PLAN DRAWN UP BY THE JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF
HEADQUARTERS TO SEND TROOPS TO THE RUSSIAN FAR
EAST TO PROTECT JAPANESE RESIDENTS

Middle of November, 1917

I. Object of sending troops:
To protect Japanese nationals living in strategic places in North Manchuria and
the Maritime Territory; and to make preparations for military operations which
may be undertaken later.

II. Basis of decision on the number of troops:
The number of troops to be determined on the basis of the number of Japanese
residents there, the strength of Russian forces in these areas, the convenience for
military operations which may be undertaken later, and the desirability of oc-
ccupying a commanding position in case the Allies jointly send troops.

III. Chain of command:
The Kwantung Government General and the Maritime Territory Temporary Detach-
ment Headquarters will be assigned the duty of protecting Japanese residents.
The Kwantung Government General will use necessary reinforcements sent from
Japan and Korea, in addition to the forces under its command. The Maritime
Territory Temporary Detachment Headquarters will use the forces organized in
Japan. The line which will delimit the areas of responsibility of the Kwantung
Government General and the Maritime Territory Temporary Detachment Headquar-
ters lies between Harbin and the Mutan-kiang Station on the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way. The Kwantung Government General will be responsible for protecting resi-
dents in Northwest Manchuria and the Maritime Territory Temporary Detachment
Headquarters will be responsible for protecting residents in Northeast Manchuria
and the Maritime Territory.

IV. Summary of the strength and organization of troops to be used to protect residents:
Omitted

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1 Japan, Sambö Hombu (Army General Staff Headquarters), Siberia Shuppei-shi (History of the
Siberian Expedition), 1924, I, Appendix. 29–33: James W. Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia,
1918, 1957, Appendix B.
V. Movement of forces responsible for the protection of Japanese residents:
A. The main strength of the Maritime Temporary Detachment will be in Vladivostok, with elements in Khabarovsk and other strategic places. Besides protecting the residents within the area of their responsibility, they will guard the telegraph facilities.
B. The main strength of the North Manchuria Temporary Detachment will be in Harbin, with elements in Tsitsihar and other strategic places. Besides protecting the residents within the area of their responsibility, they will guard the railways and telegraph facilities.
C. While trying to prevent dissipation of strength so as to protect Japanese residents, if necessary, they will be appropriately assembled.

VI. The war minister is responsible for transportation and supply, but in carrying out these responsibilities, he is to consult the chief of the army general staff.

No. 2

PLAN ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS TO REINFORCE THE MARITIME TERRITORY

Late January, 1918

I. Object of reinforcements:
A. Principally to suppress the Bolshevik uprising and hostile activity in the vicinity of the Southern Ussuri and along the railroad in the Maritime Territory, so as to accomplish the objective of protecting Japanese residents.
B. To pacify the area and to protect those citizens of the Territory who have moderate ideas; in short, to assist their independence.
C. To protect the railroads and other systems of communication and transportation.

II. Strength and Organization:
D. To send as reinforcement a force built around one division, wartime organization, and join it to the Maritime Territory Temporary Detachment (changing part of its organization) to form the Maritime Territory Expeditionary Force, organized according to the appended table.

III. Summary of Movement:
E. The Maritime Territory Expeditionary Force will locate its main strength in Vladivostok and Nikolsk-Ussuriisk, and an element in Khabarovsk; then, moving into areas where necessary, it will suppress Bolsheviks and other uprisings or hostile activities.

In addition, in order to pacify the area and protect the communication and transportation system, it will dispose defense units along the railroad and at other strategic places in the Territory.

It will dispatch a force to either the Maritime or Amur Territory depending on conditions.

*Japan, Sambô Hombu, *ibid.*, I, Appendix, 35–36: Morley, *ibid.*, Appendix C.*
F. It will secretly make the necessary preparations for operations against Russia, which may be expected to develop in the future; and, depending on circumstances, will confiscate railroad rolling stock.

IV. Transportation:
   Omitted

V. Supply:
   Omitted
   *Appended Table*
   Omitted

No. 3

PLAN ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS TO SEND TROOPS TO THE TRANS-BAIKAL TERRITORY AREA

February, 1918

I. Policy:
   To aid Cossack troops in the vicinity of Chita, to sweep aside the Bolsheviks in Trans-Baikal Territory, and to protect the residents of the Territory who have moderate ideas; in short, to assist their independence.

II. Basis of decision as to strength:
   The Trans-Baikal Territory Expeditionary Force will consist of sufficient troops to destroy the Bolshevik troops and the German and Austrian prisoners-of-war who are in the Territory; the Kwantung Government General will have under its command the strength required to guard securely the Chinese Eastern Railway.

III. Summary of strength and organization:
   Omitted

IV. Summary of movement:
   With the forces properly assigned and those sent from Korea and Japan, the Kwantung Government General will advance immediately into the Trans-Baikal Territory and will undertake to execute the policy. After the Trans-Baikal Territory Expeditionary Force Headquarters assumes its duties, the Kwantung Government General will be responsible chiefly for guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway and for line-of-communications duty east of (and including) Manchouli.

   When the Trans-Baikal Territory Expeditionary Force Headquarters arrives in the Trans-Baikal territory, it will be responsible for carrying out the policy by directing the various troops and staffs west of Manchouli (and excluding it).

No. 4

PLAN ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

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HAEDQUARTERS FOR SENDING TROOPS TO THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

March, 1918

I. Policy of sending troops:
   A. The Imperial Army is to maintain peace in the Far East by occupying various strategic points in Russian territory east of Lake Baikal and along the Chinese Eastern Railway, and by assisting the Russian moderates; and to make necessary preparations for operations against Russia and Germany, which may develop in the future. To do this, one force shall be sent to the Maritime Territory and a second to the Trans-Baikal Territory; and special defensive measures shall be taken outside the area of their operations.

