

Volume 29, Issue 2

Maximum size of social security in a model of endogenous fertility

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Abstract

Social security tends to be unsustainable in nature. It reduces individuals' demand for children as a measure to support their lifestyle during old age, which in turn undermines the financial basis of social security. Using a simple overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and income transfer from children to parents, we discuss the maximum size of a pay-as-you-go social security program that can prevent a cumulative reduction of fertility and make a program sustainable. We also show that a child-care allowance raises the maximum size of the program and raises an individual's lifetime utility.

Research for this paper was supported financially by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No.19530237) and the University of Kitakyushu. The authors are thankful to Hisakazu Kato, Motohiro Sato, Toshiyuki Uemura, Akira Yakita, and Shinji Yamashige and seminar participants at the seminar held at Hitotsubashi University. Nevertheless, any remaining errors are the authors' responsibility.

Citation: Takashi Oshio and Masaya Yasuoka, (2009) "Maximum size of social security in a model of endogenous fertility", *Economics Bulletin*, Vol. 29 no.2 pp. 644-654.

Submitted: Apr 18 2009. **Published:** April 25, 2009.

1. Introduction

Declining fertility puts strong pressures on the sustainability of social security. Most advanced countries have instituted pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security programs, which rely heavily on contributions from young and future generations. Because a decreasing number of children is most likely to make programs less sustainable, many policymakers now call for child-care support, which is expected to prevent fertility from declining further. Indeed, various studies have examined the effectiveness of child-care support to mitigate the negative impact of low fertility on social welfare (Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam, 2003; Fenge and Meier, 2005; Hirazawa and Yakita, 2008).

However, social security tends to be unsustainable or even self-destructive in nature. The old-age security hypothesis, which treats children as capital goods for the material support during old age, implies that social security reduces demand for children (Zhang and Nishimura, 1993). This is also the case if we interpret a PAYG program as insurance against not having children (Sinn, 2004). Social security provides older individuals with financial support, at least partially substituting children. A reduced motive for having children reduces fertility and renders the financial base of social security vulnerable.

The negative feedback loop between social security and fertility, which is inherent in social security, must not be ignored, especially if sustainability of social security confronts an imminent risk under conditions of declining fertility. In this study, we explicitly address the risk of a cumulative reduction in fertility and discuss how to prevent social security from collapsing, exclusively examining the role of children as capital goods for support during old age.

To this end, we explore a simple overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility and income transfer from children to parents. Incorporating the old-age gift into the model of endogenous fertility, Zhang and Zhang (1998) and Wigger (1999) show that social security programs, if small sized, can stimulate per capita income growth, but not otherwise. We extend their analysis to examine explicitly the maximum size of social security that can prevent fertility from cumulatively declining

and prevent social security from collapsing. Moreover, we show that social security reduces utility.

The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. **Section 2** presents a basic model and discusses the benchmark state that exists before introducing social security. **Section 3** introduces a PAYG social security program and examines the dynamics of fertility and necessary conditions to make social security sustainable. **Section 4** concludes.

2. Before introducing social security

We consider a simple overlapping generations model, in which individuals live in two life periods, respectively, when they are young and old. Individuals treat children solely as capital goods for material support during their old age; there are no altruistic motives¹. We start with the case in which no social security program exists. Each individual maximizes lifetime utility:

$$u = u(c_1, c_2) = \gamma \ln c_1 + (1 - \gamma) \ln c_2, \quad 0 < \gamma < 1. \quad (1)$$

Therein, c_1 and c_2 respectively signify consumption in young and old age periods. The budget constraints are given as

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &= [1 - \theta - c(n)]w - s, \\ c_2 &= (1 + r_{+1})s + \theta w_{+1}n, \end{aligned}$$

for each life stage, where s , w , r , n , θ , and $c(n)$ represent savings, wages, the interest rate, the number of children, gifts to parents, and the cost function of childrearing. The suffix “+1” indicates one period ahead. Both θ and $c(n)$ are defined in terms of the ratio to wage. When young, an individual earns wage income, bears some children, and gives some pecuniary or material gifts to their old parents. When old, individuals rely on their own savings and gifts from their children. No bequest exists². We also assume for simplicity that individuals perfectly foresee w_{+1} and r_{+1} .

