

THE SOVIET-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION IN 1955-6 AND US-JAPANESE RELATIONS

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Introduction

On 19 October, 1956, Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro and Soviet Premier N.A. Bulganin signed a Joint Declaration in Moscow to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations. The Joint Declaration finally terminated the state of war between the two countries, which had continued for more than ten years since shortly before the end of the Pacific War. Now the postwar Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations started.

The Soviet-Japanese normalization of diplomatic relations was basically a bilateral issue between the Soviet Union and Japan. But in the era of the cold war, the relations between the leading state of the Communist bloc and Japan certainly involved the United States. The U.S. government perceived the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement in the context of cold war power struggles against the Soviet Union, and vice versa.

This essay is intended to describe the development of US-Japanese relations with regard to the Soviet-Japanese normalization. The Soviet-Japanese negotiations commenced for normalizing diplomatic relations, in June 1955 in London. It took a year and half for the two countries to conclude the Joint Declaration. The main cause for this prolongation of negotiations was the difficulty in solving the territorial questions. The territorial questions were also a focus of attention of the U.S. government, which pressed the Japanese to take a tough negotiating position towards the Soviets. This American attitude undoubtedly affected Japanese negotiating attitude and the process and results of the negotiations. This essay places, therefore, a special emphasis on the US-Japanese relations on the Soviet-Japanese territorial disputes.

U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Japan Before Hatoyama

Since the San Francisco Peace Treaty having been ratified in April 1952, the United States government had prepared several versions of general framework of its foreign policy towards Japan. Before Hatoyama replaced Yoshida in December 1954, the National Security Council made two important policy papers: NSC 125/2 in August, 1952, and NSC 125/6 in June, 1953. NSC 125/2 was made by the Truman administration, and its basic elements were substantially inherited by the Eisenhower administration.

One of the most important elements of US attitude to Japan expressed in these two

policy papers was the anxiety over the increasing nationalistic and neutralist tendencies emerging in Japan. NSC 125/2 observed that Japan had started to adopt the foreign policy more independent of American influence. The US government feared that Japan might attempt to take advantage of US-USSR rivalry in order to promote her own national interests.¹ This anxiety seemed mainly caused by the fact that the occupation of Japan had been over and that, therefore, she was expected to take more independent course. NSC 125/6 placed more emphasis on this point and expressed more serious anxiety over the rising Japanese nationalism and neutralism. The Eisenhower administration found neutralist and nationalist tendencies growing stronger in Japan and NSC 125/6 proposed that the United States government attempt to wipe out these tendencies through psychological manoeuvre.²

Both of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations realized that the military security of Japan was vital to American security interests in the far east and regarded Japan as one of the most important allies to the United States in that region. Both of the policy papers suggested that Japan should be rearmed and be offered the US military assistance.³ The US government was in dilemma. It had to press Japan for more intensive rearmament, but had to be extremely careful to avoid forcing her so hard as to induce the existing nationalistic feelings in Japan to anti-Americanism.

Political development in Japan in 1954 proved the American concern. In March, the fifth Lucky Dragon, a Japanese fishing boat, was polluted by the nuclear fallout caused by the US Hydrogen-bomb experiment in the Bikini atoll and some of the fishermen died. This Fifth Lucky Dragon incident evoked anti-American feelings in the Japanese public. The Yoshida government also inclined to adopt more independent foreign policy. On 11 August, Ikeda Hayato, the secretary-general of the Liberal Party, issued a statement of new Japanese foreign policy. It stated that the termination of Indochina war at the Geneva Conference had proved the American 'roll-back' policy to have failed and that though it was not the time for Japan to choose whether she should join the Eastern or Western bloc, Japan should carefully decide her action in view of the conducts of both blocs.⁴

On 1 September, the committee of policy investigation of the Liberal Party published its new comprehensive policy programme. It contained two major foreign policy goals. The first was to exalt the spirit of independence of the Japanese people through efforts to bring about reversion of the former Japanese territories such as the Kuriles and the Bonins. The second was to enhance trade with Communist China and the Southeast Asia.⁵ Nine days later, the party committee for investigation of foreign policy also issued a new foreign policy programme. This suggested that Japan should promote her trade relations with Communist China though she did not intend to recognize her in the near future.⁶

Faced with this development, the US government did not hide displeasure. For in-

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter, cited as *FRUS*.) 1952-54, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, pp. 1302-4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1450.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1307 and pp. 1450-1.

⁴ Hiwatari Yumi, *Sengo Seiji to Nichibeikankei* (Politics in Postwar Japan and US-Japanese Relations) Tokyo, 1990, pp. 96-7.

⁵ Asahi Shimbun, 2 September 1954.

⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 11 September 1954.

stance, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs proposed to take a tough position towards Ikeda's statement. John Alliosn, the American ambassador to Tokyo, also strongly criticized the statement.⁷

From 1952 to 1954, the United States government became increasingly alarmed by the independent and nationalist tendencies of Japan. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Yoshida was replaced by Hatoyama who had been known for being more positive for improving Japan's relations with the communist neighbouring countries.

Advent of the Hatoyama Administration and Its Announcement of Normalization Policy

After the downfall of the Yoshida administration, Hatoyama Ichiro, the president of the Democratic Party, came into office as the prime minister in December 1954.

This change in Japanese political leadership evoked a serious anxiety in the U.S. government. Although the government was not completely satisfied with Yoshida, he was much more favourable to the U.S. interests than the other influential Japanese political figures. At latest in the middle of October 1954, the Department of State had already perceived the decline of Yoshida's political influence and started to estimate the alternatives to him. Herbert Hoover, the undersecretary of state in charge of the Asian affairs, considered that Hatoyama would replace Yoshida but be less conducive to U.S. interests, particularly in the fields of economics and international cooperation. Hoover was more critical about Shigemitsu Mamoru and Kishi Nobusuke.⁸

Immediately after the inauguration of Hatoyama, the 228th meeting of the National Security Council was held in Washington. At the meeting, Allen W. Dulles, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, discussed political situations in Japan. According to his observation, though Hatoyama was regarded as pro-American, his tendencies to favour increased trade between Japan and the communist countries was a source of anxiety.⁹ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also expressed his suspicion that Japan would become more assertive in promoting her trade with Communist China.¹⁰

Thus, the main elements of the American concern about the Hatoyama government were at least the following three. First of all, the Department of State felt uncertain as to whether the Hatoyama administration would continue as cooperative relations with the United States as Yoshida did. Secondly, the department state seemed to doubt the ability of the new Japanese administration to adjust Japan's domestic politics to the U.S. economic and security interests. Finally, the new administration was expected to demand more strongly the promotion of Japan's trade with the communist countries.

After the first meeting of the Hatoyama Cabinet on 10 December, the prime minister stated at a press conference his desire to improve Japan's relations with the USSR and Communist China and expand her trade with them in order to avoid another major war.¹¹

⁷ Hiwatari, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁸ *FRUS, 1952-54*, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, p. 1744.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1796.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1797.

¹¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 Dec. 1954.

The next day, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru issued a statement to outline the foreign policy of the new cabinet. He explained the desire to restore Japan's normal relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China on mutually acceptable conditions based on the principle that Japan would maintain cooperative relations with the free world.¹²

Both Shigemitsu and Hatoyama expected that their new policy towards the communist countries would irritate the Americans. They attempted, therefore, to wipe the possible American suspicion. On 27 December, Shigemitsu remarked in his conversation with Ambassador Allison that his statement on 11 December had been designed to show a positive attitude towards Communist China in order to satisfy and calm down rising nationalistic and anti-American sentiments in Japan.¹³ He intended to assure the Americans that the Japanese government's approach was positive not towards the Soviet Union but towards Communist China and that this primarily for election purposes. Moreover, on 6 January, when he met Allison, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General John B. Hull, the commander in chief in the far east, Shigemitsu emphasized in the strongest possible manner his belief that the fundamental basis of Japanese policy was close and friendly cooperation with the United States.¹⁴

Hatoyama was also anxious about American responses. He sent Matsumoto Takizo, the deputy chief cabinet secretary, who enjoyed close relations with Hatoyama, to the US Embassy on 31 January 1955. Matsumoto suggested to George A. Morgan, the counsellor at the Embassy, 'the prime minister's talk of normalizing relations with the communist bloc was almost entirely for election purposes.'¹⁵ Hatoyama emphasized that the new policy towards the USSR was for the domestic purposes and that the basic principle of foreign policy of his cabinet was to keep cooperative relations with the United States. The prime minister and foreign minister equally perceived the necessity to avoid inflicting any damages to US-Japanese relations.

Dulles Memorandum and Japanese Policy Making

The US government quickly responded to the change in Japanese foreign policy. On 10 January, John Foster Dulles prepared a policy guideline on the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, based on a preliminary study by Robert McClurkin, the director of Office of Northern Asian Affairs. According to the guideline, Dulles stated that no immediate reaction of the US government to the question of Japan's reopening relations with the USSR and Communist China would be taken, because Shigemitsu had assured that Japan's basic policy principle was to promote cooperative relations with the US.¹⁶ In this sense, the efforts to mitigate the American suspicion by the foreign minister and the prime minister were successful. But Dulles felt that it was necessary to provide the Japanese some policy guidance in order to prevent possible future problems which would be caused by Japan's ap-

¹² Mainichi Shimbun, 17 Dec. 1954.

¹³ Memorandum from McClurkin to Robertson, 7 January 1955, 661.941/1-755, the National Archives in Washington D.C., the United States. (Hereafter cited as N.A.).

