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<th>Going Soft: How the Rise of Software Based Innovation led to the Decline of Japan's IT Industry and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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Going Soft: How the Rise of Software Based Innovation Led to the Decline of Japan's IT Industry and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley

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August 2011
Going Soft: How the Rise of Software Based Innovation led to the Decline of Japan’s IT Industry and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley

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Abstract

This paper documents a shift in the nature of innovation in the information technology (IT) industry. Using comprehensive data on all IT patents granted by the USPTO from 1983-2004, we find strong evidence of a change in IT innovation that is systematic, substantial, and increasingly dependent on software. This change in the nature of IT innovation has had differential effects on the performance of the IT industries in the United States and Japan. Using a broad unbalanced panel of US and Japanese publicly listed IT firms in the period 1983-2004, we show that (a) Japanese IT innovation relies less on software advances than US IT innovation, (b) the innovation performance of Japanese IT firms is increasingly lagging behind that of their US counterparts, particularly in IT sectors that are more software intensive, and (c) that US IT firms are increasingly outperforming their Japanese counterparts, particularly in more software intensive sectors. The findings of this paper thus provide a fresh explanation for the relative decline of the Japanese IT industry in the 1990s. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence consistent with the hypothesis that human resource constraints played a role in preventing Japanese firms from adapting to the shift in the nature of innovation in IT.

Key Words: innovation, technological change, IT industry, software innovation, Japan

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I. Introduction

The surge of innovation in Information Technology (IT) is one of the great economic developments of the last two decades. This period also coincides with the unexpected resurgence of the United States IT sector, belying the gloomy predictions about the US IT industry popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Cantwell, 1992; Arrison and Harris, 1992). In this paper, we argue that these two developments are closely related.

We present evidence that the IT innovation process is increasingly software intensive: non-software IT patents are significantly more likely to cite software patents, even after controlling for the increase in the pool of citable software patents. We also see substantial differences across IT sub-sectors in the degree to which innovation is software intensive. We exploit these differences to sharpen our empirical analysis.

If the innovation process in IT has indeed become more dependent on software competencies and skills, then firms better able to use software advances in their innovation process will benefit more than others. Indeed, we argue that the shift in software intensity of IT innovation has differentially benefited American firms over their Japanese counterparts. Our results from a sizable unbalanced panel of the largest publicly traded IT firms in US and Japan for the period 1983-2004 show that US IT firms have started to outperform their Japanese counterparts, both as measured by productivity of their innovative activities, and as measured by the stock market valuation of their R&D.1

The timing and the concentration of this improvement in relative performance appears to be systematically related to the software intensity of IT innovation. We show that the relative

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1 These results parallel the findings of Jorgenson and Nomura (2007), who demonstrate that Japanese TFP rose rapidly for decades, converging to U.S. levels, but then began diverging from it around 1995. Their industry level analysis suggests that a change in the relative performance of the IT-producing industries (which we study in this paper) and the IT-using industries were particularly important in driving the shift from convergence to divergence. Jorgenson and Nomura do not attempt to explain the mechanisms behind divergence in productivity.
strength of American firms tends to grow in the years after the rise in software intensity had become well established. Furthermore, the relative improvement of the U.S. firms is greatest in the IT sub-sectors in which the software intensity of innovation is the highest. Finally, much of the measured difference in financial performance disappears when we separately control for the software intensity of IT innovation at the firm level.

Why were U.S. firms better able to take advantage of the rising software intensity of IT innovation? Bloom et al. (forthcoming) argue that superior American management allows U.S. multinationals to derive a greater productivity boost out of a given level of IT investment than their European rivals. In the context of our study, we find evidence that the openness of America's labor market to foreign software engineers may have played a key role in alleviating for American firms what was likely to have been a global shortage of skilled software engineers during the 1990s. When Japanese firms undertake R&D and product development in the U.S., it appears to be much more software intensive than similar activity undertaken in Japan. These results highlight the importance of local factor market conditions in shaping the geography of innovation.

This paper is structured as follows. Section II documents the existence of a shift in the technological trajectory of IT, Section III empirically explores its implications for innovation performance of US and Japanese IT firms, and Section IV discusses the possible explanations for the trends we observe in our data. We conclude in Section V with a summary of the key results and suggestions for future work.

II. The Changing Technology of Technological Change in IT

A survey of the computer and software engineering literature points to an evident increase in the role of software for successful innovation and product development in the IT
industry. The share of software costs in product design has increased steadily over time (Allan et al., 2002) and software engineers have become more important as high-level decision-makers at the system design level in telecommunications, semiconductors, hardware, and specialized industrial machinery (Graff, Lormans, and Toetenel, 2003). Graff, Lormans, and Toetenel (2003) further argue that software will increase in importance in a wide range of products, such as mobile telephones, DVD players, cars, airplanes, and medical systems. Industry observers claim that software development and integration of software applications has become a key differentiating factor in the mobile phone and PDA industry (Express Computer, 2002). A venture capital report by Burnham (2007) forcefully argues that that the central value proposition in the computer business has shifted from hardware to systems and application software.

Similarly, De Micheli and Gupta (1997) assert that hardware design is increasingly similar to software design, so that the design of hardware products requires extensive software expertise. Gore (1998) argues that peripherals are marked by the increasing emphasis on the software component of the solution, bringing together hardware and software into an integrated environment. Kojima and Kojima (2007) suggest that Japanese hardware manufacturers will face increasing challenges due to the rising importance of embedded software in IT hardware products. In sum, there is broad agreement among engineering practitioners and technologists that software has become more important in IT. In the next section, we validate this assertion formally, using data on citation patterns of IT patents.

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2 Personal discussions with Mark Kryder, former CTO of Seagate, confirmed that software has become an increasingly important driver of product functionality and product differentiation in the hard disk drive industry.
Measuring the Shift in the Technology of Technological Change in IT

Approach

If innovation in IT truly has come to rely more heavily on software, then we should observe that more recent cohorts of IT patents cite software technologies with increasing intensity, and this should be the case even when we control for the changes over time in the volume of IT and software patenting. We therefore use citations by non-software IT patents to software patents as a measure of the software intensity of IT innovation.

Patents have been used as a measure of innovation in mainstream economic research at least since the early 1960s. Though subject to a variety of limitations, patent citations are frequently used to measure knowledge flows (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). Following Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996, 2002), we use a citation function model in which we model the probability that a particular patent, \( p \), applied for in year \( t \), will cite a particular patent, \( P \), granted in year \( T \). This probability is determined by the combination of an exponential process by which knowledge diffuses and a second exponential process by which knowledge becomes superseded by subsequent research (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). The probability, \( \Pr(p, P) \), is a function of the attributes of the citing patent \( p \) and the the cited patent \( P \), \( \alpha(p, P) \), and the time lag between them \( (t-T) \), as depicted below:

\[
\Pr(p, P) = \alpha(p, P) \cdot \exp(-\beta_1(t-T)) \cdot (1 - \exp(-\beta_2(t-T)))
\]  

(1)

We sort all potentially citing patents and all potentially cited patents into cells corresponding to the attributes of patents. The attributes of the citing patents comprise the citing patent’s grant year, its geographic location, and its technological field (IT, software). The attributes of the cited patents are the cited patent’s grant year, its geographic location, and its...
technological field. Thus, the expected number of citations from a particular group of citing patents to a particular group of cited patents can be expressed as the following:

\[ E(c_{abcdef}) = n_{abc} \cdot n_{def} \cdot \alpha_{abcdef} \cdot \exp(-\beta_1(t-T) \cdot (1 - \exp(-\beta_2(t-T))) \]  

(2)

where the dependent variable measures the number of citations made by patents with grant year (a), geographic location (b), and technological field (c) to patents with grant year (d), geographic location (e), and technological field (f). The alpha terms are multiplicative effects estimated relative to a benchmark or “base” group of citing and cited patents, and \( n_{abc} \) and \( n_{def} \) is the number of patents in the respective categories. Rewriting equation (2) gives us the Jaffe – Trajtenberg (2002) version of the citation function, expressing the average number of citations from one category patent to another:

\[ p(c_{abcdef}) = \frac{E(c_{abcdef})}{n_{abc} \cdot n_{def}} = \alpha_{abcdef} \cdot \exp(-\beta_1(t-T) \cdot (1 - \exp(-\beta_2(t-T))) \]  

(3)

Adding an error term, we can estimate this equation using the nonlinear least squares estimator. The estimated equation thus becomes the following:

\[ p(c_{abcdef}) = \alpha_a \cdot \alpha_b \cdot \alpha_c \cdot \alpha_d \cdot \alpha_e \cdot \alpha_f \cdot \exp(-\beta_1(t-T) \cdot (1 - \exp(-\beta_2(t-T))) + \epsilon_{abcdef} \]  

(4)

In estimating equation (4) we adjust for heteroskedasticity by weighting the observations by the square root of the product of potentially cited patents and potentially citing patents corresponding to the cell, that is

\[ w = \sqrt{(n_{abc}) \cdot (n_{def})} \]  

(5)

Data

We use patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1983 and 2004. We use the geographic location of the first inventor to determine the “nationality” of the patent. We identify IT patents, broadly defined, using a classification system
based on USPTO classes, developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). They classified each patent into 36 technological subcategories. We applied their system and identified IT patents as those belonging to any of the following categories: computers & communications, electrical devices, or semiconductor devices. We obtained these data from the most recent version of the NBER patent dataset, which covers patents granted through the end of 2006.

