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Brand Royalty and Generic Competition

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Brand Loyalty and Generic Competition

Yunyun Wan*

Abstract

Facing generic competition, a brand-name drug company sometimes launches its own generic called an “authorized generic” (AG) through a third-party entity. If an authorized party transfers a substantial part of its profits to the brand-name drug company, the latter’s total profit increases as a result and every branded drug that comes off the patent should have its AG version. However, in actual fact only a small proportion of branded drugs have AGs. To explain this puzzle, I develop a model that features switching costs due to the customer base a brand-name drug develops prior to generic entry. The model predicts that AGs are launched when switching costs to the generics are sufficiently low. I test this hypothesis using prescription drug data and find strong support for it.

Keywords: brand loyalty, authorized generics, generic entry, customer base, switching cost

JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L20, I11

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1 Introduction

When facing generic competition, brand-name drug companies sometimes launch their own generic drugs. Such generics, to be distinguished from ordinary generics, are called “authorized generics” (AGs). Authorized generics contain exactly the same ingredients as the brand-name drugs and even come off the same production lines. However, they are sold by third-party entities in the generic category and hence they directly compete with the brand-name drugs like any other generics. This gives rise to the puzzle: why brand-name drug companies use such a strategy? One popular answer is product differentiation. But product differentiation is a preemptive strategy to deter entry (e.g. Schmalensee (1978)), whereas AGs are launched almost simultaneously with generic entry. The entry deterrence hypothesis does not seem apt.

Another possible explanation is in terms of divisionalization due to Baye et al. (1996), who show that in Cournot oligopoly a firm can always increase total profit by splitting itself into two autonomous entities. Thus, a launch of an authorized drug makes business sense if the authorized generic distributor acts as an autonomous entity but agrees to transfer a large part of its profit to the brand-name drug manufacturer. But if such a “divisionalization” strategy is profitable, we should observe brand-name drug companies launching AGs without fail whenever they face generic competition. In actual fact, however, only a small number of off-patent brand-name drugs have ever had AGs.\(^1\) This fact gives rise to the second puzzle: if divisionalization is profitable, why don’t brand-name drug companies launch authorized generics against every generic entry?

In this paper I intend to explain these puzzles. In doing so, I maintain the assumption that consumers are well aware that generics are bioequivalent to (i.e., just as effective and safe as) the branded drug. However, the same drug never treats every patient equally well because the same illness affects individuals differently and make them react differently to

\(^1\)This is according to the AG list prepared by FDA (U. S. Food and Drug Administration). http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm126391.htm
the same drug. In such cases patients learn the efficacy of a drug through personal uses and experiences; that is, as they keep using the drug, they continuously Baysian-update their beliefs in the efficacy of the drug. Thus, although all drugs, the brand-name and generics, are equally efficacious on average, personal experiences determine the actual efficacy of the drug for each patient. In such cases, the brand-name drug is distinguishable from generics in that patients have used the former long before the generics are introduced. That is, the brand-name drug enjoys a customer base at the time of generic entry.

In this paper, I place the customer base at center stage of my analysis and analyze its implications using the notion of switching costs popularized by a series of papers by Klemperer (Klemperer, 1987). More specifically, I first build an analytical model, which predicts that the brand-name drug company launches an authorized generic when consumers have sufficiently low switching costs to the generic. I then develop an econometric model to test this hypothesis and find strong empirical support for it.

My analytical model has two periods and two firms; the brand-name drug company and the generic drug company. In the first period the brand-name drug company markets its patented drug as a monopoly. In the second period, patent expiration allows the generic drug producer to enter the market and engage in Cournot competition with the incumbent. The Cournot assumption simplifies the analysis by eschewing mixed-strategy equilibria. As explicated above, customers who bought the brand-name drug in the first period have developed affinities towards it, thereby forming the customer base for the incumbent. I assume that the brand-name company can influence the size of its customer base but cannot affect the switching cost per se, which comes to patients through experiences. In other words, I treat the switching cost as a key parameter of this model.

I next extend the model to allow the brand-name company to launch an authorized generic in period 2. As is the case, it is assumed that the authorized drug is marketed by a third party, which competes as an autonomous entity. Consumers regard all three drugs (brand-name, generic and authorized generic) as homogeneous. However, consumers constituting
the customer base incur the switching cost when switch to either kind of generics. Finally, I assume that there are more than one firm which want to market the authorized generic so that the brand-name drug manufacturer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to capture all the profit from AG sales.

A comparison of the two versions of the model yields the key result that answers the puzzle with which this paper began: a brand-name drug manufacturer is more likely to launch an authorized generic, the smaller the switching cost from its brand-name drug to the generics. This result has the following intuitive explanation. In the standard Cournot game, a launch of an AG has only the divisionalization effect, which is profitable to the brand-name drug company, as shown by Baye et al. (1996). However, in the presence of the customer base, a launch of an AG lowers the generic prices and lures consumers from the customer base to the generics. I call this potential erosion to the customer base the cannibalization effect. In short, then, a decision whether to launch an AG hinges on the balance between the divisionalization effect which is beneficial to the brand-name drug, and the cannibalization effect, which is harmful to the firm.

