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DIALOGUE AS A BASIS OF DEMOCRACY†

TAKASHI SHIMAZAKI*

I. The Concept of Democracy and Dialogue

No movement to form a free and democratic society can be conceived without a process by which we make ourselves free and democratic. In this paper I want to consider, from the logical point of view, dialogue, which is necessary to build democratic groups or systems or institutions and which constitutes one of the bases of democracy. The term ‘dialogue’ is selected representatively from among many analogous words, such as discussion, dispute, argument, controversy and debate. It is one of the necessary conditions for the development of democratic personality to improve the capability for dialogue, for communication. But it is not only democratic personality, but also the ability and insight to see things as they really are that is required of each man who bears responsibility for future society; there must be a suitable harmony between democratic personality and this cognitive ability, but the present paper will focus on the former.

Let us begin with the question of what democracy is. The meaning of this term becomes complicated when we think of its historical origins and its uses today. As Shibata shows, the term ‘democracy’ has wide and assorted meanings—it may refer to one political, governmental form or to one form of various organizations and systems.1 For example, we can speak about democracy within a local governmental organization, a political party, a working place, a labor union, a university or a school, a club, a family, the relations between a man and a woman, etc. When we discuss democracy, it is necessary to understand its economic, material base and its historical, political origin. I will not review these, but at least the minimum definition of democracy must be given here. We use the term ‘democracy’ to describe a way for people to discuss, criticize and understand each other’s ideas without autocratic oppression before determining a plan or a policy. Therefore democracy can only be understood in the context of the human relations which form every system and organization. If the argument is taken as far as it will go, democracy becomes possible as soon as any two persons capable of telling to each other meet and form a relationship. Thus for the formation of democratic systems and for democratic consensus the participants must be consciously subjective and have a capability for introspection. These are important attributes for the formation of the democratic personality and for the achievement of a systematic integration within the self of the democracy of the various systems and organizations.

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† The present paper is translated from my Japanese paper “Minshushugi no kiso to shite no taiwa,” Shakai-kagakukyōhenpō, No. 6, Tokyo, 1982. But the content of the present paper is a little different from that of the earlier. The quotations were translated by myself.
1 Cf. Shingo Shibata, “Gendaiminshushugi no riron no tame ni” (For the Theory of Modern Democracy), Gendaiminshushugi to shakaishugi, Tokyo, 1982.
that each man is a part of.

It is especially necessary for scientists and scholars to form democratic speech-communities through free dialogue and discussion. There is no essential difference between oral discussion and criticism in publications.

Let us now take up the concept of linguistic communication or dialogue. Dialogue can be divided into two contrasting forms, that is, an antagonistic form and non-antagonistic form:

(1) 'Antagonistic linguistic communication' or 'antagonistic argument' is a reflection of real contradictions, the most important of which are the bitter struggles between social classes or strata. An ideological conflict is typically in this form, the main aim of which is to attack, blame and refute the opponent and argue an adversary down completely, if possible. The intention is not to learn or to improve one's opinion through a controversy. 'Antagonistic argument' is in this sense alienated communication.

(2) 'Non-antagonistic linguistic communication' or 'cooperative discussion' is a friendly dialogue, but it is not mere chattering because it has a purpose. It is a common pursuit of fact, truth, plan, policy, etc. In this cooperative discussion the fundamental conformity of benefit is presupposed from the beginning and the participants are ready to change their opinions. It is a collective way of thinking. The technique called brainstorming, which has four principles (preference of 'quantity' to 'quality,' perfect freedom, prohibition against criticism and improvement through combination of opinions), belongs to this form. Therefore 'cooperative discussion' is true and essential communication. (Essential, in this case, I take to mean not alienated.)

There is however a characteristic common to these two contrasting forms of communication. We can find unity in the dynamic interaction of opposed, contradictory and clashing opinions. Both forms of communication are processes, in which opinions are actively exchanged. In linguistic communication as a dynamic unity of opposites, antagonistic argument comes into being when the opposed aspect, conflict comes to the front and becomes the main moment. On the other hand, cooperative discussion comes into being when the unified, interdependent aspect becomes the main moment and the opposed aspect becomes the secondary moment. Antagonistic argument and cooperative discussion are two forms which derive logically from a single dialogue. The distinction between the two forms is thus relative. In fact, even if we argue antagonistically and bitterly, we can learn something from our opponents as a result and, on the other hand, antagonistic opposition sometimes occurs even in cooperative discussion. The democratic ideal is to build a society which needs no antagonistic argument.

