say that Europe needs political leadership (i.e., firm will on the part of politicians) to achieve further cooperation and overcome these economic difficulties. However, the author believes that such arguments have recently come to have more significance than ever, since the vectors and extent of divergence in the EU are approaching a “danger zone”—in other words, the EU has both prepared a variety of modes of governance on a variety of issues and come to emphasize input legitimacy (democracy), both at the expense of its uniformity.

The main purpose of this paper is to show that the EU has tended to be too divergent, by outlining changes in governance within the EU. This paper especially focuses on the fundamental treaties of the EU: the Treaty of Rome, the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of the European Union), the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Lisbon. It assesses the features of governance provided in these treaties, in light of (1) asymmetrical economic fundamentals and performance among member states, (2) the number of differentiation measures, (3) the public nature of EC/EU policies, and (4) the extent of concerns for democracy within the EU. Analysis of these fundamental treaties shows us that, recently, the EU has tended to be too divergent to make it controllable solely through political will.

I. Introduction

Political will has been essential to European Union (EU) projects; economic integration projects are no exception. The European Payment Union (EPU), the European Coal and Steel...
Community (ECSC), and the Customs Union, as well as the failure and relaunch of both internal market integration and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), have deeply related to changes in the world economy, especially that of the United States. However, it was political leaders in Europe who suggested the undertaking of integration projects in order to help Europe adapt to new circumstances; such projects featured increases in intra-EU trade and the stabilization of prices and currencies within its territory.

National governments had approved and implemented these projects, as far as domestic economic and political circumstances have allowed them. Thus, European (economic) integration projects can be explained in terms of three major factors: (economic) circumstances in the international milieu, the political will and leadership of European leaders and elites, and domestic constituencies. In that sense, in terms of European integration, the argument that “leadership and political will matters” bears much greater significance than is often the case, when it is used vis-à-vis political and economic phenomena.

Today, the EU faces economic underdevelopment, lowered competitiveness, and financial and fiscal turmoil. Under such circumstances, it is fairly persuasive to argue that Europe needs strong political leadership (i.e., firm will on the part of politicians) to overcome these economic difficulties and achieve further cooperation. However, the author believes that such an argument has comes to bear more significance than has previously been the case, since the vector and extent of divergence within the EU are reaching an unsustainable “danger zone”. In other words, on many issues, the EU has prepared too many varieties of modes of governance (i.e., measures), and it has begun to emphasize input legitimacy (democracy), at the expense of the EU’s uniformity.

In order to show that these concerns exist, this paper examines the features of governance within the EU and highlights some of the drastic changes therein. This paper especially focuses on the fundamental treaties of the EU—namely, the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act (SEA), the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of the European Union), the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Lisbon. This paper assesses the features of EU governance provided in these treaties, in light of (1) asymmetrical economic fundamentals and performance among member states, (2) the number of differentiation measures involved, (3) the public nature of EC/EU policies, and (4) the extent of concerns for democracy within the EU.

This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the features of EU governance under the Treaty of Rome and the SEA, in order to underline the limited divergence within the EU. Section III introduces the features of the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty of the European Union) and points out how it has been a trigger for divergence in the EU. Section IV touches upon the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon, to show how divergence grew within the EU. Finally, Section V assesses overall trends in the nature of EU governance and gives some comments on the relationship between political will and integration in Europe.

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1 For example, see Eichengreen and Frieden (2000), Tsoukalis (2000), Urwin (2003), Egan (2003), Phinnemore (2003), and Tanaka (2008).

2 For a similar argument and indication, see, for example, Keohane and Hoffmann (1990), especially pp. 284-285.
II. *The Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act: Limited Differentiation and Effective Pull Factor for Integration*

The United States’ post-war engagement to Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the EPU contributed to the reconstruction of the European economy and the development of intra-European economic ties. Politicians in Europe also made efforts to unite Europe politically. For example, Robert Schuman proposed the pooling of coal and steel by West Germany and France, in order to bring about a rapprochement between them. In 1951, four other European countries joined West Germany and France and signed the Treaty of Paris to found the ECSC. The six members of the ECSC delegated some parts of their sovereignty to the supranational authority. The ECSC contributed not only to political reconciliation within continental Europe, but also to an increase in the intra-European trade of treaty-related materials.

