More than six years had passed since the end of the Second World War, when most of the former Allied Powers and Japan concluded a peace treaty at San Francisco in September 1951. The primary reason for the long delay in peace making was, of course, the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. As the "Cold War" developed between the two superpowers, they began to perceive the strategic value of Japan in their contest for power. Inevitably, the politics of the peace settlement with Japan became entangled with the politics of the Cold War. Whereas the United States wanted to retain her close ties with Japan which she had cultivated during the occupation, the Soviet Union aimed at detaching Japan from the United States. It became exceedingly difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on the nature of a peace treaty. The first U.S. attempt in taking the initiative for a peace settlement with Japan ended in failure in 1947.

However, the lack of a consensus within the U.S. government also contributed to the delay in making peace with Japan. The State Department began to feel in 1949 the necessity for an early peace with Japan. In its judgment, the occupation had entered the phase of "diminishing returns." The Department was concerned about mounting discontent among the Japanese with the prolonged occupation. The Department wanted to conclude a peace with Japan, if necessary, without the participation of the Soviet Union. Whereas the State Department was thinking of the long-term political interest of the United States, the military was primarily concerned with perpetuating the military privileges the United States was enjoying as the occupying power.

State Department initiatives in formulating U.S. policy on the Japanese peace treaty were repeatedly frustrated by the military's delaying tactics. It was only during the visit of the Dulles mission and of a Pentagon mission to Tokyo in June 1950 that the Pentagon was persuaded to agree to an early peace settlement with Japan. The Truman administration could formally agree to proceed with a Japanese peace treaty on September 8, 1950, when President Truman put his signature on NSC 60/1.1

John Foster Dulles began a round of preliminary talks with diplomats of the other member countries of the Far Eastern Commission. In addition to the "Seven Principles,"

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a memorandum which provided a basis for those talks, the State Department drafted a peace treaty composed of 26 articles on September 11. A working group in the Defense Department drafted an U.S.-Japanese agreement on security matters on October 27. By the middle of November, Dulles felt he was ready to go to Tokyo.2

Toward the end of that month, however, the war situation in Korea took a sudden adverse turn for the United States, as massive Chinese ground forces began to intervene. Soon U.N. forces, that is, U.S. forces were forced to make a disastrous retreat. The once prevailing optimistic forecast that the war would be over before Christmas was replaced by pessimistic talk about the possible loss of Korea.

In response to this critical situation, the State Department and the military again developed different views regarding the feasibility of an early peace settlement with Japan. NSC 60/1 stipulated that "the treaty shall become effective...in no event until after favorable resolution of the military situation in Korea."3 Since there was no prospect for a favorable resolution of the Korean situation, the military took the position that it was not a good time to pursue an early peace settlement with Japan. The State Department on the other hand, considered that it became even more urgent for the United States to make peace with Japan. The Department developed a new approach to Far Eastern and Pacific affairs. It was an idea of a collective defense system for the island chain in the Pacific, in which Japan was to be included as a key member. Japanese rearmament seemed to be an urgent need for the security of Japan and for the general interest of the Western bloc. An early peace settlement with Japan was a necessary incentive to Japanese rearmament and a Pacific defense pact would facilitate it by eliminating the opposition of the Pacific countries.

If the Japanese were unwilling to align their country with the United States, a peace settlement would be out of question. Shocked by the unexpected setback in Korea, Dulles and other State Department officials were afraid of the decline of U.S. prestige in Japan. They argued that Washington should make a prompt effort "to commit Japan, spiritually and politically, to the cause of the free world." The Japanese might be reluctant to align themselves with the United States when the Communist bloc seemed to be closing in upon them. State Department officials felt that the United States might have to offer some higher price to induce Japan to become an American ally. They had in mind such concessions to Japan: a promise to defend Japan with U.S. naval and air forces; a speedy restoration of Japan’s sovereignty by a peace treaty or a declaration of the termination of war; and a guarantee of economic aid. Even the return of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands to Japan’s sovereignty was also considered.4