In considering the relation between antagonistic argument and cooperative discussion, it is useful to understand the significance of the debate society which makes a game of argumentation. A debate society can be considered a link which mediates between antagonistic argument and cooperative discussion. A debate society holds regular contests, in which the members are divided into proponents and opponents to discuss a given issue. The contest is judged by a referee according to certain criteria. The debate society is set up artificially and it is a game, a linguistic game with rules. In this sense it is distinguished from spon-

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2 The role of debate is to mediate between antagonistic argument and cooperative discussion. It is needed because although people set up democratic speech-communities consciously, there is a natural tendency also working to fight to the finish without compromise.
DIALOGUE AS A BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

Debate is mainly practiced in universities and companies and is intended as training. The debate society can be seen as a method of training for democratic dialogue. Actual, spontaneous dialogue and discussion can also be more meaningful when use is made of the forms and rules of debate. Debate should be more widely practiced in schools and universities as a part of the curriculum in a democracy. The degree to which people who differ from each other in ideology and personality can discuss their difference profitably is one criterion of democratic maturity.

II. Rescher's Logic of Dialogue

In addition to Rescher's view, there have been a number of modern attempts around the world to describe the logic of dialogue, discussion, interrogation, etc. Lorenzen and Lorenz in their 'dialogical logic' and Loeser in his 'interrogation logic' all study this problem from the standpoint of modern formal logic. In the socialist world, both Sinovjev in the Soviet Union and Wessel in the German Democratic Republic favour 'dialogical logic' and have adopted it in their work. Sokolov in the Soviet Union has studied an analogous problem in the logic of dialogue from the dialectical standpoint. The theory of the ability of communication developed by Habermas and Apel is also an interesting contribution to the study of dialogue.

We find Rescher’s logic of dialogue or dialectics very interesting because of his formal analysis of dialogue and of the real content involved in it. It was his aim to revive the dialectics of ancient times, the dialectica of the Middle Ages and Kant’s or Hegel’s Dialektik of modern times as a method of dialogue or controversy; this aim is also worthy of note from the historical standpoint of logic. The central object of criticism in Rescher’s Dialectics is, as he explains in his introduction, Cartesian cognitive egocentrism and the scepticism that grew from it. As is shown in the proposition ‘I think, therefore I am,’ the main style of questions was ‘How can I convince myself?’ or ‘How can I be certain?’ But Rescher reformulated the problem by asking the following: ‘How can we go about convincing one another?’ He says:

Accordingly, the prime aims of the present discussion are to exhibit the sociocommunal roots of the foundations of rationality, to provide an instrument for the critique of the scepticism implicit in the cognitive solipicism of the Cartesian approach, and to illuminate the communal and controversy-oriented aspects of rational argumentation and inquiry—scientific inquiry in particular.

Though Rescher takes Kuhn’s theory of paradigm into account, his aims conform to my
own conception of the problem. What is his logic of dialogue then? He thinks mainly about the formal structure of dispute. (In fact he analyzes the structure of debate mainly.) Rescher utilizes mathematical logic well as an apparatus through which to analyze an object and then formalize the product of recognition distinctly. There are three persons in a dispute: two disputing adversaries (a proponent and his opponent) and a determiner or referee. The ‘burden of proof’ lies on the proponent’s side throughout and ‘categorical assertion’ is open to him alone. A challenge or cautious denial is also open to the opponent alone. (This is called the ‘dialectical asymmetry’ of the both sides.) ‘!P’ is used for categorical assertion (‘P’ is the case) and ‘†P’ for ‘cautious assertion.’ (‘P’ is the case for all that you have shown.)

Then how is a dispute conducted concretely? For example, there is a ‘non-repetition rule’:

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<tr>
<td>!P</td>
<td>†~P</td>
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A dispute must be progressive; it must continually advance into new terrain. It is not suitable for the proponent to repeat the proposition ‘!P’ mechanically. The proponent should have shown why ‘!P’; instead he forced his opinion on the opponent in a very undemocratic way. When the proponent breaks the non-repetition rule, he is evaluated negatively.

