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<th>A CRITICAL NOTE ON SOROKIN STUDY IN JAPAN: Retrospect from the View of Integralism</th>
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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Yoshino, Koji</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>一橋研究, 24(4): 81-110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Date</td>
<td>2000-01-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Departmental Bulletin Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text Version</td>
<td>publisher</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://doi.org/10.15057/5692">http://doi.org/10.15057/5692</a></td>
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Introduction

In this paper I would like to examine an accumulated collection of Sorokin studies in Japan. And I hope to clarify the image of Sorokin by doing it. As is well known, Sorokin was wrote voluminous books in Russian and English, and had many multilingual papers and translated works. It is vitally important to see in retrospect the historical meaning of a high renown scholar. Because, by summarizing the process and the result of the introduction of such a worldwide scholar in various worlds, we can not only trace the genesis and development of knowledge in a sovereign country, but it also would be possible to do a comparative study of world mental history. By following such a procedure, we could ask the question when, what, and how a thought would spread. Moreover Sorokin was an interdisciplinary scholar covering the realms of psychology, philosophy, history as well as sociology as a specialty. This means an abundance of comparative items. Needless to say, it is also an indispensable task to see the movement of thought in America where he mainly flourished. As for the reason for focusing on integralism,

*Grateful acknowledgment is made to the Mr. S. Rife, of Nagasaki Prefectural University, whose superior command of English language is manifested in the final form of this thesis, and who has also made a number of valuable suggestions as to the treatment of the present issues.
it could be said that such a huge field of vision as Sorokin possessed, necessarily requires a grasp of the overview by any key terms. As a result, the other papers which are not mentioned are included in the appendix.

1 Research on Social and Cultural Dynamics

1.1 The Methodology—Volume 1, Part 1

If we try to comprehend Social and Cultural Dynamics, first of all, it is indispensable to master the methodology (Sorokin, 1937: I, Part 1). Its contents have the following composition.

Chapter 1. Forms and Problems of Cultural Integration and Methods of Their Study
Chapter 2. Ideational, Sensate, Idealistic, and Mixed Systems of Culture
Chapter 3. Concrete Illustrations of the Chief Types of Culture Mentality
Chapter 4. Sociocultural Fluctuation: Concept and Forms of Sociocultural Process

The methodological foundation of Sorokin is made clear by introducing some papers that engaged this part.

1.1.1 Chapter 1

The best summary of the first chapter was written by Shin Yamamoto as follows:

The existential culture is not always unified wholly by one principle of integration, but has, except for the principle of integration, many miscellaneous things which contradict or are indifferent to the principle. If culture would be divided, one type forms a system and the other does not; the former type has a meaningful relation with almost all parts related causally; and the latter, that is mere scattered mixture which has no causal or meaningful relation, is named congeries... On the other hand, even though the change is partial, it cannot spread and be steady in totality, then one part never combines causally with the other parts or whole. 'Whole culture in the specific area,' therefore, is that many systems and non-systems coexist and still other systems mutually contradict, correspond or oppose. So it is an overestimate to say all are integrated by the first [integral] principle. However, it is not
true that there is no principle which makes the whole integrated. Wherever the bases are founded, total culture is integrated by a supersystem, but it also has a system or impurity which contradicts or coexists peacefully... Even if the many details which are contained in a whole culture are examined individually, when the mixture of the system or integrated condition of the supersystem can not be grasped, the axis and structure of culture, and therefore, its change cannot be understood. (Yamamoto, 1961, 472)

This shows a general basic viewpoint of Sorokin. Of course Yamamoto (1961, 483) does not always approve of Sorokin absolutely, but he has never suspected that Sorokin "...is the most precise, consistence, and extensive representative." Especially to distinguish the social system from the cultural system, or define the system by the causal-meaningful relation, or discover the Ideational, Sensate, Idealistic cultural type called a super system, or to formulate the change, or neglect civilization for the reason that it is not integrated, or clarify a system based on integration, these Sorokin alone has completed (Yamamoto, 1961, 486-487). After all, Yamamoto evaluated that:

The brief scheme, Sorokin's 'creation of ideology,' and its 'objectification,' or 'socialization,' could cover just a single part of the complicated civilization phenomena. Challenging Toynbee with his theory of cultural system, Sorokin did not enter the investigation of complex mutual relations between culture and society or vague and important attractive zones of interaction. And because of Sorokin's devotion to logic building only in a pure safety zone, Sorokin could not specify them except by a thin fragment of fact. (Yamamoto, 1961, 493)

In short, though Yamamoto was critical of the abstraction of Sorokin's cultural theory, he truly paid considerable attention to Sorokin's cultural type.

1.1.2 Chapter 2

For the purpose of comprehending this chapter, Yuukichi Shitahodo's (1977) commentary is the most useful. He insists that Sorokin's research for "the place to control
dynamics of humanity” (i.e. meaningful human relations) is the most honorable contribution to scholarship and evaluated Sorokin’s “sharp psychological penetration,” which he called a “pattern of cultural mentality.” Figure 1 illustrates the items necessary and sufficient for cultural mentalities.