On December 13, the State Department proposed partial revision of the former NSC decisions of September 18. The main point of the proposal was that the U.S. government should proceed with a peace settlement without awaiting a favorable turn in the Korean War. The military rejected State’s proposal. They did not like to make concessions to

3 Ibid., p. 1294.
the Japanese which they would not need to make if they negotiated when America's prestige was not so low. They also wanted to retain the unrestricted use of Japanese bases for military actions in Korea. They were reluctant to make commitment to the defense of Japan. They were strongly opposed to returning the Ryukyu and Bonin islands to Japan.5

Again it seemed that State-Defense disagreement might dead-lock American policy toward a peace settlement with Japan. Because of several reasons, however, a stalemate did not develop this time. The presence of George C. Marshall as secretary of defense helped to restrain the military's obstructions. The presence of Dulles as an energetic coordinator also made difference. In his conference with the military leaders, Dulles persuasively argued that a delay in peace with Japan would be detrimental to the long-term interest of the United States. He emphasized two points. One was increasing uneasiness among the Japanese; the other was the possible loss of the initiative in making peace to the British Commonwealth. Dulles also promised that the State Department would support the retention of U.S. control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands if the military regarded it essential to U.S. strategic interest.6 On January 8, 1951, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and George C. Marshall agreed on the dispatch of the Dulles mission. President Truman approved the decision on January 10. Truman's letter to Dulles stated that the United States should immediately proceed with negotiations for an early Japanese peace treaty. He explained the policy of the United States as follows: (1) "the United States will commit substantial armed force to the defense of the island chain of which Japan forms a part," (2) "it desires that Japan should increasingly acquire the ability to defend itself," and (3) it is willing "to make a mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and perhaps Indonesia.)"7

Having spent some days in talking with the Senate and House committee concerned with East Asian affairs and in conferring with the British and Soviet ambassadors, Dulles could leave Washington for Tokyo on January 22.

I have dealt with the shaping of American policy on the Japanese peace treaty from September 1949 through January 1951 in another article, "The Road to San Francisco: The Shaping of American Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty."8 The process in which American peace policy was shaped is briefly described here only to give a background for a discussion of Japan's response to American policy. It is my major purpose in this paper to analyse the process of the Dulles-Yoshida talks of January-February 1951.

II

As the Cold War developed, the United States began to regard Japan as a potential ally. By January 1951, it became urgent for the United States to convert Japan into an American ally by a speedy settlement. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida knew well that

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5 Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to JCS, December 28, 1950, and draft JCS memorandum for Marshall, the same date, ibid., pp. 1385–92.
7 Truman to Dulles (draft), January 10, 1951, ibid., Vol. 6, pp. 788–89.
8 This article is cited in footnote 1.
Japan's position in a peace settlement had considerably been improved with the passing of time. But he could not wait long, since discontent with the occupation was mounting among the Japanese. Like official Washington, his government needed an early peace settlement. Yoshida was pleased with the American idea of a peace outlined in the "Seven Principles," which met his expectation of a soft peace. Certainly, he expected that his government could have some bargaining power in its talks with the Dulles mission. Most likely, however, he was not aware of the supersensitivity of official Washington to the impact upon the Japanese of the military setback in Korea and its fear that the United States might have to pay a higher price to secure Japan on her side.

It was Yoshida's definite policy to align Japan with the United States. He wanted the post-treaty presence of U.S. forces in Japan to insure her security. As early as May 1950, he had directed Hayato Ikeda, Minister of Finance, to convey his intention on this matter to Washington when Ikeda visited the United States to talk with Joseph M. Dodge. Although his intention had been consistent, he often took an evasive attitude on the matter. When Dulles visited Tokyo in June 1950 and talked Yoshida for the first time, Yoshida made only evasive and ambiguous responses regarding security problem. Yoshida said nothing definite about his intention of having U.S. forces stationed in Japan. "Yes," he said vaguely, "security for Japan is possible, and the United States can take care of it. But Japan's amour propre must be preserved in doing so." In any event, he added, Japan could have security through her own devices, by being democratic, demilitarized, and peace-loving and by relying upon the protection of world opinion. He was not in a mood to admit Dulles into his confidence. Dulles was "flabbergasted." Later he told William J. Sebald that "he felt very much like Alice in Wonderland." John M. Allison recalled later: "Their first meeting was a dismal failure....When I saw Mr. Dulles after the meeting he was completely frustrated and almost bitter. It took the combined efforts of Bill Sebald and myself to calm him down and get him agree to show a little patience."