When the switching cost is sufficiently high, consumers do not switch so easily, so the incumbent can build a larger customer base to better position itself against generic entry. With a large customer base, however, a price decrease due to a launch of an AG results in a large revenue loss; that is, there is a large cannibalization effect. Therefore, the brand-name drug company prefers to defend the customer base instead of launching an AG to attract new customers. Even if the switching cost is somewhat smaller so that some consumer base erosion is inevitable, the brand-name drug company may still refrain from launching an AG to avoid further customer base erosion. In contrast, if the switching cost is sufficiently small, the incumbent is unable to defend the customer base that is erodible and subject to defection. However, the small switching cost also implies a significantly weak cannibalization effect relative to the divisionalization effect, so the brand-name drug company launches an AG. Thus, my model answers the puzzle with which began this paper: an AG is more likely to
be launched when the switching cost from the brand-name drug to the generics is sufficiently low.

In the second half of this paper I empirically test the above hypothesis using the data collected from the FDA website. In doing so it is of utmost importance to specify what constitutes the switching costs in the present context. To that end, note that most drugs do not miraculously cure fatal illnesses. Rather, they reduce probabilities of death by relieving symptoms such as pain or anxiety or by altering clinical measurements - reducing cholesterol or blood pressure, for example. The point is that the true efficacy of drugs is difficult to ascertain even for scientists.\(^2\) In a word, drugs are, to a certain extent, credence goods. As such, consumers tend to rely on personal experiences to gain confidence in the drugs they take. Such confidence - or aversion to alternative drugs - grows if they use the same drugs repeatedly. In this respect, brand-name drug manufacturers have the first-mover advantage over generic entrants because consumers have been using the brand-name drugs before the generics enter. This confidence in the brand-name drugs consumers have developed serves as the switching cost, i.e., the benefit a consumer must give up when switching to the generics. When generics become available, the longer a brand-name drug have marketed, the more confidence in its efficacy the consumers have gained through repeated uses, which means the higher switching cost they would like to pay to switch to a generic. Therefore, the length of time that a brand-name drug has been marketed before generics can be used as a proxy for the consumers’ switching cost.

I now relate my work to the literature. There is a literature that examines the effects of AGs on non-authorized generic entry. For example, FTC’s 2009 report shows that launch of an AG lowers generic prices and revenues, and it goes on to speculate that threats of AGs may even prompt a collusive agreement between the generic and the brand-name drug manufacturer, delivering a double whammy to consumers in the form of deferment of generic

\(^2\)According to FDA’s special report, From Test Tube to Patient : Improving Health Through Human Drugs.
entry and non-marketing of AGs.\textsuperscript{3} Reiffen and Ward (2005) finds a similar result; launch of an AG reduces the number of potential generic entrants in the future. In contrast, however, Berndt et al. (2007) show that despite reduced expected gains due to launch of an AG, there remain sufficient incentives for generic entry. Studying German data, Appelt (2010) even goes further to claim that introduction of AGs has no effect on the number of generic entrants, and concludes that entry deterrence is not a rationale for launching of AGs. Chen (2007) examines the legal issues arising from AGs, and calls for a legislative reform of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

In contrast to all these papers focusing on the effects of AGs on generic entry, the literature examining the incentives to launch AGs is rather scanty. My paper is an attempt to fill this lacuna in the literature. Further, my analysis can shed light on some recent empirical findings. For example, Appelt (2010) empirically identifies earning generic profits as the primary motive for launch of AGs. This can be interpreted as the divisionalization effect. My analysis may also be useful in explaining the empirical finding of Berndt et al. (2007) that the brand name drugs with higher pre-generic revenues are more likely to have AGs. I can show using my model that, for a given switching cost, the incumbent is more likely to launch an AG if the market is larger. The intuition is that an increase in demand (intercept) expands the divisionalization effect relative to the cannibalization effect; that is, it raises the combined profit from the brand-name drug and the AG by a greater magnitude than the profit from brand-name drug sale alone. Thus, if the pre-generic revenues are interpreted as a proxy of the market size, my model provides an explanation for the empirical result of Berndt et al. (2007).

The remainder of this paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 2 presents a two-period model of Cournot oligopoly, in which launch of an AG is ruled out. Section 3 extends the above model to allow for launch of an AG through a third party. Section 4 I compares the two models and shows that launch of an AG is profitable to the incumbent only when

the switching cost is sufficiently small. Section 5 presents an empirical model to test the hypothesis and discuss my empirical findings. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Competition Without Authorized Generics

This section presents the basic two-period model, where launching an AG is not an option. The model has the following structure. In period 1 the incumbent is a monopoly that produces the patented brand-name drug. The patent expires at the end of period 1, allowing for generic entry. I assume that in period 2 the incumbent and the entrant engage in Cournot competition. On the demand side there is a fixed measure of consumers who live two periods. They buy at most a unit of the branded drug in period 1. Consumers’ demands vary, giving rise to a negatively-sloping demand curve, which I assume is linear and is written \( p = m - Q \), where \( m \) is demand intercept and \( Q \) is quantity demanded. Let \( B \) denote the number of customers who actually bought the brand name drug in period 1. These consumers like the branded rug and are willing to pay the premium \( s > 0 \) over the generic. I assume \( s \) to be exogenous and let it serve as a measure of the switching cost.