As for the old-age gift ratio θ , individuals choose its optimal value to maximize their lifetime utility, assuming that their children will make the same choice as their

¹ This setup is in contrast to that of many preceding analyses which have interpreted children as consumption goods—that is, they have included the number of children in an individual’s utility function—and/or incorporated altruistic motives.

² We can discuss (non-altruistic) income transfer from parents to children by replacing θ with $-\theta$, while keeping the main results unchanged.

own if other variables remain unchanged. We assume that old parents take the value of the gift received from their children as given, even if it differs from what they expected to receive from their children. In the equilibrium, each generation calculates the optimal gift such that each generation gives the same fraction of their own wage income and no generation has an incentive to change the size of the gift (see Zhang and Zhang, 1998).

The cost function of childrearing is specified as

$$c(n) = cn^\varepsilon, \quad c > 0, \quad (2)$$

where ε is the elasticity of the cost of childrearing with respect to the number of children. Moreover, we assume $\varepsilon > 1$.

The first-order conditions for utility maximization are given as

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 &= (1 + r_{+1})u_2, \\ c'(n)wu_1 &= \theta w_{+1}u_2, \\ wu_1 &= w_{+1}nu_2 \end{aligned}$$

with respect to saving, the number of children, and the gift ratio, respectively, where $u_i = \partial u / \partial c_i$. From these three conditions, we have

$$\frac{\theta w_{+1}}{c'(n)w} - 1 = \frac{w_{+1}n}{w} - 1 = r_{+1}, \quad (3)$$

which means that the rates of return from childrearing, the old-age gift, and saving are all equalized in utility maximization. This condition (3) is reduced to

$$\frac{\theta}{c'(n^*)} - 1 = n^* - 1 = r^* \quad (4)$$

in the steady state, where n^* and r^* are the steady-state number of children and interest rate.³

If (3) holds, then (i) the lifetime budget constraint is reduced to

$$c_1 + \frac{c_2}{1 + r_{+1}} = [1 - c(n)]w, \quad (5)$$

(ii) the old-age gift ratio is given as

$$\theta = \varepsilon c(n), \quad (6)$$

using (3), and (iii) the optimal saving is calculated as

³ This resultant fertility is determined solely by the interest rate, giving basically the same result as that of Becker and Barro (1988), who incorporate altruistic bequests in the model of endogenous fertility.

$$s = [1 - \theta - c(n)]w - \gamma[1 - c(n)]w = [1 - \gamma - (1 - \gamma + \varepsilon)c(n)]w. \quad (7)$$

The wage income and the interest rate are derived from the competitive firms' profit maximization. Assuming that the production function is given as

$$y = k^\alpha, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1,$$

where k is the capital-labor ratio and that capital stock fully depreciates in one life period, then we have

$$w = (1 - \alpha)k^\alpha, \quad 1 + r = \alpha k^{\alpha-1}. \quad (8)$$

The market equilibrium for capital (and for goods) is expressed as

$$k_{+1} = \frac{s}{n}. \quad (9)$$

Then, combining (3), (7), (8), and (9) yields the fertility equation:

$$c(n) = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma) - \alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma + \varepsilon)}, \quad (10)$$

assuming $(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma) > \alpha$. Normalizing the number of children before introducing social security as unity, we have the equation shown below.

$$c = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma) - \alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma + \varepsilon)} \quad (11)$$

3. Introducing social security

This section introduces a PAYG social security program, by which a young individual pays the social security tax of $t \times 100$ percent of wages and an older individual receives the benefit with a replacement ratio of $\beta \times 100$ percent of the wage paid to the young individual. Therefore, the lifetime budget constraints are given as

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &= [1 - \theta - c(n) - t]w - s, \\ c_2 &= (1 + r_{+1})s + (\theta n + \beta)w_{+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Because the number of children, the old-age gift ratio, and savings are adjusted in the same way as before introducing social security, condition (3) holds here again. Consequently, the lifetime budget constraint is expressed as

$$c_1 + \frac{c_2}{1 + r_{+1}} = \left[1 - c(n) - t + \frac{\beta}{n} \right] w, \quad (12)$$

and the optimal saving is given as

$$s = \left[1 - \gamma - (1 - \gamma + \varepsilon)c(n) - (1 - \gamma)t - \frac{\gamma\beta}{n} \right] w. \quad (13)$$

Meanwhile, the budget constraint for the government is given as

$$t = \frac{\beta}{n_{-1}}, \quad (14)$$

where the government first sets up the replacement ratio β ; then it adjusts the tax rate t to balance the PAYG social security program at each period, taking the observed number of the current young individuals n_{-1} as given.

