INTEGRATION OR EXILE:
GERMAN AUSLÄNDERPOLITIK AND TURKISH MIGRANTS

MASANORI NAITO

Introductory Remarks

The current issues concerning Turkish migrants in Germany, to a large extent, emerged from interaction between the host and migrant society. In the first decade of immigration, the 1960s, neither the Germans nor the Turks encountered serious “problems.” The Turks existed as temporary workers (Gastarbeiter), supplementing manpower for the post-war reconstruction and the subsequent miracle development.

The next decade, the serious stagnation of the mid-1970s, drastically changed the situation for the migrant workers. Immediately after the oil crisis in 1973, the Federal German government as well as other European states cancelled the new recruitment of Gastarbeiter. Despite their quick response, the German government could not efficiently control the influx of their families. This additional immigration was not stopped because family reunion (Familienzusammenführung) had been secured as a basic human right.

As the foreign workers and their families began to settle down, German policies regarding aliens (Ausländerpolitik) became more restrictive toward them remaining and toward any additional immigration. The policies basically consist of two major principles, “promoting their return” and “promoting their integration into German society.” At the same time, the German government repeatedly stated that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a country for migrants. It is a contradiction that migrants are expected to become integrated into German society, whereas the government declares that the host society itself is not orientated toward migrants.

It can be said that the German policies for foreign residents over the last two decades have been based upon this view, alienating the migrant workers. The German policies are, therefore, neither migrant policies nor minority policies, but Ausländerpolitik (alien policies). They clearly differ from the migrant policies in the Netherlands and Sweden, the objectives of which are to achieve multi-cultural societies without setting apparent boundaries between indigenous people and foreigners.

On the other hand, the Turkish government did not have a predetermined plan regarding the emigration of Turkish workers. As early as the mid-1960s, the government discovered that workers’ remittances would to a considerable extent cover the trade deficit, because of this, relatively little attention was paid to the other aspects of migration by the government.

The Turkish migrants in the FRG were, thus, confronted with contradictory alien
policies, which definitely affected their social and cultural existence in Germany, in particular, there was an identity dilemma for second and third generation migrants. To integrate into German society? To live as a Turk? If the latter, as a secular Kemalist, (Atatürkçi/Cumhuriyetçi) or as a pious and practicing Muslim? These ambivalent alternatives caused segmentation of the migrant society.

In general, migrant questions are encountered and raised by the host society. With respect to the Turkish migrants in Germany, the problems indicated by the Germans were, for instance, the threat to the German labor market, the heavy burden on the German social welfare system, and the deterioration in education standards.

However, problems which migrants encountered were usually invisible to the host society. In particular, the socio-political structure of racial discrimination was not seriously discussed unless tragic events, like the murders by Neo-Nazi groups in Mölln and Solingen, occured. At the cost of several lives, the host German society finally became aware that circumstances surrounding Turkish migrants in German seriously threatened migrant lives. In the last few years, Turks in Germany have noticed that xenophobia (Ausländerfeindlichkeit) is not a socio-psychological issue but legally institutionalized through the alien policies of the FRG.

In this study, I want to establish the veracity of how the realization process of the problems for Turkish migrants occured, and how they discovered the “wall” between the host and migrant societies which has remained even after the Berlin Wall was removed.

From Gastarbeiter to a Migrant Society

Gastarbeiter as a Buffer

The migration of Turkish workers began in the early 1960s. Thirty years later, more than two and a half million Turks are living in several European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Belgium (Table 1), forming distinguishable but marginalized societies.

The government of Turkey signed bilateral agreements to send Turkish workers with most of these countries, and exported “surplus manpower” according to the demands of the host countries. During the first stage when Turkish workers were given inducements to go abroad, the government’s concerns were as follows; firstly, by sending surplus unskilled workers; a few years later, Turkey would receive the returnees as skilled workers, secondly, that the returnees’ entrepreneurship and investment would contribute to industrialization in Turkey.

In October 1961, just after the erection of the Berlin Wall, the first bilateral agreement was concluded with the FRG, thereafter, similar agreements were concluded with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium in 1964, with France in 1965, and with Sweden in 1967.