¹⁴ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 2.

¹⁵ Memorandum of conversation by Morgan, 2 Feb. 1955, 794.00/2-955, N.A.

¹⁶ *FRUS, 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 5.

proach to her communist neighbours.

According to the guideline, the State Department was anxious that the Soviet-Japanese normalization would strengthen the hands of the Socialists and divide the Conservatives in Japan. But it considered that the US government could not strongly oppose the Japanese efforts for normalization because the United States had the normal relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Department was determined to oppose possible Sino-Japanese normalization. The State Department regarded Communist China as more serious menace to the US interests in the far east. McClurkin did not consider that the Soviets would force the Japanese to change their existing relations with the United States, but that Communist China had clearly shown that she would not 'accept any arrangement which left Japan's relations with Nationalist China undisturbed.'¹⁷ Dulles' policy guideline reflected McClurkin's apprehension. Dulles also said that Communist China have every evidence of continuing aggressive policies and that the Sino-Japanese normalization could have dangerous effect on the rest of Asia and its will to resist the communist expansion.¹⁸

A significant fact was that the State Department was aware of a possible linkage between Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations. It assumed that one of Soviet objectives was to 'play upon the difficulty in establishing the relations with Communist China and thus to exacerbate Japan's internal political situation.' In other words, if the United States opposed too strongly Japan's effort for normalization, the Japanese public would realize that it would be more difficult to improve her relations with Communist China because of the US pressure. As a result, Japanese public opinion would strengthen its anti-American tendencies. Thus, the US government was in a serious dilemma. If Japan could succeed in normalizing her relations with the USSR, it would certainly stimulate the Japanese hope to improve their relations with Communist China. It cannot, however, oppose too strongly Japan's efforts for normalization for at least the two reasons mentioned above. In these circumstances, the US had to take an extremely cautious policy towards Japan. Otherwise, the U.S. would be put in the position of suffering 'major public diplomatic defeat prejudicial to the basic US-Japanese security alignment.'¹⁹ This dilemma logically led the US government to take a subtle policy. It should not explicitly oppose Japan's efforts for normalizing her relations with the USSR, but if Japan showed any move to recognize Communist China, the U.S. government should intervene the negotiations more explicitly to prevent it.²⁰

As for the territorial issue, the guideline recommended that the U.S. support the Japanese claim for the sovereignty of the Habomais and Shikotan.²¹ The U.S. government had continued to take this position since the San Francisco Peace Conference. Dulles, who had been an author of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, had enunciated at the conference that the Habomais were the inalienable territory of Japan. He knew that the possible maximum Japanese demand which could be legally supported was the reversion of the

¹⁷ 'United States Attitude Toward The Opening of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and the Communist Bloc' from McClurkin to Robertson, 7 January 1955, 661.941/1-755, N.A.

¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Habomais and Shikotan. In addition, the secretary may have expected that Japan's territorial demand on those islands would be an effective instrument to make the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks difficult enough for the Japanese to give up taking a next step to normalize Sino-Japanese relations.

Thus, the basic policy of US State Department on the issue of the Soviet-Japanese normalization can be summarized as follows. The US government should not explicitly obstruct the normalization between the USSR and Japan. But it should put some subtle pressure on Japan in order to make it difficult and to prevent more serious future menace: Sino-Japanese normalization.

This policy principle of the U.S. government was translated into more specific expression of the conditions acceptable to the US government and of its hope towards the Japanese. On 26 January, 1955, a memorandum prepared by Secretary Dulles was sent to Allison, which was designed to be orally informed to the Japanese leaders. The Secretary Dulles memorandum aimed to exert implicit influence on Japanese negotiating policy. The significant points was contained in it are as follows. Firstly, the memorandum suggested that the United States could not allow the existing relations established by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan's treaty with the Nationalist China to be altered as a result of Soviet-Japanese normalization. Particularly, the US government could not accept participation of Communist China in the negotiations.²² This was a clear warning against Japan's neutralization and Sino-Japanese normalization. Secondly, Dulles expressed that the US government hoped for Japan to obtain significant concessions from the Soviet Union on the following issues: the repatriation of the Japanese detainees in Russia, the Soviet unconditional support for Japan's admission to the United Nations, and fishery arrangements. Then, he added in the memorandum that his government expected Japan to prevent the Soviets from extending the espionage subversion and propaganda network in Japan. As a whole, Dulles urged in the memorandum Japan to take a tough position during the normalization talks with the USSR.²³

On the territorial issue, the memorandum said, 'any arrangements Japan makes with [the] Soviets should not be inconsistent with [the] San Francisco Peace Treaty.' Then it continued that the US would continue to support Japan's claim that the Habomais and Shikotan were not part of the Kuriles and remained the territory of Japan.²⁴ In other words, the US government would support the Japanese territorial claim which was consistent with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. More specifically, given the fact that Japan had renounced the Kuriles in the Peace Treaty, the US could support her claim only for the territories which could not be regarded as part of the Kuriles. Because the Habomais and Shikotan were not considered as part of them, she would support Japan's demand. It must be noted that the US government did not intend to endorse the further territorial claim by Japan, such as the restoration of Kunashiri and Etorofu.

This American attitude was a cautious one. The reasons for it were at least the following two. First, the Americans tried not to press the Japanese to take too a hard negotiating position. It was difficult at that time to suppose that the Russians would make

²² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

any concessions to Japan's territorial demands even on the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan. In March, Dulles said that 'it would be contrary to experience to expect the Soviets to return any of their present possessions to the Japanese.'²⁵ The same impression was shared by some of Japanese leaders. Hatoyama and his foreign policy advisers such as Sugihara Arata, seem to have considered that the Japanese government should try to achieve normalization even if the territorial questions could not be solved in the negotiations.²⁶ Under these circumstances, if the United States insisted that Japan take a tougher territorial demand than that on the Habomais and Shikotan, the normalization talks with the Soviets would be stuck and the US government would have to take the responsibility for the failure in the negotiations. This would cause stronger anti-Americanism in Japan. Moreover, Dulles must have thought that the US support for Japan's claim to the Habomais and Shikotan was a sufficient political instrument to make the Soviet-Japanese normalization difficult to achieve and to prevent the Japanese from holding a positive prospect for improving Sino-Japanese relations.²⁷

Secondly, the US attitude was influenced by her consideration regarding Sino-US relations. In September 1954, Communist China had attacked Quemoy and Matsu and the Formosa crisis had been opened up. Supporting the Nationalist China, the United States was extremely sensitive to any events which could be damaging to the status of Nationalist China. Japan had renounced Formosa in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as well as the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. But the Peace Treaty had not decided the country to which those territories finally would belong. If the United States supported further Japanese territorial claim to the islands which should be regarded as part of the Kuriles by asserting invalidity of Soviet possession of the sovereignty over those islands, the legal validity of Nationalist China's rule over Formosa would inevitably be in question. Dulles seemed to realize this. On 28 January, at the meeting with Iguchi Sadao, the Japanese ambassador to the US, Dulles referred to the Habomais and Formosa problems. The details about Dulles' remarks are not recorded. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that Iguchi responded to Dulles by emphasizing the distinction between those two issues, it can be assumed that Dulles may have contended as above.²⁸

On the same day, the contents of the Dulles memorandum was conveyed by Allison to Tani Masayuki, a consultant of the Foreign Ministry. Although Tani said to Allison that its contents were identical with what Shigemitsu and he had already had in their minds,²⁹ the Dulles memorandum undoubtedly was to influence the negotiating policy of the Japanese government. Perhaps, the foreign minister and his close colleagues were so sensitive to the US attitude as to formulate their negotiating policy by predicting the possible US attitude. At any rate, the Japanese negotiating policy could not be formulated without taking the US response into account.

The Soviets favourably responded to the new foreign policy announced by the Hato-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁶ Hatoyama Ichiro, *Hatoyama Ichiro Kaikoroku* (Memoirs of Hatoyama Ichiro) Tokyo, 1957, p. 176; 'Hoppo Ryodo Mondai O Saiko Suru' (Reexamining the Northern Territories Questions), *Sekai*, February, 1992, pp. 203-4.

²⁷ Wada, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

²⁸ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. 23, p. 13.

²⁹ Allison to Dulles, 28 Jan. 1955, 661.941/1-2855, N.A.

yama government in December 1954. On 25 January 1955, the former Soviet Mission for the Allied Council for Japan proposed to start the negotiations. The Japanese government finally decided to agree with the Soviet proposal on 4 February. The Japanese government seemed to define its territorial demand against the Soviets around that time. On the day, Shima Shigenobu, the minister of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, visited the Department of State and told that the Foreign Ministry wished to maintain the position that the minimum acceptable condition would be the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan, with the hope that the Soviets would agree to reconsider later the Japanese claim to the Kuriles.³⁰

The Foreign Ministry clearly defined Japan's minimum condition for normalization was to restore the Habomais and Shikotan. Here can be seen the influence of the Dulles memorandum of 26 January. The Foreign Ministry knew, through the Allison-Tani conversations on 28 January, that the US government would support Japan's claim for those islands and that Japan could rely on the US at least in demanding against the USSR the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan.

An interesting fact is, however, that Shima also requested the US government to endorse Japan's claim to the Kuriles. He told that taking such a firm position against the Soviet Union over the territorial issue was very important to gain support from the Japanese public which was showing strong nationalistic sentiments. Then, he requested the US government to imply in some form that it had been wrong in 'agreeing to offer the Kuriles to the Soviet Union in the Yalta Agreement.'³¹

The resurgence of the nationalistic sentiments in Japan was widely observed at that time. For instance, John Coulson, the assistant under-secretary of the British Foreign Office, stated in a Foreign Office minute that there was a hysteric nationalistic mood in Japan.³² Hence, Shima's account about the public sentiments in Japan was well-evidenced. There was also strong anti-normalization factions in the conservatives in Japan, such as the Yoshida faction. The Hatoyama government needed badly to deter and tame the anti-normalization forces.

