

WHY IS ASIA DEMANDING POSTWAR COMPENSATION NOW?

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I would like to offer my heartfelt respects to Prof. Wolfgang Seifert and the other members of the Department of Japanese Studies at Heidelberg University for putting together this forum on postwar Japan in the historic capital of Heidelberg in this meaningful 50th year since the war. I would like to address my topic in four sections.

I. *The Muddied Historical Record*

First, I would like to point out that the meaning of the Potsdam Declaration, the starting point for postwar Japan, has not been fully understood. The Cairo Declaration, cited in the Potsdam Declaration, contains the following passage regarding the territorial question.

“[A]ll the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic of China. ... [M]indful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, [the powers] are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” In other words, Japan’s history of territorial expansion, dating back to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, was renounced. This was made definite by Article Two, regarding the renunciation of territorial rights, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. While China was not a party to the peace treaty, at a welcoming banquet for Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei before the announcement of a Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and Japan, Premier Zhou Enlai said the following: “In the half-century after 1894, owing to the Japanese militarists’ aggression against China, the Chinese people were made to endure tremendous disasters. ...” In other words, Premier Zhou clearly displayed a historical perception based on the same historical facts as the Potsdam Declaration and the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

There can be no denying that the Potsdam Declaration amounted to a renunciation of Japan’s past during the 50-year period of 1895–1945. If the Declaration had been based solely on the period of the 15-year-war following the Manchurian Incident, as has become virtually accepted, Manchuria would have disappeared but Japan’s possession of Taiwan and southern Sakhalin, its annexation of Korea, and its rule of islands in the South Pacific would have been allowed to stand. If this were not the case, the Allied Powers would have been accused of “improperly” removing Taiwan and Korea from Japanese control, but I have heard no one make such an argument.

* This is a slightly modified version of an address delivered Oct. 17, 1995, at Heidelberg University in Germany. I am grateful to Mr. Donald Smith, Ph. D. candidate at the University of Washington, for his assistance in translation.

Under Article Two of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which provided for Japanese possession of Taiwan, China was to cede Taiwan in perpetuity to Japan. Under Article Nine of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), Russia was to cede the southern part of Sakhalin island in perpetuity to Japan. Moreover, Article One of the Treaty of Annexation of Korea (1910) provided that Korea made “complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea.” From a literal reading of these treaties, it could be said that they are written so that separation between the two parties or independence of one from the other is impossible. It can be said, accordingly, that separation or independence was possible only through Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, which had been issued by third parties. In this respect as well, there is an important meaning in the fact that the Potsdam Declaration covered the preceding 50 years, and it should not be overlooked that consideration of this has been insufficient in the postwar period.

I would also like to point out, however, that the 15-year war (1931–1945) had important special characteristics of a different aspect. During the entire war, which began with the Manchurian Incident and ended with acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese military fought the Chinese military on the Chinese continent, but Japan never issued a declaration of war. That is the reason why events during the war are generally referred to as the Manchurian, Shanghai and China “incidents.” This is all the more problematic because Japan was a signatory (in 1912) to a 1907 treaty on the opening of hostilities.

Kazami Akira, then chief of the Cabinet Secretariat, after the war offered the following recollection of the 1937 China Incident, which led to full-fledged war between Japan and China.

Vice Naval Minister Yamamoto and Vice War Minister Umezu came to see me together and said the two services were in agreement that a declaration of war must not be issued. When I asked why, they said a declaration of war would make it extremely difficult for Japan to import war materiel. Asked about the current situation, they said restrictions on imports of war materiel would cause a great problem, opening a major gap in the national defense, so they were absolutely opposed to a declaration of war. ... With the vitally important naval and army authorities set on this position, the Cabinet cancelled the declaration of war. (Kazami, *Konoe Naikaku* [1982])

In other words, Japan’s failure to declare war was entirely intentional.

Japan’s position that it was not at war with China was also expressed in concrete form in its treatment of prisoners of war. This can be seen in the Aug. 5, 1937, Army Order No. 198 declaring that, “because the empire is not presently engaged in full-scale war with China, it would not be appropriate to act in complete accordance with the concrete provisions of the Treaty Regarding Articles and Conventions of War or other treaties regarding the articles of war.” Japan thus disavowed application of the Hague Convention and, in the war with China, set up neither a bureau of prisoner information nor POW camps. Accordingly, camps for prisoners captured in China were given unremarkable names for public consumption such as “Shimen Industrial Labor Training Institute” (November 1943) and the POWs were taken as “workers” to Japan, where they were put to forced labor.