How do the proponent and the opponent offer their opinions respectively? Rescher proposes ‘provisoed assertion’ expressed as ‘P/Q.’ He is creative in this respect. This formula is used for ‘‘P’ generally (or usually or ordinarily) obtains provided that ‘‘Q’’ or for ‘‘Q’’ constitutes prima facie evidence for ‘‘P’’. Rescher writes: ‘‘What is at issue in each case is a reasonably safe presumption rather than airtight guarantee.’’ Therefore ‘P/Q’ does not mean strictly deductive and extensive logic, and there is a difference between ‘P/Q’ and the ‘Q ⊃ P’ of mathematical logic. (‘Q ⊃ P’ is generally called ‘implication’, which reads ‘if . . . then.’) ‘P/Q’ is used for ‘subdeductive argumentation.’ It can be seen from this how flexible Rescher’s conceptions are. He begins with mathematical logic and then transcends it, taking it further. In fact we do not need generally the accuracy of mathematical logic in ordinary language.

Let me cite an example of a pattern of dispute:

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<td>(1) !P</td>
<td>~P/Q &amp; †Q</td>
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<td>(2) !~Q</td>
<td>Q/R &amp; †R</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) !~R</td>
<td>R/S &amp; †S</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) ~R/(S &amp; T) &amp; !R(S &amp; T)</td>
<td>Q/U &amp; †U</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) ~Q/(U &amp; V) &amp; !R(U &amp; V)</td>
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10 Cf. Ibid., p. 6.
11 Cf. Ibid., p. 11.
12 Ibid., p. 7.
13 Cf. Ibid., p. 17.
In step (1) the opponent asserts \( \sim P \lor Q \) in response to \( \neg P \) of the proponent. In step (2) the proponent in turn attacks \( \neg Q \) of the opponent by saying \( \neg \sim Q \). The pattern is the same in steps (2) and (3). In step (4) the proponent, admitting \( R \lor S, \) asserts \( \sim R/(S \land T) \lor !(S \land T) \). On the other hand, the opponent picks up \( Q \) again and asserts \( Q \lor U \land \neg U \). Note that the opponent has admitted the whole of the proponent's assertion \( \sim R/(S \land T) \lor !(S \land T) \) in step (4).

Many other patterns of dispute are shown and explained. When a dispute has stopped at a certain stage, a determiner judges between the opponent and the proponent according to certain criteria. This is quite similar to games of sports. As the strategy for dispute, the proponent has to cover his commitments in a maximally plausible way; the opponent tries to force him into more difficult commitments by introducing cleverly contrived assertions. Both of them give attention mainly to the defense of their assertions and to the refutation of their adversaries. Note the similarity to the so-called theory or strategy of games.

Rescher, adopting some dialectical tools, specifically 'burden of proof,' 'presumption' and 'plausibility,' describes the forms of dispute vividly, especially as they appear in a court of laws in chapter two. In chapter three he refers to the process of the scientific discovery and asserts the 'isomorphism' between it and dispute. I quite agree that there is essential identity between the process of dispute or dialogue (the aim of which is to persuade of others) and the thinking process of an individual, the aim of which is to persuade oneself. As will be mentioned about Plato in the next chapter, the thinking process can be considered a dialogue with oneself. In addition Rescher joins in the dispute over the philosophy of science in modern times; he criticizes both Carnap's concept of 'confirmation' and Popper's concept of 'falsifiability.' According to Rescher, they are both one-sided because they neglect the fact that scientific discovery is a sociocommunal performance, a process of human interaction. This criticism is very persuasive as well as sharp. In fact, in this dispute Carnap plays the role of the proponent and Popper the role of the opponent. Rescher's criticism is a good example of the synthesis of opposites found in the Hegelian dialectic.

Thus Rescher considers dialectic as the logic of dispute or dialogue and asserts that the formation of conviction and consensus is a communal activity. This contention is very instructive. But for dialogue as a basis of democracy, Rescher's view has some defects:

(1) For Rescher, dialectic is one-sided, nothing more than the logic of dialogue. He does not admit that nature and society move dialectically in an objective sense, and he attacks Marxism thoroughly. His understanding of dialectic is subjectivistic. He does not interpret the rationality of the dialectic of Hegel, Marx and others rightly. The process of dialectic is, according to him, "a probative cost-benefit analysis that weighs the pros and cons of adopting a thesis in the face of its alternatives," and he does not demonstrate how to recognize (reflect) an object deeply or accurately. Rescher adopts the principle of 'methodological pragmatism,' and for him, as it was for Peirce, the question is how to consolidate belief subjectively, even in an intersubjective form. But, here, we need two elements: the formation of democratic consensus and the objective, scientific recognition (reflection) of real things, and, as was mentioned in chapter one, without the latter democracy becomes meaningless.