   When the above operations are carried out, we shall have the Chinese forces cooperate with us.

II. Summary of operations:
   B. Maritime Territory Area.
      The First Force will occupy Vladivostok, Nikolsk-Ussuriisk and Khabarovsk; then, by extending its zone of occupation along the Amur Railroad line and the Amur River bank, it will suppress the Russian Bolsheviks and prevent the German invasion plan from being carried out.

   C. Trans-Baikal Territory.
      1. The Kwantung Governor General will use the 7th Division, the 40th Infantry Brigade and other forces to advance immediately by the Chinese Eastern Railway into the Trans-Baikal Territory. The Second Force will be used to secure the area.

      2. The Second Force will immediately advance to the vicinity of Chita; and thereafter, by extending its zone of occupation to the vicinity of Lake Baikal, it will suppress the Russian Bolsheviks and thwart the German plan to invade the Far East.

      3. After the Second Force Commander arrives in the Trans-Baikal Territory, the Kwantung Governor General will use the 40th Infantry Brigade and other forces to carry out the duty of guarding the railroad in the Kwantung Government General guard district and for line-of-communications duty there for the Second Force.

      4. Depending on circumstances, a force shall be sent to the central Mongolian area and, in cooperation with Chinese troops, shall advance from that area toward the Trans-Baikal Territory.

SUMMARY OF APPENDIX

I. Although the expeditionary forces number only about one half the strength of the German and Austrian prisoners-of-war and Russian Bolshevik forces now in the Russian Far East, it is believed that, because of the superior quality of our

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4 Japan, Sambō Hombu, ibid., I, Appendix, 39-48: Morley, ibid., Appendix G.
5 The Plan, which was adopted by the Japanese Army General Staff Headquarters in March, was transmitted to the Ministry of War with this Appendix in the last ten days of June.
troops, operational superiority can be anticipated. However, our strength in the Maritime Territory is to be increased, because of the large size of the area of operations there. Our comparative strength is as follows:

Maritime Territory Area:
- German and Austrian prisoners-of-war in the Maritime Territory and along the Amur Railroad, about 5,000.
- Bolshevik forces in that area, about 9,000. Total, 14,000.
- Combatant strength of our expeditionary force, 19,000.

Trans-Baikal Territory:
- German and Austrian prisoners-of-war in Trans-Baikal Territory and the Irkutsk district, about 93,000.
- Bolshevik forces in that area, about 10,000. Total, 103,000.
- Combatant strength of our expeditionary force, about 51,000.
- In addition, Chinese troops which can be scheduled for joint operations in this area, about 10,000.

II. Timetable of operations for the Maritime Territory Expeditionary Force is generally as follows:
- Debarkation at Vladivostok, about 20 days after the 10th day following the issuance of the mobilization order.
- Depending on circumstances, before the Force debarks, a part of the Force in Korea will be dispatched; and, in cooperation with the naval landing units, it will secure the occupation of Vladivostok.7

III. Timetable of operations in the Trans-Baikal Territory Expeditionary Force is generally as follows:
- Arrival at Manchouli of forces under the Kwantung Governor General, about 15 days following the 8th day after the mobilization order is issued.
- Arrival of the leading element of the Force at Manchouli, about 20 days after the mobilization order has been issued.8

IV. Expenses required for the above forces:
- First year of the expedition (from 1st to 12th month of the expedition), about 300,000,000 yen; and after that, about 295,000,000 yen. The basis for this calculation is the cost per man or horse for the 1st month of the expedition, 185 yen; and the cost for each month thereafter, 106 yen.

V. The action taken by Russia and Germany, especially Germany, in opposing our expedition will have a direct connection with the military situation in Europe. Although this can not be foreseen immediately, evidences of bold German military management in the areas up to now indicate that Germany is inciting Russia to become its vanguard, and that it plans future revenge by sending large forces to the Far East. It is vital for the empire to be resolved early.

In that case, if we compare their and our advantages in transporting and concentrating forces in Eastern Siberia, it is clear that, if we were to advance to the Irkutsk district or west of it, we should always have the disadvantage of

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7 The remaining part of this article has been omitted by the editor in view of its lack of importance.
8 The remaining part of this article has been omitted.
facing many with few; and, in addition, as a consequence of advancing west, the supply of the forces being difficult, we could not carry out rapid and bold operations.

In contrast to this, if we select a point of concentration in central Trans-Baikal Territory, we should, for about the first half year, have considerable superiority over the enemy; and thereafter, even if the enemy developed superior strength, we would have the advantage of being able to destroy him repeatedly as he advanced past the great obstacle of Lake Baikal; therefore, this policy is believed to be best for the Imperial Forces. Even if several years from now, as a result of changes in the European military situation, Germany were to come against us with a large force, it should be not at all difficult, considering the comparative advantages of transportation, to make use of the Trans-Baikal terrain and, with Japanese and Chinese forces operating jointly, to destroy the enemy forces.

No. 5

PLAN DRAWN UP BY THE SIBERIAN PLANNING COMMITTEE FOR SENDING AN EMERGENCY DETACHMENT TO VLADIVOSTOK

March, 1918

I. Objective:
   A. To have army troops support the naval landing units of the Imperial fleet at Vladivostok, in advance of the Imperial army expedition to the Russian Far East, and to work together with them to prepare the way for a later army expedition.

II. Strength and organization:
   B. There should be sent for the above purpose the 74th Infantry Regiment (lacking one battalion, but including a machine-gun unit) stationed at Kanko.
   C. The above force will consist of about 800 personnel and about ten horses on the basis of "emergency preparation."