Moreover, Mutō Akira, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and later hanged as a Class A war criminal, testified on Aug. 8, 1947, at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial that “because the

war with China was publicly known as an 'incident,' it was decided in 1938 that captured Chinese would not be treated as prisoners of war." The judges in the Tokyo trial concluded in November 1948 that the Japanese government had "refused to acknowledge that the hostilities in China constituted a war. They persistently called it an 'Incident.' With this as an excuse the military authorities persistently asserted that the rules of war did not apply in the conduct of the hostilities. ... These military leaders intended to make the war so brutal and savage in all its consequences as to break the will of the Chinese people to resist."

In March of 1932, the year after the Manchurian Incident, Japan supported the establishment of "Manchukuo" in northeastern China. The Lytton Commission of the League of Nations released a report in October of the same year, however, concluding that the regime had not appeared as the result of a genuine, autonomous independence movement. On Dec. 19 of that year, 132 Japanese media companies issued a joint statement supporting "Manchukuo."

The Lytton Commission report was adopted by the general assembly of the League in February 1933 by a vote of 42 to one, and Japan announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations the next month. Japan openly defied the international order created in the wake of World War I. 1933 also saw the birth of the Hitler regime in Germany in January, and that country's announcement in October that it was also withdrawing from the League of Nations. In October 1936, events took a new direction with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany.

In addition to the periods of 50 years and 15 years discussed above, it is also necessary to separately consider the final five years (1941-45) of this period. While the 15 years of aggression against China following the Manchurian Incident was an undeclared war, a declaration of war against the United States and Britain was issued at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and the Malay Peninsula landing that began the final five-year period. Japan has fought four declared wars -- the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I and World War II. The imperial proclamations of war issued in the first two of these cases by the Meiji emperor and in the third by the Taishō emperor all stated that Japan would strictly abide by international law. For some reason, however, the Shōwa emperor's proclamation declaring World War II included no such provision. Former Grand Chamberlain Tokugawa Yoshihiro said this reflected the strong wish of Tōjō Hideki (*Asahi Shimbun*, Aug. 11, 1995.). In any case, it can be said that the 15-year war was carried out in contempt of international law, even in formal terms.

The final "five-year war" (1941-45) also had special aspects of its own. Most of the areas of Southeast Asia into which Japan sent its army were colonies of the U.S. and European powers. While the war was fought against U.S. and European armies, Southeast Asians were living in the areas that became battlefields. In the early stages, some Southeast Asians, especially those who had been hoping for independence from colonial rule, thinking that "the enemy of one's enemy is an ally," accepted the presence of Japan, whose army had expelled the U.S. and Europeans. This has left room for the emergence of the historical interpretation that Japan fought to liberate Asia. One common characteristic of those who put forward this interpretation is that they put great emphasis on only the final five years of the war. It is easy to see why. There is no way such an argument can be made concerning Japan's earlier aggression against China. If Korea is brought into the picture, moreover, not only did Japan not fight for that country's independence, Japan itself made Korea into a colony.

This is clearly illustrated by a remark made to chief Japanese agent Fujiwara Iwaichi by

P. Singh, secretary general of the Indian Independence League, who took part in an operation to divide the British Indian army, allegedly to help secure Indian independence from Britain. "It is fine that you are going all out for India," Singh said, "but it is very hard to accomplish anything when my comrades ask 'why, then, is Japan still holding on to Korea as a colony?'" [Fujiwara Iwaichi, *F Kikan* (1966)]

To put it another way, perhaps the reason why Asians are now demanding postwar compensation is that even now, 50 years after the war, Japan still has only a vague perception of its history, never having fully examined the actions of the Japanese state from the standpoint that the Potsdam Declaration covered everything dating back to Japan's acquisition of Taiwan 50 years earlier.

