

A FORMAL DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM FOR CFG

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We will formulate context-free grammar as a form of logical calculus. As against the familiar generative (rewriting) system of context-free grammar, our system is deductive. That is to say, a word belongs to a language if this fact is deduced within the formal system.

In [H29] Hertz introduced the concept of sentence. A sentence is a formal expression of the form

$$v_1, \dots, v_n \rightarrow w$$

where the components v_1, \dots, v_n and w are atomic “elements.” In [G32] Gentzen investigated Hertz’s theory of sentence systems and improved Hertz’s calculus. The concept of sequent in LJ and LK in [G35] is a generalization of Hertz’s sentence. The deductive system proposed here is a calculus of sequents and it is a generalization of Gentzen’s calculus in [G32]. The concept of sequent in our system is a generalization of Hertz’s sentence in respect of components. With regard to inference rules, we adopt the substitution rule in addition to Gentzen’s rules in [G32].

Though in formal language theories a nonterminal is sometimes called a variable, we regard a nonterminal as a unary predicate rather than a variable. For example, a production rule such as

$$\text{Clause} \rightarrow \text{Noun Verb}$$

means “if α is a Noun and β is a Verb then $\alpha\beta$ is a Clause” or formally

$$\text{Noun}[\alpha], \text{Verb}[\beta] \rightarrow \text{Clause}[\alpha\beta].$$

Therefore it seems more natural to regard “Noun,” “Verb,” “Clause” as predicates than to regard them as variables.

Our system is related to the first order predicate logic. The set Σ^* consisting of all words over an arbitrary finite alphabet Σ is supposed to be the individual domain. A variable ranges over Σ^* but a constant denotes an element of Σ . Any element of the domain Σ^* can be denoted by a string of constants.

The symbols of the system are:

Predicates: Q, R, \dots (at least one);

Variables: α, β, \dots (countably many);

Constants: a, b, \dots (at least one);

Auxiliary symbols: $[,], \rightarrow$.

The set of predicates and the finite set of constants may be arbitrarily fixed.

A *term* is a finite (possibly empty) string consisting of variables and constants. The empty term is denoted by ε . A *formula* is an expression of the form $Q[x]$ where Q is any

* The author was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 62540145), Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.

predicate and x is any term. An expression is *closed* if it contains no variables. A finite (possibly empty) sequence of formulas is denoted by Γ , Δ or Θ . For any variable α and any term x , the expression obtained by substituting x for α in a formal expression E is denoted as $E(\alpha/x)$. A *sequent* is an expression of the form

$$A_1, \dots, A_n \rightarrow B$$

where A_1, \dots, A_n, B are formulas. The formulas occurring in the left hand side of " \rightarrow " are called *antecedent* formulas, and the right hand side formula is called *succedent* formula. If Γ and Δ are equal as sets, two sequents $\Gamma \rightarrow B$ and $\Delta \rightarrow B$ are considered identical. A sequent is *trivial* if its succedent formula is equal to one of the antecedent formulas. A sequent is *linear* if it has only one antecedent formula. A sequent is *tautological* if it is trivial and linear. A sequent is *regular* if it has the form $Q[\alpha] \rightarrow R[x\alpha]$ or $\rightarrow R[x]$ where x is a closed term. An *axiom system* is a fixed set of sequents, and its members are called *axioms*. An axiom system is *regular* if all the axioms are regular.

The inference schemata are as follows.

Substitution:

$$\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow A}{\Gamma(\alpha/x) \rightarrow A(\alpha/x)}.$$

Thinning:

$$\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow A}{\Delta \rightarrow A},$$

where every element of Γ occurs in Δ .

Cut:

$$\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow A \quad A, \Delta \rightarrow B}{\Gamma, \Delta \rightarrow B}.$$

A *proof* is a tree consisting of sequents. The one sequent at the root of the tree is called the *endsequent*, and the sequent at any leaf of the tree is called an *initial sequent*. Each sequent except the initial sequents is a lower sequent of an inference. Each sequent except the endsequent is (one of) the upper sequent(s) of an inference. If the endsequent is S and if every initial sequent is either a tautological sequent or an axiom of K , then it is called a *proof of S from K* . A sequent S is *provable from K* and denoted as $K \vdash S$ if there exists a proof of S from K .