Next, we identified software related patents, which is a challenge in itself. There have been three significant efforts to define software patents. Graham and Mowery (2003) defined software patents as an intersection of those falling within a narrow range of International Patent Classification (IPC) classes and those belonging to packaged software firms. This created a sample that omitted large numbers of software patents, according to Allison et al. (2006).

The second effort was that of Bessen and Hunt (2007), who defined a software invention as one in which the data processing algorithms are carried out by code either stored on a magnetic storage medium or embedded in chips. They rejected the use of official patent classification systems, and used a keyword search method instead. They identified a small set of patents that adhered to their definition, and then used a machine learning algorithm to identify similar patents in the patent population, using a series of keywords in the patent title and abstract. Recently, Arora et al. (2007) used a similar approach that connects the Graham-Mowery and Bessen-Hunt definitions.³

We used a combination of broad keyword-based and patent class strategies to identify software patents. First, we generated a set of patents, granted after January 1\textsuperscript{st} 1983 and before December 31\textsuperscript{st} 2004 that used the words “software” or “computer program” in the patent

³Allison et al. (2006) rejected the use of both the standard classification system and keyword searches, resorting to the identification of software patents by reading through them manually. Although potentially more accurate, this method is inherently subjective and not scalable.
document. Then, we defined the population of software patents as the intersection of the set of patents the query returned and IT patents broadly defined as described above, granted in the period 1980-2006. This produced a dataset consisting of 106,379 patents.

These data are potentially affected by a number of biases. Not all inventions are patented, and special issues are raised by changes in the patentability of software over the course of our sample period – making it all the more important to control for the expansion in the pool of software patents over time, as we do. We also rely on patents generated by a single authority – the USPTO – to measure invention for both U.S. and Japanese firms. However, Japanese firms have historically been among the most enthusiastic foreign users of the U.S. patent system. Evidence suggests that the U.S. patents of Japanese firms are a reasonably accurate proxy of their inventive activity (Branstetter, 2001; Nagaoka, 2007). This is particularly true in IT, given the importance of the U.S. market in the various components of the global IT industry.

Results

Figure 1 shows trends over time in the fraction of total (non-software) IT patents’ citations going to software patents. While the trends for both Japanese and U.S. firms rise significantly over the 1990s, then level off a bit in the 2000s, the measured gap between Japanese and U.S. firms rises substantially over the period. A one-tailed t-test reveals that these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels for every year of interest. However, this analysis does not take into account a variety of other factors, thus we turn next to parametric analysis.
The unit of analysis in Table I is an ordered pair of citing and cited patent classes. Our regression model is multiplicative, so a coefficient of 1 indicates no change relative to the base category. Our coefficients are reported as deviations from 1. The software patent dummy is large, positive, statistically significant, and indicates that IT patents in the 1990s are 9.42 times more likely to cite software patents than prior IT patents, controlling for the sizes of available IT and software patent pools. The second specification in Table I includes only software patents in the population of possibly cited patents. The coefficients on the citing grant years show a sharp increase in citation probabilities from 1991 to 2003. An IT patent granted in 1996 is 1.85 times more likely to cite a software patent than an IT patent granted in 1990. Furthermore, an IT patent granted in 2003 is almost 3.2 times more likely to cite a software patent than that granted in 1990. Comparing this trend to that of the specification in the left-hand column of Table I, we see that this trend is much more pronounced, suggesting that software patents are becoming increasingly important for IT innovation. In Table I, we also explore citation differences between Japanese and non-Japanese invented IT inventions. The specification in the left-hand column
indicates that Japanese invented IT patents are 31 percent less likely to cite other IT patents than non-Japanese IT patents. However, they are also much less likely to cite software patents than non-Japanese IT patents. This result is corroborated by the regression in the right-hand column, where the coefficient on the Japanese dummy again shows that Japanese invented IT patents are significantly less likely to cite software patents than non-Japanese patents.

The citation function results were subjected to a number of robustness checks. Concerned that our results might be driven by large numbers of U.S.-invented software patents appearing in the more recent years of our sample, we estimated the propensity of U.S. IT patents to cite software patents generated outside the U.S. and found a rise in this propensity qualitatively similar to that depicted in Table 1. We also directly controlled for the disproportionately high likelihood that patents cite patents from the same country, but our result that Japanese IT hardware patents are systematically less likely to cite software over time was robust to this. Finally, concerned that this result might be observed at least partially due to traditionally stronger university-industry ties in the United States⁴, we also estimated a version of the citations function in which we excluded all university-assigned patents and those citing them, and found our results to be robust to this as well.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on U.S. employment by occupation and industry from 1999-2007⁵ reveal trends consistent with a rising importance of software in IT innovation. For instance, Figure 2 illustrates how two measures of the share of software engineers in total employment in the computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing industry have trended upward over time. We see similar trends in other IT subsectors as well. The share is highest in


⁵ Methodological changes in the survey make it difficult to track occupational employment in the U.S. IT industry in a consistent way over time, particularly in comparing the periods before and after 1999.
computers and peripherals, lowest in audio and visual equipment manufacturing, and at intermediate levels in semiconductors. Interestingly, the relative share of software engineers in total employment across subsectors appears to accord with patent citation-based measures of software intensity.

**Figure 2: Trends in Software Engineering Employment**

![Graph showing trends in software engineering employment](image)

Note: Data include domestically employed H1-B Visa holders

**III. Comparing US and Japanese Firm-Level Innovation Performance in IT**

Our citation function results suggest that there has been a shift in the nature of technical change within IT – invention has become much more software intensive. Our results also suggest that U.S. firms have more actively incorporated software into their inventive activity than have Japanese firms. If this is true, then it is reasonable to expect that changes in the relative performance of Japanese and American firms may be related to the software intensity of the industry segments in which they operate. In segments of IT where innovation has become
most reliant on software, we should expect to see American firms improve their relative innovation performance relative to Japanese firms. In segments of IT where innovation does not draw heavily on software, we would expect less of an American resurgence. As we shall see, two very different measures of relative performance show exactly this pattern.

We use two of the most commonly employed empirical approaches to compare firm-level innovation performance of US and Japanese IT firms: the innovation (patent) production function and the market valuation of R&D. While the former approach relates R&D investments to patent counts and allows us to study the patent productivity of R&D, the second approach relates R&D investment to the market value of the firm and explores the impact of R&D on the value of the firm (Tobin’s Q).

**Patent Production Function**


\[
P_{it} = r_{it}^\beta \phi_{it} e^{\mu_{it}},
\]

where

\[
\phi_{it} = e^{\sum \delta_{ict}}
\]

In equation (6), \(P_{it}\) are patents taken out by firm \(i\) in period \(t\), \(r_{it}\) are research and development expenditures, \(JP_i\) indicates if the firm is Japanese, and \(\Phi\)’s represent innovation-sector-specific technological opportunity and patenting propensity differences \(D\) across \(c\) different innovation sectors as specified in (7). Substituting (7) into (6), taking logs of both sides, and expressing the sample analog we obtain the following:

\[
p_{it} = \beta r_{it} + \sum \delta_{i} D_{c} + \phi_{it} P_{it} + \mu_{it}
\]

where \(p_{it}\) is the natural log of new patents (flow) and the error term which is defined below.
\[
\mu_i = \xi_i + u_{it}
\]  

(9)

We allow the error term in (9) to contain a firm-specific component, \(\xi_i\), which accounts for the intra-industry firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and an \(iid\) random disturbance, \(u_{it}\). The presence of the firm-specific error component suggests using random or fixed effect estimators. Since the fixed effects estimator precludes time-invariant regressors, including the firm origin indicator, we feature the pooled OLS and random effects estimators, and use the fixed effects estimator as a robustness check.