In period 2, the two firms play a Cournot game and consumers buy at most one unit of either the brand name dug or the generic. I assume that consumers regard the two drugs as homogeneous. Thus, I can write the demand function facing the generic firm as \( p = m - g - b \), where \( g \) and \( b \) denote the quantities of output set by the brand name company and the generic company, respectively. As for the incumbent, thanks to the premium-paying customer base \( B \), it faces the two-part demand:

\[
p_2(b) = \begin{cases} 
m + s - b - g & \text{if } b \leq B \\
m - b - g & \text{if } b > B 
\end{cases}
\]

which is discontinuous at output \( b = B \). This shows that, if the incumbent serves its customer base only, it can keep the price above the generic price due to the switching cost \( (s) \), but if
wants to attract new customers, then it has to lower the price to match the generic price. To keep things simple, I further assume identical unit costs of production across firms and set it equal to zero, which is without loss of generality under linear demands. With these assumptions, the generic firm’s profit is written \( \pi_g = (m - b - g)g \). As for the incumbent, the demand function derived above implies the following profit function, depending on the value of \( B \); Therefore, the incumbent’s profit is also discontinuous at \( b = B \) and given by

\[
\pi_b = \begin{cases} 
(m + s - b - g)b & \text{if } b < B \\
(m + s - B - g)B & \text{if } b = B \\
(m - b - g)b & \text{if } b > B
\end{cases}
\]

Note that the profit function is discontinuous at \( b = B \). In Figure 1 the curve to the left of point \( B \) displays the profit from the customer base only

\[
\pi(b, s, g) = (m + s - b - g)b,
\]

while the one to the right of \( B \) corresponds to the profit

\[
\pi(b, g) = (m - b - g)b.
\]

Now I solve the model for subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Beginning with the second period competition, maximizing the generic firm’s profit above yields the familiar best-response function \( g(b) = (m - b)/2 \). To obtain the incumbent’s best-response function, define the key quantities: \( \hat{b}(g) = \text{arg max } (m + s - b - g)b \) and \( b(g) = \text{arg max } (m - b - g)b \), and write the corresponding maximum profits as \( \hat{\pi}(\hat{b}, s, g) \) and \( \pi(b, g) \). Define next the quantity \( \hat{b}(g) \) implicitly by

\[
\pi(\hat{b}, s, g) = (m + s - \hat{b} - g) = \hat{\pi}(\hat{b}, g).
\]
It is obvious that for given $g$

$$\hat{b}(g) < b(g) < \bar{b}(g).$$

In the linear case we have,

$$\bar{b}(g) = (m + s - g)/2$$
$$\underline{b}(g) = (m - g)/2$$
$$\hat{b}(g) = (m + s - g - \sqrt{s(2m + s - 2g)})/2$$

Now, as $g$ increases, the profit functions $\pi(b, s)$ and $\pi(b)$ shift down, giving rise to the following three cases, depending on the location of point $B$.

**Case 1:** $g$ is relatively small such that $B \leq \hat{b}(g)$. Then $\hat{b}(g)$ is the incumbent’s best response to $g$.

**Case 2:** $g$ takes on an intermediate value so that $\hat{b}(g) < B < \bar{b}(g)$ . Then the incumbent’s best response is $B$.

**Case 3:** $g$ is large so that $\bar{b}(g) \geq B$. In this case its best response is $\bar{b}(g)$.

These three cases are displayed in Figures 1 - 3.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1:** $g$ is relatively small so that $B \leq \hat{b}(g)$
Figure 2: $g$ is intermediate so that \( \hat{b}(g) < B < \bar{b}(g) \)

Figure 3: $g$ is large so that \( \bar{b}(g) \leq B \)

Accordingly, the incumbent’s best-respond function has three segments

\[
b(g) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{(m - g)}{2} & \text{if } g \leq m - 2B - 2\sqrt{sB}, \\
B & \text{if } g \in (m - 2B - 2\sqrt{sB}, m - 2B + s), \\
\frac{(m + s - g)}{2} & \text{if } g \geq m - 2B + s.
\end{cases}
\]

Figure 4 depicts the incumbent’s best-response function. Note that it is discontinuous at \( g = m - 2B - 2\sqrt{sB} \). Accordingly, we can write the incumbent’s equilibrium second-period
profit as

\[
\pi_b = \begin{cases} 
    \frac{m^2}{9} & \text{if } B \in (0, \hat{B}_2] \\
    \frac{(m - B + 2s)B}{2} & \text{if } B \in (\hat{B}_1, (m + 2s)/3) \\
    \frac{(m + 2s)^2}{9} & \text{if } B \in [(m + 2s)/3, \infty) 
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \hat{B}_1 = \frac{3m + 8s - 4\sqrt{4s^2 + 3ms}}{9} \) and \( \hat{B}_2 = \frac{2m + 3s - \sqrt{9s^2 + 12ms}}{6} \). Since \( \hat{B}_1 < \hat{B}_2 \), if \( B \in [\hat{B}_1, \hat{B}_2] \), there are two equilibria, one on the vertical segment of the best response function, the other on the lower segment of it. There is apparently the equilibrium selection issue; however, in search of the subgame-perfect equilibrium I focus on the one that yields the greater total profit to the incumbent.