More importantly, the Japanese must have realized the necessity to show the US government their intention to be tough against the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, the Japanese leaders had feared that the US might regard Japan's efforts for normalization with Russia as a sign of her neutralist orientation. Although the Foreign Ministry had to make it clear that it did not intend to erode the substance of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it also had to show that Japan would propose the strongest territorial demand against the Soviets in order to wipe the American suspicion.

Responding Shima's request, McClurkin asked Conrad Snow, the assistant legal adviser of the State Department, if the US could support Japan's claim for the Kuriles. Snow's answer was negative. He contended that, because Japan had irrevocably renounced the Kuriles in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the disposition of the islands must be decided by some future international action, 'such as an accord among the Allied powers, including

³⁰ Hoover to Tokyo, 4 Feb. 1955, 661.491/2-455, N.A.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Foreign Office Minute by Coulson, 7 Feb. 1955, FO371 115239, FJ1061/2. Public Record Office in Kew, UK. (Hereafter, cited as P.R.O.)

the Soviet Union.' With regard to the Habomais and Shikotan, Snow confirmed that because those islands were not part of the Kuriles, Japan had never renounced them. The United States government could, therefore, only support Japan's claim for them.³³ The Department of State had to continue to follow the policy guideline made by Dulles on 10 January.

NSC 5516/1 and Sebald Memorandum

At the end of February, Hatoyama's Democratic Party won the general election. Now that his administration was no longer a care-taker government, the US government started to re-examine its overall policy framework towards Japan. On 7 April, the National Security Council formulated NSC 5516/1 as a basis of US policy towards Japan. Regarding the Soviet-Japanese relations, this NSC paper contained the following paragraphs:

42. Take the position with Japanese government that the United States does not object to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, but does oppose establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China and would object strongly to political association by Japan with Communist nations in such actions as non-aggression pacts or efforts to facilitate entry of Communist China into the UN.

43. Support Japan's claim against the Soviet Union for sovereignty over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan; do not concede the Soviet Union's claim to sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and Southern Shakhalin.³⁴

In fact, these two paragraphs contained almost all of the basic principles of US policy towards Japan which had been examined since the beginning of January. After NSC 5516/1 was approved by President Eisenhower, these principles were constantly followed by the government until the end of the normalization talks.

An interesting fact was that NSC 5516/1 was a result of a minor amendment of NSC 5516. On 7 April, at the 224th NSC meeting, Secretary Dulles requested to amend paragraph 44 of NSC 5516, which read 'Support Japan's claim against the Soviet Union for sovereignty over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan; treat as legally invalid the Soviet Union claim to sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin.'³⁵ Criticizing that, Dulles argued that the US government could not state that the Soviet claim to the Kuriles was invalid, because 'the Soviet claim to the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin was substantially the same as our claim to be in the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands.' He realized that the Ryukyus were much more important to the US than the Kuriles were to the USSR. The US government could, therefore, not sacrifice the Ryukyus for gaining the Kuriles on behalf of the Japanese.

One of Dulles' main concerns regarding US-Japanese relations was treatment of Okinawa and the Bonins. He was fully aware of the irredentism intensified by rising nationalistic sentiments in the Japanese public. On 10 March, when Allen Dulles suggested

³³ *FRUS, 1955-57*, Vol. 23, pp. 11-12.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

that 'there was some slight chance that the Soviets might return the Habomais,' the secretary of state professed his fear that, in case of Soviet returning the Kuriles, 'the US would at once experience heavy Japanese pressure for the return of the Ryukyus to Japanese control.'³⁶ From the viewpoint of Dulles, the Kuriles problem was inseparably connected to the Okinawa problem. If the US government implied the legal invalidity of Soviet occupation of the Kuriles, the nationalistic Japanese public opinion would, Dulles supposed, take advantage of it. He had to avoid it. The US government was, to stick to its principle that it could speak out only its support for Japan's claim for the Habomais and Shikotan.

On the basis of NSC 5516/1, the Department of State started to formulate more specific policy. On 20 April, William Sebald, the deputy assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, prepared a detailed memorandum on the policy position to be taken by the US government. The Sebald memorandum clearly figured that the US government was anxious about the Soviet-Japanese normalization itself. It defined Soviet broad objectives as weakening US-Japanese alliance, establishing mission and consular offices in Japan, and confirming of their territorial position in the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. These objectives were undoubtedly against the US vital interests in the far east. The US policy on the Soviet-Japanese normalization was in the broader context designed to prevent these objectives from being achieved. As mentioned above, the US government regarded Sino-Japanese rapprochement as more serious menace than the Soviet-Japanese one. But this does not mean that the latter was not perceived as a menace to the US.

For that purpose, Sebald suggested that the government should avoid appearance of its involvement in the negotiations, but that, US interests being directly affected, the government should make its views known to the Japanese and the Soviets. He added that 'it will also to be our advantage to exploit serious differences between Japan and the USSR as showing Soviet intransigence.'³⁷

Then, Sebald moved to the substantive issues. As for the territorial issues, he expected the Japanese to demand all or part of the Kuriles as well as the Habomais and Shikotan. He recommended that the US government continue to support Japan's claim for the Habomais and Shikotan, 'on the theory that they are not part of the Kuriles.'³⁸ That was a clear deviation from the previous position of the department. It must be now remembered that Conrad Snow had clearly contended that the US could not support Japan's for the Kuriles because Japan had irrevocably claim renounced them in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Sebald recommended to sacrifice Snow's legal interpretation for a political purpose to obstruct the Soviet objectives.

Sebald assessed that the Kuriles were 'strategically important to the free world' and argued that Japan's claim for those islands and US support for it would prevent Japan's tacit recognition of the Soviet occupation. But he also recognized that the US could not announce her support too strongly because that sort of US support might affect her occupation of Okinawa and the status of Formosa. Moreover, he considered that 'the hostile presence of the Soviet Union on Japan's northern border will serve as a constant irritant

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-6.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

in their relations,' which the US had to take advantage of. In other words, Sebald thought that the Soviet-Japanese territorial disputes should be remained as a wedge between the two countries.

Hence, he recommended a less explicit support.

On balance, however, it would appear desirable that as a minimum we offer no objection to efforts on the part of Japan to get all or part of the Kuriles, either as part of a deal whereby Japan might recognize a valid Soviet claim to South Sakhalin. . . . , or even on the basis of a Soviet recognition of Japan's residual sovereignty over all or part of the Kuriles, comparable to our position in the Ryukyus and the Bonins.

Sebald also seemed to rely on the possibility that the International Court of Justice would legally interpret some islands which had been supposed to be part of the Kuriles were in fact, not part of them. He wrote, 'We should also support any proposal by Japan to refer territorial issues to the International Court of Justice.'³⁹ If the ICJ decided as above, the US government could become able to support more openly Japan's claim for the Kuriles.

Apart from the territorial issue, the Sebald memorandum also referred to the possibility of linkage between the Soviet-Japanese normalization and Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The memorandum recommended that the government tell the Japanese not to allow the Soviets to press Japan to recognize Communist China for the purpose to impair Japan's relations with Nationalist China.⁴⁰

Sebald aimed to influence Japan's negotiating policy making and recommended to sent his memorandum to Matsumoto Shunichi, who had been appointed the plenipotentiary of the normalization talks.

'Instruction No. 16' and Territorial Question

From February to late May, the Japanese government was engaged in formulating a general policy guideline for the negotiations with Russia. Sugihara Arata, a foreign policy adviser to Hatoyama, and Tani were assigned to the policy making. At latest before 24 May, they accomplished the policy guideline, which was called 'Instruction No. 16'.⁴¹ It seems that the Sebald memorandum had some effects on the guideline. The memorandum was, in fact, sent to Allison, and on 10 May, he informed Tani of the US positions. On 25 May, Tani said at his meeting with Allison that Japanese position was substantially in line with US thinking.⁴²

'Instruction No. 16' indicated the following policy principles. First of all, the Japanese negotiators should proceed with normalization within the limitation set by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japanese Security Pact. Instruction No. 16

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴¹ Wada Haruki, *Hoppo Ryodo Mondai O Kangaeru* (Examining the Northern Territories Questions) Tokyo, 1990, p. 145. As for the contents of the Instruction No. 16, see Kubota Masaaki, *Kuremurin eno Shisetsu—Hoppo Ryodo Kosho 1955-83* (Mission to the Kremlin—negotiations on the Northern Territories Question) Tokyo, 1983, pp. 32-34, and p. 74. The substance of 'Instruction No. 16' seemed to be communicated to the Department of State on 2 June. See Robertson to Hoover, 2 June 1955, 661.94/255, N.A.

⁴² *FRUS. 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 68, footnote 2.

clearly provided that the main goal of the normalization talks was limited to concluding a peace treaty with the USSR, and it excluded the possibility of a neutrality pact and of disarming Japan. Secondly, Instruction No. 16 defined the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan and the repatriation of Japanese detainees in Russia as conditions prerequisite to the conclusion of a peace treaty.