(2) Rescher does not connect dialogue or dispute consciously with the formation of democratic society and personality. After all, his model of dialogue is debate; defense and

\[ ^{18} \text{Ibid., p. } 51. \]
attack is all that he analyzes, and the question is the strategy for these two things. Debate is very meaningful, but we cannot discuss completely dialogue as a basis of democracy with debate only. First of all the roles of a proponent and an opponent are sometimes exchanged, and a determiner does not exist independently. According to Rescher, the process of dispute consists in the complication of conditions which provides the ground for a proposed thesis 'P.' (In 'P/Q' the ground or warrant is 'Q.') As Hidekichi Nakamura pointed out, the thesis 'P' itself never changes; this fact derives from the polemical essence of debate. On the other hand, in democratic dialogue, which includes debate as one facet, people develop and correct their opinions mutually and pursue consensus on a higher level.

(3) Rescher has wide knowledge of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, of Scholastic logic and of modern formal logic and dialectic, but he has no viewpoint through which he can discover the historical development of the forms of logic. Furthermore, failing to refer to the real, material base supporting the birth and development of logics and therefore lacking any historical conception, he never understands how logic as a method of thinking has developed and deepened historically and how logic has come to affect the development of democratic thinking.

Rescher does understand the 'isomorphism' of discussion (persuading others) and thought (persuading oneself). And if it is a prerequisite for the formation of democratic personality to connect criticism of others with self-criticism and introspection, then I must now turn criticism upon myself, which directed at Rescher. I must describe the historical development of the logic of dialogue. I will do this in the next two chapters, and then attempt to grasp the essence of dialogue as cooperative discussion in the last chapter.

III. Dialogue from the Standpoint of the History of Logic—(1)

Let us consider the history of dialectic in the sense of dialogue. (In this case, we may also take dialectic as 'the logic of contradiction' into account.) 'Dialogue' comes from the Greek 'διάλογος' which is etymologically derived from 'διά' (assunder, in different directions) + 'λόγος' (statement, speech, reasoning). The meaning of this word is that the partners in a dialogue analyze the content of speech mutually and inquire into truth cooperatively. This word is also closely related with 'διαλεκτική'.

The genesis of science and technology and the enlargement of the circulation of commodities and money are often pointed out as the background of the origin of philosophical thought in the Ionian district. The Greeks as a marine and commercial nation had an open, rational attitude toward life, and this fact perhaps promoted the development of philosophical thought. The Ionian philosophy of nature is dialectical in general and includes the logic of contradiction; its representative philosopher is Heraclitus, who said: "Into the same river we step and don't step," and "All that exist within us are always the same (?): the living and the dead, the waking and the sleeping, the young and the old." He asserted

18 Ibid., No. 88.
a dynamic unity and a struggle of opposites and a dialectic of the transformation of a thing into its opposite, but he did not call these phenomena ‘dialectic.’

It is well known that 'διάλεκτική' was used to mean dialogue since the time philosophy began to flourish in Athens. Though only the freemen participated in democratic politics, it is interesting that in political activity, which depended heavily on the art of rhetoric, they used the word ‘dialectic’ first as meaning dialogue. Socrates was mainly interested in ethical problems (justice, goodness, courage, reverence for God, etc.), and by asking others, for example, what justice was, he pursued its essence (definition or concept) cooperatively. Therefore, if dialogue is considered the pursuit of truth by cooperative discussion, its original form has already appeared here. To adopt the dialogical style means that one considers one’s adversaries to be equal to oneself, considers them able to think reasonably and take responsibility equally. In this sense dialogue is one of the bases of democracy. 'διάλεκτική' of Socrates contains a negative side called ‘Socrates’ irony’ and a positive side called ‘meieutics.’ In the first step (the negative side) Socrates criticizes and destroys the opponent’s fixed thought and prejudice, so as to make him realize his own ignorance; this can be considered to be a kind of critique of ideology. In the second step (the positive side) Socrates, appealing to the depths of the opponent’s consciousness, demonstrates the immanent essence of a human being as a sociocommunal existence, after which it is possible to arrive at a consensus of opinion.