Having computed the equilibrium profits in period 1, I am ready to move to period 1, in which the incumbent chooses output \( B \) to maximize the sum of profits in both periods (we ignore discounting):

\[
\pi_b = \begin{cases} 
    \frac{m^2}{9} & \text{if } B \in (0, \hat{B}_2] \\
    \frac{(m - B + 2s)B}{2} & \text{if } B \in (\hat{B}_1, (m + 2s)/3) \\
    \frac{(m + 2s)^2}{9} & \text{if } B \in [(m + 2s)/3, m) 
\end{cases}
\]
2.1 Local maxima

Since the total profit function is not continuous, I first derive the optimal B in each case and then determine the global optimum.

**Case 1:** \( B \in (0, \hat{B}_2] \)

In this case, B has no effect on the incumbent’s period 2 profit. The unconstrained optimum occurs at \( B = m/2 \). As \( \hat{B}_2 < m/2 \), the constraint on B is binding. Therefore, the optimal B is \( \hat{B}_2 \), and the maximum profit is \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2) \).

**Case 2:** \( B \in (\hat{B}, (m + 2s)/3) \)

The unconstrained optimum occurs at \( B_2 = \frac{3m+2s}{6} \), which is greater than \( \hat{B}_1 \). If \( s > m/2 \), then \( B_2 < (m + 2s)/3 \), and hence \( B_2 \) is the interior solution, with the maximum profit \( \Pi(\frac{3m+2s}{6}) \); On the other hand, if \( s \leq m/2 \), \( B_2 \) exceeds the upper limit of the range of B so there is no optimum (\( B = (m + 2s)/3 \) is the supremum).

**Case 3:** \( B \in [(m + 2s)/3, m) \)

The unconstrained optimum occurs at \( B_3 = \frac{m}{2} \). To find out if \( B_3 \) is an interior solution, I compare \( B_3 \) with the lower bound, \( \frac{m+2s}{3} \). If \( s \leq m/4 \), \( B_3 \geq (m+2s)/3 \), and so \( B_3 \) is the interior solution, with the maximum profit \( \Pi(m/2) \). If \( s > m/4 \), \( B_3 < (m+2s)/3 \), and therefore \( B_3 \) is not an interior solution. Therefore, the maximum profit is \( \Pi((m+2s)/3) \).

The next lemma summarizes the main findings:

**Lemma 1**

1. When \( B \in (0, \hat{B}_2] \), the local maxima is \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2) \).

2. When \( B \in (\hat{B}, \frac{m + 2s}{3}) \), the local maximum is \( \Pi(\frac{3m+2s}{6}) \) if \( s > m/2 \); otherwise, there is no maximum.

3. When \( B \in [\frac{m+2s}{3}, m) \), the local maximum is \( \Pi(m/2) \) if \( s \leq m/4 \), or \( \Pi((m + 2s)/3) \) otherwise.
2.2 Global maxima

So far we identified the local maxima in the three disjoint intervals of the incumbent’s feasible set. We now turn to the global maxima for the incumbent.

1. If \( s \leq \frac{m}{4} \), the local maxima are \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2) \) and \( \Pi(m/2) \). Computation shows that \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2) < \Pi(m/2) \), so the global optimum occurs at \( B = \frac{m}{2} \) and \( b = \frac{m + 2s}{3} \). The incumbent’s equilibrium total profit is \( \Pi(m/2) \).

2. If \( s \in (\frac{m}{4}, \frac{m}{2}] \), the local maxima are \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2) \) and \( \Pi((m+2s)/3) \). A calculation establishes that \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2) < \Pi(\frac{m + 2s}{3}) \). So the global maximum occurs at \( B = \frac{m + 2s}{3} \) and \( b = \frac{m + 2s}{3} \). The equilibrium total profit is \( \Pi(\frac{m + 2s}{3}) \).

3. If \( s \in (\frac{m}{2}, m) \), the local maxima are \( \Pi(\hat{B}_2), \Pi(\frac{3m + 2s}{6}) \) and \( \Pi((m+2s)/3) \). Computation shows that \( \Pi(\frac{3m + 2s}{6}) \) exceeds the other two. Hence, the equilibrium outputs are \( B = \frac{3m + 2s}{6} \) and \( b = \frac{3m + 2s}{6} \), and its total profit is \( \Pi(\frac{3m + 2s}{6}) \).

These results are summarized in

**Proposition 1** The equilibrium customer base is given by

\[
B = \begin{cases} 
\frac{m}{2} & s \in (0, \frac{m}{4}], \\
\frac{m + 2s}{3} & s \in (\frac{m}{4}, \frac{m}{2}], \\
\frac{3m + 2s}{6} & s \in (\frac{m}{2}, m).
\end{cases}
\]

The following results are immediate consequences of Proposition 1

**Proposition 2**

(A) **when** \( s \in (0, \frac{m}{4}] \), the brand-name firm sells less than its customer base in the second period;
(B) when $s \in (m/4, m)$, the brand-name firm holds on to its customer base in the second period;

From Proposition 2, we can see that the brand-name drug is never sold to new customers in the second period. This implies that those who bought the brand-name drug in the first period are willing to pay the premium over the generic, which reflects the switching cost. This is consistent with the fact that in the real world the brand-name drugs are always priced higher than their generic counterparts.

3 Competition with the authorized generic

In this section we allow the incumbent to launch an AG through a third party in period 2. The firm distributing the AG is autonomous and competes fully with the brand-name drug company and the generic firm. I assume that the incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the management of the AG firm and receives all the profit from AG sales through a contractual agreement with the AG supplier. This increases the total profit in the standard Cournot model and is called the divisionalization effect as noted earlier.