II. *Fishing in Troubled Waters*

In the first stage of the postwar Occupation, many policies were implemented to demilitarize Japan. The Meiji Constitution was replaced with a new Constitution emphasizing peace, human rights and international harmony. A provision in the GHQ draft of the Constitution guaranteed the rights of foreigners, but this vanished in the "Japanization" of the draft. Class A, B and C war criminals were tried, and militarists were excluded from public office. Further, the system that paid special compensation to those who had served in the military was abolished, and military pensions for those injured and the families of those killed in the war were abolished on the grounds that these payments should be incorporated in a general system of social security. Further, to illustrate "the truth that war does not pay," compensation to corporations for unpaid wartime bills was in effect canceled by levying a special tax on such payments.

However, the end of the war also meant the beginning of conflict between West and East, in particular between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was on Dec. 23, 1948, that Tōjō Hideki and six other Class A war criminals were hanged. The next day, the Occupation authorities released Kishi Nobusuke and other Class A war crime suspects without trial. The ban on militarists holding public office was lifted, and instead a Red Purge began to sweep through Japan. In the midst of these events, a "hot war" broke out in June 1950 in Korea, bringing major changes in the situation, including growing pressure in the United States for the early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan. With the Korean War raging, the San Francisco Peace Conference was convened but due to a clash of positions between the United States and Britain, neither Beijing nor Taipei was invited to represent China. America's original plan to invite South Korea was also dashed by Japanese resistance. Accordingly, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formed the basis of the resolution of Japan's postwar responsibility, was concluded in the absence of representatives of either China or Korea, the countries that suffered the most from Japan's past aggression, reflecting the Korean War era in which the treaty was adopted.

Despite the non-participation of these important countries, the treaty was signed and ratified, going into effect on April 28, 1952. As a result, Japan regained its sovereignty and rejoined international society. The most important provisions of the treaty included the renunciation of rights to territories such as Taiwan and Korea (Article Two); the resolution of claims to territories removed from Japanese control (Article Four); acceptance of the

judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes courts (Article 11); the payment of reparations and abandonment of Japanese property overseas (Article 14); and the abandonment of Japanese claims against other countries (Article 19).

Japan's chief delegate to the San Francisco Peace Conference, Yoshida Shigeru, in an acceptance statement symbolizing the nature of the treaty, called the peace "generous." The fact that China and Korea were not invited is reflected here in a major way. In accordance with American wishes, Japan, which ended up concluding a separate end to hostilities with China, signed a Treaty of Peace with the Republic of China (Taiwan) on April 28, 1952, the day Japan regained its sovereignty. However, the treaty provided (in Article Three) that the question of claims against Japan would be dealt with in a separate agreement, but no such agreement was reached before the 1972 Japanese-Chinese joint statement. Moreover, there is no provision regarding reparations in the treaty, and a Protocol states that, "As a sign of magnanimity and good will towards the Japanese people, the Republic of China voluntarily waives the benefit of the services to be made available by Japan pursuant to Article 14 (a) 1 of the San Francisco Treaty" (clause 1b). Further, regarding the question of the jurisdiction of the Taiwan government, Exchange of Notes No. 1 states that "the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government." Accordingly, the treaty with Taiwan amounted to a very limited resolution of postwar issues, leaving many things unsettled.

Twenty years after the peace treaty with Taiwan, the Joint Statement was released, Japanese-Chinese relations were reestablished, and Japan's diplomatic ties with the Taiwan government were dissolved. Behind the issuance of the joint statement were major changes in policy on the part of both the United States, which was sinking in the morass of the Vietnam War, and China, which saw the threat of war with the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Japan was in a very advantageous position. As a result, Japan succeeded in replacing what should have been the phrase "termination of the state of hostilities" in the joint statement with the phrase "termination of the abnormal state of affairs" (Clause 1). In effect, this expressed the position that the state of hostilities had already ended 20 years earlier. Moreover, Japan succeeded in removing the word "right" from "renounces the right to demand war indemnities," changing this passage to "renounces its demand for war indemnities" (Clause 5). Similarly, this expressed the position that settlement of wartime claims had been concluded 20 years earlier, so there was no longer any "right" to claim reparations. At the same time, the separate agreement called for in Article Three of the peace treaty with Taiwan to resolve the question of claims was left uncompleted.