**Figure 1 The Patterns of Main Cultural Mentality**

*Sensate Cultural Mentalities* (Active or Passive side)

*Ideational Cultural Mentalities* (Ascetic or Active side)

*Idealistic Cultural Mentalities*

*Cynical Sensate Cultural Mentalities*

*Pseudo-Ideational Cultural Mentalities*


The Sensate culture corresponding to the age of the Roman Empire or the Renaissance, has the mentality of ‘Carpe diem!’ or ‘Wine, Women, and Song!’ In other words, a person who is in the Sensate culture thought that “Being is any sensuous thing which is perceived through the eyes, ears, nose, skin, and so on,” and “there are not Idea, Ding an sich [a thing in itself], or true reality at all” (Shitahodo, 1977, 287-289). This mentality has a passive and active aspect which respectively indulges in enjoyment and works diligently for money and fame (Shitahodo, 1977, 288).

Next, Shitahodo wrote that:

This [Ideational] standpoint considers the fundamental human requirement as a truly mental requirement, in contrast with the Sensate as a physical desire. It should reduce sexual desire combination, keep from the Sensate world, get rid of self completely, encourage combination with the spiritual universe, or it is omnipresent in God’s country or Mother Nature, and gives self-sufficient and eternal peace of mind.
And besides, there is an Idealistic culture located between the Sensate culture and Ideational culture. The characteristics of an Idealistic culture is “to maintain the position of human physical wants and, on the other hand, to reclaim the field of vision of equilibrium, balance, and harmony” (Shitahodo, 1977, 292). In this way, Shitahodo precisely and clearly interpreted Sorokin’s profound methodology.

1.1.3 Chapter 4

Shotaro Yoneda showed an excellent understanding of Sorokin’s methodology in a series of papers entitled ‘The form of sociocultural change’ (Yoneda, 1937a, 1938, 1938a, 1938b). While in his prior thesis, titled ‘Position of Pareto Sociology in Modern Sociology,’ (Yoneda, 1937) Yoneda had already paid considerable attention to Sorokin. He studied Winiarsky’s forerunner to Pareto, and then he cited Sorokin’s study on them in Contemporary Sociological Theories (Sorokin, 1928, 23-29). He said that “to make a dynamic sociology mathematical-functional” would be a future subject of study (Yoneda, 1937, 43). The subject which is expected by Yoneda appeared in Sorokin’s Dynamics (Sorokin, 1937: I, Chap. 4). Yoneda (1938b, 684-685) appropriately interprets and criticizes the ambiguity of the contents of social time, as well as only admires the comprehensibility and the perfection of Sorokin’s conception. Moreover he claims that from now, it is important for us to accurately research sociocultural change. He further mentions not only the name of prominent sociologists like Tarde and Durkheim, but also deep philosophers like Bergson, and Heidegger, and pointed out the importance of their time concept (Yoneda, 1938b, 685).

Yoneda especially criticizes the following Sorokin articulations:

... a discipline which specializes in the investigation of the first - be it called sociology, social philosophy, philosophy of history, or ‘abracadabra’ - has as much right to exist as any unicist discipline that concentrates on the study of the second. (Sorokin, 1937: I, 173)
For Yoneda, science is a method that discovers relative knowledge by experience, but philosophy is a method that intuitively finds absolute knowledge. So he critically concludes that:

To speak of the research on the form of sociocultural change, if we take the position of scientific sociology, Sorokin would be recognized as a comprehensive and excellent person. But from the viewpoint of social philosophy, I cannot easily agree with him. (Yoneda, 1938b, 694)

Why could not Yoneda understand him? It is because of Yoneda’s idea that philosophy must inquire in an infinite and permanent direction, and be an absolute guiding principle of the human sociocultural life with awakening. This comment pinpoints the current problem of Sorokin study; how do we evaluate the devotion to philosophy, especially his own later integralism philosophy?

1.2 Theory of War—Volume 3, Part 2

Munakata (1964) argued on Sorokin’s war study deeply. First, “Sorokin’s theory of social change” was characterized such that “his contention about the cause of change is searching for the fundamental fluctuation of the human mind” and it is regarded by Munakata (1964, 10) as an “attempt to take back the 'image of living human beings' in recent sociological theory.” In a word, Munakata admires Sorokin’s fundamental vision which contains the possibility of answering to some questions of human beings in mental meaning (ibid.).

Munakata (1964, 12) is attracted greatly by Sorokin’s analysis of “Meaningful Relation between fundamental cultural patterns and war phenomena which quantified or compared with the historical process of the development of various countries.” The social phenomena is distinguished mental meaning which is beyond space and time from the material agency (i.e. meaningful relation from causal relation) by Sorokin. Munakata (1964, 15) properly interpreted that “in this special causal process, it is mainly the interior ‘meaning’ that works as a cause.” In short, at first, Sorokin pays attention to the causality of the phenomena which can be observed experientially, and then searched
for the meaning which could be found in its relations. In conclusion, three propositions which are discovered by using this method are cited by Munakata (1964, 16-18).

[1] Wars of the dominant Ideational culture (or period) tend to assume the form of religious or Ideational wars more frequently than the wars of the dominant Sensate culture (and period).... [2] Per se, possibly neither Ideational nor Sensate culture is more belligerent or peaceful than the other.... [3] The periods of transition from the Ideational to the Sensate, or from the Sensate to the Ideational, phase of culture are the periods of notable increase of war activities and war magnitude. (Sorokin 1937: III, 373-375)

Well, what does Munakata think about Sorokin’s purpose for the study of social change? For Sorokin, Munakata (1964, 21) says, it is to read the trace of human social life in history in accordance with the interior mental meaning, and to draw the historical human being’s existential situation with a huge comprehensive perspective by putting the sociological method to use. To explain this means that “mankind should approach the supernatural absolute Being by searching his circumference,” or appreciate the “mental polyphony between God and human” (ibid.). As we have seen, Sorokin’s theory of cultural change is too gigantic to understand as social theory. But it makes sense all the more for the reason that Sorokin could understand the relation between the change of mentality and society as a ‘meaning.’