However, further integration—especially in the areas of politics and defense—has not progressed due to France’s rejections. Subsequent efforts focused specifically on economic issues. For example, in 1955, the next year in which France rejected the European Defense Community, the foreign ministers of the six member countries gathered at Messina and confirmed that they were taking a decisive step toward further integration, through the establishment of a Customs Union and a common market.

Two years later, the Treaty of Rome was signed. It declared the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). First, the Treaty introduced a plan for the Customs Union, which was achieved by eliminating internal tariff barriers, reducing quota restrictions on products, and creating common external tariffs. The Treaty of Rome also aimed to establish the Common Market, where the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital would be ensured, and promoted an approximation of national economic policies and the development of common policies.

The Customs Union was successfully completed ahead of the planned schedule. However, the Common Market was not achieved, due to the European resolution (the Luxemburg Compromise) prepared in response to French resistance to institutional change within the EEC. The Compromise allowed the EEC to respect national sovereignty; it also made it impossible to seek out consensus-based solutions to issues where vital national interests were expressed. It allowed member states to invoke *de facto* vetoes against EEC suggestions for the Common Market. The European market would continue to exist as a fragmented group of national markets, unless the national governments therein agreed to the abolition of measures that otherwise constituted obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital.

Nevertheless, the heads of states and governments gathered at Hague in 1969 and expressed support for policy cooperation and a plan that established an economic and monetary union. At that summit, they also agreed to start welcoming new member states; the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC in 1973. However, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s changed international economic circumstances, and the

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3 For details, see Neal (2007), chapter 2.
5 In 1967, the Treaty merged the ECSC with the European Community (EC), together with the EAEC and the EEC.
implementation of the plan became unfeasible. The EC established its own exchange-rate mechanism, in order to respond to the new economic and monetary circumstances; however, differences among member states—especially in terms of monetary policies (e.g. monetarist or economist)—made it difficult to stabilize the mechanism. Added to these failures in European economic projects, the oil shocks brought stagnation to the European economy.

In the beginning of the 1980s, Europe recognized a gap in competitiveness and market share vis-à-vis the United States and Japan; it took a decisive step for completing the “unachieved” Common Market project. It was Jacques Delors, the president of the Commission of the EC, and Lord Cockfield, the internal market Commissioner of the EC, who took the initiatives. Lord Cockfield prepared a White Paper named “Completing the Internal Market”. It assessed the remaining national barriers to intra-EC trade and suggested measures for ensuring the “four freedoms” within the area: the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. At that time, there were many non-tariff barriers that restricted those freedoms. In order to eliminate such barriers and liberalize intra-EC trade, the White Paper implied that the Treaty of Rome had to be modified. Especially, it argued that the de facto veto, which was allowed to member states since the Luxemburg Compromise, should be restricted in order to facilitate the removal of national barriers.

The SEA, which came into force in 1987, provided amendments to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The SEA laid down a timetable for the completion of a single European market, as defined in Article 13 of the Treaty of Rome: “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured”. In order to speed up the decision-making process in the EC for facilitating the realization of the single market, the SEA introduced qualified majority voting (QMV).

In conclusion, the heads of states and governments suggested and welcomed the proposed European integration projects, which contributed to an enhancement of national economies by increasing intra-European trade; however, they did not want to delegate national sovereignty completely to the EC. This is why the European integration projects covered only market-related issues. However, even for economic issues, member states wanted to be able to exercise de facto veto powers with respect to topics related to national critical concerns. Earlier projects for completing the Common Market and monetary union were not successfully implemented.

However, until the 1980s, divergence in the EU was limited (Charts 1 a) and b)). The number of member states was limited to between six and nine, and economic fundamentals and performance among member states did not vary greatly before Greece, Portugal, and Spain joined the EC6. Furthermore, the EC covered issues that related to the scale of the economy, and differentiation7 (i.e., national behaviors that differ from those of the EC) measures were limited to the de facto veto. Therefore, it was easy to steer the EU into becoming a more integrated economy: a relaunch of the Common Market project was made possible by introducing QMV—which was both suggested and supported by European leaders who were facing an economic gap vis-à-vis the United States and Japan—and the successful implementation of the Single Market Programme pulled Europe into further integration, as evidenced by the EMU, for example.