On the territorial issue, Instruction No. 16 read as follows:

C. Territorial problems.

- (1) the return of the Habomais and Shikotan;
- (2) the return of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin;⁴³

Thus, it instructed the Japanese negotiators to demand the reversion of the Habomais, Shikotan, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin; in other words, all of the territories Japan had lost to the Soviet Union at the end of the Pacific War. But Instruction No. 16 clearly divided those islands into two categories: those territories which could be given up during the negotiations, and those that should be demanded to the last as a condition prerequisite to normalization. The latter contained the Habomais and Shikotan, and the former the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese government intended to show the toughest demand against the Russians first, and to retreat from it to the minimum condition later.

This Instruction No. 16 was merely a basic guideline. The Foreign Ministry later prepared a more specific additional guidance on the territorial issue. Shimoda Takezo, then the director of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry, recalls in his memories:

... before Plenipotentiary Matsumoto left for London, we examined within the Foreign Ministry how to proceed with the negotiations. At that time, the following plan which consisted of three stages was discussed: (1) To assert that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, the Northern Territories are Japanese territories, (2) To make the restoration of Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomais and Shikotan the condition for normalization, (3) To demand the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. As a result of examination of these, the first option was adopted as the policy of the government, because it was considered reasonable to put forward the maximum demand.⁴⁴

Matsumoto also made it clear that he was instructed as above, in his interview with the American scholar, Donald C. Hellman.⁴⁵ As shown above, Japan's negotiating tactics was to retreat from the strongest demand to the minimum one through the three stages.

A significant fact is that the additional guidance was possibly made under the influence of the Sebald memorandum. The memorandum suggested that the United States government would not object Japan's claim for all or part of the Kuriles. Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry executive officials who faced the memorandum must have considered that the US government might support Japan's claim for the Kuriles and that it insinuated that Japan should demand the southern Kuriles before retreating to the minimum condi-

⁴³ Kubota, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁴⁴ Shimoda Takezo, *Sengo Nihon Gaiko No Shogen* (Witness to Diplomacy of Post war Japan) Part 1, Tokyo, 1984, p. 142.

⁴⁵ Donald C. Hellman, *Japanese Foreign Policy And Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley, 1969, p. 59.

tion. In addition, they considered it was desirable to delay the progress of the negotiations until the result of the Geneva Conference in July became clear, and to tame the nationalistic sentiments in Japan. It is not unlikely that they took advantage of the Sebald memorandum to support their own gradual retreating tactics.⁴⁶

The First London Talks

The normalization talks started between Matsumoto and Yakob Malik, the Soviet plenipotentiary, on 1 June in London. At the early stage of the negotiations, it soon became clear that the Soviet negotiating attitude was tough and rigid. During the first two months, the negotiations focused the territorial issue and the question of repatriation of Japanese detainees. As expected before their starting, the negotiations stagnated over those issues.

Early in August, however, the Soviets suddenly softened their attitude. They proposed to return the Habomais and Shikotan on condition that Japan recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁴⁷ Perhaps, the Russians may have desired to settle the negotiations as soon as possible by making significant concessions. But they may also have intended to disturb US-Japanese relations. A US-Japanese foreign minister's meeting was to be held in Washington at the end of August.

Plenipotentiary Matsumoto, who was close to Hatoyama, was delighted by the Soviet proposal. But the Foreign Ministry responded quite differently. It wondered what kind of compensation the Soviets would demand in return for their territorial concession.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Japanese could not recognize the Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, because of domestic and external pressure. The Japanese must have realized that, if they accepted the Soviet proposal, it would mean a deviation from the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which the US government had continuously warned against. It must be noted that at the time of ratification of the Peace Treaty in the US Congress in 1952, the Senate had declared that the Peace Treaty should never provide the Soviet Union with any territorial gain, in particular over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

Under these circumstances, the Foreign Ministry formulated a new territorial demand responding the Soviet concession, on around 18 August.⁴⁹ This new demand was embodied in the following instructions.

- (a) The delegates ought to make the utmost effort to obtain the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan unconditionally and should attempt to regain Kunashiri and Etorofu.

⁴⁶ Memorandum by Morgan, the counselor of the American Embassy, to the Department of State, 2 June, 1955, 661.94/6-255, N.A.

⁴⁷ Shigemitsu Akira, *Hoppo Ryodo Mondai To Soren Gaiko* (The Northern Territories Questions and Soviet Foreign Policy) Tokyo, 1983, p. 82; Matsumoto Shunichi, *Mosukuwa Ni Kakeru Niji—Nisso Kokko Kaifuku Hiroku* (Rainbow Bridge with Moscow: Secret Records of Soviet-Japanese Normalization), Tokyo, 1964, p. 43.

⁴⁸ Minute by C.T. Crowe, 29 August, 1955, FO371 115234 FJ10338/66, P.R.O.

⁴⁹ Kubota, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80; Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Zoku Shigemitsu Mamoru Shuki* (Diary of Shigemitsu Mamoru, vol. 2) Tokyo, 1980, pp. 731-2; Wada *op. cit.*, pp. 164-5.

- (b) The delegates should contrive to reach an agreement to convene an international conference to discuss the territorial disposal of the northern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁵⁰

These new instructions were sent to London on 27 August and shown to the Russians, three days later.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the return of the Habomais and Shikotan was the maximum concession. Malik could not, therefore, accept the new Japanese proposal and Soviet attitude became tougher. On 6 September, Malik added new conditions for return of the Habomais and Shikotan: that is, non-fortification and non-militarization of those islands.⁵¹ These new Soviet conditions were not acceptable to the Japanese government. Now the London Talks reached a stalemate.

It is not yet entirely clear what role the US government played during the first London talks. But there are several facts to be mentioned. Firstly, the Japanese government tried to derive some US support for its territorial claim, in June. The Japanese sent the State Department a questionnaire containing the following two questions.

- (1) Should the Yalta Agreement, which was not known to Japan at the time of its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and which was not referred to in the said Declaration, be considered the determination by the Allied Powers as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the said Declaration?⁵²
- (2) Does the American government consider that the Soviet Union can singly and unilaterally decide the disposition of the sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin?⁵³

The answer from the Department of State was sent as a telegramme from Dulles to the Embassy of Japan, on 1 July. According to this, the US government reconfirmed its support for Japan's claim to the Habomais and Shikotan. Then, the State Department answered the first question favourably to the Japanese. It defined the Yalta Agreement merely as a statement of common purpose arrived at by heads of the three Great Powers, but not as the determination referred to paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. As for the second question, the answer was also favourable. It said that though Japan had renounced the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Treaty did not transfer these islands to any country, and concluded that the ultimate disposition of southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be decided by a future international agreement.⁵⁴

This telegramme was handed over to Tani on 4 July.⁵⁵ It was clearly intended to encourage the Japanese to continue to take the tough territorial demand against the Russians. With this support from the US, the Japanese continued to take a tough stance.

Due to the lack of documents available, it is extremely difficult to clarify how the US

⁵⁰ Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁵¹ Minute by Allen, 7 Sept. 1955, FO371 115234, FJ10338/68, P.R.O.

⁵² Lord Reading to Ambassador Nishi, 23 July 1956, FO371, 121080, FJ10338/35, P.R.O. No US document regarding this questionnaire could be found, but this British document includes an English version of the first part of the questionnaire.

⁵³ Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-1, Any official documents of the questionnaire could not be found.

⁵⁴ *FRUS. 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, pp. 74-5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75, footnote 7.

government reacted to the sudden change in Soviet attitude in early August. As mentioned before, the Foreign Ministry made the new territorial demand on around 18 August. According to Shigemitsu Diary, he met Allison on the day before, but there is no indication of their talks on the territorial issue.⁵⁶ It is difficult to say definitely that Shigemitsu made the new territorial demands against Russia under US influence. But we cannot dismiss that possibility, either.

An interesting fact is that the Department of State seemed to predicted Japan's reaction in case of Soviet territorial concession. A position paper was prepared on 22 August for the forthcoming Shigemitsu-Dulles conversation which was to start on 29 August, and it expected the Japanese to request the US during the conversations to endorse Japan's claim to the Habomais and Shikotan and for Kunashiri and Etorofu. Also, Japan was supposed to ask to support convening an international conference in order to determine the territorial status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁵⁷

Based on these predictions, the position paper recommended that the US should support Japan's claim for the Habomais and Shikotan. According to this paper, however, the US could not fix her position regarding Etorofu and Kunashiri because of the lack of information and investigation. Added to that, the paper clearly rejected the idea of holding an international conference, on the ground that the Soviets would never participate and that such an attempt would be interpreted by the other signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty as evidence of Japan's ambition for overall alteration of the peace treaty, especially reversion of Formosa.

Thus, the US government was not prepared to support openly all of the new Japanese territorial demands. In the Shigemitsu-Dulles conversations in Washington at the end of August, Dulles expressed his satisfaction with Japan's careful handling of the negotiations and encouraged Shigemitsu to take continuously a tough negotiating stance. But no detailed discussion on the territorial issue seems to have held, except that the secretary of state referred to Article 25 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty implying that the USSR should not gain the sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁵⁸ No documents were found describing what Shigemitsu and Dulles talked about Kunashiri and Etorofu. It is not yet clear whether Shigemitsu informed the US of the Soviet territorial concession made on 9 August and the new demands of Japan. At any rate, however, Dulles was not in the position to support Japan's claim for those islands. As already mentioned, the US government could not openly endorse Japan's efforts to restore the Kuriles. Unless Kunashiri and Etorofu were defined as not part of the Kuriles by such a legal authority as the ICJ, the US government could not support the Japanese claim to those two islands.