West Germany was suffering from a serious labor shortage after World War II. Prior to the erection of the Berlin Wall, workers coming from Eastern European countries, mainly from East Germany, met manpower demand. Since the inflow of East Germans was blocked in the early-1960s, workers from Eastern European countries were succeeded by the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,779,586</td>
<td>694,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>238,682</td>
<td>111,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>228,414</td>
<td>89,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>58,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84,935</td>
<td>23,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>69,493</td>
<td>36,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>29,680</td>
<td>12,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>10,336</td>
<td>10,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,857,696</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,250,964</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 2: NUMBER OF APPLICANTS AND WORKERS EMPLOYED (1961-1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appl.</th>
<th>Empl.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>45,050</td>
<td>1,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>143,434</td>
<td>30,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>333,449</td>
<td>51,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>105,323</td>
<td>8,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>253,946</td>
<td>103,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>267,403</td>
<td>88,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>263,608</td>
<td>135,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>125,546</td>
<td>4,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Gastarbeiters from Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Morocco.

The Federal government concluded agreements for the recruitment of Gastarbeiter with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968), regulating the flow of laborers in and out of the country depending on the condition of the labor market. On the German side, the Federal Government Agency for Labor (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*) was responsible for recruitment, and its liaison offices (*Deutsche Verbindungsstelle in der Türkei*) were placed in large cities such as Istanbul and Ankara to deal with the necessary procedures. On the Turkish side, the Employment Service (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) received applications from workers. From the beginning, the migration of Turkish workers was completely structured and mediated through government departments and was based upon the bilateral agreement between the two governments.¹

In fact, until the beginning of the 1970s, the number of Gastarbeiter was successfully

controled based on economic fluctuations. As shown in Table 2, in the 1966/67 recession, the number of Turkish workers recruited apparently decreased compared with those in previous years. The Gastarbeiter played the role of a Kriesenpuffer well, a buffer to avoid any increase in unemployment. In 1967, the unemployment rate was only 2 percent for Germans, and 1.5 percent for Gastarbeiter, therefore, as economic growth recovered in the later 1960s, Germany received much more foreign workers, in particular, from Turkey and Yugoslavia. The German government expected that the Gastarbeiter rotation system would continue to be successful in the following decades.

Workers' remittances had reached one billion dollars by 1973, which was equivalent to 153.8 percent of the trade deficit (Table 3). The remittances did not always cover the deficit. However, because of its variable nature, other aspects of migration had little significance for Turkey. The State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati) issued a warning against neglecting the other reasons for exporting manpower, such as the contributions to human resource development and technology transfers from highly industrialized countries.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3 REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TURKEY'S TRADE DEFICIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(million US $)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) trade deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) remittance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) / (b) [%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Trend toward Permanent Residence

In 1964, government delegations from both Germany and Turkey partially revised the former bilateral agreement. In this revision, a section of the 1961 agreement, Act 9, which prohibited Turkish guest workers staying more than two years, was erased. It was the first event to open a path toward permanent settlement for the Turks.

In the same year, the two governments concluded an agreement on social security which assured Turkish workers of retirement pensions, accident and sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, and children's allowances. The principle of absolutely equal treatment for both indigenous and foreign workers was therefore stipulated on a legal and diplomatic basis.

In 1965, the Federal German government enacted the first Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz), which basically confirmed the bilateral recruitment agreements. There were no apparent restrictions on recruitment during the period of their stay in Germany implied in the Aliens Act, but it was intended to regulate recruitment procedures and working conditions.

The Work Permission Act (Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung, 1971) laid down a new category of work permit whose validity was extended to five years. The special work permit could be granted to foreign workers who had continuously and legally worked for more than five years. Previously, only a general work permit was granted the validity of which was limited to less than two years. According to the Act, special permit holders could apply for any jobs

irrespective of the condition of the labor market, and any preference for EEC (the present EU) citizens did not work against them.