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7 For detailed explanations concerning the features and varieties of differentiation, see Stubb (1996).
Chart 1 Features of EU Governance in Vectors and Extents (by Treaty)

a) Treaty of Rome

- Asymmetrical economic performance
- N = 6 to 9
- Differentiation
- Veto
- CU, CM
- Public nature of EU policies

b) Single European Act

- Asymmetrical economic performance
- N = 9
- Differentiation
- QMV
- Single Market
- Public nature of EU policies

c) Maastricht Treaty

- Asymmetrical economic performance
- N = 9 to 12
- Differentiation
- Citizenship & EP
- Opt-out & Subsidiarity
- Funds for new MS
- Public nature of EU policies

d) Treaty of Amsterdam

- Asymmetrical economic performance
- N = 15
- Differentiation
- Flexibility, OMC etc.
- Lisbon Strategy
- Public nature of EU policies

e) Treaty of Lisbon

- Asymmetrical economic performance
- N = 25 to 27
- Differentiation
- e.g., Initiatives
- e.g., SGP procedure
- Cont.
- Public nature of EU policies

f) To be Converged

- Asymmetrical economic performance
- N/A
- Differentiation
- Democratic nature of the EU
- Public nature of EU policies

Source: Author
III. The Maastricht Treaty: Encroachment of Uniformity in the EU

As the Single Market Programme progressed, Jacques Delors as well as some European leaders were urged to promote both political and economic integration. Eventually, the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War in the following year created greater momentum in this direction. In 1990, two intergovernmental conferences that covered a political union and an economic and monetary union were held. At the Maastricht European Council in 1991, the heads of states and governments agreed to conclude a new Treaty on the European Union; it was called the Maastricht Treaty, and it was signed in February 1992.

First, the Maastricht Treaty sought to establish the EU for the purpose of creating “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The Treaty also defined the EU’s institutional configuration, which consisted of three pillars.

The Maastricht Treaty widened the scope of the EC so as to cover education, public health, industry, development cooperation, consumer protection, trans-European networks, and the like. It also extended the number of policy areas to which QMV could be applied, and it empowered the European Parliament in EU policy-making processes. It reinforced the Cohesion Funds and Structural Funds, to assist the new “southern” members of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In order to ensure “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, the Treaty also introduced the provisions of the European Citizenship and the Social Protocol. While the Treaty incorporated many policy areas that the EU had already covered, it confirmed the principle of subsidiarity in order to ensure member states’ autonomy in policy areas such as social policy and environment policy.

As far as European economic integration was concerned, the introduction of the time schedule for the EMU was the most remarkable provision in the Treaty. As its name indicates, it was thought that introducing a single currency could be achieved and managed in areas in which economic fundamentals were largely converged. After the failure of the exchange-rate mechanism in the 1970s, member states came to agree with making price stability their primary objective in their monetary policy-making. The provisions of the EMU ruled that member states that had passed certain macroeconomic criteria (i.e., Maastricht criteria) were eligible to enter a common-currency group under a single monetary policy ruled by the single European central bank.

As seen above, the Maastricht Treaty seemed to push the EU in a more integrated way. However, in reality, the Maastricht Treaty triggered a differentiation of attitude among member states and encroached upon uniformity within the EU. First, economic divergence among member states was widened after Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the EU (Chart 2). The divergence in fundamental economic figures led to the “multi-speed” nature of the EMU,

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8 For details of the development of political commitment to a monetary union since 1988, as well as a political union since 1989, see Grant (1994), chapters 2 and 3.

9 The principle of subsidiarity requests that the EC/EU act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty of Rome and of the objectives assigned to it therein (Article 3b). The EC/EU takes action only when the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by its member states and would be better achieved by the EC/EU.

10 For the same points of argument, see Phinnemore (2003).
because countries that were not satisfied with the Maastricht criteria were not eligible for participating in the third stage of the EMU.