No. 6

EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM VICE-CHIEF OF STAFF TANAKA TO MAJOR GENERAL NAKAJIMA AT VLADIVOSTOK

March 4, 1918

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4 Japan, Sambō Hombu, *ibid.*, I, Appendix, 69-71; Morley, *ibid.*, Appendix F.

10 The remaining articles have been omitted by the editor in view of their lack of importance.

11 Japan, Kaigunshō Kiroku (Navy Ministry Archives), Senji Shorui (Documents Relating to the First World War).
You are now advised to take measures so as to more rapidly develop the situation there. For this purpose you will discuss the matter secretly with the Japanese Consul-General Kikuchi and the Naval Commander Kato, and to secure close cooperation with them...... We will supply the funds and the weapons required, if there will be any suitable way for sending them. You are to watch the activities of the Bolsheviks and to take necessary steps to prevent them from transferring the military matériel gathered there or from destroying it.

No. 7

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM PRINCE YAMAGATA TO PREMIER TERAUCHI\(^\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\)

March 15, 1918

It is still premature to send our forces to Siberia. The fact that the Germans, capitalizing on the separate peace made with the Russian Bolsheviks, are likely to push forward in order to establish their influence in the Far East, does not provide us with a proper reason for dispatching forces. If we dare to send the army to Russian territory without Russia's request, it will constitute an interference by force, no matter how good our intentions are in deciding the action. The expedition, without justifiable reason, will cause suspicion on the part of England and the United States, and particularly the latter. Consequently, any move on our part would not only fail to gain the support of these countries, but on the contrary would create difficulties between us. It is essential first to ascertain the Russian policies of England, France, and America, before the Empire can come to a decision on its policy toward Russia.

Our armed forces are strong enough to rival the enemy forces, but I regret to say that we should depend greatly upon the assistance of the United States and Great Britain in the form of military matériel and financial backing in trying to expel the German influence from the Far East. If we make a rash decision without ascertaining the intentions of those countries, there is a likelihood that we might encounter a grave danger at some future date. This is the reason why I have persistently emphasized the importance of the attitudes of Great Britain and the United States in examining our future Russian policy.

No. 8

EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM VICE-CHIEF OF STAFF TANAKA TO MAJOR GENERAL NAKAJIMA AT HARBIN\(^\text{\textsuperscript{13}}\)

March 30, 1918

\(^{12}\) Letters with the same content were also addressed to Foreign Minister Motono and Home Minister Gotô. Tokutomi Ichiro, ed., Kishaku Yamagata Aritomo Den (Biography of Prince Yamagata Aritomo), III, 1933, 987-989.

\(^{13}\) Japan, Kaigunsho Kiroku. Senji Sho:ui.
Horvat's request for armed assistance from Japan will be fulfilled, provided that Horvat organizes a new government and moves to carry out his political programs. Of this you can be certain. Furthermore, the Empire will invite the Allied countries to join in military assistance.

No. 9

SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER MOTONO'S STATEMENT ENTITLED "PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF SENDING AN EXPEDITION TO SIBERIA"¹⁴

Early in April, 1918

It seems to be only a question of time before Germany extends its influence into Far Eastern Russia and then to Manchuria and Mongolia. Unless the Empire is now strongly resolved to counteract the eastward movement of the German influence in the early stage and to take steps to secure its foothold in the Orient, there may arise a situation in which the Empire's position in the Far East is undermined and Japan's relationship with China is drastically altered in the post-war period.

The Imperial Government must weigh the following points carefully.

I. Recent developments of international affairs indicate that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will still form the basis of the Japanese foreign policy in the post-war period and the entente between Japan and America will complement it. If it is admitted that this above view be correct, we must be resolved to take measures to strengthen the foundation on which the above three countries can unite themselves, and at the same time secure a stronger position vis-à-vis Germany.

II. Even in the event after the war we find ourselves in the situation whereby our relation with Germany will be improved, it will still be essential for us to occupy a strong position in our relation with the Germans. Should we not have a strong position in any future favorable relation with Germany, we will share the same fate that Turkey and Bulgaria have suffered.

III. In the general situation it is almost inevitable that the American government will extend its activities to the Russian Far East beyond the Chinese border. Whether we will cooperate with it or oppose it, it will be absolutely necessary for the Empire to occupy a powerful position in the area at the present time. The present situation gives us a propitious opportunity to achieve this goal.

IV. It goes without saying that we should be prepared for the post-war period, when the Western Powers are expected to converge on China, by establishing a solid basis for closer relation with China prior to the conclusion of the war; we should try to maintain peace and security in the Orient for a prolonged period on the basis of friendship between the two countries. In the meantime, we should not create the impression among the Western Powers that we are carrying on our activities

¹⁴ Tsurumi Yüsuke, ed., Gōtō Shimpei (Biography of Gōtō Shimpei), III, 1937, 880-883. The statement was addressed to Premier Terauchi, Elderstatesmen Yamagata and Matsukata, early in April, and then read at the cabinet meeting on April 12 (Itō Miyoji Papers).
in such a way as to take advantage of their present inability to devote attention to the Far East, otherwise we will not only fail in our objectives, but we will also sow the seeds of dissension in the future. Therefore, we should look upon our military operation as part of the struggle against Germany now being carried on strenuously by the Allied Powers, and we should demonstrate positively to the world that this is our intention. To this effect, we must be prepared for sparing no expenses. On the other hand we should avoid overemphasizing the fact that we are struggling against Germany alone.

V. Furthermore, I entertain a pessimistic view as to just how much influence the Empire will have at the coming peace conference, should the war come to an end under the present circumstances. Suppose, for example, the allied forces sustain a damaging blow at some points of the western front; our position, in that case, will become more unfavorable. We must, therefore, in view of the fact that the prospect for peace has improved, take immediate active measures to improve our position.