In the FRG, residential permits for foreign workers and their families are issued by the foreigners' office under the Ministry of the Interior in each state (Land). Foreign workers are required to have a residential permit as well as a work permit, and the granting of the former is at the discretion of the Ministry of the Interior, and could be suspended without considering the condition of the working permit. In spite of these two separate legal requirements, the foreign workers themselves did not feel these regulations were restrictive, as the permits would not be cancelled due to the full employment in the 1960s.

Due to strong demands from the industrial and construction sectors, the German government's Gastarbeiter policy did not attempt to restrict the increasing inflow of foreign workers until the first oil crisis in 1973.

On the contrary, it accelerated the number of workers staying permanently by granting the right to family reunion (Familienzusammenführung). The number of foreign residents jumped from 2,976,500 in 1970 to 3,966,200 in 1973, and the number of Turkish residents almost doubled over the same three years from 469,200 to 910,500. But, the percentage of the Turkish resident population which was working had fallen from 75.4 percent in 1970 to 66.4 percent in 1973, and by the end of the 1970s, it had declined to almost 40 percent.

By the end of the 1960s, most of the Turkish workers and their families did not have any reason to return to their home country, in fact, social welfare standards in the FRG were much better than those in Turkey in the 1960s, particularly in the area of insurance. Although they became permanently settled forming a migrant society, the German public still saw them solely as a temporary source of manpower. There was a clear contradiction between the German policy of recruitment of foreign workers and German public opinion.

In general, the breakdown of the rotation system for foreign workers was attributed to the influx of the Turkish families which flooded into the FRG through family reunification. However, as mentioned above, the remarkable increase in the number of foreign residents and the trend for them to stay permanently were the result not only of a "push" policy from the Turkish government but also of a "pull" policy from the German government.

Dirty, Dangerous, and Physically Demanding Work

Even if the German alien policies were not particularly restrictive in the 1960s, this did not mean that the working conditions of the foreign workers were satisfactory. Foreign workers were usually found in all the dirty, dangerous and physically demanding jobs. Turkish workers, in particular, were concentrated in the mining, manufacturing and construction sectors. During the first decade of the 1960s, the number of German coal miners halved, however, the number of Turkish coal miners increased fourfold. In 1963, of the total number of Turkish workers, 48.2 percent were involved in the iron and steel industries, 17.8 percent in construction work, and 8 percent in textile industries. They were mostly engaged in monotonous and repetitive work as unskilled laborers. There was little possibility of the ac-

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1 Iwao Kamozawa, *Nishi Doitsu no Toruko-jin*, [The Turks in West Germany], Gaikokujin Rodosha to Shakaihoshou, Univ. of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1991, p.158.

acquisition of the new skills which the Turkish government had expected. In terms of numbers the demand for extra manpower in Germany coincided with the extra supply in Turkey, however, German industries merely needed lots of cheap manpower, contrary to the Turkish government's expectations.

As shown in Table 4, even in 1989, the sectors in which foreign workers were concentrated were the textile industry, street cleaning, garbage collection, and iron and steel industries. It is clear that all of the unattractive low jobs with low prestige have been relegated to foreign workers, and this job distribution structure has hardly changed over the last thirty years.

**TABLE 4 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN WORKERS OF BY SECTORS (1989)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Foreigner</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical industry</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel, Metal industry</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile industry</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery industry</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food industry</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile industry</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics industry</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Mitteilungen der Beauftragten Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer: Daten und Fakten zur Ausländer situation 1990.

**Integration or Exile**

*Threats from the Gastarbeiter?*

Undoubtedly, the first oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent recession was a turning point in German *Ausländerpolitik*. The 1970s was the start of an economic slow-down and high unemployment in the FRG. While the unemployment rate for the whole working population was only 0.9 percent in 1969, during the same year the rate was 0.2 percent for foreign workers.

In 1974, the unemployment rate for the whole working population reached 2.6 percent, and 2.9 percent for foreign workers. In this year, the unemployment rate for foreign workers exceeded the rate for the whole working population for the first time. On the other hand, in 1974, the total population of foreign residents exceeded four million, the number of Turks exceeded one million. During the late 1970s, the unemployment rate for foreign workers stayed at almost 5 percent, and was slightly higher than that for the whole working population. After the second oil crisis in 1979, the unemployment rate rapidly increased, and unemployment problems for foreign workers worsened a great deal.