1.3 Culture and Civilization—Volume 4, Chapter 4

Shigeaki Ootsubo (1967), mentions Sorokin’s discussion about dichotomic theories of culture. He especially comments on the question ‘Does the Total Culture of an Area Change in Togetherness or Independently in Its Various Parts?’ (Sorokin, 1941: IV, Chap. 4). In many cases, almost all people would divide a sociocultural phenomena into two parts; civilizational, material, social, technological or economical things are one part; and cultural, nonmaterial, ideological or speculational things are the other. Sorokin criticized this classification of course. Ootsubo discussed this classification represented by material and mind by focusing on the mutual criticism between Sorokin and Toynbee.
Toynbee (1963) blamed Sorokin who has insisted that though physics develops in accordance with its history, it is not necessarily so in the case of poetry or art. This is because Sorokin has never recognized a plain difference between the change of natural science and art. Sorokin prepared the following three points as a re-criticism, attaching importance to Toynbee’s criticism. To begin with, his statements, “exaggerate the difference between physics and poetry on the fashion of change, development, progress.” The second fact is that Toynbee considered one certain culture as “a universal and permanent happening.” And a final point is the ambiguity of the meaning of Toynbee’s word ‘excellent’ (Ootsubo, 1967, 284). Sorokin made up his mind to cling persistently to his own view even though this objection was refuted. On the occasion of this dialog, Ootsubo apprises that this was a valuable dispute for clearing the dichotomic theories of culture. Furthermore, Ootsubo recognizes the excellence of Sorokin’s theory replacing obsolete dichotomic theories of culture. Nevertheless, the problem that Sorokin’s excessive criticism destroys “the valuable elements” of dichotomic theory remains (ibid.). According to Ootsubo (1967, 285), its valuable element means that dichotomic theory could distinguish the unified culture from unified society as culture bearer, and take the crisis of modern society with both discords, or realize that post-modern Western civilization goes through the dramatic conversion of science, technology and economy.

Moreover Ootsubo (1967, 286-287) asserts Sorokin’s two critical points: (1) Sorokin has passed through the occurrence of crisis by emphasizing the discord of two sides in civilization. Sorokin denied civilization consequently: (2) it is true that accumulative progress of science and technology could be evaluated by his subjective method, but the method could not be applied to religion or art.

After all Ootsubo (1967, 291) found that “Sorokin’s weak point was contained in systemic theory,” that is, the ambiguousness in understanding language, religion, art and philosophy as “main cultural systems.” In other words, Ootsubo asked for improvement on the fault that certain important points of actual society and culture have slipped through the net of his abstract conception.

2 The foundation field of Sorokin

As Ford (1996, 87) already proved, Sorokin’s Integralism was present in his early
works. If his statement is correct, Sorokin studies up until now would have exposed something like integralism. Now I will attempt to highlight Sorokin’s important standpoint on integralism for Japanese study on Sorokin, which exists in the field of social theory, agricultural sociology, social mobility and so forth.

2.1 Synthetic sociology

The concepts of ‘synthetic’ or ‘integral’ sociology in Sorokin’s sociology are not so complicated. In brief, if there will be N kind of social science, it is necessary to unify those sciences which are equivalent to N+1. Sorokin (1928, 761) regards this number N+1 science as Sociology. Thus only sociology could study common characteristics in the huge sociocultural phenomena. But, those assertions are inevitably contradicted since it is merely “dilettantism as an aim at a synthesis without a synthetic point” (Odaka, 1949, 252-267). However this stereotyped criticism is contradicted as follows.

As Sorokin said, the study of individual partial nature or relations as well as omnipresent nature and the relations or uniformity in the sociocultural phenomena are very specialized. Therefore, though sociology has the character of synthesizing, it is strictly one of the special sciences. (Sasaki, 1978, 124)

Well, the next question is how integralism has been included in Sorokin’s sociology? Needless to say, social science has been developed in accordance with the development of natural science. But Sorokin’s sociology is strictly against that trend.

... according to Sorokin, sociocultural phenomena (usually called social phenomena) have a special component which is different from the physico-chemical, pure biological or other natural phenomena. So sociology has the individuality which should be suitable for its nature... [And this sociocultural phenomena] consist of three components; (1) non-material, spaceless and timeless ‘meaning’; (2) physical, physico-chemical, or biological ‘vehicles’ which materialize, externalize and objectify this meaning; (3) ‘human agents’ which keep, use and manipulate the meaning by being helped by physical vehicles. (Matsumoto, 1973, 4)
In short, the subject of Sorokin’s sociology was to inquire into the meaning which unifies the main parts of social phenomena. Not that Sorokin abandoned the method of natural science himself. He emphasizes combining the causal method with the logico-meaningful method and searched for causal-meaningful relations (Sorokin, 1937: I, 22ff).