Second, some member states intentionally chose ways and policies that differed from those of the EU. In the EMU process, the United Kingdom and Denmark invoked an opt-out (derogation) clause in the Treaty. Opt-ins and opt-outs within a single market made it both difficult and complicated to facilitate coordinated actions, in both legal and practical terms. The same kind of measures could be seen with the Social Protocol, for which the United Kingdom also invoked an opt-out. The principle of subsidiarity also allowed for divergence in terms of the actions taken by member states.

Another feature of the Maastricht Treaty was its concern for EU nationals/lay citizens. The EU institutionalized input legitimacy and concern for citizens, in order to emphasize the fact that the EU was a union that represented the “peoples of Europe”—despite the fact that the EU itself was founded by international agreement and had been primarily established in order to enhance economic/political cooperation among member “states”. It introduced the concept of European Citizenship, in order to protect EU citizens under the rubric of the European “Union”. It also gave more power to the European Parliament in the EU decision-making process, since Parliament members were directly elected by EU nationals.

However, the EU faced resistance from lay citizens in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty.

11 For example, see the editorial comments in “Weathering through the credit crisis. Is the Community equipped to deal with it?,” Common Market Law Review 46 (2009), pp. 3-12.
Following the failure to ratify in Denmark, the president of France decided to undertake a referendum to relaunch and facilitate the ratification process in member states, but the result was only a slightly win for the yes. Although the EU began to concern itself with input legitimacy and policy measures that focused on EU nationals and lay citizens, those lay citizens eventually cast doubts on further economic and political integration, despite the fact that the EU had promised effective management of the European economy for the prosperity of all.

In conclusion, the Maastricht Treaty facilitated further integration (as evidenced by the EMU), and it also broadened the scope of the EU’s policies under a three-pillared structure. At the same time, the Treaty prepared some measures to meet its defined nature as a union and to ensure that the EU would not become a “super-state” that would threaten its member states or EU nationals. The Maastricht Treaty allowed the EU to be both supranational and intergovernmental in nature, and this led to the EU having a more complex system of governance; this characteristic, in turn, led to greater divergence within the EU (Chart 1 c).

The increased number of member states—all bearing very different economic fundamentals—made the EU economy an asymmetrical one. The EU came to cover a wide range of issues, although it did not come to have exclusive power with respect to all those issues. The EU also began to cover distributional policy, as evidenced by the Cohesion Funds and Structural Funds, to support new member states. Differentiation measures could be seen in the forms of opt-outs and the principle of subsidiarity, and they allowed member states to behave autonomously at the expense of the EU’s uniformity. The Maastricht Treaty began to raise concerns about democracy and input legitimacy within the EU, but the ratification process proved that a revolt by lay citizens could effectively halt EU decision-making processes as a whole.

IV. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon: Toward a More Divergent Union

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, changed its provisions so as to move many Pillar III issues—except police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters—to Pillar I (the EC Pillar). “Communitarization” (the shift of certain policy areas to Pillar I) was achieved in such fields as refugee protection, immigration, and border control.

The Treaty of Amsterdam also altered provisions for border control within the EU member states. The Schengen Agreement, which aimed to remove border control within the EU for EU nationals, was incorporated into the provisions of the Treaty. However, on this issue, the United Kingdom and Ireland invoked the opt-out clause.

The Treaty also introduced a new chapter for employment. Although employment was not regarded as an area of “Communitarization”, the EU made it a common concern and attempted to promote conversions of member states’ engagements on employment-related issues, such as

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12 See Keohane and Hoffmann (1990), as well as Wallace (2000), p. 530.
13 The Treaty of Nice, which was signed in 2001, is regarded as “Amsterdam leftovers” (Phinnemore 2003, p. 55), as it provided institutional reformations in preparation for enlargement. The Constitutional Treaty, which attempted to improve the democratic control, legitimacy, and transparency of EU institutions and bring the EU closer to the lay citizens, was not ratified. For these reasons, this paper follows neither the Treaty of Nice nor the Constitutional Treaty.
employability, gender equality, adoptability, and the like. In 2000, the EU launched the Lisbon Strategy, which sought to create a competitive and dynamic knowledge-based European economy by the year 2010, by introducing a new policy method called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The EU began to address employment and social issues that were once governed exclusively by each member state, but it did not introduce a single, exclusive policy. Rather, it simply expressed common concerns and awaited a convergence of efforts among member states by promoting the mutual learning of “best practices” among the member states.