The model is similar to the one developed in the preceding section. In the first period the incumbent chooses the quantity $B$. In the second period, it competes now with two generic firms. Let $a$ denote the quantity of the authorized generic supplied, and $b$ and $g$ the quantities of the brand-name drug and the generic drug supplied in the second period, respectively. With this notation the brand-name company faces the inverse demand function:

$$p_2 = \begin{cases} 
  m + s - b - a - g & (b \leq B), \\
  m - b - a - g & (b > B).
\end{cases}$$
Note that the demand function is discontinuous at output $b = B$. Therefore, the incumbent’s profit is also discontinuous at $b = B$:

$$
\pi_b = \begin{cases} 
(m + s - b - a - g)b & (b < B), \\
(m + s - B - a - g)B & (b = B), \\
(m - b - a - g)b & (b > B).
\end{cases}
$$

The incumbent’s best response function can be written as

$$
b(a, g) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{m - a - g}{2} & a + g \leq m - 2B - 2\sqrt{sB}, \\
B & a + g \in (m - 2B - 2\sqrt{sB}, m - 2B + s), \\
\frac{m + s - a - g}{2} & a + g \geq m - 2B + s.
\end{cases}
$$

Without the customer base, the generic faces the demand

$$
p_2 = m - b - a - g
$$

and maximizes the profit $\pi_g = (m - b - a - g)g$. The best response function is given by

$$
g(b, a) = \frac{m - b - a}{2}
$$

Similarly, the authorized generic faces the symmetric demand

$$
p_2 = m - b - a - g
$$

and maximizes the profit $\pi_a = (m - b - a - g)a$, obtaining the best response

$$
a(b, g) = \frac{m - b - g}{2}
$$
As in the previous case without the AG, the incumbent has three distinct best-response functions, depending on $B$, and hence there are three possible equilibria. Below I calculate, the incumbent’s equilibrium profits for each possibility.

\[
\pi_b = \begin{cases} 
\frac{m^2}{16} & B \in (0, \bar{B}_2], \\
\frac{B(m-B+3s)}{3} & B \in [\bar{B}_1, \frac{m+3s}{4}), \\
\frac{(m+3s)^2}{16} & B \in [\frac{m+3s}{4}, m).
\end{cases}
\]

Calculation shows that if \( \frac{1}{8} \left( 2m + 9s - 3\sqrt{s(4m + 9s)} \right) \leq B \leq \frac{1}{4} \left( m + 2s - 2\sqrt{s(m + s)} \right) \), there are two equilibria, one is \((B, 1/3(m - B), 1/3(m - B))\), the other is \((m/4, m/4, m/4)\). Let \( \bar{B}_1 = \frac{1}{8} \left( 2m + 9s - 3\sqrt{s(4m + 9s)} \right) \) and \( \bar{B}_2 = \frac{1}{4} \left( m + 2s - 2\sqrt{s(m + s)} \right) \).

With the AG the equilibrium profits for the authorized drug manufacturer are:

\[
\pi_a = \begin{cases} 
\frac{m^2}{16} & B \in (0, \bar{B}_2], \\
\frac{(m-B)^2}{9} & B \in [\bar{B}_1, \frac{m+3s}{4}), \\
\frac{(m-s)^2}{16} & B \in [\frac{m+3s}{4}, m).
\end{cases}
\]

In the first period, the brand-name firm’s profit is \((m - B)B\) so the incumbent’s total profits (including the profit for AG sales) are:

\[
\Pi_{AG} = \begin{cases} 
(m - B)B + \frac{m^2}{8} & B \in (0, \bar{B}_2], \\
(m - B)B + \frac{B(m-B+3s)}{3} + \frac{(m-B)^2}{9} & B \in [\bar{B}_1, \frac{m+3s}{4}), \\
(m - B)B + \frac{(m-s)^2}{16} + \frac{(m+3s)^2}{16} & B \in [\frac{m+3s}{4}, m).
\end{cases}
\]

The incumbent chooses $B$ to maximize $\Pi_{AG}$. I consider the three cases seriatim.

**Case 1:** $B \in (0, \bar{B}_2]$

In this case, since the choice of $B$ will not affect the incumbent’s profit in the second
period, the unconstrained optimum is $B = m/2$. However, since $m/2 > \tilde{B}_2$, the constraint on $B$ is binding. Hence, $\tilde{B}_2$ maximizes the total profit, yielding the maximized profit $\Pi_{AG}(\tilde{B}_2)$.

**Case 2**: $B \in [\tilde{B}_1, \frac{m+3s}{4})$

In this case the unconstrained optimum is $B_2 = \frac{10m+9s}{22} > \tilde{B}_1$. Further, if $s \leq \frac{3m}{5}$, $B_2$ exceeds the upper bound on $B$ and hence there is no optimum (the supremum is $B = (m + 3s)/4$. If $s > \frac{3m}{5}$, $B_2 < \frac{m+3s}{4}$, and hence the incumbent choose $B_2$, with the maximum profit $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{10m+9s}{22})$.