Unemployment was a serious problem for foreign workers. If workers lost their jobs,
and if they only had a general work permit and a residential permit with a time limit, the workers' residential status might not be guaranteed because the granting of a residential permit was based upon their labor contract. The dual permission system was not perceived as a restrictive measure during periods of full employment, however, since the mid-1970s, it has become a major concern for foreign workers and their families.

In Germany, the regional imbalance in the distribution of industries was sharply reflected in regional differences in unemployment rates for foreign workers. For instance, in 1986, the unemployment rate for foreign workers was 16.8 percent in Nordrhein-Westfahlen where iron and steel industries are concentrated, on the other hand, it was 8.6 percent in Baden-Württemberg where electronics and automobile industries offered relatively plentiful job opportunities. Industries such as mining, and iron and steel which had been prosperous during the post-war development period of the 1960s went into structural decline, and most of the Turkish workers were concentrated in these industries.

**Between Fear and Hostility**

Although the unemployment rate for Turkish workers was constantly higher than that of Germans, the existence of Gastarbeiter always conjured up images which threatened the German labor market. More seriously, such myopic fear too often at the beginning of the 1980s led to mass hostility against foreigners (Auszländerfeindlichkeit).

Incongruity with foreigners itself was an undercurrent in German society, this was often expressed as "fear of contact" Berührungsangst in German. And it was strengthened drastically due to the rapid increase both in unemployment and the number of foreign workers. By means of exaggerating the threat from foreign workers, fear and discomfort against foreigners exploded as xenophobia. Turkish migrants in Germany have experienced four peaks in xenophobia, during the recessions of 1966/67, 1974/75 and 1979/82, and the last peak
came shortly after the reunification in 1990. "Ausländer 'raus!" (Foreigners, get out!), "Türken 'raus!" (Turks, get out!) "Do you know the best Turk? He is a dead Turk." "Do you know the difference between Jews and Turks? Jews have already experienced it." Such insulting phrases are well known among the Turks in Germany, most of them have experienced similar discomfort from discrimination. All kinds of insult and abuse were heaped on the Turks whose race, culture, social life, and religion are very different from the Germans. Since such differences were visible, the Turks could easily become the targets of racial discrimination and violence.

Apart from this overt racism, Turks are often criticized by their German neighbors because of their lifestyle. "Turkish women cover their heads with scarves, which is a symbol of backwardness and the oppression of women." "They are noisy when they gather in the evening in groups." Such censures came mainly from an instinctive hatred of foreigners. Even if these feel somewhat reasonable to the Germans, it is very difficult to see the boundary between valid criticism and racial discrimination. More importantly, too little attention has been paid to the condemnation which is based upon differences in culture. Differences in culture very easily transform into explicit racial discrimination, because a cultural background cannot be changed easily.

If workers were to lose their jobs, and gathered with their friends at railway stations or cafeterias, they would become a target of public criticism; lazy Gastarbeiters are living off German unemployment insurance and children's allowances. Such condemnation was, initially in the 1970s, raised by elderly pensioners and unemployed people, those who constituted the lower strata in German society, then in the late 1980s this extended to German youngsters.

Meanwhile, Turkish migrants' views of their host society show clear ambivalence, favorable views of German social infrastructure including education, medical services and social welfare on one hand, undesirable impressions of the German personality such as obstinately principled behavior and an alienating attitude against foreigners on the other hand. In spite of bitter experiences from xenophobia, the first generation of Turkish migrants in Germany seems to have been very patient, otherwise, they could not realize their "German dream," returning to their hometown or village with a Mercedes, building a flat in a city, and owning a small shop.

Such patience was reasonable only for the first generation of migrants. The second and third generation of youngsters, born after the period of high unemployment, have had very few chances for upward economic mobility. As long as the present high rate of unemployment continues, no one can be sure their patience will be rewarded. In fact, second or third generation Turkish migrants are heavily burdened with many questions which finally boil down to the choice, return or integrate.