**Private Returns to R&D and Tobin’s Q**

Griliches (1981) pioneered the use of Tobin q regressions to measure the impact of R&D on a firm’s economic performance (see Hall (2000) for a detailed review). We can represent the market value \(V\) of firm \(i\) at time \(t\) as a function of its assets:

\[
V_{it} = f(A_{it}, K_{it})
\]

(10)

where \(A_{it}\) is the replacement cost of the firm’s tangible assets, typically measured by their book value, and \(K_{it}\) is the replacement value of the firm’s technological knowledge, typically measured by stocks of R&D expenditures\(^6\). We follow the literature, which assumes that the different assets enter into the equation additively:

\[
V_{it} = q_i (A_{it} + \beta * K_{it})^\sigma
\]

(11)

where \(q_i\) is the average market valuation coefficient of the firm’s total assets, \(\beta\) is the shadow value of the firm’s technological knowledge measuring the firm’s private returns to R&D, and \(\sigma\) is a factor measuring returns to scale. Again, following standard practice in the literature (e.g. Hall and Oriani, 2006), we assume constant returns to scale \((\sigma = 1)\). Then, by taking natural logs

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\(^6\) The construction of variables is explained in greater detail in subsequent sections.
on both sides of (11) and subtracting \( \ln A_{it} \), we obtain the following expression that relates a firm’s technological knowledge to its value above and beyond the replacement cost of its assets, Tobin’s Q:

\[
\ln Q_{it} = \ln \left( \frac{V_{it}}{A_{it}} \right) = \ln q_t + \ln \left[ 1 + \beta_t \left( \frac{K_{it}}{A_{it}} \right) \right]
\]

Following Hall and Kim (2000) and others, we estimate a version of (12) using the nonlinear least squares estimator, with time dummies and a firm origin indicator. We were unable to estimate a specification with firm-fixed effects because the NLS algorithms did not converge. As a robustness check, we estimated a linearized version of (12) with fixed effects.

**Data and Variables**

**Sample**

Our sample consists of large publicly traded IT companies in the United States and Japan, observed from 1983 to 2004. We obtained the sample of US firms from historical lists of constituents of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) US 500 and S&P 400 indices. The resulting set of firms was refined using Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) classification so that only firms appearing in “electronics”, “semiconductors”, “IT hardware” and “IT software and services” categories remained in the sample. This initial set of approximately 290 firms was narrowed further as follows: (a) only firms with least 10 patents in between 1983-2004 were retained, (b) US firms in “IT software and services” were removed to

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7 We use the NBER Patent Database, which currently incorporates all patents granted through 2006. Since our empirical specifications use patents dated by the date of application, and since can patents take more than two years to work their way through the USPTO evaluation process, we are currently unable to extend our data past 2004.

8 GICS, the Global Industry Classification System, is constructed and managed by Moody’s in collaboration with Compustat.
achieve compatibility,\(^9\) and (c) only firms for which at least 3 consecutive years of R&D investment and sales data were available were kept in the sample. This yielded an unbalanced panel of 133 US IT firms.

The initial sample of 154 large publicly traded Japanese IT firms derived from the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) database\(^{10}\) was supplemented by an additional 34 firms included in Standard & Poor’s Japan 500 index as of January 1\(^{st}\) 2003\(^{11}\) that belong to either “electronics”, “semiconductors”, “IT hardware”, or “IT software and services”.

We winnowed the sample by (a) dropping all firms without at least 10 patents in the observed period, (b) dropping Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, and most significantly, (c) all firms for which at least three consecutive years of R&D investment and positive output data were not available. This produced a final sample of 77 Japanese IT firms.

Collectively, the Japanese and U.S. firms in our sample accounted for over 70% of total U.S. IT patenting by Japanese and U.S. firms, respectively, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, confirming that we are capturing a large majority of private sector innovative activity in this domain.\(^{12}\)

**Locating Firms in Software Intensity Space**

To explore how innovation performance differentials between US and Japanese firms vary with software intensity, we classify firms into industry segments. GICS provided us with a classification of US firms in our sample into four sectors – “electronics”, “semiconductors”, “IT

---

\(^{9}\) NTT is the only Japanese firms in “IT services and software” in our sample.

\(^{10}\) We thank the Columbia Business School Center on the Japanese Economy and Business for these data.

\(^{11}\) January 1\(^{st}\), 2003 was the date of creation of this index.

\(^{12}\) Figuring out what fraction of total IT production is accounted for by our firms is harder, because of the far-reaching globalization of IT production by the late 1990s. According to the OECD, in 1999, the top 10 IT U.S. firms in our sample had global revenues greater than the entire amount of IT production in the U.S. in that year. The picture is similar for our Japanese firms, who have also taken increasing advantage of opportunities to offshore production.
hardware”, and “IT software and services”. Japanese firms were classified manually using the two-digit GSIC classification data from the S&P Japan 500 along with data from Japan’s Standard Industrial Classification (JSIC), supplemented by data from Google Finance, Yahoo! Finance and corporate websites.

We construct two separate measures of software intensity, both of which suggest a similar ranking of IT subsectors. First, we use the shares of software patents in total patents taken out by the firms, averaged across firms in an industry category. Second, we calculate the fraction of citations to software patents by non-software IT patents, averaged across firms in a sample category. Table II presents summary statistics for both these measures of software intensity. As expected, electronics is the least software intensive, followed by semiconductors and IT hardware. A two-sided test for the equality of means rejects that the intensities are the same in any pair of sectors when we use the share of software patents as our measure. The second measure, citations to software patents, yields similar results, albeit at lower levels of significance in some cases. Tables III and III-2 calculate the industry averages of our measures of software intensity separately for U.S. and Japanese firms. In general, the ranking of industries in terms of software intensity suggested by the overall sample apply to the country-specific subsamples as well.13 Japanese firms are disproportionately located in less software intensive sectors, and within those sectors, are less software intensive than their US counterparts.

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13 Depending on the measure, tests of equality are not always statistically significant when we disaggregate it by country of origin. When Japanese software intensity is measured by citations to software in non-software patents, electronics is (insignificantly) more software intensive than semiconductors.
Taking the assignment of firms to the different IT industries as given\(^{14}\), we test whether US firms outperform Japanese firms, and whether this performance gap is more marked in IT industries that are more software intensive.

**Construction of Variables**

*Patent Counts:* Patent data for our sample of firms were collected from the updated NBER patent dataset containing patents granted by the end of 2006. Compustat firm identifiers were matched with assignee codes based on the matching as constructed and available on the NBER’s Patent Data Project website.\(^{15}\) The matching algorithm for Japanese firms was based on a Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) code - assignee code concordance previously used in Branstetter (2001), but was manually updated by matching strings of firm names and strings of assignee names as reported by the USPTO.

*R&D Investment:* Annual R&D expenditure data for US firms were collected from Compustat, and a set of self-reported R&D expenditure data for Japanese firms were collected from annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiki Ho survey.\(^{16}\) We deflated R&D expenditures following Griliches (1984), and constructed a separate R&D deflator for US and Japanese firms that weigh the output price deflator for nonfinancial corporations at 0.51 and the unit compensation index for the same sector at 0.49. Using data on wage price indexes for service-providing and goods-producing employees,\(^{17}\) we constructed a single unit compensation index for each country, and

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14 Our main results are robust to using firm-level software intensity assignments instead of industry classifications.

15 Downloaded from the following link: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ (5/15/2011)

16 *Kaisha Shiki Ho* (Japan Company Handbooks) is an annual survey of Japanese firms, published by the Japanese equivalent of Dow Jones & Company, *Toyo Keizai* Inc. We thank Ms. Kanako Hotta for assistance in obtaining these data from the collections at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies of the University of California at San Diego.

17 We obtained these data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Statistics Bureau of Japan, respectively.
then applied the proposed weights and appropriate producer price indexes to compute the R&D deflators and deflate the R&D expenditure flows.

**R&D stocks:** We calculated R&D capital stocks from R&D expenditure flows using the perpetual inventory method, with a 15% depreciation rate.\(^{18}\) We used 5 pre-sample years of R&D expenditures to calculate the initial stocks.\(^{19}\)

**Market Value of the Firm:** Market value of a firm equals the sum of market value of its equity and market value of its debt (Perfect and Wiles, 1994). Market value of equity equals the sum of the value of outstanding common stock and the value of outstanding preferred stock. The value of outstanding common (preferred) stock equals the number of outstanding common (preferred) shares multiplied by their price. For US firms, we used year-close prices, year-close outstanding share numbers, and year-close liquidating values of preferred capital. For Japanese firms, the only available share price data were year-low and year-high prices, and we used the arithmetic mean of the two to obtain share price for each firm-year combination. In addition, preferred capital data was not available for Japanese firms, which should not create problems as long as preferred capital does not systematically vary with time and across technology sectors. For market value of debt we used total long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. For Japanese firms, we used fixed liabilities as a proxy for the value of long-term debt and short-term borrowings as a proxy for the value of short-term debt.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) See Griliches and Mairesse (1984) and Hall (1990) for a detailed description and discussion of this methodology. We used several depreciation rates between 10% and 30%, with little change in the results.

\(^{19}\) When the expenditure data was not available, we used first 5 years of available R&D expenditure data, “backcast them” using linear extrapolation, and calculated the initial R&D capital stock based on the projected R&D expenditures.

\(^{20}\) Perfect and Wiles (1994) suggests that the measurement error in using book value of debt is modest.
Replacement Cost ofAssets: The replacement cost of the firm’s assets is the deflated year-end book values of total assets\(^\text{21}\) where the deflator is a country-specific capital goods deflator obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Statistics Bureau of Japan, respectively.

**Patent Production Function Results**

Figure 3 compares the number of patents per firm for the US and Japanese firms in our sample. We observe that Japanese firms obtain more non-software IT patents than their US counterparts. Between 1983 and 1988, the average number of non-software IT patent applications were almost identical for Japanese and US firms. Between 1988 and 1993, patent applications by Japanese firms outpaced those of US firms, after which both grew at a similar pace. By contrast, Japanese firms file fewer software patents than their US counterparts, and the difference has grown steadily since the late 1980s, and especially after the mid 1990s.