The philosophy of nature is not an object of Socrates’ 'διάλεκτική.' In the area of ethical problems, indeed, it appears that the partners arrive at a consensus by comparing their opinions with each other, but in attempting to reach conclusions in the area of natural phenomena, we need in addition to analyze the objects themselves by observation, experiment, etc. As I mentioned above, truth does not only consist in intersubjectivity, but also in the accurate reflection of objects.

Plato, in the Phaedrus, takes ‘διάλεκτική’ as a method for division ('διάίρεσις') and synthesis ('ανωγωγία') of an idea ('ideal'). In the Sophist and the Theaetetus, he says that thinking is the dialogue of a soul with itself. In contrast with inter-personal communication, the process of thinking is intra-personal communication, where the same person is both a sender and a receiver; only when communication with others gets internalized into the thought of an individual, one can think independently, as we observe in the development of children’s language. If this is so, independent thinking requires that one consciously communicates with others. Here we can find some dialectical laws: internalization of the outer, externalization of the inner and then the unity of both. Still, though Plato thinks of the dialectic in the Hegelian meaning of the logic of contradiction, he does not call it ‘διάλεκτική.' He does understand that every category contains in itself an opposed category and that the former cannot be thought without the latter and enlarges, particularly in the Parmenides, on the relationship between existence and non-existence, the one and the many, motion and rest, birth and death, etc. In fact, as I have shown in the first chapter, dialogue is an example of dialectic (the logic of contradiction), because it posits a dynamic unity of opposites.

But Plato’s ‘διάλεκτική,’ which seeks after ‘ideal,’ has an important defect from the standpoint of formal logic. For example, when in dialogue one is asked if a human being is a living thing or not, one can perhaps give a correct answer. But this is not enough; one must give a warrant for the answer—for example, because a human being breathes. The result is a syllogism which has three terms: a human being—breathing—a living thing. The central
object of Socrates was concept or the definition of concept. Plato's central object was judgement, from which concept is formed; judgement is the Ur-teil of a concept into a subject and a predicate, as Hegel pointed out. Aristotle's main theme is syllogism. His idea that the answer must be given as the conclusion of a syllogism provides the ground for his syllogistic, in which one draws a conclusion through the medium (middle term), as may be seen especially in book two of the Analytica Posteriora. True dialogue requires objective necessity, from which the answer is drawn; intersubjectivity alone is insufficient to find the answer. For example, discrimination against slaves and barbarians was a historical ideology wide spread among the Greek people at that time. We must ask again and again if commonly held ideas are really true and valid or not. Smug satisfaction with a majority opinion does not make for an independent, democratic individual.

By the time we get to Aristotle, we find that the form of dialogue alone is not sufficient to grasp scientific truth and to describe it. Let me make two points in respect to this:

(1) As truth is the reflection of an object, we cannot arrive at it only communal thinking. Dialogue cannot replace the fact that a man really experiences, observes and verifies an object. Even agreement or consensus that is a result of truthful dialogue is not always true, as is often the case in social ideology. Therefore only dialogue cannot discover and grasp the truth.

(2) To grasp a real thing with its complicated structure, it is necessary to develop its content from the level of essence to the level of appearance, namely, to describe it by a method which ascends from the abstract level to the concrete. Marx demonstrates this very well in Das Kapital. It is necessary to form various concepts and to describe an object systematically, and this is perhaps impossible in a dialogical form.

Of course this does not mean that dialogue (διάλεκτική) is useless for the grasp of truth and for decision-making. In Aristotle's philosophy διάλεκτική is put into a proper perspective. Διάλεκτική is no longer simply the way of dialogue, but a form of syllogism (dialectical syllogism) which is distinguished from the regular syllogism (ἀπόδειξις) starting from true premises. Preserving an interrogative element, as a whole, dialectical syllogism examines by trial and error some answers given provisionally before proposing regular scientific proof (ἀπόδειξις).

It is well known that such philosophical categories as substance, essence, cause, movement, possibility, actuality, form and matter, which are found in the Metaphysics and the Physics, are called by Hegel 'dialectical.' But Aristotle himself did not call them 'dialectical.'