His public statement remained uncommitted even after the outbreak of the Korean War. For example, he told before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors on July 29 that he did not want the lease of Japanese bases to the United States. However, he took Sir Alvary Gascoigne, Head of the British Liaison Mission in Japan, into his confidence, revealing several times his intention of having U.S. forces stationed in Japan to insure her security. It was characteristically of Yoshida to speak his official stance in one occasion and his real intention in another at his discretion.

It was September 1950 when the Japanese government began intensive preparation for defining its position regarding the peace settlement. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the working group engaged in "Operation A" drafted a Japanese counterproposal on the peace settlement on September 26. The document envisaged a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations to endorse the presence of U.S. forces in Japan. To Yoshida, such a procedure seemed to be too academic. He wanted a treaty plan which would clearly indicate Japan's stance to cooperate with the United States on security matters. He

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13 Memorandum by Gascoigne, Nov. 26, 1950, FO371/83838 7358 (Public Record Office).
ordered reconsideration, returning the paper to the working group with a very critical com-
ment. "I regret," he commented, "I cannot find a statesmanlike good sense in it."

Shocked by the prime minister's comment, Director of the Treaty Bureau Kumao
Nishimura and three middle-echelon officials of the Bureau (Hisamitsu Ando, Michitoshi
Takahashi, and Masato Fujisaki) worked hard to meet the standard of "statesmanlike good
sense" demanded by the prime minister. Their "Operation D" produced a new draft paper
on December 27. This paper was reviewed by Masaaki Hotta, a veteran diplomat, and
Premier Yoshida himself and revised twice (on January 5 and 19).14 Hotta, former ambas-
sador to Italy, served as a liaison between Yoshida and the working group in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. This paper outlined the position of the Japanese government in regard
to the peace settlement. It may be summarized as follows.15

(1) The Japanese government considers that Japan should cooperate with democratic
nations for world peace and security against the communist bloc. Japan must regain com-
plete independence to build up herself as a member of the democratic bloc. For this pur-
pose, the Japanese government deems it the best for Japan to conclude a peace treaty outlined
in the U.S. proposal to the FEC nations.

(2) In case a general peace settlement cannot be made in the near future, the Japanese
government should proceed with concluding a peace treaty even with the United States only.

(3) The Japanese government is pleased to learn that the "Seven Principles" does
not intend to impose any special political and economic restrictions upon Japan. The
government is of the opinion that the agreement on security matters should be separated
from a peace treaty itself. It is prepared to meet in any manner American military require-
ments. The government earnestly requests that Okinawa (the Ryukyus) and Ogasawara
(the Bonins) should be left to Japan. It is pleased with the American intention of leaving
the status of Chishima (the Kuriles) to the decision by the U.N. General Assembly.

(4) The Japanese government does not desire rearmament.

(5) As for Japan's external security, the government would like to consider an inter-
national cooperative system in addition to general security provided by the United Nations.
It would be worthy to consider an arrangement for the abolition or limitation of war and
armament in a specific area.