VI. Since it is obvious that the Russian question and its apparent effects on the whole of East Asia will be discussed as one of main issues at the coming peace conference, it is essential that the Empire secure the basis beforehand for having an influential voice there. In case we have no solid footing on Russian territory, we will exert little influence on the decision of the Russian question, no matter how strong we may argue for territorial integrity of Russia and for other conditions necessary for maintaining peace in East Asia. The best means of assuring us a strong voice at the conference is to secure a footing on Russian soil itself.

VII. It is a matter of grave concern to see our people sink into effeminacy these days. Should we fail to stir up the spirit of our people in advance of making peace, we will not be able to compete in an intense struggle of the post-war period with the people of western countries, who have endured the severe trials of the present war.

Consideration of the above-mentioned points shows us that it is now time for making up our mind to decide on sending forces to Siberia, not only to impede the eastward movement of German influence for the purpose of securing the self-defence of Japan, but to maintain peace in East Asia

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**TELEGRAM FROM TOCHINAI, VICE-MINISTER OF THE NAVY, TO KATO, COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH SQUADRON, AT VLADIVOSTOK**

April, 8, 1918

If your plan is adopted for dealing with the situation, which is justifiable as a measure aiming at a drastic solution, it will eventually develop into sending forces to Siberia. The government, however, is not prepared to dispatch the army there. Under the pre-

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15 Japan, Kaigunshō Kiroku, Senji Shorui.
sent circumstances, you are strongly advised to regard the navy's landing as a temporary measure having local meaning only and to cease operations without provocation as soon as possible. In short, the government's policy is now directed toward avoiding, by all means, undertaking an all-out expedition. Taking it into account that the government does not want this operation to serve as a tinder-box, you should take immediate steps to settle the matter after a consultation with the consul-general.

No. 11

EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN MINISTER MOTONO TO KIKUCHI, CONSUL-GENERAL AT VLADIVOSTOK

April 11, 1918

The landing of the Japanese marines has no connection with such political aims as restoring order in the area or improving administrative conditions. Whatever dissatisfaction you may feel with administrative conditions, you are advised to restrain yourself from taking actions or making statements which may be interpreted as interference, unless you find urgent necessity to protect the life and property of foreign residents.

No. 12

SINO-JAPANESE JOINT DEFENSIVE MILITARY AGREEMENT

May 16, 1918

I. China and Japan, realizing the fact that the gradual spread of German and Austrian influence over Russia may jeopardize the peace of two countries, consider it their mutual duty, as participants in the war, to take concerted action against the common enemy.

II. As regard military cooperation, each country shall pay due respect to the prestige and interests of the other country, and both parties shall be considered to be on an equal footing.

III. When the time comes to take action in accordance with this agreement, the two countries shall instruct their military and civil officials and people to adopt a friendly attitude toward those of the other country in the military areas. The Chinese officials shall do their best to aid the Japanese troops in the said areas so that no obstacles shall arise to impede their movements, and the Japanese troops shall respect the sovereignty of China, and shall not be allowed to act in a manner contrary to the local customs and cause inconvenience to the people.

IV. The Japanese troops in Chinese territory shall be withdrawn as soon as military operations cease.

V. Whenever troops have to be dispatched outside Chinese territory, the two countries

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16 Japan, Kaigunsho Kiroku, Senji Shorui.
17 Tsurumi, ibid., III, 833–835: Morley, ibid., Appendix N.
shall dispatch them jointly whenever necessary.

VI. The military areas and other matters relating to the military operations shall be decided by the military authorities of the two countries whenever necessary, in accordance with the military strength of each country.

VII. In order to facilitate matters, in the course of the military cooperation the military authorities of the two countries shall observe the arrangements:

a) In regard to the making of all arrangements for carrying on military operations, both countries shall appoint deputies who shall arrange all matters regarding cooperation.

b) In order to secure rapid transportation, by land or water, and rapid communication, both sides shall cooperate to this end.

c) When occasion arises the two commanders in chief shall arrange all necessary military constructions such as military railways, telegraph and telephone lines. These shall all be removed at the conclusion of the military operations.

d) Regarding the necessary military supplies and materials required for taking concerted action against the enemy, the two countries shall supply each other to such an extent as not to affect the supplying of ordinary demands.

e) The two countries shall assist each other in carrying out sanitary measures for the troops in the military areas.

f) With regard to the question of military experts for direct military operations, should the necessity arise for mutual assistance, if one country requests the assistance of such experts the other shall supply it.

g) In the areas in which military operations are taking place, intelligence agencies may be established, and the two countries shall exchange important military maps and military reports. The intelligence agencies of the two countries shall exchange information and render mutual assistance.

h) Secret passwords in common shall be agreed upon.

VIII. When military transportation necessitates the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the provisions in the original treaty regarding the management and protection of the said railway shall be respected. The method of transportation shall be decided upon at the time.

IX. Regarding the enforcement of the details in this agreement, it shall be decided upon by delegates appointed by the military authorities of the two countries.

X. This agreement and the supplementary articles therein shall not be published by the two Governments, but shall be considered as military secrets.

XI. This agreement shall be signed and sealed by the military delegates of the two countries and recognized by the two Governments before it becomes operative. The time for commencing military operations shall be decided by the highest military organs of the two countries. This agreement and the details arising from this agreement shall become null and void as soon as the military operations of China and Japan against the enemy countries of Germany and Austria come to an end.

XII. Two copies of this agreement shall be written in the Chinese language, and two corresponding copies in the Japanese language, and each party shall keep one copy of the agreement in each language.
No. 13

STATEMENT MADE BY HARA, LEADER OF SEIYU KAI, AT THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

June 17, 1918

While I do not want to raise any objection whatever against maintaining our friendship with the British and the French, I ask you, in making our decision, to take into account the difficult position they are now facing on the western front. The emphasis must be laid on the significance of not impairing our friendship with the Americans, which is likely to have a decisive influence on the future course of our country. The present-day tendency to estrangement between the two countries is due to a suspicion on the part of the Americans to the effect that we have a hidden ambition to invade Siberia as well as China. Therefore, it will be of benefit for us to restrain ourselves from taking action which may serve to increase their suspicion.