**Case 3**: $B \in [\frac{m+3s}{4}, m)$

In this case the unconstrained optimum is $B = \frac{m}{2}$. However, $m/2 \geq (m + 3s)/4$ if and only if $s \leq m/3$. Hence, when $s \leq \frac{m}{3}$, the constraint is not binding, and the maximized profit is $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2})$; otherwise, the constraint is binding and the maximized profit is $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m+3s}{4})$.

### 3.1 Global Maxima

The results from the preceding section are the following:

1. When $B \in (0, \tilde{B}_2]$, the local maximum equals $\Pi_{AG}(\tilde{B}_2)$.
2. When $B \in [\tilde{B}_1, \frac{m+3s}{4})$, there is a local maximum, $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{10m+9s}{22})$, if $s > 3m/5$.
3. When $B \in [\frac{m+3s}{4}, m)$, there is a local maximum, $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2})$, if $s \leq \frac{m}{3}$; there is a local maximum, $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m+3s}{4})$, if $s \in (\frac{m}{3}, m)$.

As we can see, the local maxima depend on the switching cost, and hence so does the global maximum. I compute the following:

1. When $s \leq \frac{m}{3}$, the local maxima are $\Pi_{AG}(\tilde{B}_2)$ and $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2})$. Computation shows that $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2}) > \Pi_{AG}(\tilde{B}_2)$, so the global optimum occurs at $B = \frac{m}{2}$ and $b = \frac{m+3s}{3}$. The incumbent’s equilibrium total profit is $\Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2})$. 

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2. When \( s \in (\frac{m}{3}, \frac{3m}{5}] \), the incumbent will compare \( \Pi_{AG}(\bar{B}_2) \) and \( \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m+3s}{4}) \). A calculation shows that \( \Pi_{AG}\left(\frac{(m+3s)}{4}\right) > \Pi_{AG}(\bar{B}_2) \), so the global maximum occurs at \( B = \frac{m+3s}{4} \) and \( b = \frac{m+3s}{4} \). The equilibrium total profit is \( \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m+3s}{4}) \).

3. When \( s \in (\frac{3m}{5}, m] \), the incumbent will compare \( \Pi_{AG}(\bar{B}_2) \), \( \Pi_{AG}((\frac{10m+9s}{22}) \) and \( \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m+3s}{4}) \). A calculation shows that \( \Pi_{AG}\left(\frac{10m+9s}{22}\right) \) is greater than the other two. Hence, the equilibrium outputs are \( B = \frac{10m+9s}{22} \) and \( b = \frac{10m+9s}{22} \), and the total profit is \( \Pi_{AG}(\frac{10m+9s}{22}) \).

**Proposition 3** *If the incumbent launches an AG, the equilibrium customer base is given by*

\[
B = \begin{cases} 
\frac{m}{2} & s \in (0, m/3], \\
\frac{m+3s}{4} & s \in (m/3, 3m/5], \\
\frac{10m+9s}{22} & s \in (3m/5, m).
\end{cases}
\]

4. **Comparisons**

In this section we compare the incumbent’s profit in two regimes at various values of \( s \). First, for \( s \in (0, \frac{m}{3}] \), the incumbent’s profit is \( \Pi\left(\frac{m}{2}\right) \) without an AG and \( \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2}) \) with an AG. Calculations show that when \( s \in (0, 0.077m) \), \( \Pi\left(\frac{m}{2}\right) < \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2}) \), meaning that launching an AG will be more profitable for the incumbent. However, when \( s \in [0.077m, \frac{m}{3}] \), \( \Pi\left(\frac{m}{2}\right) \geq \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2}) \), so launching a AG is less profitable.

When \( s \in (\frac{m}{4}, \frac{m}{3}] \), the incumbent’s profits are \( \Pi(\frac{m+2s}{3}) \) without an AG, and \( \Pi_{AG}(\frac{m}{2}) \) with an AG. It can be shown that \( \Pi(\frac{m+2s}{3}) \) is the greater and hence the incumbent will not launch AG if the switching cost is within this range. In all other values of \( s \) the incumbent receives greater profits if it does not launch an AG. To conclude, the incumbent launches an AG only when the switching cost is sufficiently small, namely, if \( s < 0.077m \).

**Proposition 4** *The incumbent launches an AG only when \( s < 0.077m \).*
This result contrasts sharply with the standard result from Cournot oligopoly. There, an oligopolist can increase total profits by setting up an autonomous company that competes with the parent company; see Baye et al. (1996). This fact also lies at the heart of the so-called horizontal merger puzzle; see first formulated by Salant et al. (1983).

Proposition 4 leads to the following empirically testable hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1** The brand-name company is more likely to launch an AG when the switching cost is relatively low.

In the next section we test this hypothesis.

## 5 Empirical investigations

### 5.1 Data

In this section we empirically test the hypotheses presented at the end of the preceding section. To that end, I use the dataset I collected on all the brand-name drugs that have experienced generic penetration from the beginning of 2001 till the beginning of 2003.

This data set was constructed by combining information from three different resources on the FDA website. The first resource is the First Generics list. First Generics are “those drug products that have never been approved before as generic drug products and are new generic products to the marketplace”. From this list, I obtained the information about all the first generics approved from 2001 to 2003, including the generic names and the dates that they were approved for marketing. Then I used the name of the generics to find out the corresponding brand-name drugs in the Orange Book. The Orange Book lists all the brand-name drugs and their generic counterparts, including the names, the dosage and

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The address may be subject to change.