Meanwhile, on October 5, Prime Minister Yoshida had ordered the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to prepare a draft agreement on security matters. It was "Operation B." The
first draft of the agreement and an explanatory paper were prepared in the Treaty Division
by October 11. The work was reviewed by a group of "knowledgeable people," and the
revised version, "A draft Japanese-U.S. treaty on security arrangement," was completed
on December 26. Thus Yoshida's idea of insuring Japan's security with the presence of
U.S. forces in Japan was embodied in the papers prepared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It may be mentioned here that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, upon the prime min-
ister's request, was engaged in "Operation C" to prepare an "idealistic plan" which aimed
to achieve Japanese security through general disarmament in Northeast Asia and the abol-
tion or limitation of armament in the Western Pacific. On December 28, the result of this
"Operation C," a paper called "Proposals to promote peace and security in the Northern
Pacific area," was submitted to the prime minister. Yoshida did not expect that such a

15 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
The Japanese government anticipated that rearmament would be the central issue in the coming negotiations with the Dulles mission. There was a wide gap between the positions of the two governments in regard to the issue. When Dulles had talked with Yoshida for the first time in June 1950, Dulles had brought up the rearmament issue. Yoshida had given him only a noncommittal answer, and his official stance had remained negative to rearmament. Nevertheless, Yoshida perceived that, because of the existing international circumstances, Japan would eventually have to proceed with rearmament. Therefore he gathered unobtrusively a group of military specialists he trusted and requested them to study problems related to rearmament.

But he believed that rearmament had to be postponed as long as possible so that Japan could have an adequate time to reconstruct her war-devasted economy. Japan should concentrate, he thought, her energy to economic reconstruction, rebuilding her industries, developing her trade, and thus stabilizing the livelihood of the people. Japan should not spare her meager financial resources for rearmament. He also feared that hasty rearmament would give chances for the former militarists to regain influence. By temperament, he disliked the saber-rattling type of former military officers. He was determined not to allow their political resurgence. Besides, it was feared that, if Japan should build up her armed forces while war still continued in Korea, Japan might be requested to send them to Korea. Yoshida's prewar records, such as his diplomatic activities during the era of the Tanaka diplomacy, may not qualify him as a determined anti-militarist. Yet it would not do justice to him as a determined anti-militarist. Yet it would not do justice to him to argue, as John Dower does, that he was secretly but positively planning to rearm Japan in these years we are now dealing with. During these years, he strongly resisted any hasty rearmament.

In view of Yoshida's negative attitude toward rearmament, it could not be expected that agreement could easily be reached in the coming Dulles-Yoshida talks. For Dulles, one of the most important aims of his mission was to induce Japan committed to rearmament. Besides, he had the idea of a collective defense system for the Pacific island chain, which the Japanese government had never anticipated. It was his diplomatic strategy to get some kind of positive response from Japan to the idea of a Pacific pact and then develop it more concretely through his talks with the governments of the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

The Dulles mission arrived in Tokyo in the evening of January 25, 1951. His party included Mrs. Dulles, his Deputy John M. Allison, Robert A. Fearly of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson, Major General Carter

16 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
B. Magruder, Colonel Stanton Babcock, and John D. Rockefeller III. Rockefeller’s presence in the party was an indication of Dulles’s interest in cultural diplomacy. Considering that cultural exchange programs would contribute to strengthening Japanese attachment to the Western bloc, Dulles wanted Rockefeller to join his mission as a promoter of cultural exchange.19

The first Dulles-Yoshida parley was held on January 29. Dulles opened the conversation with a remark that the United States did not intend to impose dictated peace upon Japan. He said it was the intention of the United States to conclude a treaty as a friendly power. Thereupon Yoshida recalled the statement he had made to Dulles in June 1950 that the amour-propre of the Japanese people should be considered in a peace settlement with Japan and repeated his desire that such a settlement could be made. Then he mentioned Japan’s need of trade with mainland China and solicited American understanding.20

Dulles then brought up the central issue, the problem of Japan’s security. As already mentioned, there were very important differences between Dulles’s and Yoshida’s thinking in regard to Japanese security. Yoshida wanted to rely for Japanese security on the presence of U.S. forces in Japan. He intended to obtain a U.S. guarantee to defend Japan by offering the United States the right to use military bases in Japan. Dulles, on the other hand, considered the right of the United States to retain her forces in Japan as an obvious pre-condition for any peace settlement, not a Japanese concession for which the United States should pay a price. He could commit the United States to defend Japan only if Japan was willing to commit herself to rearm and contribute to the common defense of the Pacific region.