The relationship between this joint statement and the question of jurisdiction covered in the peace treaty with Taiwan was also left vague. China, for its part, was no doubt faced with the dilemma that raising the question of jurisdiction would mean treating Japan's peace treaty with Taiwan as a precedent. Moreover, while the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan received parliamentary ratification, no such procedures were applied to the joint statement. In August 1978, a treaty of peace and friendship was signed by Japan and China, and this did receive parliamentary ratification. As shown by the provision that the treaty was valid for 10 years and would be automatically extended in the absence of notice of termination from either side (Article Five), however, this was not a treaty resolving postwar issues. It goes without saying that major changes in the Cold War between East and West lay behind the signing of

this treaty.

Such changes also played a part in the payment in 1988 through the passage of two special laws of 2 million yen in condolence money to each of some 30,000 Taiwanese former members of the Japanese military in response to a suit filed in 1977 seeking compensation, and in the Japanese government's appropriation in the budget for fiscal 1995, 50 years after the end of the war, of some 15.8 billion yen for the "final settlement of Taiwanese determinate obligations" (such as postal insurance, unpaid wages, military postal savings). This was the first year's installment of a total payment of 35.5 billion yen, calculated by multiplying the original amounts owed by a uniform factor of 120.

Moreover, on the Chinese mainland the question of reparations from Japan began to be taken up with greater intensity from the latter half of the 1980s. This began with an open letter regarding reparations from Japan that a young graduate of the law department of Chinese People's University sent in September 1987 to a member of the Chinese People's Congress. In March 1991, another youth visited a member of the Chinese People's Congress at the latter's lodgings to present a written opinion regarding reparations from Japan. In March 1992, this opinion, having won support from the prescribed number of members, was formally introduced into the People's Congress.

This opinion was based on the argument that the war reparations relinquished in the joint statement were state claims only, and that this statement did not affect private claims. Unlike the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Articles 14 and 19), the Japanese-Soviet joint declaration (Clause Six), and the Japanese-Korean agreement on claims (Article Two), all of which refer to claims by a "country and its people," both the Protocol to Japan's peace treaty with Taiwan (Clause 1b) and the joint Japanese-Chinese statement (Clause 5) refer only to "countries." When a group of Chinese brought to Japan by force for hard labor filed suit for reparations in June 1995 in Tokyo District Court against their employer, Kajima Construction, attention was focused on the position of the Chinese government, as expressed by a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry who said Japan should take a responsible attitude and respond to the suit appropriately, including the payment of necessary compensation (Asahi Shimbun, June 30, 1995).


Turning to relations with the Korean Peninsula, even today, 50 years after the end of the war, Japan still has no diplomatic relations with the northern half. Great changes have taken place in the postwar East-West Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. The postwar settlement incorporated into the Cold War era San Francisco Peace Treaty may have allowed Japan to fish profitably in troubled waters, but the bill is coming due now that the Cold War has ended.

III. *Japan First, Japan Only: Generous Postwar Compensation for Japanese*

With this as background, I would like to answer the question raised in the title of this address by examining how Japan has dealt with its war record since it regained sovereignty.

Japan's first action after regaining sovereignty was, surprisingly, to resume state payments to the victims of war. A bill providing for payments to those injured in the war and the families of those killed (See Table One, Item One) was enacted on April 30, 1952, as if it had been held

TABLE 1. LEGISLATION PROVIDING AID TO WAR VICTIMS



Notes: Numbers represent years and months. For example, "23.4" refers to April 1923. Parentheses indicate provisions requiring Japanese citizenship. The laws followed by an asterisk require citizenship as a result of other laws invoked in these statutes, which do not themselves contain citizenship provisions. Japanese and foreign citizens are accorded equal treatment under laws 14, 15, and 16.

Source: Izoku to Sengo (Iwanami Shoten, 1995)

in waiting for the resumption of sovereignty. While there had been strong calls for a resumption of military pensions, as a start payments to those injured in the war and the families of those killed were resumed under this law, "in the spirit of state compensation." Military pensions were resumed in August 1953 but, being based on service in the military and including special measures such as bonus years added to actual service to make ex-soldiers eligible, were significantly different in character from the payments under the 1952 law, which were to be made only in cases of specific damage or injuries. The third related bill passed in the first half of the 1950s provided for aid to people in Japan whose family members had been unable to return from such places as China or the Soviet Union (See Table 1, Item Nine).