5http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/eclink.cfm
dosage forms, and the marketing approval dates. After the corresponding brand-name drugs
are determined, I used the Authorized Generics List\textsuperscript{6} to find out if these brand-name drug
companies had ever launched authorized generics.

I conjecture that the switching cost from the brand-name drugs to the generics mainly
comes from two factors, “unwilling to switch” and “unable to switch”. “Unwillingness to
switch” to a generic means that a consumer feels a mental and psychological attachment to
the brand-name drug. I measure the degrees of consumer “attachment” by the length of time
during which there were no other drugs than the brand-name drugs on the markets, that is,
the length of time between the date a brand-name drug was approved and the date its first
generic was approved. As is mentioned in the introduction, drugs are credence goods. It
takes time for consumers to develop affinities to drugs. Drugs for acute conditions may have
immediate curing effects. However, the same conditions often recur over time, requiring the
consumer to take the same drug (since the brand-name drug is the only drug available of
its kind before generic entry) repeatedly. Each additional use can make the consumer feel
more confident about the the drug’s efficacy. Similarly, for chronic illnesses, a longer-term
continual use of a brand-name drug may give a consumer a better understanding of its effects
on her health. As these cases imply, the longer the brand-name drug has been marketed,
the greater the degree of confidence a consumer has in its efficacy. As a consequence, the
length of time the brand-name drug has been marketed can serve as a proxy for the consumer
switching costs.

Unfortunately, however, the time before generic entry cannot be used to measure the
“mental and psychological attachment” to OTC drugs, which are previous prescription drugs
that have been made available over the counter after long marketing periods with established
safety records. From the pre-generic marketing time, we only know how long the OTC version
had been on the market before the first generic OTC enters. We do not know, however, how

\textsuperscript{6} http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/
ucm126391.htm
The address may be subject to change.
long the prescription version had existed on the market, at home or abroad, before the OTC version first appeared. For this reason, my data set comprises only the data for prescription drugs.

The other factor defining a consumer switching cost is the consumer’s “inability to switch”. Inability to switch means that a consumer has limited freedom to choose among different versions (the brand-name version or the generic substitutes) of the drug. I consider that all the drugs fall into two categories: “Hospital Use” and “Home use”. “Hospital Use” drugs are used administered in hospitals, mainly provided by caregivers, during surgery or medical tests. On the other hand, “Home Use” drugs are those patients administer themselves at home, for example, tablets to be taken orally, and cream to be applied on the skin. Usually patients who take “Hospital Use” drugs face less choice. First, those who receive hospital treatments are more likely to be in emergency, and therefore take whatever drugs they are given. Second, their choices are limited by the hospital’s pharmacy: it is possible that the hospital does not carry the drugs they want to switch to. Third, treatments provided by a caregiver usually involve fairly complex procedures and hence, given the limited knowledge, patients are more likely to leave the choice of drugs up to their doctors. In contrast, patients who take “Home Use” drugs have more options. With prescriptions, they can go to pharmacies they like best or even to online pharmacies, and can choose between the brand-name drug and the generic substitute. For this reason, “Home Use” drugs should have lower switching costs relative to “Hospital Use” drugs.

To decide which drugs are for “Hospital Use” and which are for “Home Use” is not an easy task, however. To do that, I looked up each drug online to determine its uses, and I then used the following criteria for classifications. Drugs used in surgery, or for other treatments mainly practiced by caregivers, injection, for example, are considered “Hospital Use” drugs; otherwise they are considered for “Home Use”. For example, Ultane (inhalation liquid) is an anesthesia used before surgery. Therefore it is classified as a “Hospital Use” drug. Similarly, Rimso-50 (intraversical solution) is used for bladder instillation, which I classify
as a “Hospital Use” drug, though some patients might practice bladder instillation at home. Sometimes, the “dosage forms” can be useful to determine drugs’ uses. For example, Amicar is used to control bleeding during or after a surgery. While Amicar Injection is grouped as “Hospital Use”, Amicar Tablet is grouped as “Home Use”. Compared to injections, tablets are taken orally and require a longer time before taking effect, so they should not be used to treat serious bleeding problems or used in emergencies, like during a surgery. The instruction of Amicar Tablets further implies that they should only be used to treat mild bleeding problems after a surgery, like dental surgery, which can be practiced by patients on their own in a less urgent situation.7

Table 1 below summaries the characteristics of the three variables in my dataset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ag</td>
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<td>.282</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inp</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>mono_month</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>141.018</td>
<td>70.564</td>
<td>21.767</td>
<td>256.433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary results

The dataset has 202 observations. ag, a dummy variable, denotes brand-name firm’s decision on launching AG, 1 for “launch”, 0 for “not launch”. The mean of ag is 0.282, showing that out of the 202 brand-name drugs about 28.2% has launched AG. “inp”, another dummy variable, 1 for “Hospital Use”, 0 for “Home Use”, denotes whether a drug is taken in treatments mainly practiced at hospital. This variable is intended to represent consumers’ “easiness to switch”. The mean of “inp” shows that, out of the 202 drugs, 19.8% are made mainly for “Hospital Use”. “mono_month”, measured in months, denotes the length of brand-name drug marketing periods before generic entry. This variable captures consumers’ unwillingness to switch (brand loyalty). The mean of mono_month is about 12 years (141