More important was the State Department's reaction against the new Russian proposal of 6 September against the new Japanese demands. On 18 September, Walter Robertson, the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, observed that while the influence of Shigemitsu, who had been regarded by him as 'the most outspoken advocate of hard bargaining with the Soviets,' was declining, the Hatoyama government might well decide to settle the

⁵⁶ *Zoku Shigemitsu Mamoru Shuki*, p. 731.

⁵⁷ A position paper prepared by Pfeiffer, entitled 'Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Visit, Wasnington, August 25-September 1, 1955; Japan-USSR Negotiations' SHV D12, 22 August, 1955, FE File, Lot 60 D330, 56-D225, 56D256, Box 7, N.A.

⁵⁹ *FRUS. 1955-57*, Vol. 23, pp. 90-6.

negotiations with the Soviets.⁶⁰ The Americans clearly became increasingly worried that the Japanese would settle the negotiations on the Soviet terms. The US government could not tolerate this.

Robertson recommended, then, to advise the Japanese leaders of the US views on the following three points:

- (a) we hope Japan will do nothing implying recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and south Sakhalin and we believe disposition of these territories should be left for future international decision.
- (b) the Soviet proposal to prohibit entry into the Japan Sea by warships of non-riparian powers violates international law and would virtually nullify the naval aspects of the US-Japanese Security Treaty, and
- (c) the Soviet proposal for demilitarization of the Habomais and Shikotan would appear to be an unjustifiable derogation of Japanese sovereignty over these islands.⁶¹

Robertson's message was clear: Japan should not recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin but continue to be tough. The US had kept insisting that Japan could not conclude with the USSR a peace treaty contradictory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. [If Japan recognized Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it would be a clear violation of the Peace Treaty, which the US could not accept. Robertson feared that Shigemitsu's decline would result in relative increase in Hatoyama's influence in the Japanese cabinet and in the Soviet-Japanese normalization on the Soviet terms.

Robertson's recommendation was implemented. On 22 September 1955, Allison communicated the abovementioned US position to Tani and Shigemitsu.⁶² Shigemitsu responded it, stating emphatically that the Japanese government did not intend to change its previous position vis-a-vis Soviet negotiations.⁶³ On 15 September, Shigemitsu met Ashida Hitoshi, one of the Party leaders, and Shigemitsu made it clear that he intended to conclude the negotiations by restoring the Habomais and Shikotan. He may have considered that Japan should continue to take tough stance against the Soviets in order to make the Soviets retreat from the position expressed on 6 September and to conclude the peace treaty on condition that the USSR return the Habomais and Shikotan with hoping that the Soviets and Japan would reconsider the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin later. At this stage of the negotiations, the US position seemed quite identical with Shigemitsu's. But his conversation with Ashida shows that he still considered that the minimum condition for normalization was to restore the Habomais and Shikotan.

Hatoyama was much more inclined to accept the Soviet term. On 5 October, Allison met him in Tokyo and discussed the territorial issue. The prime minister stated that the Soviet-Japanese negotiations would be settled soon and that Japan had already relinquished her rights to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin at signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Although he was determined to get back the Habomais and Shikotan unconditionally, Hatoyama was reluctant to continue to demand the reversion of the Kuriles and southern

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

Sakhalin.⁶⁴

Perhaps, there was a struggle between Shigemitsu and Hatoyama over how to proceed with the negotiations with Russia. Shigemitsu may have desired to continue to take a tough position in order to satisfy the United States. From his viewpoint, Japan could accept the Soviet terms later, but she should continue to be tough until it became clear that she had done everything to resist the Soviet claim. On the other hand, Hatoyama was in a hurry to settle the negotiations.

Shigemitsu probably attempted to deter Hatoyama by obtaining a clear support from the US for Japan's claim for Kunashiri and Etorofu. [On 12 October, Shigemitsu met Allison and handed him a note explaining the Japanese government's opinion that Kunashiri and Etorofu were not part of the Kuriles. In addition, he probably handed Allison a questionnaire including the following two questions as to:

- (1) Whether the leaders of the Allied Powers participating in the Yalta Conference recognized the following historical facts when they adopted the words 'the Kuriles' in the Yalta Agreement: that Kunashiri and Etorofu which are directly adjacent to Hokkaido were inalienable Japanese territories where Japanese people had lived in large numbers, that those islands had never belonged to any foreign countries, and that in the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 'the Kuriles' were defined as only 18 islands located northward from Etorofu.
- (2) Whether the United States government who played the main role in drafting the San Francisco Peace Treaty understood that 'the Kuriles, in Article 2 (c) did not include Kunashiri and Etorofu.⁶⁵

The Department of State's reply to this questionnaire was conveyed to Tani by Allison on 21 October. The substance of the reply was interestingly almost identical with the Sebald memorandum of 20 April and can be summarized as follows. First, neither the Yalta Agreement nor the San Francisco Peace Treaty contained no definition of the range of the Kuriles. The territorial definition of the Kuriles was not made at the Yalta Conference or in the drafting process of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Second, therefore, the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be subject to a future international decision. But such a settlement could not be expected at this moment.

Then, the Department's reply moved to some recommendations. It said:

As an alternative, the US government has no objection to Japan's efforts to persuade the Russians to return Kunashiri and Etorofu on the ground that those islands are not part of the Kuriles. Considering the Soviet position which has so far been announced, however, it is unlikely that the Japanese demands would be successful. In case of failure, it is advisable for the Japanese government to assert that the questions about 'the Kuriles' should be submitted to the ICJ by both the interested countries. As another alternative, the US government has no objection to the Japanese and the Soviets reaching agreement that the Soviet Union would return those two islands to Japan in exchange for the latter's confirmation in a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty that

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁶⁵ Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

she renounced the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁶⁶

The State Department's reply showed that the US refused to support the Japanese idea of holding an international conference to decide the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. As for Kunashiri and Etorofu, the reply expressed that the US government would not positively support Japan's claim for Kunashiri and Etorofu, but that it would not oppose Japan's efforts. In this sense, the US government tried to avoid backing openly Japan's claim for those islands. The reason for this cautious American attitude was that those two islands could not yet legally be defined as not part of the Kuriles. That is why consulting the ICJ was recommended. As the last sentence of the above paragraph shows, however, it seemed that the Department of State encouraged the Japanese to continue to demand the reversion of those islands in their negotiations. The Japanese government failed in obtaining clear US support for its claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu. But it could not stop demanding those islands. It seems that the Americans caught this opportunity to use Japan's claim for Kunashiri and Etorofu as an effective instrument to prevent Soviet-Japanese normalization from being achieved. At any rate, the US reply, though ambiguous, could be used to deter Hatoyama.

On 15 November, the so-called Conservative Merger was achieved and the Liberal Democratic Party was established. The newly born Liberal-Democratic Party issued a new foreign policy platform on the same day, which included a policy formula regarding the territorial issue. The policy formula of the Party contained the very same contents as the counter proposal against the Soviet territorial concessions made in early August. The Party formula insisted that Japan should demand the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu and submit the problems of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to an international conference. Interestingly, Shigemitsu issued, however, a strong critical statement against the Party policy formula. Faced with a draft of the formula, he stated on 8 November that the Party should not get involved too much in the negotiations by making a specific negotiating policy.⁶⁷ Having followed his original three-stage negotiating tactics, he wanted to proceed with the negotiations flexibly enough for him to be able to retreat from the present Japanese demand to the minimum one. But the new Party foreign policy formula certainly shackled him. Perhaps, the anti-normalization factions in the former Liberal Party may have exerted a great influence on the making of the policy formula which had an effect to make the Japanese territorial demand rigid against the Russians.

It can be argued that the Party formula reflected the influence of the State Department's reply on 21 October. In fact, the contents of the reply were leaked to the press and the conservative leaders, in particular, those of anti-normalization factions, must have known that the United States had no objection to Japan's efforts to restore Kunashiri and Etorofu. Perhaps, some of them must have assumed that the real intention of US government might be to use Kunashiri and Etorofu as a wedge to prevent normalization. If so, the State Department's reply played a significant role in depriving the Japanese negotiating policy of flexibility by supporting indirectly anti-normalization factions in Japan.

The US government seemed to welcome the Conservative Merger. McClurkin stated that 'the majority conservative government will be more responsible than the present Hato-

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-3.

⁶⁷ Mainichi Shimbun, 9 Nov. 1955.

yama minority regime and will be more capable of getting things done.' 'With Liberals sharing the responsibility,' he continued, 'there will be less flirtation with the communist orbit and a clearer affirmation of Japan's ties with the Free World.'⁶⁸ This estimation must have been an indirect indication of American favourable response to the new negotiating policy made by the new Liberal-Democratic Party.

At the same time, the Soviet attitude became more rigid on the territorial issue. On 21 September, Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the USSR Communist Party, met a Japanese parliamentary delegation visiting Moscow. There he accused the Japanese government of intentionally delaying normalization without being satisfied with Soviet territorial concessions and implied that the Soviet Union was determined to refuse the territorial demand of Japan. He asserted that the territorial problem had already been solved with the Yalta Agreement, but that the Soviet government was willing to concede the Habomais and Shikotan, as an indication of Soviet good-will to the Japanese.⁶⁹ British Ambassador Sir William Hayter in Moscow observed that the Soviet government now adopted the 'we can wait' attitude.⁷⁰

First Moscow Talks and Shigemitsu-Dulles Conversation

The Second London Talks started in January 1956. Under the circumstances mentioned above, the negotiations could not make very much progress on the territorial issue, though the two plenipotentiaries reached agreements on most of the other issues. Shortly after the end of the second London talks, the fisheries negotiations were held in May and Minister for Agriculture and Forestry Kono Ichiro visited Moscow as the plenipotentiary. During the negotiations, when Soviet Premier Bulganin suggested that the Soviet Union had no objection to normalization through 'the Adenauer formula,' Kono responded favourably. The 'Adenauer formula' was the method adopted by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer when he established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1955. West Germany and the USSR only agreed to terminate the state of war and to exchange ambassadors, while shelving various questions. Hatoyama and his colleagues were quite keen on this formula since the start of the normalization talks.