In the latter half of the 1950s, to cover those not compensated by the laws above, special measures were passed for pensions to the survivors of those such as service members (see Table One, Item Three), payments to returnees to help compensate for the property they had lost overseas (Item 11), and to finance medical treatment of atomic bomb victims (Item 14). The latter law was enacted after victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki filed suit demanding compensation from the Japanese government in 1955, causing a great public response. This law, under which the government took measures from a medical standpoint, focusing on radiation disease, was an anomaly among the cluster of laws focused on aid to soldiers and civilian employees of the military. That is because, although victims of air raids had been compensated by the state during the war, this system was abolished, along with military pensions, during the Occupation and never re-established.

In the 1960s (as the shaded area in table 1 shows), with Japan's economy growing rapidly, these relief programs were expanded further, with ever more detailed measures being adopted and coverage extended beyond the principal victims of the war. For example, the law providing for special payments to the widows of those killed in the war (Item Four) provided payments to widows already receiving pensions as family members of those killed in the war. Similar measures were adopted for payments to the wives of those injured in the war (Item Seven), those such as the parents of those killed in the war (Item Eight), and for special condolence payments to the families of those killed in the war (Item Six). Moreover, when the national bonds issued under the program to benefit returnees neared their redemption dates, new payments were made under another special law (Item 12). With these additions to the original program, the government declared postwar compensation completed at the end of the 1960s (although the government enacted a "special funding law for programs commemorating peace" 20 years later for the benefit of Siberian detainees and others).

I must also address the question of the relationship between war crimes and eligibility for benefits under these programs. For example, the military pension law provides that those ineligible for benefits include, in addition to those who fail to satisfy the "citizenship clause" examined below, those sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of over three years (Article Nine, Clause One, Section Two). However, having received such a sentence as a war criminal is treated as having no effect on eligibility. Accordingly, Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which Japan accepted the outcome of the Tokyo and other War Crimes Trials, has no validity whatsoever domestically. Meanwhile, another cause for ineligibility, the "loss of citizenship" (Section Three) was based on the renunciation of territorial rights in Article Two of the same treaty and led directly to former colonial subjects living in Japan losing their right to receive benefits. This is almost beyond comprehension!

There are two major gaps in the various relief measures discussed above. The first is the

TABLE 2. CUMULATIVE PAYMENTS TO WAR VICTIMS
(Unit: Millions of Yen)

	Military pensions and survivors' benefits		Aid to returnees and families of those stranded abroad			Total
1952~59	567,169		13,402			580,571
	Pensions for survivors of former soldiers	Pensions, etc., for survivors of those killed in war	Medical treatment of those injured in war	Medical treatment of A-bomb victims	Other benefits to war victims	
1960~77	5,497,829	809,586	30,800	174,967	191,859	6,705,041
Subtotal (Fiscal 1952-77, period during which external payments completed)						(7,285,612)
1978~92	22,713,657	3,139,560	79,757	1,503,772	27,210	27,463,956
1993	1,562,494	205,701	4,460	135,507	1,568	1,909,730
TOTAL (Fiscal 1952-93, cumulative)						36,659,298
Remarks	Recipients in fiscal 1992: about 950,000 former soldiers, 880,000 survivors	Includes condolence money and special payments. Pensions paid to some 70,000, condolence money to 2,080,000.	Some 120,000 have been granted papers entitling them to war injury benefits.	Some 340,000 have been granted papers entitling them to A-bomb victims' benefits, while 230,000 receive a monthly health maintenance allowance of 30,000 yen.	Includes payments to returnees, of whom there were some 3,490,000 (civilians only).	

Notes: Appropriations for fiscal 1952-59. Later figures on settlement basis.

Source: Compiled from Sōrifu, *Shakai hoshō tōkei nenpō*, annual.

exclusion, as mentioned earlier, of air raid damage. The second is the application of a "citizenship clause" to all programs except those for atomic bomb victims, excluding foreigners, such as former colonial subjects, from benefits. In a suit filed by Korean residents of Japan demanding that they be recognized as eligible for benefits, the Tokyo District Court, in July 1994, rejected the suit but pointed to an omission in the law. Moreover, the Osaka District Court, in October 1995, rejected a similar suit but issued a stronger ruling, saying there was a "suspicion of unconstitutionality" regarding the relevant law, finally bringing the issue to public attention.