Kazuyoshi Matsumoto (1973, 14-16) finds fault with this standpoint of Sorokin. First, Sorokin had argued that social or human acts exist without uniting meaning. Second, he had not paid much attention to distinguishing social phenomena from cultural phenomena, social science from human science, or social systems from cultural systems. And third, the point that his methodology is static, circular and fatalistic. Only the last criticism is on target. This problem which will reveal the similarity between Sorokin’s thinking style and dialectic is discussed in the next section.

2.2 Dialectic

As Hanson (1996, 102) has already stated that “theoretically and methodologically (though not ‘rigidly’ nor ‘simply’), Sorokin was, in American sociology, distinctively, substantially, significantly, and critically, a dialectician, as a part of his integralism,” and in a sense Sorokin was a dialectician.

This subject unexpectedly appeared in Japanese Marxist sociology. Of course, as Yukio Kitano (1952, 6-7) accused, it could be said that Sorokin overlooked the true meaning of dialectical materialism by using experiential sociology which measures superficially. But does Sorokin truly overlook it? Needless to say Sorokin’s criticism of Marxism is bitterly true to form. According to Sorokin (1928, 546-547) at first, economic phenomena and non-economic phenomena are more complicated than Marxist thoughts. In the next place, the correlation of social phenomena and economic phenomena are a special case. Thirdly, there is no single correlation between them on earth. And last but not least, it is easy for us to surmise other variables besides economic variables. Such are the weak points of Marx or Marxist theory.

However, this statement has never meant that Sorokin has the character of research favoritism or theory paranoia. It is true that “American sociology or rather social research fails to get something which integrates the world” (Kitano, 1952, 11). If anyone at all cordially hates these attitudes it is Sorokin. Therefore comparing this opinion,
Toshiya Hayase's comment is more or less proper. Frankly speaking, Hayase (1972, 322) concluded from the standpoint of Marxism that Sorokin's system of sociology was based on historical materialism.

2.3 Rural sociology

Sorokin studies in Japan have memorialized him as a rural sociologist for all ages. Eitaro Suzuki is the most prominent contributor for introducing Sorokin's rural sociology to Japan. Suzuki's major work 'A Principle of Japanese Rural Sociology' systematized native and foreign rural sociology, including Sorokin's works. But in addition, Suzuki actively applied Western sociology to the Japanese situation, and managed to complete a first standard rural sociology in Japan. The main influences of Sorokin is on the concept of the 'cumulative community' and 'functional association' and relates to rural social structures (Suzuki, 1940, 85-95), the 'study of family and the familial system in the rural district' (Suzuki, 1940, 116-136), or 'the theory of the social stratification of the farmer' (Suzuki, 1940, 569-574). After all, Suzuki (1931, 134; or 1932) regards the idea of 'rural community' which has been used vaguely by rural sociologists as one of the most excellent achievements of rural sociology.

Strictly speaking, the main themes of Sorokin in the range of rural sociology are "to understand the rural areas by comparing them with the city," or "to study the rural district in the process of urbanization" (Suzuki, 1933, 308). This way of grasping urban and rural areas as an opposition concept is the "seed" of integralism in Sorokin's rural-urban sociology. As Ford said briefly:

Not until later works, especially Dynamics, did his quest for logical unification approximate integralism, but the seeds were in these works on rural and rural-urban sociology. (Ford, 1996, 87)

2.4 Theory of social mobility

2.4.1 Social Mobility

Much research on Social Mobility (Sorokin, 1927) has been discussed no less than his rural sociology in Japan. Kawai's thesis (Kawai et al., 1982) which is useful as a
supplementary reader of *Social Mobility* is discussed here. On the whole, Kawai (Kawai et al., 1982, 93) evaluated Sorokin's macroscopic position as "a plan of inclusion or synthesis, which has double meaning (interest and methodology), from the frame of reference of social mobility". Kawai's critical remark on *Social Mobility* is as below.

With regard to part one, because of "such a macroscopic frame of reference," the concept and the measure of social mobility have become abstract and vague, or moreover, mutuality of each stratification (economic, political, occupational) is not being clarified (ibid.). Part two and three were blamed for the reasons of the uncertainty of "the theoretical relation between individual mobility and mobility of social object or value" (ibid.). And besides, contrary to Sorokin's intention, the analysis is static. With regard to chapter five and six, Kawai complains of Sorokin's "tendency for elitism and aristocracy" (Kawai et al., 1982, 94). Generally speaking, *Social Mobility* discusses the difficulty in the theory of functionalistic stratification, or the recognition of scientific history, or proposition building and hypothesis establishment and so evaluation of Sorokin will consequently separate (ibid.). Kawai admired the theory and object of Sorokin's comprehensibility in the use of "double meaning." For example, "the effect of mobility" (Sorokin, 1927, chaps. 21-22) in which social mobility and social change are being argued simultaneously is one of the excellent points.

2.4.2 The subject of social mobility

As we have seen, in comparing usual migration research, Sorokin truly established the concept of social mobility which has a large extension, and provided an integrative view for some chaotic phenomena that have no mutual relation between each element (Yasuda, 1971, 37). The next critical problem which needs examination is 'the subject of mobility.' This problem largely is related not only to the evaluation of Sorokin but also to the substance of social mobility study itself. The origin of the problem is in the ambiguity of the subject of social mobility which Sorokin called "social object" (individual or meaning-value). If the large concept of social object was taken, it would consequently bring the following opposite evaluation. When all is said, one concludes that various research was synthesized, and others criticize the obscurity of a concept which is due to generalization (Yasuda, 1971, 551). A person who hates vagueness, naturally
limits a definition such as "social mobility means the shifting of social position by an individual" (ibid).