Such a decentralized approach was also seen in other provisions. For example, the Treaty introduced mechanisms called “closer cooperation” and “the principle of flexibility”, in order to allow for a willing and interested coalition comprising a majority of member states that sought further cooperation and integration. Usually, a certain state or group of states can halt processes of cooperation/integration by invoking vetoes and exercising opt-outs. The new mechanisms sought to promote voluntary cooperation among willing member states, although some conditions had to be met before they could be used. Such a mechanism was not applied to the Pillar II issues (i.e., Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP]). In CFSP, “constructive abstention” was introduced to allow some states to abstain without blocking CFSP initiatives overall. In the EMU process, the United Kingdom was still allowed the opt-out.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in 2007, sought to make the enlarged EU more democratic, transparent, and effective. It introduced participatory democracy by citizens and social partners, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and it also set out the provision of citizen’s initiatives. The Treaty of Lisbon abolished the pillar structure, but that abolition did not mean that all the policy areas fell under “Communitarization”. The CFSP issues were still intergovernmental matters. Thus, the Treaty did not contribute to a strengthening of the EU’s power in terms of economic/political integration. Nonetheless, the asymmetry within the EU had been enlarged: the new membership from the Central and Eastern European Countries brought the number of member states to 27, and the EU became more divergent in terms of economic performance and fundamentals (Chart 2). Such macroeconomic divergence affected the EMU; many member states are still not part of the single currency. As for the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU Commission came to propose an overall assessment of whether or not an excessive deficit existed, but it could only recommend bringing the situation to an end. For these reasons, EMU-related matters remained fragmented.

In conclusion, EU policies came to cover social and employment matters and became more public in nature. However, the treaties allowed the EU only to address and voice common concerns and promote its member states’ voluntary engagements with regard to those concerns. When we consider the concepts of closer cooperation and the principle of flexibility, it seems that the treaties had pulled the EU more in the direction of differentiation than uniformity. The asymmetry in economic performance and fundamentals pushed the EU internal market into greater divergence. Moreover, the treaties paid much more attention to the EU’s democracy and transparency than to its efficiency. Under these treaties, the EU must garner support for EU projects and programs, not only from its member states but also from lay citizens and constituencies, either in advance or simultaneously.

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14 For further details, see Philippart and Edwards (1999).
15 For a detailed explanation of the Treaty of Lisbon, see Shoji (2008).
The previous sections showed how the EU tends to be divergent in terms of four different vectors. Chart 1 shows the features and extents of EU governance in these vectors; the larger the area of the square is, the more the EU tends to exhibit divergence.

As for the first vector (i.e., Asymmetrical economic performance), membership has gradually increased and it led to divergence in economic fundamentals within the EU: The speed of “catching up” differed among new member states, and so did the membership of the EMU. These differences among member states produced asymmetrical impacts that resulted in external economic shocks\(^\text{18}\) and a number of EU policies, and led to differences in policy preferences.

As for the second vector (i.e., Differentiation), the EU introduced many measures in its policy areas, especially as it faced an increase in the number of its member states. Originally, these measures were expected to enhance cooperation, even within diversity. However, in reality, different sets of Ins and Outs in different policy areas led to a fragmented image of integration. Today, QMV is the sole effective measure by which the EU can urge member states to converge their policies; however, the application of QMV has been very limited, especially compared to the widening of certain policy areas, which has given rise to “differentiation”. Thus, as far as this vector is concerned, the feature of EU governance tends to be more divergent, since it is unlikely that the EU would execute exclusive powers to urge member states to adopt single policies in all policy areas.

As for the third vector (i.e., Public nature of EU policies), the EU has introduced distributional policies such as the Cohesion Funds and Structural Funds, as well as the Lisbon Strategy. They related to national social and employment policies, so it became difficult for the EU to seek out uniform actions. As a result, there was great divergence among member states’ policies\(^\text{19}\). Wherever the democratic nature of the EU increased, as the fourth vector indicates, distributional policy solutions at the EU level tended to be halted by resistance from national governments and people with vested interests.