The exchange of views between Kono and Bulganin in May 1956 in Moscow certainly served to intensify the movement towards normalization through the Adenauer formula. In response to this movement, the Foreign Ministry started searching for a way towards early normalization by making some concessions to the Soviets.⁷¹ But it was clear that the ministry did not intend to adopt the Adenauer formula. Shigemitsu clung to concluding a peace treaty. He predicted that if Japan adopted the Adenauer formula, she would have to give up even the Habomais and Shikotan.⁷² Shigemitsu planned to conclude the peace treaty, even by making some significant territorial concessions to the Soviet Union.

The drastic changes in the climate of the negotiations took place in the first Moscow

⁶⁸ *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. 23, p. 141.

⁶⁹ *Soviet News*, No. 3260, 28 Sept. 1955.

⁷⁰ Hayter to Macmillan, 30 Sept. 1955, FO371 114234, FJ10338/78, P.R.O.

⁷¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 May, 1956.

⁷² *Asahi Shimbun*, 31 May, 1956.

talks in August. Shigemitsu went to Moscow as the Japanese plenipotentiary and attempted to conclude a peace treaty through solving the territorial questions. He had already been determined to settle the negotiations before his visit to Moscow. For this purpose, he tried to preempt possible future American criticism. He visited Ambassador Allison before his departure for Moscow and asked whether the US government would approve, if the Japanese government reached an agreement with the Soviet Union on the territorial issue on terms which were satisfactory for Japan.⁷³ This suggests that Shigemitsu had already planned to reach some agreement with the Soviet Union on conditions which would be inconsistent with American interests: namely Japan's recognition, whether implicit or explicit, of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles, including the southern Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin.

The first Moscow talks started at the end of July. From the beginning, Shigemitsu indicated Japan's willingness to conclude a peace treaty. He suggested at the first meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Foreign Minister Dmytri Shepilov, that if the Soviet Union returned Kunashiri and Etorofu in addition to the Habomais and Shikotan, Japan would renounce the northern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁷⁴ This position clearly reflected the State Department's position described in its reply of 21 October to the Japanese questionnaire. The Soviet foreign minister was, however, determined to make the Japanese accept the Soviet terms: that is, the USSR would return the Habomais and Shikotan on condition that Japan recognized the Soviet possession of the Kuriles including Kunashiri and Etorofu, and of southern Sakhalin.

Then, Shigemitsu proposed not to refer to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in a peace treaty.⁷⁵ This was intended to show the Soviets that Japan would give her tacit consent to the status quo over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. At the same time, he tried to secure the Habomais and Shikotan and to open the way to later discussion on the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. This was, however, not accepted by Shepilov. Then, Shigemitsu made a further retreat. He suggested that Japan would clearly renounce all claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the peace treaty. This was also a great concession from the Japanese view point. But the Soviets did not move.

Up to this point, Shigemitsu's proposals had been in line with the American position. But he was forced to deviate from this line. On 13 August, he admitted, at last, that he could not find any other way than to accept the Soviet terms. Shigemitsu might have assumed that the US would feel the necessity to accept Shigemitsu's decision if he, as an acknowledged pro-American leader, came to the view that Japan had no way other than to accept the Soviet terms.⁷⁶ Although he insisted that he was authorized by his government to make any decision by himself, Matsumoto Shunichi, who was also one of the plenipotentiaries to Moscow, strongly recommended that Shigemitsu should request Tokyo for instructions. Persuaded by Matsumoto, the foreign minister finally decided to request the instructions from Tokyo. The response from Tokyo was negative. Given the strong

⁷³ Robertson to Hoover, 24 July 1956, 661.941/7-2456 N.A.

⁷⁴ *Information Bulletin*, issued by Embassy of Japan in London, entitled 'Special Issue of Japanese-Soviet Negotiations' 15 August, 1956, FO371 121040 FJ10338/41, P.R.O.

⁷⁵ Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁷⁶ Saito Shizuo, *Nihon Gaiko Seisakushiron Josetsu* (Introduction to History of Japan's Diplomacy) Tokyo, 1981.

opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party and the tough public opinion, Hatoyama and his cabinet members could not accept Shigemitsu's proposal. The cabinet assembled on the evening of 12 August and decided to send him to London for the international conference of the users of the Suez canal late in August.

On 19 August, the foreign minister met John Foster Dulles in London, who also participated in the conference. Shigemitsu reported to Dulles the development of his negotiations in Moscow. Dulles responded harshly. He told Shigemitsu that the Kuriles and Ryukyus were handled in the same manner and that 'if Japan recognized that the Soviet Union was entitled to full sovereignty over the Kuriles we would assume that we were equally entitled to full sovereignty over the Ryukyus' on the basis of Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.⁷⁷ Against that, Shigemitsu requested Dulles to take the initiative to convene a conference to discuss the disposition of the Kuriles and the Ryukyus, but Dulles responded negatively. Instead, Dulles suggested, 'Perhaps in dealing with the Soviet Union the best way would be to take the position that all the Kuriles enjoy the same status as the Ryukyus—i.e., foreign occupation with residual sovereignty resting with Japan. Then he continued, 'Were Japan to ask the United States if the title of Kuriles could be split as between the southern-northern parts, the United States might reconsider.'⁷⁸ Dulles clearly suggested that Japan should not abandon her claim for Kunashiri and Etorofu.

On 24 August, the Japanese foreign minister met Dulles again. Shigemitsu repeated his desire to open an international conference to discuss the problems of the Kuriles. But Dulles rejected it by saying that the 'territorial problem is complicated—a conference might bring in Taiwan as well as the Kuriles.' After refusing Shigemitsu's request, Dulles moved to discuss the problem of the Kuriles. Dulles argued that 'it is difficult to contend that Etorofu and Kunashiri are not part of the Kuriles' and added that 'if the Soviet Union were anxious to have a treaty, with consequent diplomatic representation in Tokyo, they might give in eventually on the territorial question,' but that if the military value of the islands were substantial and the sea passage south of these islands were strategically important, the Soviets probably would not give in.⁷⁹

Dulles' message was clear. He asserted that Japan should stick to her territorial claim for the Kuriles or at least the two southernmost islands of the Kuriles and that she should continue to negotiate with the Soviet Union, though it was almost impossible to expect the further Soviet concession, or should walk out of the negotiations. He strongly hoped to obstruct the normalization between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Explicit Intervention of US Government and Aide-Memoire of State Department

The statement of Dulles made on the linkage between the Kuriles and the Ryukyus was leaked to the Japanese press and caused a 'furor' in Japan. The United States government had so far tried to avoid any direct and open involvement in the normalization

⁷⁷ *FRUS, 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 202.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-9.

talks, but now this cautious stance could no longer be continued. On 30 August, Allison recommended to abandon the previous line of non-involvement and urged the department to issue a public statement by the US and as many other San Francisco Treaty powers as the US could round up in brief time, to the effect that the United States supported Japan's interpretation of 'Kurile Islands' in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty as excluding Etorofu and Kunashiri. In addition to that, Allison recommended that the US government should state that Etorofu and Kunashiri should be promptly returned to Japan.⁸⁰ Perhaps he tried to neutralize the impression put by the Dulles statement on the Japanese public that the United States government tried to obstruct the normalization talks.

There was another purpose. Allison observed that the Kono faction intended to push through a cabinet shuffle, including the ouster of Shigemitsu. He said that the recommended US statement would give some support to Shigemitsu. This sounds rather odd, for Shigemitsu had decided in Moscow that Japan should accept the Soviet terms. What the US should have done to support Shigemitsu was to express her support for the normalization on the Soviet terms. Considering this riddle, we can make the following two hypothetical answers. The first is that Shigemitsu had not told Dulles about any detailed information about his Moscow talks. On 3 September, in his memorandum, Walter Robertson suggested that 'the farthest they [=the Japanese] have expressed willingness to go is acceptance of treaty language like that of variant formulas—including a definition of Japanese territory without any definition of Soviet territory, and including recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, leaving Etorofu and Kunashiri under Japanese sovereignty (with or without Soviet occupation by analogy to Article 3 arrangements)—but they have not presented these formally to the Soviet Union because of the adamant Soviet stand.'⁸¹ According to this, Shigemitsu did not tell Dulles anything about the concessions he had made in Moscow. But it is difficult to suppose that the United States government did not know Shigemitsu's decision to accept the Soviet terms, because the Japanese press had already reported the details about his decision in Moscow. Even if Shigemitsu kept silent what really happened in Moscow, the Americans could almost precisely guess about the development of the first Moscow talks from some of the Japanese news reports.⁸² If the US government did really not know that, it still considered that Shigemitsu had strongly demanded the reversion of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. If so, Allison's intention to support Shigemitsu is understandable.