Now let us look at a definition which defines the subject to the individual. Noboru Yamamoto insisted that the substance of social mobility should be clearly distinguished from the concept (Yamamoto, 1950 [1984]). In other words, though as a category, the validity of social space can be admitted, it is impossible to understand it as a substance. Furthermore, as to the assumption of the vertical and horizontal dimension in social space, Yamamoto (1950, 273) criticized that the actual stratum is not composed of three-dimensional relations such as buildings or pyramids. In short, for Yamamoto (1950, 274), the "vertical and horizontal dimension" is nothing but a metaphor or a concept that captures the substance. Yamamoto (ibid.) concludes that the study of social mobility is a conceptual tool for quantitatively discerning position in the social relations. This is because the subject of social mobility could not be anything besides a breathing human being. Yamamoto (1950, 288-289) thought that even if there is mobility in culture or values, its bearer is a human being.

To sum up Yamamoto’s issues, social mobility is a top-and-bottom change in quantitative social position (1950, 290). However it is also obvious that this definition loses comprehensibility which was an advantage of Sorokin’s approach.

2.4.3 The mobility of the social object

But different from Yasuda’s or Yamamoto’s opinion, the subject of social mobility, as Sorokin intends, included the culture and value, and opened a new perspective. It has the title of A Study of Community Morale and Social Mobility (Suzuki ed., 1978). After theorizing on social mobility, Hiroshi Suzuki positively investigated the correlation of social mobility and social change from the original viewpoint of the community morale. Suzuki’s considerable concern for Sorokin is seen in his theory where Sorokin is specially emphasized. According to Suzuki, Sorokin’s essence is to have fixed social positions in the net of social space or social relations, and devised a vertical and horizontal coordinate as its standard. By attaching a whole social relation with the totality of society, class or community, Suzuki (1969, 233) succeeded in elegantly catching the idea of social position.
3 The fundamental theory of Sorokin

3.1 Theory of social time

In *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time* which was written after the completion of *Dynamics* and was not so famous, Sorokin tried to understand social science by comparing it with natural science, and also to state the difficulty of mutual interchange. In Japan, Shigefumi Kurahashi quickly noticed the value of this work and paid particular attention to Sorokin’s argument about social space and time.

The traditional theory of time which grounded evolutionism or the law of progress has been examined from the viewpoint of “a unique movement and rhythm which is evident in organization and the fixed cycle in activities” (Kurahashi, 1969, 39). Though this is called “the linear theory of evolution,” Kurahashi thought that Sorokin’s theory of social time contained an important element which improves such a one-sided viewpoint. Now, I would like to take a glance at the discussion on Sorokin’s social time.

According to Kurahashi, social time must be divided into three parts: proper rhythm and periodicity should be discovered in human behavior, relations, groups, and so on; socially systematized and meaningful time; and the third type of social time. As to the last type, the main purpose of this social time theory is to find a meaningful system of time which is in the social object, to explain the social relevance of time, and to make both relations clear (Kurahashi, 1969, 41). Sorokin, however, divided time into “(1) physico-mathematical time, (2) biological time, (3) psychological time, and (4) sociocultural time,” and, indeed, emphasized the importance of the last item in sociology (Kurahashi, 1969, 41-42). His main reasons are as follows. First, each type has some functions and relations. Second, every type belongs to either concept and is conditioned by social and cultural circumstances. Third, sociocultural time is to be completely different from other time in character or function. Fourth, sociocultural time reflects the social and cultural environment directly. And last, the conception of sociocultural time is necessary to explain sociocultural phenomenon (Kurahashi, 1969, 43).

On one hand, if social time is an index of duration, simultaneousness, continuity, and change in sociocultural phenomenon all must have a different speed in each group. However, it is impossible to divide social time into innumerable parts, to be qualitative
and effective. To tell the truth, social time has different phases, such as, *aeternitas*, *aevum*, *tempus* and so on (Kurahashi, 1969, 44; See also 1993, 5). Taking these features into consideration, it is obvious that the explanation of social phenomena by quantitative time contains the following difficult problems. For example, the before-after relations cannot be expressed quantitatively and so, concerning the interval of time, it is too difficult to decide the starting point or goal. If time is measured by quantitative methods, the social meaning of time would vanish, and social reality would become something empty or inanimate. Finally, it is obvious that completely different social phenomena would have been considered the same, the meaning of the phenomenon itself would have disappeared, and the meaningful connection or causality between two or more phenomena would not be understood (Kurahashi, 1969, 45-46).

Sorokin’s way of thinking of time, in relation to the structure of logic, is identical with his theory of social space.

3.2 Theory of social space

First of all Sorokin divides space into “(1) physico-mathematical space, (2) physio-logical space, (3) psychological space, and (4) sociocultural space.” And sociocultural space is said to be especially uninterpretable using the analogy of natural science or psychology (Kurahashi, 1974, 7). Just the same, social time is different from physical time and social space is also not a homogeneous space like geometrical space. According to Kurahashi (1974, 6), though Sorokin puts emphasis on the meaning of social phenomena; the fact is “the position of the meaning is not decided until it is in the meaning world.” And moreover, the characteristics of social space can be summarized as follows.