When Yoshida emphasized the danger of militarist resurgence and a serious negative impact upon economic recovery as major obstacles for rearmament, Dulles observed that all nations must sacrifice something to remain free. He said he understood Japan’s economic difficulty and would not press Japan for rearming beyond her means. But he argued that Japan could begin with a token contribution to a general cause of collective security. He asked Yoshida if he simply pointed out difficulties to be overcome or if he meant that Japan could do nothing. Yoshida answered that Japan of course would be willing to make some contribution to the common cause. But he did not say anything definite as to how Japan could do so. Japan would like, he said, to be a part of the Western bloc, but it was too early to discuss how Japan could contribute to the common defense of the Western bloc, because the Japanese mind was now absorbed in regaining their nation’s independence.21

Yoshida reiterated his negative attitude to the rearmament in a memorandum handed to the Dulles mission on January 30.22 “As a question for the immediate present,” the memorandum stated, “rearmament is impossible for Japan for the reasons as follows.” It listed three reasons.

(a) There are Japanese who advocate rearmament. But their arguments do not appear to be founded on a thorough study of the problem, nor do they necessarily represent the sentiment of the masses.

19 Minutes—Dulles mission staff meeting, January 26, 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, p. 814; The Record of Dulles’s conversation with Gascoigne, January 29, 1951, ibid., p. 826.
21 Ibid., pp. 829-31; Nishimura, op. cit., p. 88.
22 Undated memorandum by Yoshida, FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, pp. 833-34.
(b) Japan lacks basic resources required for modern armament. The burden of rearma-
ment would immediately crush our national economy and impoverish our people, breeding
social unrest, which is exactly what the Communists want. Rearmament, intended to serve
the purposes of security, would on the contrary endanger the nations' security from within.
Today Japan's security depends far more on the stabilization of people's livelihood than
on armament.

(c) It is a solemn fact that our neighbor nations fear the recurrence of Japanese aggres-
sion. Internally, we have reasons for exercising caution against the possibility of the
reappearance of old militarism. For the immediate purpose we should seek other means
than rearmament for maintaining the country's security.

The record of the first Dulles-Yoshida parley printed in Foreign Relations of the United
States suggests that Dulles hinted establishing a collective defense system for the Pacific
region. In his memorandum of January 30, Yoshida stated that "we desire consultation on
the question of Japan's specific contribution to the common defense of the free world."23
However, it does not seem that Dulles much discussed with Yoshida about a collective de-
fense system for the Pacific region. Since Yoshida was opposed to rearmament, Dulles
probably thought that it did not make much sense to talk with him about it until he com-
mitted Japan to proceed with rearmament. It is conceivable that Dulles therefore concen-
trated his effort in drawing out from Yoshida a more positive attitude toward rearmament.
Possibly, his knowledge of London's negative response to the idea also restrained him from
discussing it in detail with Yoshida. It appears that Dulles discussed more in detail about
it in his talks with Sir Alvary Gascoigne.24 Probably, Dulles did not intend to go further
about it than sounding Japan's response before he could discuss it with the governments of
the other Pacific countries he was going to visit.

Yoshida had MacArthur's support in his resistance to Dulles's pressure for rearma-
ment. One week before the arrival of the Dulles mission, Yoshida had conferred with
MacArthur. Possibly he had asked MacArthur to support him against Dulles on the re-
armament issue. The father of the Japanese Constitution, especially of Article Nine, Mac-
Arthur continued to hope that Japan would remain a non-military nation, retaining the
"peace clause" of her Constitution. When Dulles and Yoshida visited MacArthur together,
the General expressed his views that the free world should not expect Japan to make direct
military contributions. In his opinion, it was not practicable. However, he added that
Japan could contribute to the strength of the free world through her industrial production
for the military purposes of the free world.25