\(^{21}\) Perfect and Wiles (1994) note that different calculation methodologies do result in different absolute replacement cost values, but do not seem to bias coefficients on R&D capital.
Table V reports the estimates of the patent production functions of U.S. and Japanese IT firms. Our first key result is presented in Figure 4 below, which plots the pooled OLS average difference in log patent production per dollar of R&D, between Japanese and US firms in our sample through time, controlling for time and sector dummies. We see that R&D spending by Japanese firms was 70% more productive than that of their US counterparts during 1983-1988, but became less and less productive from 1989-1993 onwards. This trend accelerated in the 1990s and early 2000s, with Japanese IT firms producing 20% fewer patents, controlling for the level of R&D spending, than their US counterparts in the period 2000-2004.
Figure 4: Average Japan-US Productivity Differences, Entire Sample

Based on results from Table V. Appendix A. Reported are pooled OLS estimation coefficients.

Figure 5: Average Japan-US Productivity Differences, By Software Intensity Sector

Based on results from Table V. of Appendix A. Reported are selected pooled OLS estimation coefficients.

Figure 5 reports Japan-U.S. differences in patent output controlling for R&D input by IT sector. In electronics, previously shown to be the least software intensive, and where average software intensity is similar between US and Japanese firms, Japanese firms have been less productive in patent production in the 1980s and early 1990s, but have been catching up to their
US counterparts in the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s.\textsuperscript{22} On the other hand, in semiconductors and IT hardware, which have significantly higher software intensity than electronics, and where average software intensity of US firms is greater than of Japanese firms, Japanese firms exhibited higher productivity in the mid 1980s, started losing their advantage by the turn of the 1990s, and started to lag behind their US counterparts in the mid to end 1990s and early 2000s.\textsuperscript{23}

Most of the results in Table V are statistically significant at the 5% level and become more statistically significant in more recent time periods. In addition, the results are robust to changes estimation techniques and measures. Random effects and fixed effects estimates are similar, suggesting that our results are not driven by unobserved firm-specific research productivity or patent propensity differences.. The dependent variable in these estimations is the log of total patents applied for by firm $i$ in year $t$. Unreported estimations show that the results are very similar if we use instead the log of IT patents, or the log of IT patents excluding software patents, or if we weight patents by subsequent citations or by the number of claims.

**Accounting for Alternative Hypotheses**

The collapse of the Japanese bubble economy at the end of the 1980s. The shift in relative performance parallels the slowdown in the Japanese domestic economy at the end of the 1980s. This domestic slowdown could have led to lower levels of R&D expenditure by Japanese firms. However, a simple recession induced decline in R&D investment cannot explain our results. We are estimating the *productivity* of R&D in producing patents, rather than the number of patents

\textsuperscript{22} In the mid-2000s, Japanese electronics firms received a boost from the rapidly growing sale of so-called digital appliances, such as DVD recorders, digital cameras, and LCD televisions. Industry observers, such as Ikeda (2003), warned of imminent commoditization of these new products – a prediction that has been born out in the latter years of the decade.

\textsuperscript{23} An earlier version of the paper used data that ended in the late 1990s, raising the possibility that our results were driven by the late 1990s IT bubble. Extension of our data into the mid-2000s shows that this is not the case. We thank an anonymous referee for pushing us to extend these data.
produced. If Japanese firms sought cost savings by eliminating marginal R&D projects, measured productivity should be higher, not lower. Budget pressures could have also led Japanese firms to change their patent propensity, filing fewer but higher quality patents outside Japan. However, estimates using citation weighted patents yield results similar to those reported above. More fundamentally, no simple story about a post-bubble slowdown in the domestic economy can explain the observed pattern, wherein the relative decline in productivity is greater in more software intensive segments.

The appreciation of the yen after 1985. The yen appreciated sharply in the mid-1980s and remained much stronger through the mid-to-late 1990s. These exchange rate shifts lowered the international competitiveness of Japan-based manufacturing. However, we do not think that exchange rate shifts are driving our results. All the segments of the Japanese IT industry confronted the same yen-dollar exchange rate, yet the relative innovative performance of the different segments varied in ways that are difficult to explain based on exchange rate considerations alone. For example, the Japanese electronics sector is arguably the one most likely to be affected by an appreciating currency; electronics had a much larger “commodity” share in total output, as compared to semiconductors and hardware. However, it is electronics in which Japan's relative performance strengthened the most.

Strong venture capital in America, weak venture capital in Japan. Kortum and Lerner (2001) provide evidence of the strong role played by venture capital backed firms in the acceleration of innovation in the United States in the 1990s. Recent Japanese scholarship (Hamada, 1996, Goto, 2000, Goto and Odagiri, 2003) stresses the relative weakness of venture capital in Japan as an impediment to the growth of science-based industries. While it is certainly true that new firms

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adept at software-based innovation entered the market in the mid-to-late 1990s, often with backing from venture capitalists, our results do not depend on their inclusion in the sample. For instance, we get similar results if we remove all U.S. firms that went public after the Netscape IPO, widely regarded as the start of the VC fuelled boom in the U.S.

*Strong university-industry linkages in the U.S., weak linkages in Japan.* Goto (2000), Nagaoka (2007), and many others have suggested that weaker Japanese universities and weaker mechanisms for university-industry technology transfer impede growth in Japan’s science-based industries. We acknowledge the importance of these linkages. However, if university-generated inventions were an important element in the transformation of the U.S. IT sector, then corporate patents citing these university-generated inventions should be especially important in generating our empirical results. We delete all university-owned inventions and all corporate patents citing university-owned inventions from our data; the results do not change.

*Technology standards and market dominance.* Japanese scholars, such as Tanaka (2003), have suggested that the increasing dominance of U.S. IT firms since the 1990s is driven largely by U.S. ownership of key technology standards in the industry. Though owning a major technology standard may be beneficial, we can delete from our sample all U.S firms that could plausibly be described as owners of a major IT technology standard without altering our results. The most (in)famous standard owner, Microsoft, is never included in the sample: We do not include firms from the packaged software industry, because there are very few publicly traded Japanese firms in that segment. If we were to include the packaged software firms such as Oracle and Google, the productivity differences would be even more favorable to the US.

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25 Towards the end of the 1990s, a small number of publicly listed firms, such as Softbank, that we could classify as software firms appeared on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Motohashi (2009) uses a different data set to explore productivity trends in the Japanese software industry, but does not attempt an international comparison.
The same arguments may apply to the decline of one of Japan's important technology standards. Throughout the 1980s, the Japanese firm NEC dominated the sales of personal computers in Japan. NEC pioneered the development of a PC capable of handling Japan's complex written language. The popularity of the NEC standard created a virtuous cycle in which Japanese software firms and game developers focused their efforts on NEC-compatible products, reinforcing NEC's market dominance. In 1991, a consortium led by IBM Japan introduced DOS/V, an operating system that allowed IBM-compatible PCs to handle the Japanese language without any additional IT hardware.\(^{26}\)

The introduction of this software ended NEC's market dominance, and allowed a new group of firms to gain market share. The firm most obviously affected by DOS/V is NEC, and our results are robust to the exclusion of NEC. Insofar as the introduction of DOS/V reduced R&D by other Japanese IT firms by shrinking their markets, this may be reflected in our Tobin's q results. However, to the extent that this market compression induced firms to reduce R&D spending, they should have cut the marginal projects first, suggesting, if anything, an increase in R&D productivity rather than the decrease that we see in the data.

**Results Based on Private Returns to R&D**

We begin by plotting the average difference in Tobin’s Q between our sample of US and Japanese firms through time, shown in Figure 6 below. We observe that Japanese firms, on average, have had higher Q values than US firms in the mid 1980s and early 1990s. These differences diminished with the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble at the dawn of the 1990s, and Japanese Q values have lagged throughout the 1990s, especially in semiconductors,\(^{26}\)

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\(^{26}\) We thank an anonymous referee for stressing the importance of this event. Jorgenson and Nomura (2005) discuss this event and show that the pace of IT price declines in Japan accelerates after the introduction of DOS/V.
and to a lesser extent, also in IT hardware, before recovering somewhat in the early 2000s with the bursting of the U.S. stock market bubble. Thus trends in average Tobin’s Q values generally parallel those in patent production.

Moving beyond the descriptive analysis, we regress Tobin’s Q on the ratio of R&D stocks by total assets to estimate private returns to R&D (shadow value of R&D). Table IV reports estimates of equation (12) by period using nonlinear least squares. It shows that the shadow price of R&D/Assets for US firms was close to zero and not statistically significant in most periods, but rose to positive and statistically significant levels by the mid-to-late 1990s. On the other hand, the coefficient on R&D/Assets for Japanese firms has not followed this trend. It has hovered just above zero in the 1980s but dropped significantly by the mid 1990s and early 2000s. In these periods it was much lower than that of US firms, with the difference statistically significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with what we observed when plotting the values of Tobin’s Q through time, except that we do not observe much of a positive pullback for Japanese firms in the early and mid 2000s.