There is also a Stoic formulation of διάλεκτική, originated by Zenon and Chrysippus. They divided logic into two branches, ρητορική (rhetoric) and διάλεκτική (dialectic); the former has to do with talking well or persuasively, and the latter with talking correctly. The concrete content of the latter is similar to that of propositional logic as a branch of mathematical logic. In recent years the superiority of Stoic formal logic has been proposed by Scholz, Lucasiewicz, et al. This formal logic has some relation to dialogue or discussion. But the Stoic period came after the complete destruction of the Greek communities (πόλεις), and Greek democracy no longer provided a material basis for philosophy. Socrates' διάλεκτική (cooperative discussion) was possible only in the kind of community that existed in his day.

The Stoic school asserts that only an individual is a true, real thing, and they are interested in the particular, in themes such as: 'How can the proposition “P” be refuted?’ There was social split which made it impossible to attain a sociocommunal decision-making.

IV. Dialogue from the Standpoint of the History of Logic—(2)

In the Middle Ages formal logic was often called dialectica. It is, however, only with the appearance of the logic of Port-Royal, and of Hegel in modern ages that use of the term ‘logic’ becomes decisive. In the Middle Ages formal logic was generally conceived of as the art of dispute, and in this sense the term ‘dialectica’ is suitable. On the other hand, dialectic in Hegel’s sense (the logic of contradiction and the theory of categories) was preserved in speculative metaphysics, which succeeded to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. Medieval logic was the art of regular dispute with detailed rules and forms, and it was used in the universities and law courts. Rescher’s logic of dialogue was quite similar to this medieval logic.

In Scholastic discussion, first of all, the thesis is proposed in the form of syllogism or enthymeme. The proponent and the opponent discuss with each other according to a certain process and finally the referee judges. It is the theory of obligatio explained, for example, by William of Ockham in his Summa totius logicae, that is noteworthy in medieval logic. Obligatio is the power of logical obligation and refers to the rules observed in dispute. Once the proposition is offered, the power of logical obligation must be preserved until the persons concerned declare a lapse of obligatio or they begin to discuss another theme. For example, when we take up the alternative proposition ‘PVQ,’ the whole alternative proposition must be admitted if either ‘P’ or ‘Q’ is admitted.

In the Middle Ages various forms and rules of logic were constructed, which were then observed as the rules of dispute. The object of medieval logicians was neither empirical nature as it was for Ionian philosophy, nor ethical problems grounded in the Greek communities as it was for Socrates; their object was metaphysical and religious, and it was veiled with theological ideology. Since the object was so non-empirical as God, empirical verification was useless. The problem was how to construct their logic with powerful proof and how to refute their opponents’ opinions. (They were also interested in applying this logic to the interpretation of religious literature.) It is well known that medieval logic was bitterly accused of being empty formalism by Bacon and Descartes. Though they moved in different directions, they both tried to construct a logic of method for the discovery of truth. Their efforts coincided with the development of industry and science and the opening of a new epoch. They had to reject Scholastic logic, which aimed at argument as argument. But medieval logic was an advancement over Greek διάλεξις in its detailed analysis of the formal side of dispute.

Some logical literature appeared in the Renaissance during which a new view of the world was being constructed; its representatives are Giordano Bruno, Nicolaus Cusanus and Galileo Galilei. In the Renaissance the structure of dialogue was not discussed, but

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21 Cf. Scholz, op. cit., p. 7f.
works in the form of dialogue often appeared. At that time, there was a strong need for productive capacity and for science and technology; specialists and scientists tried to acquire scientific knowledge and a new view of the world through cooperative dialogue. Various democratic rights and civil liberties were acquired after the Renaissance, the civil revolution and the industrial revolution. Naturally, democracy contains within itself freedom of thought and of political activity. There is no doubt that such revolutionary slogans as freedom, equality and fraternity extended the boundaries of free dialogue, because a free atmosphere, a feeling of equality and human solidarity enliven the process of dialogue. Democratic discussion in modern times is freer and more diverse than medieval formal dispute.

It was Kant in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* who connected the two forms of dialectic with each other: the method of dialogue and the logic of contradiction. The schema of opposition between thesis and antithesis shown by Kant is a remnant of the controversial form in medieval logic. (In the time of Kant this form was still used in university examinations.) Though he does not assert that the essence of an object contains contradiction, Kant points out that human reason necessarily falls into contradiction and confusion if a man thinks of such metaphysical problems as God and human freedom. According to Kant, there is no essential difference between the antinomy which results from dispute and the antinomy which results from the thinking of a human individual. The theory of antinomy thus approaches Hegel's dialectic. The historical background of Kant's thought is a period of transition, which was developing dynamically with contradiction, opposition and collision. In Germany at that time strenuous efforts were being made to reconcile the contradictions between modernism and medievalism, between capitalism and feudalism and between science and religion.