Within each vector and its sphere, the EU tended to be too divergent; it did not have many tools by which it could pull itself out of divergence and create and maintain uniformity. The first vector deeply relates to the second and third vectors (Chart 1 f)). The third vector, meanwhile, relates strongly to the fourth one. Thus, it is unlikely that some of the vectors would tend toward convergence simultaneously, whenever the democratic nature of the EU has been strengthened and emphasized.

Are there any possible measures, other than QMV, that could pull the EU toward greater convergence? When we examine the relationships among the EU, politicians and elites, and EU nationals, as defined by the treaties, we must concede that the answer is negative. Chart 3 shows the factors inherent in the integration project. Until the 1980s, changes in international (economic) circumstances pulled Europe toward integration and further cooperation. If the politicians or elites judged such integration/cooperation acceptable or beneficial in light of their

\(^{17}\) For the same point of argument, see Tanaka (2005), p. 10, quoting Wallace and Smith (1995), p. 144.

\(^{18}\) For further details, see Soko Tanaka (2007).

\(^{19}\) For further details, see Inoue (in press).
Chart 3  The Factors of Economic Integration Projects, a) Until the Early 1990s and b) After the Early 1990s

a) Until the Early 1990s

- International (economic) circumstances
  - Influence on...
    - Will of politicians (political leadership)
      - Consideration of...
        - Domestic constituencies

b) After the Early 1990s

- International (economic) circumstances
  - Influence on...
    - Wills of politicians (political leadership)
      - Are influenced by...
        - Domestic constituencies

Source: Author
respective domestic situations, then the integration/cooperation was allowed to progress (Chart 3 a). However, recently, EU treaties have contained provisions relating to the participation of citizens and to the introduction of citizen-tabled initiatives. This has changed the relationships among the factors, as seen in Chart 3 b): the politicians and elites tended to be influenced more by public opinion and opinion polls, as to whether or not they should give the integration/cooperation process the “green light”. The several crises that have occurred vis-à-vis the ratification process have proven that the electorate’s “NO” can act as brakes with respect to further integration and cooperation\textsuperscript{20}.

Under such situations, there are two possible solutions. The first solution would involve international circumstances that would push the EU toward integration much more forcefully than the citizens’ pull toward EU divergence (A). However, this option cannot be easily realized, because member states’ interests with respect to integration/cooperation differ, given that the divergent fundamentals of national economies are influenced by international circumstances. Furthermore, certain areas of EU distributional policies, such as employment and competitiveness, do not seem to push member states toward achieving convergence, compared to the effect of the Single Market Programme whose scale of economy had a “magnetic effect” on member states that had fallen behind on such integration projects.

The second possible solution involves the expectation that politicians would restrain their respective constituencies: in other words, the politicians’ will for integration would become stronger than, and therefore supersede, the lay citizens’ refusal of it (B). However, this option cannot be easily realized, either: today, the electorate tends to act as a mass (popularized citizen), and its voting behavior within each country is intensive, while the voting rate in the European Parliament remains very low. Politicians tend to be fence-sitters in such a political environment.

\section*{VI. Concluding Remarks}

Today, the EU has become too divergent in terms of the four vectors studied. Increases in the number of members has promoted asymmetry within the EU; the number of measures that ensure “unity in diversity” has increased; the number of distributional policies that the EU oversees have increased; and a number of institutional innovations that attempt to make the EU more transparent and democratic has been achieved, even at the expense of uniformity. These current features of EU governance do not contribute to efficiencies in cooperation and integration. Today, the vectors of divergence have reached an unsustainable and uncontrollable point that can be corrected only through political will.

In times when integration has stalled, people emphasize that the impasse must be broken by the will of the politicians involved. When we consider the features of EU governance—and especially its tendency toward divergence—that argument appears to be truer and more pressing than ever before.

\textsuperscript{20} For a discussion of the dilemma the EU faces, see also Toshiro Tanaka (2007). For suggested prospects regarding the relationship between the EU projects and its citizens, see Kaji (2007).
REFERENCES