Interestingly, this “reversal of fortune” for the market valuation of U.S. firm R&D appears to be sensitive to the inclusion of a direct measure of software intensity. Table IV-2 reports the results of a regression in which we add a variable representing firm-level software intensity, and also interact it with R&D/Assets. This additional regressor significantly alters our results. The R&D/Assets coefficient for U.S. firms is lower than before, while the differences between US and Japanese firms disappear and, in some periods, reverse with the inclusion of an indicator of firm-level software intensity. These results support the view that the relative increase in U.S. performance is related to software intensity.
Figure 6: Average Difference in a Raw Measure of Tobin’s Q, By Sector

Tobin’s Q as calculated in the database, averaged across sector. Calculated as US average subtracted from JP average.

Figure 7 compares private returns to R&D for Japanese and US firms by IT sector. As with patent productivity, we find that results differ by sector. In electronics, the least software intensive sector, the Japanese firms started off with a small advantage in the 1980s, before increasing it substantially by the mid 1990s. The reverse is true in IT hardware, the most software-intensive sector. We report detailed regression results in Tables VII-VIII.27

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27 In unreported estimates, we obtain similar results if we divide our sample into the following periods, 83-88, 89-93, 94-99, and 2000-2004.
We conducted several robustness checks. We first estimated versions of (12) using NLS and FE estimators, where we directly estimated time trends for private returns to R&D separately for US and Japanese firms. Table VI shows that the direction of the trends remains unperturbed. Private returns to R&D for Japanese firms linger, as before, around 0, and show a slight negative trend over time, while private returns to R&D for US firms show a marked and statistically significant positive trend. In Tables VII-VIII, we report both estimates of the linear approximation using firm fixed effects and estimates obtained using nonlinear least squares. Again, we observe that the signs of the coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged.

As in the previous section, we consider our results alongside alternative explanations. We estimated versions of (12) by excluding VC-backed entrants from our sample, and found little qualitative change in our results. Similarly, we re-estimated our regressions by excluding firms who owned major technological standards during the sample period (as well as to the exclusion of NTT), and again found little change in our results.
In order to directly test the robustness of our results to changes in industry group assignment of firms, we estimated a linearized version of the regression where we assigned firms in our sample into groups of the same sizes as those suggested by the industry classification, but based on both firm-level shares of software patents and firm-level shares of citations directed towards software patents. We found our results to be qualitatively robust to this exercise that allowed us to estimate the regressions without imposing possibly restrictive assumptions about firm industry assignments. Finally, we estimated a version where we split US and Japanese firms into quartiles according to the firm-level share of software patents in total patents. We observe that US firms’ private returns to R&D increase with software intensity, while they fall in the case of Japanese firms. Interestingly, we also observe that US firm’s private returns to R&D increase with the software intensity of the sector when they are also in the top quartile of software intensity. The same is true for Japanese firms. Conversely, private returns to R&D decrease with the software intensity of the sector for firms located in the bottom quartile of software intensity.

Our paper is focused on innovation in the IT sector and the market returns to IT innovation in that sector, rather than IT production. However, our findings are consistent with reported industry-level productivity trends. Specifically, Jorgenson and Nomura's (2007: p 26, fig 9) show that in both computers and electronic components, an initially more productive Japanese industry is sharply overtaken by its U.S. counterpart in TFP over the course of the 1990s.28

28 Interestingly, Jorgenson and Nomura find quite different trends in the communications equipment industry. The firms in our sample include many major Japanese manufacturers of communications equipment, but as one of many lines of business. Given our data, we cannot separately analyze the communications equipment business units of IT firms.
IV. Discussion

This paper documents three facts. First, IT innovation has become more software intensive. Second, Japanese firms rely less on software knowledge in IT hardware invention than their US counterparts (and produce significantly fewer software inventions). Third, the innovation performance of Japanese IT firms is increasingly lagging behind, particularly in software intensive sectors. Together, they point to a link between the changing technology of technical change in IT and an inability of Japanese firms to respond adequately to the shift.29

What prevented Japanese firms from using software advances as effectively as U.S. firms? There are at least two explanations. The first is a resource constraint argument: U.S.-based firms have access to a much larger pool of software engineers than do their Japanese counterparts. Japanese firms have not yet been able to overcome their national labor resource constraints by offshoring their software-intensive R&D. The second explanation is one rooted in the failure of Japanese managers to understand and adequately respond to the changing nature of technological change in IT.

Many studies have pointed out the persistent shortages of software engineers in Japan, dating back to the 1970s and 1980s.30 This longstanding weakness did not prevent Japanese firms from acquiring a strong market position in IT in the 1980s, but it may have become more important as IT hardware product development became steadily more software-intensive.31 The

29 As we were writing this paper, we became aware of the work of Cole (2006) and Cole and Fushimi (2011), who use narrative history and interviews with practitioners to suggest that the changing fortunes of the U.S. and Japanese IT industries are linked to the superior ability of American firms to exploit software advances in their new product development. Our quantitative analysis is broadly consistent with their interview-based description.
31 Some Japanese firms, most notably in videogames, have maintained a strong international market positions in software-intensive segments of IT. However, videogames sales are driven by artistic factors as well as purely technological ones, and Japanese developers have a rich local cultural tradition of manga (a Japanese art form akin to comic books in the West) and anime (animated films) to draw upon.
level of local human capital might not be a constraint if knowledge flowed freely across
countries. However, tapping into foreign knowledge pools can be difficult (Jaffe, Trajtenberg,
(1997), and Belderbost, Fukao, and Kwon (2006) document the relatively limited extent of
Japanese R&D activity outside Japan during the period under consideration. Japan’s relatively
restrictive immigration laws and its long history as an ethnically homogenous society mitigate
against large-scale importation of skilled labor.

The available data make it difficult to precisely quantify the differences in software
human resources between the U.S. and Japan, but the gap between the two is clearly large.
Figure 8 presents data from several sources comparing the flows of new (potential) domestic IT
workers during the crucial years from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s. Due to
differences in reporting conventions, we aggregate over IT software and hardware related
disciplines to produce a count of total IT bachelors, masters, and Ph.D. level graduates for both
countries. We use data reported by Lowell (2000) and Kirkegaard (2005) to estimate the number
of temporary workers joining the U.S. labor force in “computer-related fields” under the auspices
of an H-1B visa. In Figure 8, we assume that half of all foreign workers newly admitted to Japan

32 Branstetter (2006) finds a positive but limited impact of U.S. R&D centers on the research productivity of
Japanese firms’ home R&D operations. Anchordogy (2000) argues that tapping into foreign pools of software
knowledge was especially difficult for Japanese firms, given language barriers and differences in labor market
practices.
33 Kojima and Kojima (2007) examine the available data on Japanese offshoring of software development to other
countries. While the data are highly problematic, they suggest a very low level of offshoring relative to the U.S. –
something as low as 5-10% of the U.S. level – even by the mid-2000s.
34 U.S. data are from the NSF’s SESTAT survey (http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/recentgrads/) and the annual Survey
of Education, Sports, and Welfare’s Basic School Survey. We thank Professor Kyoji Fukao of Hitotsubashi
University and Professor Takao Kato of Colgate University and Professor Anthony D’Costa of Copenhagen
Business School for helping us identify and obtain the Japanese data sources used in this paper.
as “researchers,” “engineers,” or “intracompany transferees” are employed as IT workers in
Japan – a far larger fraction than plausibly holds true in reality.\footnote{Japanese statistics track newly registered foreign workers across a number of broad categories including “researchers,” “engineers,” and “intracompany transferees.” These data are reported annually in the \textit{Shutsu Nyukoku Kanri Toukei Nenpo (Annual Report of Statistics on Legal Migrants)}, published by the Japanese Ministry of Justice.}

\textbf{Figure 8: ICT Human Resources, U.S. vs. Japan (ICT graduates and H1-B immigrants into computer-related professions, 1995-2001)}

Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2010) describe these data (and their shortcomings) in
greater detail.\footnote{Only a fraction of IT graduates will enter employment in IT industries in the countries in which they study, and only a fraction of those who obtain employment in the IT industry will be engaged in research. Likewise, our estimates of H-1B temporary workers include individuals employed in IT companies as well as individuals working for banks and insurance companies, and only a fraction of the H-1Bs employed in IT companies are involved in research. These data track (potential) new entrants to the IT workforce, not the total stocks of workers available for employment in the sector.} Despite these caveats, the picture painted by Figure 8 is quite striking: the flow
into the domestic IT labor pool grew much faster in the U.S. compared to Japan. In 1995, the
inflows into the domestic IT labor pool in the U.S. were about 68\% greater than those in Japan.
By 2001, the inflows in the U.S. were nearly three times bigger than those in Japan, with the
difference being driven largely by H-1Bs. In some of the latter years of the sample period, the
U.S. was importing more IT specialists per year than it was graduating from all IT-related bachelors, masters, and doctoral programs combined. Of course, firms are not confined to their domestic labor pool. Accounting for the level of software offshoring in the U.S. and Japan is even harder, but the available data suggest that consideration of software offshoring would significantly increase the resource gap implied by Figure 8 (Arora, Branstetter, and Drev, 2010).