By the way, to illustrate how much the Japanese government has paid out under the various benefit programs, I have put together Table 2. From fiscal 1952 through 1993, the total came to some 37 trillion yen (and has probably reached 40 trillion yen by now). The number of recipients under the various programs is indicated in the "remarks" column of this table. To

TABLE 3. JAPAN'S EXTERNAL PAYMENTS
(Unit: Hundreds of Millions of Yen)

Country (Date of Agreement, Etc.)	Reparations	Quasi-reparations	Various claims	Total
1. Burma (1954, 1963)	720	684		1404
2. Switzerland (1955)			12	12
3. Ex-POWs, Under Article 16, San Francisco Peace Treaty (1955)			45	45
4. Thailand (1955, 1962)		96	54	150
5. Denmark (1955, 1959)			7.23	7.23
6. Netherlands (1955)			36	36
7. Philippines (1956)	1980			1980
8. Spain (1957)			19.8	19.8
9. France (1957)			16.728	16.728
10. Sweden (1957)			5.05	5.05
11. Indonesia (1958)	803.083	636.876		1439.964
12. Laos (1958)		10		10
13. Cambodia (1959)		15		15
14. South Vietnam (1959)	140.4			140.4
15. Italy (1959, 1972)			8.3305	8.3305
16. Britain (1960)			5	5
17. Canada (1961)			0.063	0.063
18. India (1963)			0.09	0.09
19. South Korea (1965)		1080		1080
20. Greece (1966)			0.5823	0.5823
21. Austria (1966)			0.0601	0.0601
22. Malaysia (1967)		29.4		29.4
23. Singapore (1967)		29.4		29.4
24. Micronesia (1969)		18		18
25. North Vietnam (1975)		85		85
26. Vietnam (1976)		50		50
27. Argentina (1977)			0.8316	0.8316
28. Mongolia (1977)		50		50
Total	3643.488	2783.676	210.7655	6637.9295

Note: "Reparations" are payments under formal reparations agreements. "Quasi-reparations" are other funds provided without cost to the recipient.

Source: Compiled with minor corrections from Asahi Shimbun sengo hoshō mondai shuzaihan, *Sengo hoshō to wa nani ka* (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1994).

illustrate the generosity of benefits for Japanese, Sok Song-ki, a Korean resident in Japan and the plaintiff in the Tokyo District Court suit cited above, would have received a cumulative total of 60 million yen for his injury (the loss of an arm) if he had been Japanese. This should give some indication of the scope of discrimination according to citizenship.

Under Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, meanwhile, Japan assumed the burden of paying reparations, but in concrete terms this issue was to be settled on a bilateral basis. At the time of the treaty, the United States opposed reparations, but countries such as the Philippines reacted strongly to this position and a general obligation to pay reparations was decided upon. Moreover, a limitation was attached to Article 14 recognizing that "the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other

TABLE 4. OVERSEAS JAPANESE PROPERTY (AS OF AUG. 15, 1945)
(Unit: Millions of Yen)

	Total (%)	State Property	Corporate Property	Individual Property
Total (%)	325,000 (100)	51,000 (15.7)	232,000 (71.4)	42,000 (13.0)
Korea	77,000 (23.7)	17,000	50,000	10,000
Taiwan	29,000 (8.9)	12,000	14,000	3,000
Manchuria	134,000 (41.2)	14,000	104,000	16,000
North China	42,000 (13.0)	5,000	31,000	6,000
Central and Southern China	27,000 (8.3)	2,000	21,000	4,000
Other	16,000 (5.0)	1,000	12,000	3,000

Source: Compiled from "Minkan zaigai zaisan no hoshō uchikirika," *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 29, 1946.