Let $G = (N, \Sigma, P, A)$ be a context-free grammar. The language generated by G is denoted as $L(G)$. Let the set of constants be Σ , and suppose that for any nonterminal $B \in N$ there corresponds a predicate. For the sake of simplicity, we do not distinguish a nonterminal and its corresponding predicate. Any production $p \in P$ can be expressed as

$$p = (B \rightarrow x_0 C_1 x_1 C_2 x_2 \dots C_n x_n),$$

where $n \geq 0$, $B \in N$, $C_i \in N$ ($i=1, 2, \dots, n$), $x_i \in \Sigma^*$ ($i=0, 1, \dots, n$). Let $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$ be distinct variables and define p^* as the sequent

$$C_1[\alpha_1], \dots, C_n[\alpha_n] \rightarrow B[x_0 \alpha_1 x_1 \dots \alpha_n x_n].$$

The axiom system G^* is defined as the set

$$G^* = \{p^* | p \in P\}.$$

If the grammar G is regular (right linear) then the axiom system G^* is regular.

Now we will generalize Gentzen's concept of normal proof and prove a normal form theorem. A proof consisting of exactly one tautological sequent is *normal*. A proof consisting of exactly one thinning with a tautological upper sequent is *normal*. A proof of a nontrivial sequent is *normal* if it satisfies the following conditions:

- (1) No trivial sequent occurs.
- (2) Any cut occurs above neither a substitution nor the left upper sequent of a cut.
- (3) If any thinning occurs, it is the lowest inference.

The following is a generalization of Theorem III in [G32]. Though Gentzen proved it in another way, any proof can be transformed into a normal proof by a finitary procedure (cf. the remark after Theorem III).

THEOREM 1. *For any axiom system K and any sequent S , if $K \vdash S$ then there exists a normal proof of S from K .*

PROOF. It is clear that any trivial sequent has a normal proof. It is easy to show that a proof of a nontrivial sequent can be transformed into a normal proof by permuting inferences successively. For instance, if a part of given proof runs:

$$\frac{\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow A \quad A, \Delta \rightarrow B}{\Gamma, \Delta \rightarrow B} \quad B, \theta \rightarrow C}{\Gamma, \Delta, \theta \rightarrow C},$$

then this part is transformed into:

$$\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow A \quad \frac{A, \Delta \rightarrow B \quad B, \theta \rightarrow C}{A, \Delta, \theta \rightarrow C}}{\Gamma, \Delta, \theta \rightarrow C}.$$

□

The *principal portion* of a normal proof consists of the endsequent, the upper sequent of every thinning and the right upper sequent of every cut.

LEMMA. *Let $G = (N, \Sigma, P, A)$ be a context-free grammar, $B \in N$ and $x \in (N \cup \Sigma)^*$. If $B \Rightarrow^* x$ and x is decomposed as*

$$x = x_0 C_1 x_1 C_2 x_2 \dots C_n x_n \quad (C_i \in N, x_i \in \Sigma^*),$$

then

$$G^* \vdash C_1[\alpha_1], \dots, C_n[\alpha_n] \rightarrow B[x_0 \alpha_1 x_1 \dots \alpha_n x_n]$$

for distinct variables $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$.

PROOF. By induction on the length of a derivation $B \Rightarrow^* x$.

Basis: $x = B$, $G^* \vdash B[\alpha] \rightarrow B[\alpha]$.

Inductive step: Let the last step of derivation be $uCw \Rightarrow uvw$, where $(C \rightarrow v)$ is a production, $x = uvw$ and

$$\begin{aligned} u &= u_0 D_1 u_1 \dots, \\ v &= v_0 E_1 v_1 \dots, \\ w &= w_0 F_1 w_1 \dots \end{aligned}$$