No. 14

MEMORANDUM HANDED BY AMBASSADOR CHINDA TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

June 23, 1918

While the policy of the Imperial Government concerning Siberia has been attempted to act in concert with the Allied Powers, it has emphasized the importance of receiving assurances from the United States as to aid, both moral and material, should it initiate military operations in Siberia. The Imperial Government, therefore, believes that the British, French and Italian Governments took the above circumstances into consideration when they drew up the memorandum handed by the British Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador in London on the 7th of June.

The Imperial Government, with due regard to the spirit expressed in the memorandum addressed to the United States Government on the 19th of March, is morally in a position to show restraint in its resolution to send forces prior to the conclusion of the agreement between the United States Government and the said three Governments. Since the details of the above memorandum have been communicated to the three Governments, the Imperial Government believes that your Government has no suspicion concerning our Government's good intentions.

As for the three conditions necessary for carrying out allied intervention in Siberia, which were mentioned in your memorandum, the Imperial Government, after careful consideration, has reached the following conclusion:

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18 Seiyū Kai was the leading opposition party at that time. Hara Keichiro, ed., Hara Kei Nikki (Diary of Hara Kei), VII, 1951, 421–424.
Regarding the first and second conditions, the Imperial Government will not raise in principle any objection to them, as was declared before. With regard to the third condition, that is, that the Japanese forces should advance westward as far as possible, the Imperial Government, with due regard for your position, can not accept it, in view of the fact that the Imperial forces are physically unable to advance westward beyond Eastern Siberia.

The Imperial Government further expresses its willingness to attach an importance to coordinating military operations, and to assuming the supreme command of the allied forces. The Imperial Government considers itself justified in adopting the above view, taking into consideration its geographical propinquity and also the number of troops it would send.

No. 15

EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GOTO TO KIKUCHI, CONSUL-GENERAL AT VLADIVOSTOK

July 8, 1918

The Imperial Government, not having a clear picture of the political developments there, is not prepared to render assistance to one particular Russian group at the expense of antagonizing some other group. It is deeply sympathetic to the plan of setting up a Siberian Government in order to prevent the infiltration of the enemy there and to restore order. However, the Imperial Government entertains a suspicion as to how sincere Derber is now working for his scheme, and at the same time it feels concern that assistance to Derber's group will inevitably cause dissatisfaction with Horvat's group, which will in turn develop into an enmity against the Japanese Government. Therefore, concerning assistance to Derber's group, you are advised to adopt a cautious attitude so as to leave us freedom of action in the future, and you are to observe carefully the development of the situation, while keeping in close contact with the British and American consuls.

No. 16

CHIEF OF STAFF UEHARA'S VIEW REGARDING THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT MILITARY ACTION

July 11, 1918

I. Should the government agree to undertake the joint military action for the purpose of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops, measures to be taken and military areas to be chosen must be judged from the strategic point of view.

II. Since it is the nature of a military operation that the number of forces to be employed is determined in relation to the strength or the deployment of enemy troops, it

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20 Japan, Gaimusho Kiroku, Rokoku Kakumei Ikken.
21 This "View" was presented to the government on July 11. Japan, Sambô Hombu, ibid., I, 48.
can not be admitted that a restriction can be placed on the number of troops before initiating of the operation.

No. 17

THE ARMY'S DECISION ON THE STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES²²

July 12, 1918

I. To dispatch, taking advantage of the American proposal, a force built around one division, peacetime organization, as the first step toward realization of an all-out intervention.

II. To endeavor to assume the supreme command of the allied forces. To this end, the general headquarters shall be organized, and the strength of our forces shall be large enough to form the nucleus of the allied forces.

III. This shall be followed by a proposal to send our forces to the Trans-Baikal Territory.

IV. To use the 12th Division with a view to expediting the operation.

No. 18

DECISION MADE BY PREMIER TERAUCHI, WAR MINISTER OSHIMA, AND VICE-CHIEF OF STAFF TANAKA²³

July 20, 1918

I. To abandon the idea of sending troops, on political grounds, in advance of the main body of the 12th Division.

II. To endeavor to assume the supreme command of the allied forces.

III. Two divisions to be mobilized shall be the 3rd Division and the 12th Division. Both the 7th Division and the 40th Infantry Brigade shall be assigned the task of guarding the movement of the 3rd Division.

IV. The 12th Division shall not attempt to engage in battle, but instead its function shall be limited to guarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovak forces. Therefore, it should seek prior approval from the General Staff before engaging the enemy, should that become necessary in rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops. This principle, however, does not apply to an emergency, and the Division is allowed to act on the judgment of the divisional commander whenever necessary.

V. The deployment of the 12th Division, whose duty is limited to guarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovak troops, shall be restricted to the vicinity of Vladivostok. There is no objection to enlarging the defence area as the Czecho-Slovak forces

²² Japan, Sambō Hombu, ibid., I, 49.
²³ Japan, Sambō Hombu, ibid., I, 55-57.
advance.\textsuperscript{24}

No. 19

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING MILITARY ACTION IN SIBERIA\textsuperscript{25}

August 2, 1918

The Japanese Government, actuated by the sentiment of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, has always entertained the most sanguine hopes of the speedy reestablishment of order in Russia and a healthy and untrammeled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenceless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian far eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted and they practically assume the position of command. The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the cobelligerents to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern. In the presence of danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for an early dispatch of troops to relieve pressure now weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces.

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, has decided to proceed at once to dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people and reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases whether political or military.