obligations." In addition, the Ministry of Finance has said that Japan "was able to pay reparations without that much difficulty" (*Shōwa zaiseishi: shūsen kara kōwa made 1* [1984]). The Foreign Ministry, however, has written that "it was desirable to create familiarity through reparations, building a foundation for future economic advances" (*Nihon no baishō* [1963]). Japan's external payments in accordance with Article 14, including those to South Korea, came to some 663.8 billion yen (see Table 3), while it is estimated that property lost overseas was worth some 325 billion yen (Table 4). The two categories together total some one trillion yen. Accordingly, this means that the 40 trillion yen paid out to Japanese for suffering during the war comes to 40 times what Japan has paid in reparations. Moreover, while all payments to Japanese were made as simple compensation to individuals, it must be remembered that most of the external payments went to the societies of the receiving countries as a whole. Moreover, while the payments to Japanese are continuing, the external payments were concluded in 1977 with the sole exception of North Korea, with whom no settlement has been reached. The subtotal in Table Two shows the amount that had been paid out to Japanese (some 7 trillion yen) as of the time when external payments were concluded. Since then, only the payments to Japanese have continued to mount.

IV. A Twisted Perception of History

I think that this multi-faceted gap between the domestic and the external has an intimate relationship with the perception of history on which it is based. The families of those killed in the war, in their campaign for the government to restore the military pensions they had received until these were cut off by the Occupation authorities, in November 1947 formed the Japan Welfare Federation of War Bereaved Families (which in March 1953 adopted its present name, the Japan War Bereaved Families Association) and began publishing a newsletter in February 1949.

The group's newsletter, originally titled *Kaihō*, ran the following statement of purpose under the masthead in every issue from the very first: "while fostering mutual aid among survivors and the recovery of remains, working toward the enhancement of morality and the cultivation of character, and striving for the construction of a peaceful Japan, to also contribute to the welfare of the entire human race by working to eliminate war and in turn

establish a lasting world peace.” However, major changes were made from issue No. 161 (May 1964). “Glorification of the souls of departed war heroes” was added at the beginning of the statement, and the portion underlined above was deleted.

A commentary titled “the International Dimension of the Survivors’ Problem” published in issue No. 10 of *Nihon izoku tsūshin* (the new name under which the newsletter was published from issue No. 9 in March 1950), argued that “we must remember to ask whether an American mother who lost her child in the war or a Chinese wife who lost her husband would be convinced that [our position] is indeed correct.” Further, an article in issue No. 31, in the section titled “Impressions of the Beginning of 1952,” under the headline “Our Path to the World” maintained that “this is something that connects [us with] Germany, Italy, the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China, indeed with all the nations of the world, whether they won or lost. Across the world, hundreds of millions died or lost family members in the war. We all share the same human desires and cry together for peace.” As these excerpts show, the Japan War Bereaved Families Association at the time was not at all an inward-directed organization concerned only with Japanese interests.

However, in the 1960s subtle changes began to take place in Japanese society. It was from February 1957 to July 1960 that Class A war crimes suspect Kishi Nobusuke held the post of prime minister. He was followed by the Cabinet of Ikeda Hayato, who announced a plan to double the people’s income, ushering in the age of high growth. It was in August 1960 that a ceremony was held on the summit of Mt. Sangane in the central Japanese prefecture of Aichi to unveil the tombs erected there for “national martyrs” Tōjō Hideki and six other Class A war criminals. Moreover, it was from August 1962 to April 1977 that Class A war criminal Kaya Okinori served as chairman of the War Bereaved Families Association (Kaya, finance minister in Tōjō’s Cabinet, was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial but later released after his sentence was reduced). Allow me to mention a few other things I have noticed.

The government-sponsored Aug. 15 memorial service for the war dead, which has now become an established annual custom, began in 1963. It was in November 1963 that the figure portrayed on the thousand-yen note was changed from Prince Shōtoku to Itō Hirobumi, the first Japanese resident-general of Korea. Moreover, it was from September 1963 to June 1965 that Hayashi Fusao’s provocatively titled “In Affirmation of the Greater East Asia War” ran in *Chūō Kōron*. And it was on the emperor’s birthday (April 29) in 1964 that the practice of conferring posthumous decorations on the war dead, which had been abolished after the war, was resumed.

In 1966, Koizumi Shinzō’s *Kaigun shukei tai-i Koizumi Shinkichi* (Bungei Shunjū), the story of the author’s son who died in the war; and Agawa Hiroyuki’s *Yamamoto Isoroku* (Shinchōsha), about the prominent admiral; both became best-sellers. In February 1967, the prewar Empire Day, or *kigensetsu*, was resurrected as National Foundation Day. In the same period, the Tokyo Olympics were held and the Tokaido shinkansen began running in 1964, and the Meishin expressway opened and construction began on the Tōmei expressway in 1965.