$(u_i, v_i, w_i \in \Sigma^*, D_i, E_i, F_i \in N)$. By induction hypothesis, the sequent

$$D_1[\alpha_1], \dots, C[\beta], F_1[\gamma_1], \dots \rightarrow B[u_0\alpha_1 \dots \beta w_0\gamma_1 \dots]$$

is provable from G^* . The sequent

$$E_1[\delta_1], \dots \rightarrow C[v_0\delta_1 \dots]$$

is an axiom. From these two sequents, the sequent

$$D_1[\alpha_1], \dots, E_1[\delta_1], \dots, F_1[\gamma_1], \dots \rightarrow B[u_0\alpha_1 \dots v_0\delta_1 \dots w_0\gamma_1 \dots]$$

is deducible by an application of substitution and an application of cut. \square

THEOREM 2. *Let $G=(N, \Sigma, P, A)$ be a context-free grammar. If $x \in L(G)$ then $G^* \vdash \rightarrow A[x]$.*

PROOF. It immediately follows from Lemma that for any $B \in N$ and any $x \in \Sigma^*$, if $B \Rightarrow^* x$ then $G^* \vdash \rightarrow B[x]$. \square

THEOREM 3. *Let $G=(N, \Sigma, P, A)$ be a context-free grammar. If x is closed and $G^* \vdash \rightarrow A[x]$ then $x \in L(G)$.*

PROOF. There exists a normal proof of $\rightarrow A[x]$ from G^* . Any sequent S in the principal portion is closed and its succedent is $A[x]$. If S runs as

$$B_1[y_1], B_2[y_2], \dots, B_n[y_n] \rightarrow A[x],$$

then each y_i is a subterm of x , and the subterms y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n do not overlap in x . We define $\phi(S) \in (N \cup \Sigma)^*$ to be the word obtained by replacing each occurrence of y_i by B_i for every $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ in x . If the antecedent of S is empty then $\phi(S)=x$.

If S_1 and S_2 occur in the principal portion and if S_2 occurs immediately below S_1 , then $\phi(S_1) \Rightarrow \phi(S_2)$ in G . Hence by induction, $A \Rightarrow^* x$ in G . \square

As an application, we prove a well-known fact.

THEOREM 4. *A language is acceptable by a nondeterministic finite automaton if and only if it is regular.*

PROOF. Let $M=(Q, \Sigma, \delta, A, F)$ ($F \subset Q$, $\delta \subset Q \times \Sigma \times Q$, $A \in Q$) be a nondeterministic finite automaton. Suppose that for any state $B \in Q$ there corresponds a predicate. For the sake of simplicity, we denote a state and its corresponding predicate by the same letter. The axiom system K is defined as

$$K = \{(C[\alpha] \rightarrow B[a\alpha] \mid (B, a, C) \in \delta) \cup \{\rightarrow D[\varepsilon] \mid D \in F\}.$$

There exists a regular grammar $G=(Q, \Sigma, P, A)$ satisfying $K=G^*$. Now we will prove that $x \in L(M)$ if and only if $K \vdash \rightarrow A[x]$. By induction on the length of x , it can be shown that if $(B, x, C) \in \delta^*$ then $K \vdash C[\alpha] \rightarrow B[x\alpha]$. For any $x \in L(M)$ there exists a $C \in F$ such that $(A, x, C) \in \delta^*$, hence there exists a proof of $C[\alpha] \rightarrow A[x\alpha]$ from K . By adding the figure

$$\frac{\frac{C[\alpha] \rightarrow A[x\alpha]}{\rightarrow C[\varepsilon]} \quad C[\varepsilon] \rightarrow A[x]}{\rightarrow A[x]}$$

to this proof, we obtain a proof of $\rightarrow A[x]$ from K .

For the proof of the converse, suppose $K \vdash \rightarrow A[x]$ and consider the principal portion of a normal proof. Any sequent in the principal portion except the endsequent has the form $B[y] \rightarrow A[xy]$ and it can be shown that $(A, x, B) \in \delta^*$. The lowermost part of the proof has the form

$$\frac{\rightarrow C[\varepsilon] \quad C[\varepsilon] \rightarrow A[x]}{\rightarrow A[x]}$$

for some $C \in F$. It follows that $x \in L(M)$. Hence $L(M)$ is regular.

Conversely, for any regular language L there exists a regular axiom system K , and an automaton M such that $L(M) = L$ can be constructed from K . \square

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