In other words, imports of workers and software offshoring may have been a critical source of advantage for U.S. based firms. Relatively few of these imported experts may have been software architects of the highest order, capable of undertaking transformative innovation. However, creating, testing, and implementing software for IT innovation required both fundamental innovators and programmers undertaking more routine and standardized kinds of software engineering. America’s ability to tap into an increasingly abundant (and increasingly foreign) supply of the latter may have raised the productivity of the former and enabled American firms to outpace their rivals. Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2010) present a simple model in which a more abundant supply of software engineers capable of routine coding and testing raises the productivity of highly skilled software innovators, and show how it could imply results for the relative research productivity of Japanese and U.S. IT firms that are similar to those documented in this paper.

An alternative hypothesis posits that Japan’s relative decline in innovative productivity was driven by the failure of Japanese IT managers to appreciate and respond to the rising importance of software in IT product development. A stream of the recent management literature has focused on how managerial mindsets, formed through years of experience, affect the (in)ability of firms to make strategic shifts when firm environments change (Bettis and Hitt, 1995). In the economics literature, Nick Bloom, John Van Reenen, and their co-authors have
shown that persistent performance differences across firms based in different countries could be driven by differences in management practices (e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, forthcoming; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). The papers also show that multinationals tend to bring their management practices, both good and bad, with them when they set up subsidiaries abroad.

**Distinguishing Between Possible Hypotheses**

These two possible explanations yield different predictions regarding what types of innovative activities Japanese firms should undertake in Japan and abroad. If they are constrained by their software human resources at home, then Japanese firms will have the incentive to tap into foreign knowledge and expertise by setting up software intensive R&D facilities abroad. On the other hand, if differences in relative performance are because Japanese managers downplay or ignore the importance of software, then the research output of Japanese overseas subsidiaries ought also to be less software intensive than their American counterparts.

Because Japanese and U.S. firms conduct IT R&D (and generate patents associated with that activity) at home and in the other country, we can submit these two hypotheses to a test. What we observe is consistent with the resource constraint hypothesis. The share of software patents in total patents invented in Japan by Japanese parent firms in our sample is 6%, as reported in Figure 9-1. However, the share of software patents in total patents invented in the US by Japanese firms is significantly higher – 24%. This surpasses even the share of software patents in total patents invented in the US by US-based IT firms, which is approximately 17%. This suggests Japanese firms are disproportionately likely to engage in software innovation abroad. In addition, as shown in Figure 9-2, patents invented in the U.S. by the subsidiaries of Japanese firms are far more likely to cite software innovation than those invented in Japan -- and
they are even more likely to cite software than the comparable patents of U.S.-based firms. As reported in Figures 9-3 and 9-4, these patterns hold when we focus on individual sectors – electronics, semiconductors, IT hardware - but are strongest in IT hardware. It is almost as if Japanese firms are trying to work around the constraints in their home market by choosing a very software-intensive style of innovation in the U.S., where the resources exist to support it.

Bloom et al. (forthcoming) present a compelling case that superior American firm management practices may be important in explaining why American firms deploy IT more effectively than their foreign rivals. In this paper, we find evidence that human resource constraints may be important in explaining the success of American firms in creating new IT products. In general, the role of international differences in access to human resources and the interaction of these differences with local management practices would appear to be an interesting and fruitful area for further research.

V. Conclusions, Implications and Next Steps

In this paper, we document the existence of a software-biased shift in the innovation process in information technology. Although widely acknowledged in the computer and software engineering literature, this shift has received very little prior attention from economists or management scholars.\footnote{The growing literature on software patents has examined the impact of software patentability on R&D and the impact of software patents on venture firm financing, but it has not yet addressed the impact of software technology on innovation elsewhere in IT. See Bessen and Hunt (2007), Hall and MacGarvie (2006), and Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009).} We provide evidence on the economic importance of this shift by studying how it affected the innovation performance of IT firms in the United States and Japan. We show that this shift has resulted in a deterioration of the relative innovation performance of Japanese firms, and we find that this effect is more pronounced in software intensive sectors.
This pattern of relative deterioration and its concentration in software-intensive sectors is robust to controls for the different levels of development of venture capital and formal mechanisms for university-industry technology transfer in the two countries and to controls for disproportionately American ownership of key technology standards. Our findings thus provide a largely new explanation for the precipitous global decline of one of Japan’s once leading industrial sectors – another development that has received relatively little attention from mainstream economists.

Finally, we provide evidence that suggests that a constrained supply of software knowledge and skills in Japan might explain the relatively weaker innovation performance of Japanese IT firms in the 1990s. These findings are particularly interesting in light of a growing literature that explores linkages between factor endowments, technological change, and industry performance (e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Dudley and Moenius, 2007), and may provide a useful complement to the growing literature that links the superior performance of American firms in some contexts to superior management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).
References


## Table I: Citation Function Results

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<td>-0.8256    ***</td>
<td>0.0209</td>
<td>-0.9188     ***</td>
<td>0.0192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>-0.6657    ***</td>
<td>0.0199</td>
<td>-0.7863     ***</td>
<td>0.0186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citing Patent From Japan</td>
<td>-0.3078    ***</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
<td>-0.6298     ***</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cited Software Patent</td>
<td>9.4217     ***</td>
<td>0.2573</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citing Patent From Japan</td>
<td>-6.2592    ***</td>
<td>0.1981</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software Patent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsolescence</td>
<td>0.3252     ***</td>
<td>0.0095</td>
<td>0.3398     ***</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>3.61e-06    ***</td>
<td>4.79e-07</td>
<td>3.56e-04    ***</td>
<td>4.27e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R-Squared</td>
<td>0.9232</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
<td>2940</td>
<td></td>
<td>1470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for regression estimations presented in this table are drawn from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA using the nonlinear least squares algorithm. The dependent variable is an empirical measure of the probability a citing patent of a given type cites a cited patent of a given type. All presented coefficients are relative to base categories. They are the following: citing patent grant year = 1990, cited patent grant year = 1989, citing patent type = “Communications”, cited patent category = “non-software” (only applicable to column I), citing patent geography = “Japan”. Patent origin is defined using all inventors listed on the patent document.
### Table II: Firm-Level Software Intensity by Sector, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
<td>0.0808</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.0544</td>
<td>0.0654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.1069</td>
<td>0.1246</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.0768</td>
<td>0.0837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Hardware</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.1974</td>
<td>0.1681</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.1428</td>
<td>0.1109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table compares measures of software intensity of firms in our sample that belong to different subsectors. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The unit of observation for descriptive statistics and statistical tests presented in this table is a firm. The share of software patents for each firm is computed as the number of software patents granted to a firm in the sample period divided by the total number of patents granted to that firm in the sample period. The share of citations to software patents for each firm is calculated as the number of citations directed to software patents generated by the firm's non-software IT patent portfolio divided by the total number of citations generated by the firm's non-software IT patent portfolio. The tests for differences in means across sectors are performed using one-sided t-tests and are reported in the brackets next to the value of the mean. (***) represents the difference being significant at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. The first series of asterisks in any given bracket represent the results of a one-sided t-test for differences of means using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row above, while the second series of asterisks represents the results of a one-sided t-test using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row below. For sectors listed in the first row, the first series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in row immediately below, while the second series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in the final row. An identical system applies to the interpretation of asterisks for sectors listed in the final row.

### Table II-2: Patent-Level Software Intensity by Sector, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>67775</td>
<td>0.0476</td>
<td>0.2130</td>
<td>23452</td>
<td>0.0532</td>
<td>0.1429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>83609</td>
<td>0.0995</td>
<td>0.2994</td>
<td>48214</td>
<td>0.0742</td>
<td>0.1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Hardware</td>
<td>251422</td>
<td>0.1439</td>
<td>0.3510</td>
<td>126339</td>
<td>0.1127</td>
<td>0.2092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table compares measures of software intensity of firms in our sample that belong to different subsectors. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The unit of observation for descriptive statistics and statistical tests presented in this table is a patent. The share of software patents for each sector is computed as the number of software patents granted to all firms belonging to that sector in the sample period divided by the total number of patents granted to firms in that sector in the sample period. The share of citations to software patents for each sector is calculated as the number of citations directed to software patents generated by all firms' non-software IT patent portfolios divided by the total number of citations generated all firms' non-software IT patent portfolio. The tests for differences in means across sectors are performed using one-sided t-tests and are reported in the brackets next to the value of the mean. (***) represents the difference being significant at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. The first series of asterisks in any given bracket represent the results of a one-sided t-test for differences of means using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row above, while the second series of asterisks represents the results of a one-sided t-test using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row below. For sectors listed in the first row, the first series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in row immediately below, while the second series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in the final row. An identical system applies to the interpretation of asterisks for sectors listed in the final row.
Table III: Software Patent Shares by Sector and Firm Origin, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Firms</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese Firms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.0806</td>
<td>0.1425</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.0173</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.1341</td>
<td>0.1292</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0138</td>
<td>0.0213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Hardware</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.2411</td>
<td>0.1699</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.0585</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Unit of observation is a firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
<th>No. of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Firms</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese Firms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>38902</td>
<td>0.0647</td>
<td>0.2460</td>
<td>28873</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.1551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>56833</td>
<td>0.1324</td>
<td>0.3389</td>
<td>26776</td>
<td>0.0298</td>
<td>0.1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Hardware</td>
<td>104998</td>
<td>0.2337</td>
<td>0.4232</td>
<td>146424</td>
<td>0.0795</td>
<td>0.2705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit of observation is a patent