“(1) The human world, (2) the social position of a person, meaning the relations between a person and all groups, relations in the group, and whole relations between each member, (3) an individual position was proved by confirming these relations, and (4) such whole groups and the position of each group make a socially consistent system” (Kurahashi, 1974, 10; cf. Sorokin, 1927, 6).

In other words, social space is the world which is typical for human beings, or the system which is made in the mutual relationship of individuals or other relationships between a person and a group.
But Sorokin’s prescription for multiple dimensions and the heterogeneity of social space is so ambiguous that it is difficult to understand the relation of the absolute position. That is to say, Sorokin could only understand the relative position of the relation. The faults that Sorokin should have revised are the following. First, Sorokin’s concept is too abstract and generalized to fully grasp social phenomena. Second, as a result of putting excessive emphasis on the difference between social space and other physical space, the relationship of different spaces was neglected. And third, the fact that he did not refer to the matter of technology as a decisive factor in social space. These are the problems in Sorokin’s thinking that Kurahashi (ibid.) set forth.

3.3 Theory of social group

The next task is to retrace the argument about Sorokin’s social group. Needless to say, ‘social group’ is an object of sociology. Morimitu Shimizu (1959) discusses the statement of Sorokin’s social group. He pays attention to the classification of the organized and unorganized group by Sorokin. Indeed, Shimizu regards the organized group which has a “meaningful interaction” as Sorokin’s most important point; and specifies that the meaningful interaction has not only causal-functional dependence but also meaningful dependence (Shimizu, 1959, 8). It is true that causal dependence can be seen in any group, however, the more important relation, Sorokin wrote, is the meaningful relation. No sooner has a relationship been engaged in than it becomes a “meaningful interaction, which is different from the aggregate of an isolated individual” (Shimizu, 1959, 9). Subsequently Shimizu (1971, 165) deepened his analysis and said that Sorokin interprets the meaning of interaction as being the combining bond of a group and strictly divides the groups into unibonded groups and multibonded groups.

Moreover, an important fact to note is that the words unification, system, and totality which Shimizu made much account of, are synonyms for Sorokin’s terms, meaning-value-norm. If we fail to understand these terms, we can not see the significance of an unorganized group which are termed “public, crowd and mob, semi-nominal plurels” (Sorokin, 1947, 92). Shimizu (1959, 10) disapproved of Sorokin’s opinion that crowds and mobs are not organized groups, and stated that a mob has meaning and organization. Despite Shimizu’s criticism, I must say a crowd lacks meaning. This is because to
Sorokin’s terms, meaning-value-norm, were always mentioned in proximity to the words “dominated in the given society.” Strictly speaking, there is neither meaning nor organization in a mob. On the contrary, a mob does not have the meaning-value-norm which is formed by the ideational, idealistic and sensate principle. In truth, if we misread Sorokin’s concept of meaning-value-norm, we can not understand his similar terms ‘culture’ or ‘integral system.’

3.4 Study of altruism

Finally, I would like to review some studies on Sorokin’s altruism which are based on the above various fundamental theories from the viewpoint of integralism. Where could Sorokin’s unique altruism study have been placed in his sociological system? For Sorokin, altruistic love as the social reality of human beings, and as the problem of practice, is the final task of his study. Therefore, Imasaki (1967, 37) explains, it is one of the most important tasks for sociology, which concerns the character of human science and behavioral science, to study the altruistic love which Sorokin discusses. This is a sort of personality study. Sorokin recognizes the contemporary ‘social reality’ as a crisis situation, seeks the source of its crisis to an unintegrated personality, and intends to achieve the final task, that is to integrate the personality through the practice of altruism.

To say this more concretely, from the viewpoint of anti-sensate age, and in order to get rid of the economical, political, and cultural difficulty, Sorokin established the ‘Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism’ at Harvard University (Hosokawa, 1977a, 295). The task of this center is, first, to draw and formulate the work procedure of nonegoistic and creative love, and discover the situation of this work in present science, and second to investigate effective technology and factors of the formation and the transfiguration of altruism (Hosokawa, 1977a, 298, 302).

As for the substantial contents of altruism, Mikio Hosokawa (1985, 472) argued this problem in detail and characterized Sorokin’s argument on the “energy of love,” as the “central cohesion which composes the society.” This cohesion is nothing but a personality which is stratified into four parts; biological unconsciousness (subconsciousness), biological consciousness, sociocultural consciousness and superconsciousness (Hosokawa, 1985, 472-473). It was vitally important to emphasize the fact that the psychoanalysts,
represented by Freud, have overlooked the difference between 'unconsciousness' and 'superconsciousness.' To tell the truth, 'superconsciousness,' which seemed to be difficult to explain, is in fact the effusion of 'true love' or 'universal love' (Hosokawa, 1985, 474-476). Of course, this insistence includes criticism toward modern society where it would have spread unessential and unequal love. Finally, Sorokin was convinced that the subsequent society is integrated by this universal love, and this is where the creative culture would arise.