Then, combining (3), (8), (9), (13), and (14) yields the dynamic equation of fertility:

$$c(n) = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma) - \alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma + \varepsilon)} - \frac{\beta}{1 - \gamma + \varepsilon} \left(\frac{\gamma}{n} + \frac{1 - \gamma}{n_{-1}} \right).$$

Normalizing the number of children before introducing social security as unity and using (11), we have

$$n^\varepsilon = 1 - \left(\frac{\gamma}{n} + \frac{1 - \gamma}{n_{-1}} \right) \frac{\beta}{A}, \quad (15)$$

where

$$A \equiv \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma) - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} > 0.$$

From (15), we confirm that the number of children continues to decline after introduction of social security. Introducing social security reduces the demand for children as capital goods used for material support during old age and correspondingly reduces the cost of child rearing, which also engenders a reduction in the old-age gift (see (6)). Consequently, individuals can increase saving, which accelerates capital accumulation and reduces the interest rate. This brings a reduction in the rate of return from child rearing (see (3)) and engenders a further reduction in fertility. Under this adjustment, old parents depend less on the gifts from their children than before introducing social security because they receive social security benefits.

Next, we consider the maximum size of social security that can prevent a cumulative reduction in fertility and make social security sustainable. From (15), the equation which solves the steady-state number of children, n^* , is expressed as

$$n^{*\varepsilon} = 1 - \frac{\beta}{An^*}. \quad (16)$$

To consider the solutions of this equation graphically, Figure 1 depicts curves of $f(n^*)=n^{*\varepsilon}$ and $g(n^*)=1-\beta/(An^*)$. This figure suggests that an overly high value of β engenders no steady-state solution of n^* because, thereby, the $g(n^*)$ curve is shifted downward and located below the $f(n^*)$ curve. The maximum value of β , denoted by β_+ , is such that makes the two curves mutually tangent. Considering $f(n^*)=g(n^*)$ and $f'(n^*)=g'(n^*)$, we calculate

$$\beta_+ = \varepsilon(1+\varepsilon)^{-(1+\varepsilon)/\varepsilon} A,$$

which engenders $n=(1+\varepsilon)^{-1/\varepsilon}$. Simple calculations show that β_+ is an increasing function of ε and a decreasing function of α and γ . The number of children continues falling cumulatively and the social security program collapses if β exceeds β_+ . Consequently, we can state that A PAYG social security program should be maintained within a certain limited size to prevent a cumulative reduction of fertility and a collapse of the program.

To graphically illustrate this conclusion, let us tentatively assume $\gamma=0.5$, $\alpha=0.25$, and $\varepsilon=2$. Normalizing the number of children before introducing social security as unity, we have $c=0.0667$ from (11) and $A=0.0167$. Then, the dynamics of fertility, (15), is expressed as

$$n = \sqrt{1 - 3\left(\frac{1}{n} + \frac{1}{n_{-1}}\right)\beta},$$

and the maximum size of social security is calculated as $\beta_+=0.0642$. Figure 2 portrays the dynamics of fertility, with the $n=n(n_{-1})$ curve and the 45-degree line along which steady states must lie, for three difference replacement ratios, $\beta=0.05$, $0.0642(=\beta_+)$, and 0.07 . If $\beta=0.05$, the $n=n(n_{-1})$ curve crosses the 45-degree line at $n=0.787$ and $n=0.319$, which correspond to stable and unstable state solutions, respectively. Assuming that the economy starts at $n=1$, the number of children will fall to and stabilize at 0.787 . When β is raised to 0.0642 , the curve becomes tangent with the 45-degree line and yields the only stable number of children of $n=0.579$. When β is 0.07 , which is greater than 0.0642 , the curve does not cross the 45-degree line, suggesting that the number of children falls cumulatively to zero.