But what could be said, if Shigemitsu let the US government know the development in Moscow? As already mentioned, he had been regarded as a most outspoken pro-American statesman in the Hatoyama cabinet. He must have been considered as a leverage to manipulate the Hatoyama cabinet in the direction of US interests. Perhaps, from the American view point, Shigemitsu was regarded as close to the anti-normalization faction such as the Yoshida factions. If so, Allison may have thought that the United States government could save its leverage in the Japanese cabinet by openly supporting the tougher Japanese claim for the southern Kuriles. Moreover, this means that Allison wanted to prevent the Hatoyama

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 212–3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁸² For example, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 12 August, 1956.

factions from achieving the normalization through the Adenauer formula, which was Hatoyama's pet policy.

The Department of State accepted Allison's recommendation. On 3 September, Robertson recommended in his memorandum that the government should state that Kunashiri and Etorofu had always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty.⁸³ The considerations behind his recommendation were as follows. Firstly, Robertson observed that despite Soviet tough position on the territorial issue, 'there has been comparatively little public indignation against the Soviet Union's blackmailing tactics, partly because the Japanese tend to be cowed by Soviet ruthlessness.'⁸⁴ Moreover, he argued that 'the Japanese cards, which have not been well played, are the Soviet desire to have a full diplomatic mission in Japan and the possibility of dramatising before Japanese and world opinion that contrast between Soviet "smiling diplomacy" and Soviet acts.'⁸⁵ Then he concluded 'Any demonstration of moral support would be of some value from this standpoint, such as declaration that we believe Japanese claims to Etorofu and Kunashiri are just.'⁸⁶ In summary, Robertson tried to make the Japanese public opinion tougher on the territorial issue by supporting Japan's claim for the southern Kuriles. He considered that, by doing so, the US could make it difficult for Japan to conclude a peace treaty with Russia on the basis of acceptance of the Soviet terms.

Moreover, Robertson seemed to desire to prevent the Adenauer-type normalization from being achieved. He wrote that an 'Adenauer formula would give the Soviets one of the main things they have wanted, however, a mission in Tokyo and full diplomatic intercourse.' But 'if such a resolution is possible, it is hard to estimate to what extent the Soviets would accept Japan's desires on prisoners, United Nations entry and fisheries.'⁸⁷ He clearly admitted that the Adenauer formula was disadvantageous. It must now be emphasized that his main purpose was to prevent any form of Soviet-Japanese normalization.

As mentioned above, the United States government had been taking the position that it could not oppose Japan's efforts for normalization with the Soviet Union. But the development from the end of August to the beginning of September in 1956 shows that the government abandoned its previous course. One of the most immediate reasons was, as Allison stated, a furor in Japan caused by Dulles' statement on 19 August. But it seems that there were other significant background factors.

It must be remembered that the Americans feared that the Soviet-Japanese normalization might lead to a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The Sino-Japanese relations had been, however, irritated the Americans in 1955 and 1956, and their anxiety was intensified late in May 1956. As a result of Kono's fishery talks in Moscow, the possibility of Soviet-Japanese normalization based on the Adenauer formula was regarded as increasing. At the same time, Communist China strengthened her efforts to normalize her relations with Japan. On 15 May, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai had suggested that

⁸³ *FRUS, 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 221.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 218-9.

Communist China was willing to welcome a visit by Hatoyama and Shigemitsu.⁸⁸ A week later, Allison held a meeting with Shigemitsu and talked about domestic trends towards normalization with Communist China. In this conversation, Allison noted that from the US point of view, the most dangerous result of Kono's activities was the spur it had given to those who wished to go on and normalize relations with Communist China.⁸⁹ The American ambassador came to the conclusion that the US government should take more positive steps to prevent the Sino-Japanese rapprochement and recommended that President Eisenhower or Dulles send a personal message warning against it. This recommendation did not receive the backing of the secretary of state. But the Department of State did instruct Allison to inform the Japanese at his discretion that the US government was concerned that Japan might accede to resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR without obtaining adequate returns from her.⁹⁰ The US government evidently intended to prevent the Sino-Japanese normalization by indicating its anxiety over Soviet-Japanese normalization.

It must be noted that the US government did not only oppose normalization on the Soviet terms, but also normalization on the basis of the Adenauer formula. The US officials could not positively support any type of normalization, because any kind of Soviet-Japanese normalization could provide a momentum for Sino-Japanese normalization.

A pressure from the Nationalist China also seemed to play a significant role. In late June, President Chiang Kai-shek asked the US to intervene in the normalization talks. Chiang was reported to consider that the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement 'may lead to "disaster"' and to hope that the US 'will do everything in its power to render abortive all efforts in that direction.'⁹¹ This pressure from Chiang must have accelerated the fear held by the US officials.

The US government was also under the pressure from some influential Congressmen. On 1 June, Senator Alexander Smith sent a personal letter to Walter Robertson and suggested that the US government should more positively commit itself to Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. He said,

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the consequences to the American position in the Far East if the fears of our friends in Japan are fulfilled. What dismays these friends is that, with all this going on, the United States seems to be either ignorant of or indifferent to the potentialities of the situation. They are even considering sending a group to Washington to inform our government of what is transpiring and to urge us to manifest our interest in a situation which might well deprive us of an important ally.⁹²

'Our friends' in the above passage must have meant the anti-Hatoyama factions such as represented by former Prime Minister Yoshida. Smith may have been pressed by some of the anti-normalization faction leaders in Japan. It must be also remembered that Smith had most strongly opposed the transfer of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet

⁸⁸ Asahi Shimbun, 16 May, 1956.

⁸⁹ *FRUS, 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 179.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Ambassador Rankin in Taipei to Dulles, 21 June 1956, 66.94/6-2156, N.A.

⁹² Alexander Smith to Robertson, 1 June, 661.946/6-156, N.A.

Union at the time of the peace treaty making in 1951. His firm opposition had been embodied in an attachment to the instrument of ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty which expressed the Senate's objection to the government offering any benefit to the Soviet Union over the treatment of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan.⁹³

Now in 1956, Smith requested the Eisenhower government to get more deeply involved with the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Dulles was sensitive to reactions of the Congress. At the meeting with Shigemitsu on 24 August, he referred to the possible Senate's objection.⁹⁴ Smith's pressure must have exerted certain influence on the government's attitude.

Thus, the US government departed from its previous non-involvement line because of its fear for the acceleration of Sino-Japanese rapprochement and under the pressures from Nationalist China and some Congressmen.

After the first Moscow talks, the influence of Shigemitsu quickly declined and the Hatoyama faction gained more power on the cabinet foreign policy making. Kono and Hatoyama carefully planned for normalization through the Adenauer formula and had a series of secret meetings with the representative of the former Soviet mission in order to clarify the conditions for normalization. The Aide-Memoire of the Department of State was issued in the middle of this development. This Aide-Memoire was relayed to the American Embassy on 3 September and, with several amendments, handed over to the Japanese on 7 September. The Department of State also sent Allison a document called 'Oral Points.'

The Aide-Memoire contained at least the following three main points. Firstly, the state of war between the USSR and Japan should *formally* be terminated. Secondly, The Memoire indicated that the United States government understood that Japan did not have the right to transfer sovereignty over the territories which had been renounced by her in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and that the signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty would not be bound to accept any actions by Japan like a territorial transfer. Finally, it enunciated that Kunashiri and Etorofu along with the Habomais and Shikotan which were part of Hokkaido had always been part of Japan.⁹⁵ The 'Oral Points,' which was designed to be communicated orally to the Japanese at Allison's discretion, contained a warning against the Adenauer-type normalization. According to this document, the Adenauer formula was not very advantageous for Japan and the Soviet promises on the repatriation of Japanese detainees, Japan's admission to the UN, and fishery agreement would not be met 'even if an Adenauer-type formula were adopted.'⁹⁶ Thus, the Aide-Memoire and the 'Oral Points' suggested that Japan should conclude a peace treaty, not the Adenauer-type of settlement, with the Soviet Union by solving the territorial issue without recognizing Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, but getting back Etorofu and Kunashiri, not to mention the Habomais and Shikotan.

The Aide-Memoire was published on 13 September in Japan. The anti-normalization factions seemed to be delighted and try to make use of it. On 12 September, Ikeda Hayato, who was one of the most influential leaders of the Yoshida faction, issued a statement to the effect that the Japanese should not give up their territorial claims to the Kuriles

⁹³ *FRUS. 1951*, Vol. 6, p. 933; *FRUS. 1952-54*, Vol. 14, Part 2, pp. 1216-7.

⁹⁴ *FRUS. 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 208.

⁹⁵ John Stephen, *The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific*, Oxford, 1974, Appendix A-x, p. 246.

⁹⁶ *FRUS. 1955-57*, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 231.

because the most important signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US, finally came to support the Japanese claims. He also criticized the Adenauer formula by saying that it would result in substantial transfer of the southern Kuriles to the Soviet Union.⁹⁷ Thus, the US position was identical with the position of the Yoshida faction. In fact, the timing of publication of the Aide-Memoire also seemed to have been carefully set up.⁹⁸ It had been published immediately before the letter from N.S. Bulganin, the Soviet premier, reached which expressed Soviet acceptance of the conditions for normalization on the basis of the Adenauer formula. The publication of the Memoire must have been aimed to prevent Hatoyama's formula from obtaining favourable support from the Japanese leaders and public.

Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration and American Response

But Hatoyama was not deterred. Rather he tried to make use of the Aide-Memoire. He could persuasively assert that Japan should normalize her relations with the Soviet Union by shelving the territorial question, because of the US support for Japan's claim for those territories. After all, Hatoyama visited Moscow and started the negotiations on 13 October 1956. During these second Moscow talks, it seemed that the United States could do nothing to influence the course of negotiations. On 19 October, Hatoyama and Bulganin signed a joint declaration to reestablish diplomatic relations between the two countries. The territorial question was not fully solved but the Joint Declaration provided that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned to Japan when a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR was concluded.