4 Sorokin's critical attitude

As we have seen, Sorokin's major writings, essential fields and fundamental theories were persistently based on the integral philosophy. Therefore, it is true that the more Sorokin clings to integralism, the more severe the conflict with a scholar who is located in the directly opposite position. In the end, I turn to draw an aspect of Sorokin that did not fear the antipathy that naturally lead to, and kept a critical attitude. It is in a festschrift, Sorokin in Review (Allen ed., 1963), that his attitude is clearly shown (Baba, 1964, 1992). On taking this work and his autobiography, A Long Journey (Sorokin, 1963), into consideration, Kazuyuki Iesaka precisely outlined Sorokin's fundamental thought. According to Iesaka:

modesty and confidence, light and shade, harmony and hostility, confrontation or contradiction of joy and sorrow in Sorokin this understanding of reality as coincidentia oppositorum or misterium tremendum et fascinosm had to be the aim of Sorokin's philosophy, that is integralism. (Iesaka, 1965, 492)

Sorokin's criticism of Toynbee and Parsons and even the age in which they lived is concentrated on in the next sections.

4.1 Criticism of Parsons

If we are to consider the relationship between Sorokin and Parsons, the special thesis on 'Christianity and Modern Industrial Society' (Parsons, 1963) which Parsons contributed to Sorokin's festschrift (Tiryakian ed., 1963) must be read. In this paper Parsons
expressed his opinion on Sorokin's famous theory of the ideational, idealistic, and sensate cultural change for the first time. Parsons wrote:

Sorokin, however, clearly regards Protestantism, compared with medieval Catholicism, as primarily a step in the general decline of religiousness, and the secularism which has been prominent since the Age of the Enlightenment as the natural further step in the same direction. (Parsons, 1963)

Parsons states that Sorokin could not evaluate Weber's term innerweltliche Askese [temporal ascesis] properly. In short, Parsons grasps the process of the Christian world since the 18th century as an expansion process of the "institutionalization of the Christian ethics" (Takahashi, 1986, 301). There is a bone of contention between Parsons and Sorokin here.

Modern society is popularly described as the age of specialization or structurization. Religion, of course, could not go against the current of our age. The problem is the secularization of religion. In the face of this reality, Parsons recognized that secularization does not mean the decline of religion but rather is an integrated organ of a subsystem which is differentiated in various fields. This means there is a huge difference in the idea of modern religion between Parsons and Sorokin. Parsons views present secularized religion as an upsurge of solidarity, while Sorokin thought it to be a decline. This difference in the view of the world and religion was the root of the scholarly and personal confrontations between them.

4.2 Criticism of Toynbee

Kazuyuki Iesaka (1955, 142) examined the logical similarity between Sorokin and Toynbee. Sorokin's criticism of Toynbee can be roughly divided into three parts. First is the structure of civilization or the total culture, second is the factor of the changing process of civilization or cultural system, and last is about the diffusion of culture (ibid.). As to the first point, Toynbee called total culture, which includes mere congeries and has no integral parts, a civilization, and unfortunately mixes the cultural system with the social system (Sorokin, 1941: IV, 150; 1950, 214-217). Moreover, Sorokin said that if
Toynbee's "destruction of civilization" means the decay of the cultural system, it makes no sense (Sorokin, 1950, 225-226). Considering this opinion, Iesaka proposes that as Toynbee's "civilization" equals Sorokin's "sociocultural phenomena" which has both characters of culture and society, so Sorokin's "extinction of the social group" can be substituted for Toynbee's "death of civilization" (Iesaka, 1955, 179).

The second point is related to Toynbee's formulation of "the growth of civilization." In short, Toynbee thought of the good environmental conditions, the creative elite, and "challenge and response" as factors of the growth of civilization. But, according to Sorokin's criticism, the word "good condition" is vague. And even if somehow such a condition is made, it is not including the growth of civilization. Instead, Sorokin insists that it is important to discover the beginning of creativity, and to explain the reasons for being creative. And because every society and culture always receives an impulse, "challenge and response" could not be regarded as a factor of civilizational growth. Sorokin's cultural development theory which replaces Toynbee's, considers the fundamental factors to be as follows; to be a creator who has hereditary genius; for a person's expectation to be the creation of a new cultural system, and the most important; to be a junction of various cultural streams (Iesaka, 1955, 180-189).

The third point that Sorokin criticized was directed toward Toynbee's idea on the diffusion and mobility of culture. Toynbee said that civilization is completely transplanted to another society through its period of growth, while in a period of decline it only spreads a little. However Sorokin's criticism was that even though there are growth and decay in civilization, cultural diffusion is limited in a group and never transplants to the other group.

As Iesaka pointed out, in spite of Sorokin's critical manner, his argument very much resembles Toynbee's theories. Therefore, as for a future profitable subject of study, it is important to define Toynbee's standpoint using Sorokin's criticism.

4.3 After the publication of *Social and Cultural Dynamics*

The wide historical view formulated in *Dynamics* is consistent in subsequent Sorokin statements and behavior. Yasujirou Daido (1954) noticed a decisive influence on Sorokin in the essay in which he looked back on his life. Sorokin's character was formed due
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to the following: first, "his international view and erudition comes from the occasion of his spending his life in Russia and America"; second, "the fact he was of Russian peasant origin"; third, he was involved in the Russian Revolution, spent the later half of his life abroad and experienced the transfiguration of modern society; and finally, his talent as a theorist" (Daido, 1954, 295). Such experiences and a career have regulated Sorokin's basic sociological ideas on social change and system for his life. Daido (ibid.) goes on to say that Dynamics is the definitive edition of social change, while "other books were written on the way to this book, and began from this book." Namely, Daido (ibid.) would, on the one hand, regard Dynamics as "the theory of fluctuation," and on the other hand he defines Sorokin's stand point as being a mixed position between the theory of progress and cyclical theory. Though Daido (1954, 297) evaluated the fact that Sorokin tried to apply his integrated historical view to some particular histories, he could not help criticizing Sorokin for having a non-historical attitude.