This table compares measures of software intensity of firms in our sample that belong to different subsectors, separately for those firms based in Japan and those based in the United States. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The unit of observation for the descriptive statistics and statistical tests presented in the upper panel is a firm, while it is a patent in the lower panel. For details about the construction of software intensity measures please consult Table II. The tests for differences in means across sectors are performed using one-sided t-tests and are reported in the brackets next to the value of the mean. (***) represents the difference being significant at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. The first series of asterisks in any given bracket represent the results of a one-sided t-test for differences of means using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row above, while the second series of asterisks represents the results of a one-sided t-test using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row below. For sectors listed in the first row, the first series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in row immediately below, while the second series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in the final row. An identical system applies to the interpretation of asterisks for sectors listed in the final row.
Table III-2: Share of Citations to Software by Non-Software IT Patents by Sector and Firm Origin, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>U.S. Firms</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese Firms</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St. Deviation</td>
<td>No. of Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.0761</td>
<td>(/***)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.0435</td>
<td>(/***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0895</td>
<td>(/***)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0286</td>
<td>(/***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Hardware</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.1647</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.0738</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit of observation is a firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>U.S. Firms</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese Firms</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St. Deviation</td>
<td>No. of Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>12915</td>
<td>0.0617</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
<td>10537</td>
<td>0.0430</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductors</td>
<td>36389</td>
<td>0.0797</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
<td>11825</td>
<td>0.0572</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Hardware</td>
<td>53706</td>
<td>0.1466</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
<td>72633</td>
<td>0.0877</td>
<td>(<strong>/</strong>*)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit of observation is a patent

This table compares measures of software intensity of firms in our sample that belong to different subsectors, separately for those firms based in Japan and those based in the United States. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The unit of observation for descriptive statistics and statistical tests presented in the upper panel is a firm, while it is a patent in the lower panel. For details about the construction of software intensity measures please consult Table II-2. The tests for differences in means across sectors are performed using one-sided t-tests and are reported in the brackets next to the value of the mean. (***) represents the difference being significant at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. The first series of asterisks in any given bracket represent the results of a one-sided t-test for differences of means using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row above, while the second series of asterisks represents the results of a one-sided t-test using the sector in question and the sector listed in the row below. For sectors listed in the first row, the first series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in the row immediately below, while the second series of asterisks refer to a comparison with the sector listed in the final row. An identical system applies to the interpretation of asterisks for sectors listed in the final row.
**Table IV: Tobin’s Q Regressions by Period, 1983-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lnQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets</td>
<td>0.1087</td>
<td>0.0158</td>
<td>-0.0564</td>
<td>0.2196</td>
<td>-0.0579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0415) ***</td>
<td>(0.1451)</td>
<td>(0.0812)</td>
<td>(0.0897) **</td>
<td>(0.0495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets * Japan</td>
<td>-0.1327</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0250</td>
<td>-0.2844</td>
<td>-0.2916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0556) **</td>
<td>(0.1516)</td>
<td>(0.1129)</td>
<td>(0.1310) **</td>
<td>(0.1408) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnSales</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
<td>0.0198</td>
<td>0.0309</td>
<td>0.0995</td>
<td>0.0966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0039) ***</td>
<td>(0.0069)</td>
<td>(0.0062)</td>
<td>(0.0059) ***</td>
<td>(0.0050) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
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<td>825</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.2986</td>
<td>0.2763</td>
<td>0.2429</td>
<td>0.4414</td>
<td>0.4049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for regression estimations presented in this table were obtained from Compustat and the Development Bank of Japan for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively. R&D expenditure data for Japanese firms comes from annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiki Ho survey. The data represent an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. and Japanese IT firms active in the sample period, 1983-2004. As a consequence of using an unbalanced panel, total number of observations used in regression estimations can vary between time periods. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA using the nonlinear least squares algorithm. The dependent value is the log of Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement value of its total assets. RD/Assets are calculated as the ratio of the stock of firm’s accumulated R&D expenditures, calculated using the perpetual inventory method, to the replacement value of the firm’s total assets. The Japan dummy equals 1 if the firm is based in Japan. Standard errors are reported in brackets. For detailed information about the specification, sample selection, and variable construction, please consult the main body of the paper. The asterisks that are listed next to coefficients reported in the table denote statistical significance in the following manner: (***) represents significance at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. For brevity, only coefficients on variables of interest are reported, while coefficients on some of the control variables may be omitted. Detailed estimation results are available from the authors by request.
### Table IV-2: Tobin’s Q Regressions by Period, Including Firm-Level Software Intensity, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lnQ</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>NLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnQ</td>
<td>-0.2342</td>
<td>-0.2302</td>
<td>-0.2020</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>-0.2412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0553)</td>
<td>(0.1554)</td>
<td>(0.0945)</td>
<td>(0.1189)</td>
<td>(0.0820)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets * Japan</td>
<td>0.1992</td>
<td>0.2227</td>
<td>0.1615</td>
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<td>-0.1365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0651)</td>
<td>(0.1593)</td>
<td>(0.1208)</td>
<td>(0.1483)</td>
<td>(0.1478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets * Sof. Intensity</td>
<td>0.9752</td>
<td>2.4214</td>
<td>0.7938</td>
<td>0.9375</td>
<td>0.7052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1844)</td>
<td>(0.6740)</td>
<td>(0.3688)</td>
<td>(0.3365)</td>
<td>(0.2968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnSales</td>
<td>0.0419</td>
<td>0.0135</td>
<td>0.0305</td>
<td>0.1093</td>
<td>0.0995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0039)</td>
<td>(0.0070)</td>
<td>(0.0062)</td>
<td>(0.0061)</td>
<td>(0.0049)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for regression estimations presented in this table were obtained from Compustat and the Development Bank of Japan for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively. R&D expenditure data for Japanese firms comes from annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiki Ho survey. Firm-level software intensity measures were calculated using data from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The data represent an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. and Japanese IT firms active in the sample period, 1983-2004. As a consequence of using an unbalanced panel, total number of observations used in regression estimations can vary between time periods. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA using the nonlinear least squares algorithm. The dependent value is the log of Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement value of its total assets. RD/Assets are calculated as the ratio of the stock of firm’s accumulated R&D expenditures, calculated using the perpetual inventory method, to the replacement value of the firm’s total assets. The Japan dummy equals 1 if the firm is based in Japan. Standard errors are reported in brackets. For detailed information about specification, sample selection, and variable construction, please consult the main body of the paper. Regression analysis presented in this table is identical to that presented in Table IV above, except that a measure of firm-level software intensity has been added to the specification. The asterisks that are listed next to coefficients reported in the table denote statistical significance in the following manner: (***) represents significance at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. For brevity, only coefficients on variables of interest are reported, while coefficients on some of the control variables may be omitted. Detailed estimation results are available from the authors by request.
### Table V: Patent Production Function Regressions, Japanese Indicator and Time Trends, Entire Sample and By Sector, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entire Sample</th>
<th>Electronics</th>
<th>Semiconductors</th>
<th>IT Hardware</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS RE FE</td>
<td>OLS RE FE</td>
<td>OLS RE FE</td>
<td>OLS RE FE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log R&amp;D</td>
<td>0.9814 (0.0392)</td>
<td>0.7429 (0.0463)</td>
<td>0.6682 (0.0542)</td>
<td>0.9456 (0.0672)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 1989-1993</td>
<td>0.0066 (0.0765)</td>
<td>0.1056 (0.0668)</td>
<td>0.1237 (0.0680)</td>
<td>0.0868 (0.0995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 1994-1999</td>
<td>0.1151 (0.1269)</td>
<td>0.4168 (0.1142)</td>
<td>0.4942 (0.1174)</td>
<td>0.1328 (0.3598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 2000-2004</td>
<td>-0.1647 (0.2629)</td>
<td>0.3258 (0.3336)</td>
<td>0.4280 (0.3504)</td>
<td>0.2525 (0.2278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Dummy</td>
<td>0.7363 (0.1796)</td>
<td>0.8482 (0.1922)</td>
<td>n.a (0.0305)</td>
<td>0.5806 (0.3523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan * 1989-1993</td>
<td>-0.3033 (0.1116)</td>
<td>-0.1823 (0.0984)</td>
<td>-0.1584 (0.0994)</td>
<td>-0.5258 (0.1341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan * 1994-1999</td>
<td>-0.5294 (0.1713)</td>
<td>-0.5037 (0.1435)</td>
<td>-0.5111 (0.1451)</td>
<td>-0.3492 (0.3706)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan * 2000-2004</td>
<td>-0.8835 (0.1884)</td>
<td>-1.0319 (0.1740)</td>
<td>-1.0758 (0.1759)</td>
<td>-0.3181 (0.2392)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The firm-level R&D expenditure data for regression estimations presented in this table were obtained from Compustat and annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiki Ho survey for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively. Patent data come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The data represent an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. and Japanese IT firms active in the sample period, 1983-2004. The dependent variable is the log of the number of total patents granted in a given year. The Japan dummy equals 1 when a firm is based in Japan. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA using ordinary least squares, random effects, and fixed effects algorithms. Robust and cluster-corrected standard errors are reported in brackets. For detailed information about the specification, sample selection, and variable construction, please consult the main body of the paper. For brevity, only coefficients on variables of interest are reported, while coefficients on some of the control variables may be omitted. Detailed estimation results are available from the authors by request.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entire Sample</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>lnQ</strong></td>
<td><strong>FE</strong></td>
<td><strong>NLLS</strong></td>
<td><strong>FE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets</td>
<td>-0.0814</td>
<td>-0.0167</td>
<td>-1.1304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1257)</td>
<td>(0.0442)</td>
<td>(0.2753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets * 1989-1993</td>
<td>-0.3011</td>
<td>-0.1369</td>
<td>0.6919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1016)</td>
<td>(0.0552)</td>
<td>(0.2890)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets * 1994-1999</td>
<td>0.1375</td>
<td>0.1309</td>
<td>1.1809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1262)</td>
<td>(0.0700)</td>
<td>(0.2753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets * 2000-2004</td>
<td>0.0611</td>
<td>-0.0396</td>
<td>0.9727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1460)</td>
<td>(0.0663)</td>
<td>(0.2932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
<td>3571</td>
<td>3571</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for regression estimations presented in this table were obtained from Compustat and the Development Bank of Japan for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively. R&D expenditure data for Japanese firms comes from annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiiki Ho survey. The data represent an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. and Japanese IT firms active in the sample period, 1983-2004. The regression estimation results presented in this table are analogous to those presented in Tables IV and IV-2, except that they include a direct estimation of the time trends. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA. A linearized version of the specification is estimated using the fixed effects algorithm, while a nonlinear version of the specification is estimated using the nonlinear least squares algorithm. The dependent value is the log of Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement value of its total assets. RD/Assets are calculated as the ratio of the stock of firm’s accumulated R&D expenditures, calculated using the perpetual inventory method, to the replacement value of the firm’s total assets. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Robust and cluster-corrected standard errors are reported for specifications estimated using the fixed effects algorithm. For detailed information about the specification, sample selection, and variable construction, please consult the main body of the paper. The asterisks that are listed next to coefficients reported in the table denote statistical significance in the following manner: (***), (**), and (*) represent significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level, and 0.1 level, respectively. For brevity, only coefficients on variables of interest are reported, while coefficients on some of the control variables may be omitted. Detailed estimation results are available from the authors by request.
### Table VII: Tobin’s Q Regressions, By Industry and Time Period, Fixed Effects, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets</td>
<td>-0.3464</td>
<td>-1.1880</td>
<td>-0.7058</td>
<td>0.0609</td>
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<td>-0.2278</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3059)</td>
<td>(0.3865)</td>
<td>(0.1752)</td>
<td>(0.0017)</td>
<td>(0.3095)</td>
<td>(0.1496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets *</td>
<td>0.2789</td>
<td>1.1019</td>
<td>0.6043</td>
<td>-0.6449</td>
<td>-0.0335</td>
<td>-0.3502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>(0.3040)</td>
<td>(0.4283)</td>
<td>(0.1966)</td>
<td>(0.9356)</td>
<td>(0.5447)</td>
<td>(0.4091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.1158</td>
<td>0.1030</td>
<td>0.0286</td>
<td>0.0796</td>
<td>0.0966</td>
<td>0.1089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for regression estimations presented in this table were obtained from Compustat and the Development Bank of Japan for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively. R&D expenditure data for Japanese firms comes from annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiki Ho survey. The data represent an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. and Japanese IT firms active in the sample period, 1983-2004. As a consequence of using an unbalanced panel, total number of observations used in regression estimations can vary between time periods. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA using the fixed effects algorithm. The dependent value is the log of Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement value of its total assets. RD/Assets are calculated as the ratio of the stock of firm’s accumulated R&D expenditures, calculated using the perpetual inventory method, to the replacement value of the firm’s total assets. The Japan dummy equals 1 if the firm is based in Japan. Robust and cluster-corrected standard errors are reported in brackets. For detailed information about the specification, sample selection, and variable construction, please consult the main body of the paper. The asterisks that are listed next to coefficients reported in the table denote statistical significance in the following manner: (***) represents significance at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. For brevity, only coefficients on variables of interest are reported, while coefficients on some of the control variables may be omitted. Detailed estimation results are available from the authors by request.