7“For the treatment of acute bleeding syndromes due to elevated fibrinolytic activity, it is suggested that 5 AMICAR 1000 mg Tablets or 10 AMICAR 500 mg Tablets (5 g) or 4 teaspoonfuls of AMICAR Oral Solution (5 g) be administered during the first hour of treatment, followed by a continuing rate of 1 AMICAR 1000 mg Tablet or 2 AMICAR 500 mg Tablets (1 g) or 1 teaspoonful of AMICAR Oral Solution (1.25 g) per hour. This method of treatment would ordinarily be continued for about 8 hours or until the bleeding situation has been controlled.” https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/archives/fdaDrugInfo.cfm?archiveid=5242
months), which is consistent with the fact that the average brand-name marketing time before generic entry is 12 to 13 years.\textsuperscript{8} The row of mono\_month suggests substantial variations in the length of pre-generic marketing time across different brand-name drugs.

5.2 Methodology

I assume whether or not a brand-name company launches an authorized generic is related to the switching cost its consumers has to pay to switch to a new drug. I treat the decision to launch an authorized generic as a binary variable, \( Y_i \), which equals 1 if brand-name drug \( i \) launches an authorized generic, and 0 if it does not. A probit model is built to analyze the determinants of such decisions. The probability of launching an authorized generic is defined as:

\[
\Pr(Y_i = 1 \mid X_i, \varepsilon_i) = \Phi(X_i \beta + \varepsilon_i)
\]

where \( X_i \), a vector of regressors, contains observed factors that explain the decision of launching authorized generics, while \( \varepsilon_i \), with \( \varepsilon \sim N(0, 1) \), is an error term, which captures the effect of unobserved factors on such decisions, and \( \beta \) is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. \( \Phi \) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.

5.3 Results

In my probit regressions, the dependent variable, “ag”, is 1 whenever an authorized generic is launched for brand-name drug \( i \). The independent variables are “ln\_mono\_month” (log-linearized “mono\_month”) and “imp”. As I have mentioned in section 5.1, “mono\_month”, denoting the length of pre-generic marketing period of brand-name drug \( i \), is a continuous variable, and hence so is its log-linearized version “lnmono\_month”. “imp” is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when drug \( i \) is made mainly for “Hospital Use” and 0 otherwise. Table 2 shows the regression results:

\textsuperscript{8}According to the New Medicine Timeline in Mossinghoff (1999).
Table 2: Estimation results : regress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>( P &gt; z )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inp</td>
<td>-0.769</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnmono_month</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coefficient of the variable “inp” is negative, which means that, if a drug is made mainly for “Hospital Use,” the brand-name company would be less likely to launch an authorized generic. The coefficient of the variable “lnmono_month” is negative, implying that, if a brand-name drug has a longer pre-generic marketing period, the brand-name company would be less likely to launch an authorized generic. The results are significant as the p-values are less than the cutting value 0.05.

A brand-name drug company launches an authorized generic at a lower price to attract consumers who would not buy brand-name drugs. For “Hospital Use” drugs, consumers do not have much freedom to choose as their choices are usually made by the doctors. It is reasonable to assume that doctors are relatively less sensitive to price changes than patients. Therefore for hospital-use drugs, brand-name firms are more likely to influence the doctors to stay with their brand-name drugs instead of lowering prices to compete with generics.

In contrast, for “Home Use” drugs, consumers have more freedom to choose from, and therefore the strategy to launch an AG is more important in competition with generics. However, launching an AG leads erodes the brand-name drug’s customer base as a lower price tempts some customers in the base to switch to the generics. This dilemma can be resolved if the brand-name companies can figure out how much more the higher-end customers would like to pay for the brand-name drugs. The results of my test show that the length of the pre-generic marketing periods of the brand-name drugs may serve as a good proxy for the “how much more”. If consumers have longer experiences with the brand-name drugs, they would value them considerably more (than generic substitutes). In this situation, the brand-name firm might find it more profitable to exploit the higher end customers, and hence is less likely to launch an AG. In contrast, if consumers have relatively short experiences with the brand name drug, they would not value the brand-name drugs as much (more than the
generic substitutes), and hence a brand-name firm is more likely to launch an AG to compete for the lower-end customers with the generic firm.

6 Concluding remarks

When there is generic competition the brand-name company sometimes (but not always) launches an generic version of its brand-name drug, called an authorized generic, through a third party. Launch of an AG is justifiable in terms of “divisionalization” but then AGs should be launched virtually for all brand-name drugs that come off the patent. In actual fact, however, only a small percentage of such drugs have the AGs. In this paper I address this puzzle. To that end, I develop a two-period model in which the incumbent develops a customer base as a monopoly in the first period and readies itself for generic competition in the second period.

My main finding is that a brand-name company launches an authorized generic only when users of the branded drug have sufficiently low switching cost. When the switching cost is high, the incumbent sells more than the profit-maximizing quantity to develop a larger customer base. If the switching cost is low, however, the customer bases is more vulnerable to price competition and hence instead of building a large customer base and defending it, the brand-name company launches an AG and resorts to the divisionalization tactic to steal lower end customers from the generic entrant. To test my main finding econometrically I then build a probit model. The regression result gives significant support for my hypothesis.

References