Further more, Daido (ibid.) praises Society, Culture, and Personality for the reason that this volume does not only add to mere descriptive sociology but also develops a system for a kind of synthetic sociology (general sociology). Generally speaking, according to Daido's appreciation of Society, Culture, and Personality, though the pursuit of the aspect of special sociology is somewhat careless, this volume is worth attending to as a work of general sociology which systematically develops and contains the recent fruit of study (i.e. cultural sociology or research of personality).

The Crisis of Our Age (Sorokin, 1941) could be used as a guidebook for Dynamics. Daido (1958) summarized this work in his article 'Concerning Sorokin's The Crisis of Our Age.' According to Sorokin's interpretation, though present culture faces a crisis, there is a continuation in the next culture. Therefore, even if its shape fundamentally changes, certain things have been lasting in every culture or society (Daido, 1958, 62).

The reason for these thoughts were produced mainly from Sorokin's experience of the Russian Revolution and American rationalism or capitalism (Daido, 1958, 62). As a result, Sorokin's cyclical theory, unlike Spengler's theory, is optimistic and offers a beam of hope. As far as Daido's general criticism of Sorokin is concerned, it could be summarized by saying that Sorokin has a prominent ability for analysis and a vast range in perspective, though his formula of cultural change was oversimplified.
Next, Takao Hakuta wrote an appreciation of *The Crisis of Our Age* (Sorokin, 1941) and *The Reconstruction of Humanity* (Sorokin, 1948). Indeed, Hakuta (1967, 1-3) abstracts Sorokin’s “character of a pluralistic empiricist humanism” from the viewpoint of “the study of the ethical thought that is living in American society.” Sorokin hits upon the idea “to convert mankind to be altruistic and creative,” as a prescription for the crisis of those days, through the process of research in *Dynamics*. And Sorokin tried to popularize the altruism, which was also the conclusion of *Dynamics*, in *The Crisis of Our Age* (Sorokin, 1941), and prepare *The Reconstruction of Humanity* (Sorokin, 1950) as the way of practicing it. But while the importance of these books was fully admitted, Hakuta (1967, 29-31) at the same time picked out some faults. In the first place, it is true that Sorokin was putting emphasis on the commonness of manifold religion, however he could not highlight the heterogeneity. Second, as a result of the emphasis on the *space* in the understanding of history, unfortunately he made light of *time*. In other words, its defect is the lack of recognition that modern culture was born by escaping from the restraint of the medieval culture. The third point is his grasp of the social mechanism which come from culturalism. In short, the socio-existential analysis of the questions of why there is such a result or what its cause is, are indulgent. Fourth, we are too helpless to fight against severe contemporary reality with altruism (Hakuta, 1967, 30-31). And finally, though true altruism must exceeded dialectically to the opposite egoism, Sorokin did not think so.

Conclusion

As we have seen, Sorokin study in Japan has covered his whole aspect to a certain extent, while there was partial deviation. And it is true that his philosophy of ‘integralism’ was not so stressed, but nevertheless a base for understanding was founded. Through these papers, the meaning of *Dynamics*, Sorokin’s foundation field and fundamental theory, or his critical attitude which were all consistent with his ‘integralism,’ has been made more or less clear.

I would like to put his *integralism* in order. First of all, there is integration in the pure theory. To say it more concretely, it is an integration of the causal theory of natural science and the subjective theory in the human or social science. In *Dynamics*
Sorokin called this the causal-meaningful method.

In the second place, it is an integration of the frame of reference for understanding phenomena. Instead of vain efforts that try to deal with a whole sociocultural phenomenon, Sorokin endeavors to discover the integral system in the phenomena.

Third, integration is socio-psychological. Sorokin proposed integrative philosophy to relieve the confusion in modern society, in a word, war or revolution.

The above three integrations were named integralism by Sorokin. One reason that Sorokin's complete view has not risen clearly, is in the fact that the three integrations are mixed in his book. Therefore, when we read Sorokin's works, it is necessary to ask whose integration he supports. As a result, the real intention of Sorokin would most certainly be understood. I expect, in the future, to carry out a similar examination, and to compare world sociological thought and ideal history in several countries. By comparing the influence and reception on worldwide thought of science and scholars in certain countries, it will be possible to make clear the peculiarity and essential character of science and thought in each country.

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*This bibliography is divided into tow parts, 1. Work on Sorokin in Japanese, and 2. Reference Works. The former are listed in chronological order so that the history of Sorokin research in Japanese sociology is easily seen. All papers were written in Japanese and published in Japan. The titles have been translated and put in square bracket, except in case of titles of papers or journals that have already been translated into English. The latter is a Concordance. Japanese words are romanized according to the modified Hepburn system used in the standard Kenkyusha New Japanese-English Dictionary.
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