Although MacArthur tried to soften Dulles's pressure on Yoshida for rearma-
ment, emphasizing the importance of non-military roles for Japan in the Western bloc, Dulles
was not in a position to be able to leave Tokyo without any Japanese commitment on this matter.
After the second Dulles-Yoshida parley, in which Yoshida maintained his negative attitude
to rearmament, the members of the mission were much disappointed and some of them

23 Ibid., p. 834.
24 The Record of Dulles's conversation with Gascoigne, January 29, 1951, ibid., p. 826; minutes—Dulles
mission staff meeting, January 30, ibid., p. 831; memorandum concerning a conversation between Dulles
and Gascoigne, February 2, 1951, ibid., p. 842.
complained to Japanese officials that the Japanese premier did not understand Ambassador Dulles's sincerity and good will.26

From February 1 on, substantial discussions were conducted on the staff level to explore possibility in agreement. For Japan, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadao Iguchi and Director of the Treaty Bureau Kumao Nishimura participated in those staff level meetings, while Allison, Johnson, Magruder and Babcock participated in those meetings for the United States. Officials in the Foreign Ministry, much worried about the impasse in the negotiations, advised the prime minister to present to the American side the two documents prepared in the Operation B: "A Plan for Japanese-American Cooperation for Their Mutual Security" and "Items on security matters to be included in the Peace Treaty." The text of the second document could be outlined as follows:

a) The United States would guarantee Japan's security on behalf of the United Nations.

b) When the United Nations recognized the existence of an act of aggression against Japan, the United States will take measures necessary to stop aggression.

c) To achieve the purpose mentioned above, Japan agrees that the United States maintains her armed forces in Japan. The conditions for the stationing of U.S. armed forces will be decided in a joint committee.

d) Japan and the United States will consult each other whenever their territorial integrity and political independence seem to be threatened.27

Thus the Japanese side adopted the strategy of seeking agreement first on a Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It may be said that they hoped to postpone rearmament by confirming the offer of the use of Japanese bases to the United States.

The American side accepted these documents as the basis of discussion and presented the next day as a counterproposal an American document, "An Agreement Concerning Japanese-American Cooperation for Their Mutual Security." This treaty draft included a number of provisions related to the privileges of U.S. forces in Japan. This did not please Japanese officials. They wanted to relegate these provisions to an executive agreement, since they feared that their existence in the text of a treaty might be offending to the pride of the Japanese people.28 Although the American draft treaty did not please the Japanese officials, and although there was a wide gap between the two parties to bridge, it may be said that Japan-U.S. negotiations regarding a security treaty marked a degree of progress with the both sides submitting their own proposals.

Although it was the Japanese strategy to negotiate a bilateral security treaty without committing Japan to rearmament, the American negotiators persisted in pressing the Japanese for it. In the staff-level meeting of February 1, the Americans repeatedly argued that it was essential for Japan to cooperate for the common defense of the free world not only with her police forces and industrial power but also with armed forces she could afford to possess. They also requested Japan to create an equivalent to the U.S. Department of Defense. The Japanese continued to respond to this argument with the remarks that a constitutional revision was necessary for rearmament and that it was difficult to make.29 Thus there was yet no prospect for an accommodation over the rearmament issue.

26 Ibid., p. 89.
27 Ibid., p. 82.
28 Ibid., p. 91.
29 Nishimura, "Sanfuranshisuko heiwajōyaku ni tsuite," p. 32.
IV

The meeting of February 2 was a turning point in the series of the Dulles-Yoshida talks. On that day, the Japanese side decided to avoid the break-up of the negotiations by acceding to the American request for rearmament in a limited way. Yoshida asserted in various occasions that he had not acceded to Dulles's request for rearmament to the end and thus succeeded in creating a myth. However, an article, which appeared in the Tokyo Shimbun on May 13, 1977, pointed out that Yoshida’s assertion did not correspond to the records. The article was written, based on a secret document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The First Series of Japan-U.S. Talks: January-February 1951,” a copy of which the newspaper somehow managed to obtain. Since the contents of the article largely conform to Nishinmura’s later testimony and also to State Department records, it can be said that the article is highly credible.