Another interesting question to be addressed is whether introducing social security

raises an individual's lifetime utility. We concentrate on the steady state, in which the lifetime budget constraint (12) is reduced to (5), the same as before introducing social security. In addition, an individual's adjustment equalizes the rate of return from the old-age gift to that from saving; that is, $n^* - 1 = r^*$, which makes the net rate of return from PAYG social security equal to zero. Therefore, social security affects the lifetime budget and utility entirely through its impact on fertility. Because the level of utility in the steady state, u^* , is given as

$$\begin{aligned} u^* &= \gamma \ln[(1 - c(n^*))w^*] + (1 - \gamma) \ln[n^*(1 - c(n^*))w^*] \\ &= \ln w^* + \ln[1 - c(n^*)] + (1 - \gamma) \ln n^*, \end{aligned}$$

we have

$$\frac{du^*}{d\beta} = \left[\frac{1}{w^*} \frac{dw^*}{dn^*} - \frac{c'(n^*)}{1 - c(n^*)} + \frac{1 - \gamma}{n^*} \right] \frac{dn^*}{d\beta}. \quad (17)$$

We can show $dn^*/d\beta < 0$ as long as social security stays sustainable ($\beta \leq \beta_+$) from (16) and also $[\quad] > 0$ in the RHS of (17), as long as

$$n^* < \left[\frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma + \varepsilon)}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \gamma + \varepsilon) - \alpha} \right]^{1/\varepsilon}, \quad (18)$$

using $dw^*/dn^* = -(\alpha/n^*)^{1/(1-\alpha)} < 0$, $c'(n^*) = c\varepsilon n^{*\varepsilon-1} > 0$ and (11). We start with $n^* = 1$. Therefore, (18) holds and so we have $du^*/d\beta < 0$. Consequently, we can state that a PAYG social security program reduces an individual's lifetime utility in the presence of income transfer from children to their parents.

This conclusion is consistent with a conventional view that a PAYG social security program reduces lifetime utility under declining fertility. It is noteworthy, however, that the negative impact of social security on utility is not caused by a reduction of lifetime income in our model. Indeed, social security *raises* lifetime income because it makes individuals reduce the number of children and increase saving, which in turn accelerates capital accumulation and raises per-capita income. At the same time, however, it reduces the interest rate, which directly implies a higher cost of old-age consumption. The negative sign of eq. (17) indicates that this negative effect dominates positive effects from lower fertility—that is, an increase in lifetime income and a reduction in the childrearing cost—and reduces net lifetime utility.

4. Conclusion

We discussed how to make a pay-as-you-go social security sustainable, based on a simple overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility and an old-age gift from children to parents. We confirmed that a PAYG social security program should not be too large, because of the risk that a large program leads to a cumulative reduction in fertility. To make the program sustainable, we should contain its size within a certain limit, as determined by parameters related to individual utility, production, and the cost of childrearing functions.

We also showed that a PAYG social security program reduces an individual's lifetime utility. In response to an introduction of social security, individuals reduce the number of children and the old-age gift to their parents, which raises saving and raises per-capita income. However, the lowered interest rate raises the cost of old-age consumption and reduces the net lifetime utility by more than offsetting the positive effects of lower fertility.

These results hold even if we consider the opposite direction of intergenerational transfer, i.e., bequests from old parents to children, as far as an individual's utility does not include an altruistic aspect. Individuals increase income transfer to their children to offset its impact on lifetime income in response to an introduction of social security. Consequently, social security affects an individual's utility entirely through fertility, just as in the case of the old-age gift.

Including another aspect of children, especially their role as consumption goods, and altruistic motives will most likely engender mixed results. However, the inherent unsustainability of old-age social security cannot be alleviated completely so long as social security programs at least partially substitute intergenerational income transfer.

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Figure 1. Solving the steady-state number of children





Figure 2. Dynamics of fertility under social security



Note: $\gamma=0.5$, $\alpha=0.25$, and $\epsilon=2$ are assumed.