The US government did not show any explicit response to the conclusion of the Joint Declaration. Allison observed in his telegramme to Dulles dated 23 October that the press tended to stress the dissatisfaction of US government with the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. He feared that the silence of the US government would encourage an interpretation that the signature of the Joint Declaration was a diplomatic defeat of the US. Added to that, he was concerned that the non-response of the State Department would be interpreted as an indirect support for pro-Yoshida group's efforts to prevent ratification of the declaration. He suggested, therefore, to the Department of State that Dulles should issue some statement to the effect that the Joint Declaration was a step in the direction the United States had long favoured. But his recommendation was not implemented.

In fact, the State Department had a strong negative feelings over the result of the second Moscow talks. On 24 October, Robertson commented that the Soviet-Japanese agreement would pose the following significant problems:

- (1) Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union will lead to increased demands within Japan for rapprochement with Communist China.
- (2) The Soviets will undoubtedly utilize their mission in Tokyo to increase internal subversion and disrupt the alliance between Japan and the United States. . .

⁹⁷ Mainichi Shimbun, 13 September, 1956; Asahi Shimbun, 12 September, 1956.

⁹⁸ *FRUS*. 1955-57, Vol. 23, Japan, p. 223.

(3) the Soviets may attempt to embarrass United States-Japanese relations either by seeking to champion Japan's UN entry at the exclusion of the United States or by relating Japan's membership application to that of Outer Mongolia.⁹⁹

Robertson realized that the US government failed in achieving its main and probably the most significant purpose regarding Soviet-Japanese normalization: to prevent Soviet-Japanese normalization in order to decrease the future possibility of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In this sense, the Soviet-Japanese normalization was a diplomatic defeat from the viewpoint of the US government.

Hatoyama and his delegates visited New York on their way back to Tokyo. They could not meet President Eisenhower because the president was caught in the middle of the presidential election campaign. They could not meet Secretary Dulles, either, because of the uprising in Hungary and Poland. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that the Americans were showing their displeasure at the Soviet-Japanese normalization. The Japanese delegates had to be content with meeting Robertson on 26 October. During the meeting, Kono Ichiro, who had visited Moscow as a member of the Hatoyama delegation, asked Robertson to issue a statement to the effect that the United States supported the Joint Declaration. Robertson did not, however, give any assurance.

This clearly shows that the United States government was not satisfied with the result of the normalization talks. Moreover, its negative attitude seemed to be under the influence from Nationalist China. J. Lee Rankin, the US ambassador to the Republic of China, sent a telegramme to Dulles on the next day of the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Declaration. Rankin reported that Chiang Kai-shek was 'obviously perturbed' by the Soviet-Japanese agreement in Moscow. The Ambassador suggested that the Joint Declaration was regarded by the Nationalist leaders as harmful to their interests. The visit of Hatoyama to the US at that time and any indication that the US was pleased with the Joint Declaration would, Rankin argued, make matters even worse from the viewpoint of the government of Nationalist China.¹⁰⁰ The cool reception of Hatoyama's visit, Robertson's comment mentioned above and the State Department's refusal to implement Allison's recommendation reflected this consideration about the reaction of Nationalist China.

The Japanese delegation returned to Tokyo on 1 November. The Yoshida faction and other anti-normalization group within the Liberal-Democrats furiously criticized the outcome of Hatoyama's Moscow talks. But the general climate in Japanese political circles and public opinion was favourable to the Joint Declaration. Although the Socialist Party accused the Hatoyama government of delaying the normalization, it indicated its support for the declaration. On 27 November, the Joint Declaration was unanimously ratified by the House of Representatives, even if over 70 dietmen of the Liberal Democratic Party abstained from voting. In the House of Councillors, it was also ratified on 5 December.

⁹⁹ Robertson to Dulles, 24 October 1956, a memorandum by Robertson attached to a confidential document from Howard Furnas, a staff of the Record Group of the National Archives and Record Administration, to Burns, a report and operations staff of the Executive Secretariat of the State Department, dated 13 November, 1956, 661.941/11-1356, N.A.

¹⁰⁰ Rankin to Dulles, 20 October 1956, Telegramm 445, 661.94/10-2056, N.A.

Conclusions

The US attitude to the Soviet-Japanese normalization affected the course of the normalization talks. The Japanese foreign policy makers formulated their negotiating policy sometimes by following suggestions of the State Department and sometimes by predicting its possible reaction. The United States government clearly intended to induce the Soviet-Japanese negotiations in the direction favourable to its national interests by influencing the Japanese policy makers.

As a whole, the Soviet-Japanese normalization was regarded as a menace to US national interests. The US officials considered that the Soviet-Japanese normalization would result in the increase of Soviet influence on the Japanese through intensifying subversive activities within Japan. They also feared that if Japan succeeded in normalization with the Russians, she would move to rapprochement with Communist China. In fact, the Americans thought that Soviet-Japanese rapprochement was less harmful to the US than Sino-Japanese normalization. Hence, the US government had a good reason to oppose strongly Japan's efforts for normalizing her relations with the USSR. But at least the following two conditions restrained the Americans from taking that course. First, the US had already had normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Second, the US government was aware of the danger which the strong US opposition would cause: that is, danger of inducing rising of nationalistic sentiments in Japan into strong anti-American public feelings.

Under these circumstances, the US government was compelled to adopt subtle policy towards Japan. The territorial disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union provided an effective instrument with the Americans. By supporting Japan's territorial claim, the US government could avoid causing strong anti-American feelings in Japan and simultaneously prevent the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. In fact, the US government stepped up the level of endorsement to the Japanese territorial demand. At the early stage of the negotiations, it only supported Japan's claim for the Habomais and Shikotan. But when the Soviet-Japanese negotiations came to appear to be settled, it came to support Japan's claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Although the US officials manoeuvred the Japanese by using the territorial issue, the American officials were extremely careful in dealing with this issue to avoid any appearance of US involvement in the normalization talks until the summer of 1956. Until then, the US government could use Shigemitsu as an effective leverage in the Japanese cabinet to prevent normalization by restraining Hatoyama. In addition, the Americans could use anti-normalization factions in Japan such as the Yoshida group. But even Shigemitsu was not a puppet of the US government. In Moscow, the foreign minister completely diverged from the US line and tried to conclude a peace treaty with, Russia by accepting the Soviet terms. As a result of his failure in Moscow, Shigemitsu's influence declined drastically, the Department of State decided to intervene openly in the normalization talks by support-Japan's claim for Kunashiri and Etorofu. The US attitude was also affected by a Chinese factor. When the possibility of Sino-Japanese rapprochement increased from the springing to the summer of 1956, the US government could no longer hesitate to exert more explicit pressure on Japan to prevent the Soviet-Japanese normalization.

The US government tried hard to prevent Soviet-Japanese normalization but finally failed. The diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan were restored through Hatoyama's Adenauer formula. In view of the fact that after the retirement of Hatoyama, Ishibashi Tanzan, the successor to Hatoyama, was to make Sino-Japanese normalization the main foreign policy goal of his cabinet, it must be said that the United States was suffered from a serious diplomatic defeat. But she succeeded in driving a long-lasting wedge between the Soviet Union and Japan: the territorial disputes. The US pressed Japan not to accept the Soviet terms for normalization, and this pressure was undoubtedly one of the most important factors which prevented the Soviet-Japanese territorial disputes from being solved. Moreover, the US Aide-Memoire issued on 13 September 1956 certainly encouraged the Japanese to stick to their claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu. It is needless to say that the territorial issue was to become one of the most intractable obstacles to improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations even after normalization. In this sense, it must be emphasized that the US government was greatly responsible for the futile Soviet-Japanese relations in the postwar era.

The Japanese leaders of the Hatoyama administration considered that they should maintain cooperative relations with the United States and tried to wipe any American suspicion that Japan would go to the Communist orbit. They were, therefore, extremely sensitive to US attitude on the Soviet-Japanese normalization. Because the anti-normalization factions such as the Yoshida group adopted the toughest territorial demand, their negotiating policy was generally in line with the US position on this issue. Hatoyama and Shigemitsu were quite different from them. Both of the two at last deviated from the US line. The foreign minister took a tough position on the territorial issue in order to avoid evoking US suspicion, but in Moscow he chose to conclude a peace treaty with Russia even by accepting the Soviet terms rather than to continue to follow the American line. Needless to say, Hatoyama showed much clearer divergence from the US position throughout the process of the normalization talks. Both of them can be regarded as nationalists. In some way, the normalization with the Soviet Union must have been perceived by them as a symbol of the nationalistic 'independent diplomacy'. Both the prime minister and the foreign minister tried to seek freedom of action from the United States control. Shigemitsu failed, however, in escaping from the shackle put on by the US and Japanese domestic pressures. But Hatoyama succeeded by shelving the territorial questions. Although the American government disliked the Adenauer formula, it could effectively neutralize the American pressure on the territorial issue. But it is clear that Hatoyama failed in solving the territorial disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union. To achieve normalization by shelving the territorial question, he mortgaged future improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Thus, the US-Japanese relations prevented the Soviet-Japanese normalization from becoming a strong basis for further improvement of the postwar Soviet-Japanese relations.

ERRATA

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p.86, 1.10, 'There was ~~naother~~ purpose.'
to be read as
'There was another purpose.'

p.87, 1.29, '...the beginning of September in 1996 shows...'
to be read as
'...the beginning of September in 1956 shows...'