How should the decade of the 1960s be depicted in the context of postwar history, considering both these changes and the expansion described above of various benefits for war victims? In the late 1960s, the long-smoldering movement for the state maintenance of Yasukuni Shrine won the introduction of a series of Yasukuni bills into the Diet (Five bills were introduced between 1969 and 1973, although all were defeated). The next issue to arise

was that of state visits to the shrine. In August 1975, Miki Takeo became the first prime minister to visit Yasukuni on "end of the war day," (though as a "private citizen"). Then, in August 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made an "official visit." This brought outraged protests from across Asia and, since then, at least the prime minister and foreign minister have "refrained" from making official visits to Yasukuni. It is hardly necessary to point out that official visits to Yasukuni, where war criminals including Class A offenders are enshrined, are inconsistent with Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which Japan accepted the judgment of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. However, it is doubtful how widely this is recognized.

1985, when Nakasone made his official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, was also the year in which West German President Richard von Weizsacker made his famous speech pointing out that those who close their eyes to the past are unable to see the present either. And, on the very day of Nakasone's visit, China opened halls both commemorating the Nanjing Massacre and displaying proof of the crimes of Unit 731. In Singapore, an exhibition on Singapore under Japanese rule was held, sponsored by the government. Two years later, in 1987, China opened a hall commemorating the people's war against Japan, while South Korea opened its Independence Hall.

In fact, before the official visit to Yasukuni, the 1982 textbook controversy had already illustrated a decisive gap in historical perception between Japan and the various countries of Asia. This was also illustrated by the controversial statements made by Fujio (1986), Okuno (1988), Ishihara (1990), Nagano and Sakurai (1994) and Shimamura (1995).

Meanwhile, the United States and Canada (1988-90) apologized to and compensated people of Japanese ancestry interned during the war, and the Soviet Union, after re-examining its detention of Japanese in Siberia, provided Japan with lists of Japanese detainees and those who had died. The death of the Shōwa emperor in just this period made it hard to avoid debate about the war. Moreover, the outbreak of the 1990-91 Gulf War raised the contemporary question of the overseas dispatch of the Japanese military just at the same time as the problem of the "comfort women," involving the former Japanese military, was becoming a major issue. We must not forget that, when people in Asia heard about Japan's financial contribution to the war of the large sum of 13 billion dollars (1 trillion, 300 billion yen at the current exchange rate), some suggested that Japan, if it had that much extra money, should properly resolve the issue of postwar compensation.

Fifty years after the war, the Japanese government appropriated another 604 billion yen for the fourth postwar "special condolence payment" to the families of Japanese war dead, and it is now accepting applications for this money. At the same time, money has just started to be collected for a fund for the "comfort women" (the "Asian Women's Fund"), and there is no indication how much will be provided in one-time payments or when. Almost no one in Japan seems to have noticed the imbalance between these two programs. This year as well, in its announcement of the Aug. 15 memorial service for the war dead, the government called for a minute of silence at noon "in sincere mourning for the 3 million people who fell in war at home and abroad and in prayer for world peace." This number of 3 million deaths includes only Japanese, but the figure has been used consistently since the memorial services began in 1963. Perhaps distrust of inward-looking Japan, where cries of "No More Hiroshimas!" are heard clearly but it is almost impossible to make out whispered calls of "No More Nanjings," and which is seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and proclaiming its

desire to make an international contribution, has surfaced in the form of demands from Asia for postwar compensation.

The Cold War, which allowed Japan to fish in troubled waters, is virtually over, and democratization has progressed in Asia. When I visited the Association of Victims of the Pacific War in South Korea in August 1990, I asked when the association had been formed and what sort of activities it had conducted. An association official responded that the group had been founded in 1973 but, every time they tried to do something, they were picked up by the KCIA. It was only after then-Vice President Roh Tae Woo's June 1987 declaration of democratization that they were able to accomplish anything. This is symbolic of a larger phenomenon, and the policies of reform and opening in China may be leading to the same result. When I hear the voices of Asia, I feel as if I can hear them saying that there is no statute of limitations in history.

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