\textsuperscript{24} The remaining articles have been omitted by the editor in view of their lack of importance.

\textsuperscript{25} United States, \textit{Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia}, II, 1932, 324-325.
ORDERS FROM CHIEF OF STAFF UEHARA TO OTANI, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE MARITIME TERRITORY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

August 10, 1918

I. The allied forces, consisting of Japanese, British, American, French, Italian and Chinese troops, will be dispatched to the Maritime Territory for the purpose of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak army and will carry out joint military operations under the direction of the Japanese Supreme Commander. Depending upon the circumstances, the Japanese Supreme Commander may assume the command of the Czecho-Slovak forces, as well as of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces.

II. With the above forces at his command, the Japanese Supreme Commander shall eliminate the enemy elements, including the Russians supporting above groups, in the Maritime Territory and Amur Territory so as to rescue the Czecho-Slovak troops and to maintain peace and order in those areas.

III. With the forces at his command, the Japanese Supreme Commander shall first secure a stronghold in the area extending from Vladivostok to Nikol’sk and then advance to the vicinity of Khabarovsk at an early date in order to guard the strategic points along the Ussuri Railroad. He shall then make preparations for having a detachment advance further westward along the Amur Railroad and the Amur river basin.

IV. To endeavor to secure the systems of communication and transportation connecting the areas of military operation with Vladivostok, particularly to protect the railway running between Nikol’sk and Progranichnai a so as to keep communications open with the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

V. A detachment shall be dispatched to the Trans-Baikal Territory to undertake a joint operation with the Chinese troops, with a view to rescuing the Czecho-Slovaks there and pacifying the area.

EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF OF STAFF UEHARA TO OTANI, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE MARITIME TERRITORY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

August 10, 1918

I. Those of the allied forces already stationed in the Maritime Territory will be placed under the command of the Japanese Supreme Commander from the time of his landing at Vladivostok, and those still outside Russia, from the time of their arrival

27 The remaining articles have been omitted by the editor in view of their lack of importance.
in the Maritime Territory.

II. Omitted

III. Taking it into consideration that the Japanese Supreme Commander has been entrusted by the allied countries to assume command of the allied forces, he shall do his best to secure friendly cooperation among troops under his command. At the same time he shall observe the following principles in directing the allied forces:

a) Although there may be no divergence of views among the Allied Powers as to the objectives to be pursued, there is a likelihood that there may be divergence of views concerning specific measures to be followed in accomplishing these objectives. The Supreme Commander shall make efforts to establish harmony among the allies. However, in case military operation demands a certain course, he shall take appropriate measures so as to rapidly achieve the anticipated objective.

b) Omitted
c) Omitted
d) Omitted

IV. The Supreme Commander shall observe the following principles concerning political affairs in the Russian Far East:

a) Omitted

b) The Imperial Government is seeking to build up a nucleus of anti-Bolshevik elements who are now attempting to eliminate the German and Austrian influence from Siberia.

c) Omitted
d) To facilitate the activities of the Japanese officials and civilians, such as relief works for local residents, the conduct of business and the development of natural sources, provided that they do not disturb military operations. The Expeditionary Force, however, shall exhibit caution so as not to be accused of monopolizing the interests to the exclusion of other members of the allied forces.

Principles to be observed in directing the allied forces:

a) To have the British, American, French and Italian troops undertake their military operations in the Maritime Territory or Amur Territory and to prevent them at all costs from advancing into Northern Manchuria. In case the Supreme Commander, under the circumstances, is obliged to honor a request by the allied forces to advance in that direction, he is advised to limit to as small a number as possible the forces of the Allied Powers to be sent.

b) To endeavor to have foreign influence remain within Siberia and to prevent it from extending to Northern Manchuria.

No. 22

PLAN DRAWN UP BY THE JAPANESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS TO BUILD UP AND GUIDE THE RUSSIAN
August 31, 1918

I. The Empire, anxious to consolidate governmental power in Far Eastern Russia, shall emphasize the importance of building up a Russian army on which the new government will be based.

II. In building up the Russian army in Far Eastern Russia, we shall have the Cossacks form the nucleus of it under the present situation. The approximate number of the Cossacks suitable for being enlisted is as follows:
   The Maritime Territory, about 5,000
   The Amur Territory, about 3,000
   The Trans-Baikal Territory, about 50,000

III. The above Cossack troops shall be organized under the leadership of Ataman Semenov in the Trans-Baikal Territory, under Ataman Kalmykov in the Maritime Territory, and under Ataman Gamov in the Amur Territory. All of these figures have already engaged in recruiting the Cossack soldiers. The Empire shall attempt to gradually strengthen the Cossack army through necessary aid and instruction.

IV. The Cossack army shall first be assigned the task of bolstering the local governments and restoring order in the localities; they shall then engage in organizing a self-governing body for the Cossacks. If the circumstances permit, the authority of the body shall be expanded to other Russians so that it can serve as the core of a local autonomous organization in Siberia.

V. Having as its basis the above planned Cossack army and Cossack autonomous body, the united government of moderate Russians will be set up in Far Eastern Russia.