In the staff level meeting of February 2, the Americans requested the Japanese to create an agency responsible to represent the Japanese government in the consultation with the U.S. Department of Defense, in case, as the Japanese proposal on the previous day mentioned, “there was a threat of aggression.” The Japanese participants in the meeting went to Prime Minister Yoshida for consultation, and it was decided to answer that such a consultation should be made through the medium of the joint committee which was referred to in the draft security agreement. The Japanese side also handed to the Americans a written statement which expressed the Japanese views that “plans for rearmament and measures to be taken in an emergency should be adopted secretly by the joint committee.” “Such an arrangement,” it asserted, “could produce a more detailed understanding than the provision in the draft agreement.” This statement meant that Yoshida had made one forward step toward compromise. It is probable that Yoshida proposed this joint committee formula as time-buying tactics. Since such a committee would not start before the peace treaty became effective, he could have some time to study problems related to rearmament. He also liked the formula probably because it was convenient to keep secrecy.

However, the Americans were not satisfied by this proposal alone. They questioned which agency of the Japanese government would participate in the joint committee. They also wanted to know the size of ground forces the Japanese government was going to organize at the initial phase of rearmament. After the meeting was over for that day, the Japanese members gathered at Yoshida’s private residence for further consultation. Concerned about possible stalemate in negotiations, Yoshida directed Foreign Ministry officials to prepare a memorandum which outlined a plan for creating ground forces. “If we show them such a plan,” Yoshida said, “it would be effective for the progress of our negotiations.”

Foreign Ministry officials immediately proceeded with drafting the plan. The plan was delivered to Allison in the evening of February 3. It was the document titled “Initial Steps for Rarmaments.” An editorial note to Foreign Relations, 1951, Vol. 6 mentions that the Japanese Government stated in the memorandum that “with the coming into effect

31 Ibid.
of the proposed peace and security treaties it would be necessary for Japan to undertake a
program of rearmament" and "briefly described the measures it contemplated. But it does
not say anything more about its contents. The document, according to the article in the
Tokyo Shim bun, contained the following proposals.

1. Japan will create national defense forces of 50,000 army and navy personnel. They will be
organized as an entity different from the Police Reserve or the Maritime Security
Agency. They will be equipped with more powerful weapons than the Police Reserve or the
Maritime Security Agency. These national defense forces are to be the core from which a
democratic military organization can be developed later.

2. Japan will create the Ministry of National Security and establish the Defense Planning
Staff in it. This Defense Planning Staff will represent the Japanese government in the
joint committee and eventually become a Japanese version of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is doubtful that Eiichi Tatsumi (former Lieutenant General of the Army) and other
military specialists, who were serving Yoshida as unofficial advisors, participated in drafting
this plan. It may be correct to surmise that the plan was conceived on the basis of Yo-
shida's instantaneous idea. Improvisation was a characteristic of his diplomatic style.

The presentation of the plan removed a major obstacle in the progress of negotiations.
On the same February 3, the Japanese government also presented its "observations" on the
U.S. draft of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty Agreement. This Japanese memorandum
requested the deletion of Chapter VIII from the draft. The Chapter contained such pro-
visions as "any establishment of forces by the Japanese government shall be for the pur-
pose of protecting peace and security in the Japan area..." and "in the event of hostilities
or imminently threatened hostilities in the Japan area... the National Police Reserve, and
all other Japanese armed forces, shall be placed under the unified command of a Supreme
Commander designated by the United States government...." These provisions were
not acceptable to the Japanese government, because they seemed to presume Japanese re-
armament. Yoshida wanted to make all the treaties and published agreements free from
any references to Japan's possession of "armed forces" or "military forces." Yoshida
took a great care in keeping secrecy about rearmament.

On February 6, when he conferred with MacArthur, he expressed his desire to avoid
mentioning explicitly Japanese rearmament in a treaty or any other agreements. MacArthur
concurred with his opinion. In the last of Dulles-Yoshida parleys, which was held on Feb-
uary 7, Yoshida expressed the same desire and obtained Dulles's promise that Japanese
rearmament would not be mentioned anywhere in the treaty or agreements to be concluded.