### Table VIII: Tobin’s Q Regressions, By Industry and Time Period, NLS, 1983-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets</td>
<td>-0.0804</td>
<td>0.3760</td>
<td>-0.2752</td>
<td>0.2919</td>
<td>-0.1399</td>
<td>-0.1412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1216)</td>
<td>(0.1995)</td>
<td>(0.0904)</td>
<td>(0.1098)</td>
<td>(0.1019)</td>
<td>(0.0429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD/Assets *</td>
<td>0.1070</td>
<td>-0.3838</td>
<td>0.1239</td>
<td>-1.5693</td>
<td>-0.3292</td>
<td>-0.3107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>(0.1271)</td>
<td>(0.2147)</td>
<td>(0.1287)</td>
<td>(0.2756)</td>
<td>(0.3255)</td>
<td>(0.2500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.4826</td>
<td>0.2414</td>
<td>0.2416</td>
<td>0.6240</td>
<td>0.1431</td>
<td>0.3760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for regression estimations presented in this table were obtained from Compustat and the Development Bank of Japan for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively. R&D expenditure data for Japanese firms comes from annual volumes of the Kaisha Shiki Ho survey. The data represent an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. and Japanese IT firms active in the sample period, 1983-2004. As a consequence of using an unbalanced panel, total number of observations used in regression estimations can vary between time periods. Regression specifications are estimated in STATA using the nonlinear least squares algorithm. The dependent value is the log of Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement value of its total assets. RD/Assets are calculated as the ratio of the stock of firm’s accumulated R&D expenditures, calculated using the perpetual inventory method, to the replacement value of the firm’s total assets. The Japan dummy equals 1 if the firm is based in Japan. Standard errors are reported in brackets. For detailed information about the specification, sample selection, and variable construction, please consult the main body of the paper. The asterisks that are listed next to coefficients reported in the table denote statistical significance in the following manner: (***) represents significance at the 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. For brevity, only coefficients on variables of interest are reported, while coefficients on some of the control variables may be omitted. Detailed estimation results are available from the authors by request.
This table compares a measure of firm-level software intensity of patenting for the firms in our sample by the geographical region of their origin and the geographical region of invention. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The software intensity variable is calculated as the share of software patents in total patents granted in the sample period, 1983-2004, averaged across all firms belonging to a given region of origin - region of invention combination. Geography of invention is determined using geographical locations of all inventors listed on the patent document. T-tests for differences in means across geographical groups show that differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the case of all group pairs.

This table compares a measure of firm-level software intensity of patent citations for the firms in our sample by the geographical region of their origin and the geographical region of invention. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The software intensity of citations variable is calculated as the share of citations made to software patents in total citations made by all patents granted to a firm in our sample period, 1983-2004, averaged across all firms belonging to a given region of origin - region of invention combination. Geography of invention is determined using geographical locations of all inventors listed on the patent document. T-tests for differences in means across geographical groups show that differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the case of all group pairs.
This table compares a measure of firm-level software intensity of patenting for the Japanese firms in our sample by the geographical region of invention, separately for three industrial subsectors in Information Technology. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The software intensity variable is calculated as the share of software patents in total patents granted in the sample period, 1983-2004, averaged across all firms belonging to a given region of invention - industrial subsector combination. Geography of invention is determined using geographical locations of all inventors listed on the patent document. T-tests for differences in means across geographical groups show that differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the case of all group pairs, except in the case of “electronics” and “semiconductors” where the region of invention is USA.

This table compares a measure of firm-level software intensity of patent citations for the Japanese firms in our sample by the geographical region of invention, separately for three industrial subsectors in Information Technology. The data used to construct measures of software intensity come from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. The software intensity of citations variable is calculated as the share of citations made to software patents in total citations made by all patents granted to a firm in our sample period, 1983-2004, averaged across all firms belonging to a region of invention - industrial subsector combination. Geography of invention is determined using geographical locations of all inventors listed on the patent document. T-tests for differences in means across geographical groups show that differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the case of all group pairs, except in the case of “electronics” and “semiconductors” where the region of invention is USA.