VI. Omitted

No. 23

EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF OF STAFF UEHARA TO OBA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE THIRD DIVISION

September 14, 1918

I. The Commander shall observe the following principles in the course of directing the allied forces in the vicinity of the Trans-Baikal Territory:
   a) In guiding the Chinese forces, you shall extend necessary help to them so as to enhance Japan's position in its future competition with the Western Powers in China.
   b) To have the Semenov detachment carry out its operation in the Trans-Baikal Territory or along the Amur river basin.
   c) With a view to preventing allied influence from taking root in the Trans-Baikal

29 Japan, Gaimushô Kiroku, Rokoku Kalkumi Ikken.
30 Japan, Sambô Hombu, ibid., I, 726–727.
Territory, the Commander shall have the Czecho-Slovak troops and the allied forces move westward. He is also advised to send a detachment to the vicinity of Verkhneudinsk, on a special mission to observe any possible movement of the allied forces in that direction.

d) With regard to the hope of the other Allied Powers of establishing a new eastern front, their proposal to this effect should be declined as diplomatically as possible, since it is our government's intention to establish our influence in Eastern Siberia as soon as possible.¹¹

No. 24

TELEGRAM FROM CHIEF OF STAFF UEHARA TO OTANI, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE MARITIME TERRITORY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE¹²

November 21, 1918

Instructions

Since military operations on a grand scale have come to a standstill in Far Eastern Russia, it is now essential that the Empire take action to secure and strengthen its political, as well as economic, position there. You are advised to take such action using the following principles as your guide:

I. It is believed that the allied countries, entertaining a suspicion of Japanese intentions, and nursing a jealousy of Japanese prominent position in Far Eastern Russia, will take repeated counter-measures. While being attentive to the intentions and the attempts on the part of the allied countries, you should take steps suited to the occasion so as to carry out our policies without interruptions.

II. It is essential to have the local autonomous bodies, as well as those in command of local troops, recognize and support Horvat's government.

III. The Imperial Government desires a realization of united control over the Russian army in Far Eastern Russia. To this end, you shall extend a helping hand whenever necessary.

IV. The Government is aiming at building up the Russian army, which is expected to engage in maintaining peace and order in Far Eastern Russia, and at sending any reserved forces of the latter army to the Ural front if possible. Regarding the organization, designed by the Allied Powers, of the Russian army in Far Eastern Russia, you shall take coordinated action, provided that it will not hinder, in any way, the achieving of our objectives.

V. To aid and direct the Japanese nationals in their efforts to promote their economic development in Far Eastern Russian. To this end, you shall attempt to unify and coordinate their activities, but at the same time you shall be careful so as not to create suspicion and jealousy among the other Allied Powers.

¹¹ The remaining articles have been omitted by the editor in view of their lack of importance.
¹² This telegram was sent to Nakamura, Kwantung Governor General, and Oba, Commander in Chief of the Third Division as well. Jap. Gaimushō Kiroku, Rokoku Kakumetsu Ikken. Japan, Sambō Hombu. ibid., I, 209–210.
VI. To have our soldiers make contacts with the Russian officials and civilians so as to instill in them a friendly sentiment toward us.

VII. In short, the Empire, most desirous of seeing the solid Russian government set up at the earliest possible date, shall maintain friendly connections with the All-Russian Provisional Government at Omsk and with its agents, especially those located in Far Eastern Russia, and shall support them in cooperation with the allied countries so that they can serve as a nucleus for reestablishing a government with control over the whole of Russia. You, however, are advised not to take any steps so as to commit our government to a special course of action, in view of the fact that the Japanese government, together with the allied governments, has given neither de jure nor de facto recognition to the All-Russian Provisional Government at Omsk.

No. 25

EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR ISHII AT WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN MINISTER UCHIDA

December 5, 1918

It is necessary for the Japanese government to improve its present bad relations with the American government resulting from the Siberian question. In view of the rumor to the effect that the American government is about to make a proposal for improving the situation before or after the opening of the peace conference, it is advisable for our government to take the initiative in this matter. My ideas concerning this matter are as follows:

I. Since our announced objective of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops has been almost realized as a result of suppressing the Russian Bolsheviks, it may be reasonable as a first alternative to decrease the number of our troops in Siberia to 12,000, that is, the figure on which the two countries reached agreement prior to the expedition.

II. There have been advanced two aims for sending the allied forces into Siberia: the first one was to rescue the Czecho-Slovak army, and the second one was to extend help to the Russians. As for the first one, we can find few justifiable reasons, now that the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia are no longer in danger, for the continued presence of the allied forces in Siberia. As for the second aim, it may be foolish to remain in Siberia, since the Allied Powers have already gained their footholds along the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. In either case, it is evident that the present stay of the allied forces in Siberia has lost its original meaning.

Suppose the Japanese government makes a proposal for withdrawing the whole allied forces from Siberia and allied governments accept it. In that case, once the Bolsheviks, recovering their influence, should undertake an oppressive action after the withdrawal, intervention will come about once again, and will in most probability consist of Japanese troops alone; and there is a likelihood that the Amer-
can government will turn down the proposal on the grounds that it will be necessary to station the American troops there in order to supply and distribute relief materials to local residents. If this should happen, it will provide the Japanese government with a good opportunity to demonstrate its disinterestedness in the Siberian matter without sacrificing its aims. Thus, another alternative should be to advance the proposal for joint withdrawal.34

No. 26

TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN MINISTER UCHIDA TO CONSUL-GENERAL SATO AT OMSK 35

December 5, 1918

The Japanese government and people, earnestly praying for the reestablishment of Russia, are in full sympathy with serious efforts made by the Omsk government toward achieving that goal. Therefore, I am certain that, in case Semenov or Kalmykov seeks to place difficulties in the way of its achievement, the Japanese government will not hesitate to take suitable measures within its power for clearing the way, provided that the Omsk government will understand the good intentions of Japan and show an unbiased attitude toward it.

No. 27

TELEGRAM FROM CHIEF OF STAFF UEHARA TO OTANI, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 36

December 11, 1918

Taking the occasion of the simplification of chain of command over all Japanese troops operating in Far Eastern Russia, the government instructs you to observe the following principles:

I. The Empire extends its deep sympathy to the All-Russian Provisional Government at Omsk struggling to pacify the Russian area.

II. To help the Omsk government fulfill that purpose, the Empire shall respect the position of Far Eastern Commissar to which Horvat was appointed by the Omsk government and shall attempt to establish Horvat's authority in Far Eastern Russia. Then the Empire expects him to extend his power to the Trans-Baikal Territory through moderate means, taking advantage of any opportunity presented him.