Yoshida's presentation of "Initial Steps for Rearmament" met Dulles's minimum con-
dition for a peace settlement. This does not mean, of course, that Dulles was fully satisfied
with such a limited commitment to rearmament. The conversation in the staff meeting of
the Dulles mission held on February 5 is revealing in this respect. When Colonel Babcock
commented that the Japanese had shown willingness to assume certain obligations, Dulles

34 Agreement concerning Japanese-American Cooperation for Their Mutual Security (draft), FRUS, 1951,
Vol. 6, p. 848, editorial note, p. 849.
35 Ibid.
noted that it was not clear what those obligations could at present be. Babcock agreed and stated that that was the reason why the Defense members wished to have Chapter VIII of their draft retained. Dulles conceded that it probably would be desirable to retain Chapter VIII in some form. Then Dulles expressed his views that "when Japan, following amendment of her Constitution, is in a position to make precise commitments... to contribute a certain number of divisions by a certain date, then we will be in a position to make more concrete commitments ourselves." "Until then," he went on to say, "we must maintain a flexible position." This conversation indicates that Dulles intended to avoid a clear American commitment to the defense of Japan which the Japanese government desires. It also shows that Japan's positive commitment to rearmament and America's clear commitment to the defense of Japan were in a give-and-take relationship.

On February 6, the both sides agreed on a draft bilateral Security Agreement. The American side conceded to the Japanese plea to make it a simple one, relegating to an executive agreement detailed provisions regarding the status and privileges of U.S. forces in Japan. The draft agreement was composed of four articles.

Article One provided:

Japan grants, and the United States accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Agreement, to station United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such dispositions would be designed solely for the defense of Japan against armed attack from without and any forces contributed pursuant hereto would not have any responsibility or authority to intervene in the internal affairs of Japan. Assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan would not be deemed intervention in the internal affair of Japan. American military commitment to the defense of Japan was expressed rather vaguely. In the finally adopted text of the Security Treaty, the commitment became a vaguer one. This vagueness reflected a compromise between Japanese desire for America's clear commitment to the defense of Japan and American desire for Japan's clear commitment to rearmament.

As for the peace treaty itself, the American side handed an American draft to the Japanese side on February 5. Nishimura later wrote that "on reading it, we were immediately impressed by its generosity and fairness." The Japanese government was generally satisfied with the American plan of the peace treaty. However, the government was disappointed in one aspect. Yoshida had presented a written statement which expressed his earnest desire to have the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands returned to Japan. Yoshida had suggested that, if it was impossible for the United States to return those islands, the lease of those islands to the United States might be considered.

However, Dulles's response was entirely negative. Although he had once considered the return of those islands to induce Japan to cooperate closely with the United States, he had determined to seek status quo for those islands before his coming to Japan. He cautioned Yoshida and opposition leaders not to encourage popular movements for the reversion of those islands. MacArthur, too, was emphatic on the necessity for the United States to

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98 Draft of bilateral security agreement, February 5, 1951, ibid., pp. 856-57.
retain her control over those islands. Thus the problem of Okinawa reversion was destined to remain an important issue in Japan-U.S. relations.

The first series of Dulles-Yoshida talks were over by February 9, 1951, and the Dulles mission departed Tokyo for its trip to the three Pacific countries—the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Dulles would visit Japan twice more before the San Francisco Peace Conference. However, the first series of Dulles-Yoshida talks held in January-February 1951 were far more important than the latter ones. Yoshida's limited commitment to rearmament made progress toward a peace settlement possible. The basic character of the bilateral security treaty was shaped in those talks. Japan's reluctance of rearmament, together with the negative responses of Britain and several Pacific countries, discouraged the United States from pursuing a collective defense system for the Pacific region.

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39 For the text of the draft, see provisional memorandum, February 3, 1951, ibid., p. 849-55; Nishimura, op. cit., p. 90.