It is well known that Hegel distinctly asserts the dialectical movement of nature, society, human beings and the thinking process; according to him they all have the structure of the dynamic unity of opposites. Thus he systematized dialectical logic. From a historical standpoint we can point out the development of human societies toward modern civil society made possible by labor and production; we find also the phenomena of self-alienation and reversion in human society, the phenomena of contradictions and splits among social classes. Hegel, who perceives the dialectical movement in the essence of all phenomena, in the *Geschichte der Philosophie* also considers Socrates' *διάλεκτική* dialectically. But he did not intend to revive *διάλεκτική* (dialogue) as a core concept in his own philosophy. On the contrary, Hegel criticized and restricted democracy; in the end, he constructed a 'rational theology' so as to support religion, as Feuerbach and the young Marx criticized. Maybe this comes to the neglect of democratic dialogue. Hegel's philosophy does not get rid of the closed system of *absoluter Geist*; on the other hand, dialogue or discussion always offers the possibility that a man's opinions will be refuted by others who urged him to change his opinion.

It is Feuerbach, the anthropological materialist, who stresses the importance of dialogue in modern times. He says: "True dialectic is not a monologue of an isolated thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between me and you." It is notable that he adopted the idea of dialectic as dialogue by criticizing Hegel, the isolated thinker. According to Feuerbach, the essence of a human being consists in the community (Gemeinschaft) of real individuals, who

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have their own bodies, senses and desires; in reality they are distinguished from each other and cannot be thought of simply as a collective, spiritual being. Therefore demonstration is nothing but communicating one's own thought to others through language; only between you and me does true thought exist. It is not impossible to find democratic consciousness in this idea of Feuerbach. He suggests that materialism, democracy and dialectic as dialogue are connected with each other; we must follow Feuerbach's lead in the further development of these ideas. On the other hand, he stressed materialism so strongly that he neglected the rational core of Hegelian dialectic. The unity between dialectic as the logic of contradiction and dialectic as dialogue—this is a further problem handed down to us.

V. The Essence and Structure of Dialogue

Though every day we communicate with each other, we do not always discuss a problem. Our acts are usually accompanied by communication, as the theory of kommunikatives Handeln of Habermas shows. In ordinary life we chatter to divert ourselves or greet each other, and linguistic communication and gesture appear as one. At this level, we often argue (spontaneous controversy) and discuss consciously what is true and what is good. But in addition, we also often discuss matters, with a specific and well defined purpose in mind (in conferences, seminars or debates in universities, in discussion at academic meetings, in disputes in law courts or in governmental councils). In the first chapter, two forms of dialogue were shown; in this chapter I will analyze democratic discussion solely, in which people consent willingly.

It is well-known fact that Engels divided dialectic into 'objective dialectic' and 'subjective dialectic' and that the latter reflects the former. He says in his Dialektik der Natur:

Dialectic, that which is called objective dialectic, applies to the whole of nature; what is called subjective dialectic or dialectical thought is a reflex movement in oppositions, which exists in all parts of nature and which determines the activity of nature by continual struggle and in the end by mutual transformation or transformation to higher forms.24

According to the idea of 'objective dialectic,' nature and society around us as well as we ourselves move essentially in accordance with dialectical objective laws. 'Subjective dialectic' is the process of thinking and recognition which reflects these objects, and it is divided into two levels: (1) the spontaneous dialectical process of thinking, and (2) the dialectical process of thinking based on the dialectical theory of knowledge. By grasping dialectical laws, we can move from (1) to (2); the dialectical theory of knowledge was based by Marx, Engels and Lenin on a materialistic view. The autonomous thinking process of a human individual consists in internalizing linguistic communication with other people, as I have mentioned above. In constructing historical materialism, Marx asserted that language and consciousness are derived from the social process of labor (Zusammenwirken). In his Deutsche Ideologie, he says: “Language is as old as consciousness—language is a practical consciousness, which exists for other people and, only for that reason, exists to me also, and language

24 NEW, Bd.20, Diez-Verlag, p. 481.
derives, like consciousness, only from the necessity and the demand for communication with others."25

Just as language and consciousness are social products, thought is also a social product. We can thus interpret 'subjective dialectic' by Engels not only as the thinking process of a human individual, but also as a collective, social thinking process, namely, as a process in which people discuss with each other and then solve a problem. The subjective thinking process of a human individual can be developed only on condition that he takes a part in a democratic, communal thinking process.