III. By way of gradual integration, the Empire shall centralize power over the Russian

34 The remaining sections have been omitted by the editor because of their lack of importance.
35 Dispatch of this telegram was decided upon at the cabinet meeting of December 8. Japan Gaimushō Kiroku, Rokoku Kakumei Ikken. Japan, Sambō Hombu, ibid., II, 10-11:
army in Far Eastern Russia.

IV. As to the Siberian Railroad, the Japanese government shall respect Russian control over the system and give its guidance as to managing the enterprise in cooperation with the Allied Powers. And at the same time it shall seek to prevent an arbitrary management on the part of Russia, or unreasonable interference on the part of the Allied Powers, so as to keep the transportation in order.

V. In their contact with the Russian people, our soldiers shall attempt to arouse good feeling among them and thereby increase the Empire's prestige.

VI. In short, while the Expeditionary Force shall attempt to take concerted and restrained actions, it shall not flinch from practicing justice. And the prominent position of the Empire in the Far East commands that it establish strong influence there.

No. 28

EXTRACT FROM A TELEGRAM FROM WAR MINISTER TANAKA TO OTANI, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE SIBERIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

December 12, 1918

In recent times Semenov has caused trouble to our government by his ill-considered activities and has cooled our people's sympathy toward him. If he, lacking insight into the general situation, will continue the rash movements from his personal feeling or from his eagerness for success, the Japanese government may be obliged to stop rendering its aid to him. It will mean nipping the scheme in the bud. He must be admonished for his action and guided so as not to make any further imprudent moves.

No. 29

PROPOSAL DRAWN UP BY THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS FOR EXTENDING AN IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO THE ALL-RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AT OMSK

December 14, 1918

I. The Empire, desirous of seeing Russia reestablished, shall render its aid to the building up of a solid Russian government at an early date, and then shall establish friendly relations with it, with a view toward contributing to further peace between East and West.

II. Omitted

III. Omitted

37 Japan, Rikugunshō Kiroku (War Ministry Archives), Sai Mitsu Dai Nikki (Secret Diaries Relating to the Siberian Expedition).
38 Japan, Gaimushō Kiroku, Rokoku Kakumei Ikken.
IV. Omitted

V. The All-Russian Provisional Government at Omsk, having gradually assumed shape, was already granted unofficial recognition by the allied countries and given support on a mutual understanding. If this government will be successful in extending its influence to western Russia under the assistance of the allied countries and in reestablishing the Russian Government in Moscow built around it, it will produce a profound effect on the whole situation in the Far East. Since the Japanese interest in the Far East is involved in the future fate of the Omsk government, we should, therefore, pay more attention to the situation at Omsk. It is really regrettable that the Japanese Government has not shown a definite policy whatever to upholding the Omsk government, beyond that of bolstering the position of Far Eastern Commissar now held by Horvat.

A. Armed Assistance

A mixed detachment built around one infantry regiment of the Third Division shall be dispatched to Omsk. This step is aimed at contributing to the fortification of the All-Russian Provisional Government, to the pacification of Russian people, and to the building up of a new Russian army.

B. Assistance in Building Up the New Army

To assist in building up the new army, ammunitions and other matériel shall be supplied to the Omsk government, and at the same time the military personnel shall be trained and instructed by us.

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No. 30

PRINCIPAL POINTS OF THE JAPANESE RUSSIAN POLICY
DECIDED AT THE CABINET MEETING

January 26, 1919

I. The Empire, desiring the reestablishment of Russia, shall extend considerable aid to this effect. However, armed assistance shall not be increased above the present level unless it is absolutely necessary.

II. The reestablished Russian government is expected to advocate the cause of pacifism. To this effect, the following points shall be realized:

a) To take such steps so as to develop to the utmost the autonomous organization in Siberia, so that, in the event the central Russian government follows an aggressive policy toward Siberia, the Empire will be able to prevent the latter's advance into Siberia.

b) To attempt to the utmost to remove the Russian military institutions in Far Eastern Russia in excess of necessity for preserving order, and further, to prevent the establishment of additional ones.

c) To attempt to remove the Russian enterprises resulting from an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia and to prevent the establishment of additional ones.

The remaining sections have been omitted by the editor in view of their lack of importance.

Japan, Gaimusho Kiroku, Rokoku Kakumei Ikken.
III. Regarding the question bearing on European Russia, it is advisable for the Empire not to take positive action, and at the same time it is necessary to pay cautious attention to this question in view of the fact that eternal peace in the Far East will be closely related to the fate of Russia in the west.

IV. To remove the existing restrictions or barriers placed upon the development of natural sources, upon the running of business, and upon the operation of industry in Russia, especially in Siberia, and thereby to facilitate foreigner’s dwelling, business, and investment from abroad on the basis of the equal opportunity doctrine. To this end it will be suitable to maintain free navigation on the Amur River and to change the status of Vladivostok to that of a free port.

V. The Empire has no design for calling upon the Russian government to grant concessions in return for the aid the Empire has rendered in the form of troops and matériel. To take advantage of the present misfortune of the Russian people to annex Russian territory or monopolize economic concessions is to sow seeds for discontent in the future.

VI. The Empire is earnestly anxious to see the united Russian government set up and for the latter to be responsible for maintaining order in Siberia. To this effect, the Empire intends to make the Cossack troops in the various areas of Siberia, to whom it has until now extended aid, incorporate with the said united Russian government, on certain conditions, in the near future and to bring them under the government’s control.

VII. With a view to centralizing political control, excluding all military affairs, the Empire shall dispatch a higher official to Siberia and at his arrival shall abolish the Political Section attached to the Siberian Expeditionary Force.