What kind of dialogue is then meaningful? How can we grasp the essence and structure of dialogue?

Of course, dialogue as cooperative discussion is not chatter without purpose and direction. After all, the objective character of the theme discussed determines the situation and direction of dialogue, because 'subjective dialectic' reflects 'objective dialectic.' As a theme reflects a given real object, its structure determines finally the development of discussion as well as the situation of participants in dialogue. The essence and the stratified structure of an object appears gradually in the advancing process of dialogue. Here it is necessary to exclude arbitrary elements, such as "selfishness, excessive self-assertion, cutting off communication when one finds oneself at disadvantage, escaping difficulties with jokes or denial,"26 which Hegel pointed out. I should mention here the 'double structure of communication in ordinary language' of Habermas which consists of: (1) the level of intersubjectivity, in which a speaker and a listener communicate with each other; (2) the level of an object, about which they understand; here 'object' is interpreted as thing, occurrence, situation, person, speech or situation of a person.27

Habermas identifies the Maxist theory of reflection with the correspondence theory of truth, which is in reality the primitive theory of reflection put forth by Aristotle, Tarski et al.28 But I do not agree with him on this point. (How can one prove the objectivity of truth without the theory of reflection?) The second level mentioned above is the process, in which participants in dialogue grasp objectively the essence and structure of an object and in which then they propose a practical policy based on this recognition.29 The essence of an object is considered to be a dynamic unity of opposites (contradiction). When each of two participants takes one opposing side upon oneself respectively, dispute becomes the most meaningful. In fact, dispute in which opposite arguments do not appear is not interesting, nor is it interesting when the dispute remains at the level of individual feeling. Only when the opposition of opinion and mutual critique reflect the contradictory essence of an object does dialogue become meaningful.

For example, let us think of the question: 'Are women equal to men?' If one proposes the assertion that women are not essentially equal to men, other people may accuse him at once of being feudalistic. As Marx pointed out, men and women are two branches from one genus (Gattung) and are considered to be a unity of opposites.30 Therefore this ques-

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28 Cf. ibid., p. 123.
29 There is a distinction between recognition of facts or laws and proposing policies or plans. Indeed Sollen is distinguished from Sein, but we must pay attention to the close relation between them.
30 Cf. MEW, Bd. 1, p. 293.
tion is suitable for dialogue. Though men and women have the same rights, they never can be qualitatively the same. By definition, women and men are opposite sexes. Here is objective ground for the assertion that women are not equal to men. Recently it appears that sexual difference has become more obscure, and so the opinion which stresses the difference looks more persuasive. Other derivative questions may appear here such as: 'Is womanhood (or manhood) necessary?'

The essence and the stratified structure of a real object selected as a question thus determine finally the situation of the dialogue and the direction of its development. Although Habermas pointed out the 'double structure of communication in ordinary language', he could not develop it because he did not understand the dialectical theory of reflection. Indeed Rescher understood the 'isomorphism' between the process of dispute and the thinking process of a human individual, but he could not explain why it was so, also for lack of the dialectical theory of reflection. When he thinks deeply, a man often falls into the situation of antinomy, because the object itself has a contradictory structure. Dispute between two persons and the thinking process of a human individual are essentially the same. And we approve of the idea of respect for the minority, not only because it will possibly become the majority in the future, but also because its opinion grasps reality more objectively. Without this objectivism, democracy is meaningless, merely ideological. It is in danger of falling into ochlocracy, narrow collective egoism and despotic fascism.

We can also pay attention especially to the relation between participants in dialogue (intersubjectivity). First of all, it is important that the participants be truly equal and that the condition is met that they can talk freely (moreover with responsibility). It is also important that their speech is not used against them subsequently.

The purpose of dialogue is to assert the rationality of opinion on both sides, and at the same time to try to understand and accept the rationality of other opinions. In dialogue, there is a dynamic, mutually penetrating unity of the information exchanged. The result of discussion, if it succeeds, is a dialectical synthesis of opposite opinions on a higher level. This synthesis derives from objective recognition of an object and depends on the depth of understanding of the personalities of the participants. Only such a dialectical grasp of dialogue truly succeeds to the dialogical tradition which has existed in the history of philosophy since Socrates.