Integration, the Fundamental Ausländerpolitik Policy

In 1970, the Federal Ministry of Labor first laid down the principles for the integration of foreign workers and their families. The document indicated several measures necessary for their integration into German society such as promoting family reunion, giving the migrants' children enough language and vocational training opportunities, and providing decent housing for their families. It showed tolerance for foreign workers and their families, stating that
their existence was indispensable to the economic development of the FRG not only as part of labor market policy but also as a positive influence on the age structure of the population.¹

Since the beginning of the 1970s when foreign workers and their families first started intending to settle down more permanently, integration became a key term in German alien policies. But, integration criteria were not discussed at length although the term itself was used frequently. Journalists, scholars, and politicians in the social democrat factions, have consistently stated that integration is urgently needed, but they have not offered a blueprint of a future Germany as a multi-ethnic society.

Summing up, the concept of integration might be described as follows; first, to allocate certain places for migrants where they could perform their participation economically and socially, but not politically, second, to adjust them to the German society especially in their behavioral patterns and way of thinking.

In November 1973, the Federal German government declared a halt to any further recruitment of foreign workers (Anwerbstop), and closed the recruitment offices in labor exporting countries including Turkey. There was only one exception Bayern where manpower demand was still higher than other regions. The Federal government allowed the state of Bayern to recruit short-term foreign workers but only for fixed projects. The alien policies in the 1970s basically followed the “principles” issued by the Labor Ministry, the concern was to implement integration however to what end was not clear.

In 1978, the former prime minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Heinz Kühn (SPD) was appointed as the first Federal Ombudsman for the Foreigners (Ausländerbeauftragter). He made proposals named the “Kühn Memorandum” in September 1979. Similar to former proposals, he stressed the necessity of integration. However, his Memorandum was notable for the basic concept of German alien policies it outlined. He proclaimed that foreign workers and their families had already abandoned the idea of returning to their home countries, therefore, they were no longer Gastarbeiter but Einwanderer (migrant).

This recognition was basically accepted by the two ruling coalition parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). But due to strong opposition from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/the Christian Social Union (CSU), it could not be turned into a government scheme. In Kühn’s proposals, two important measures were included; one was to grant political rights in local elections, and the other was to grant German nationality (Einbürgerung) to adolescents. The former was dismissed by the Federal Constitutional Court in October 1990, while the latter was realized under the new Aliens Act which has been in force since 1991.

In 1979, the Aliens Act was partially revised as follows; aliens who had legally resided in the FRG for more than five years would be granted an open-ended permit to stay, and those who had legally resided for more than eight years would be entitled to the right to permanent residence (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) and a special work permit. Granting a more secure legal status for migrants was, definitely, a progress towards implementing legislatve integration, but it was almost the last improvement carried out by the SPD/FDP coalition.

Elimination and Integration Projects

During the years from 1979 to 1982, the severe stagnation after the second oil crisis aggravated unemployment problems in the FRG. The total number of unemployed workers increased remarkably, from 889,000 in 1979 to 2,258,000 in 1983. The unemployment rate in 1984 was 9.6 percent for all workers, and 14.7 percent for foreign workers, but more specifically 17.7 percent for Turkish workers.

For the new coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the FDP which came to power in October 1982, unemployment was the most urgent problem. Chancellor Helmut Kohl repeatedly emphasized that Germany is not a country for migrants (Die Bundesrepublik ist kein Einwanderungsland.), and this statement is still the basic line for German Ausländerpolitik. In this coalition government, the CDU/CSU consistently applied their firm attitude against foreign residents. In fact, they have not yet recognized migrants as permanent residents but still keep their old definition of Gastarbeiter.

Even within the coalition, the FDP, which has a rather liberal and more realistic stance on alien policies, often opposed the discriminative attitude of the CDU/CSU. The major opposition party SPD was consistently criticising the anti-foreign stance of the CDU/CSU, and the Green Party (Grüne) denounces the present alien policies as institutionalized discrimination.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Republican Party (REP), which became more powerful in the late 1980s, blatantly expressed its anti-foreign ideas viewing the government's alien policies as being too lenient on the elimination of the foreigners.

The Kohl government's main alien policy had three facets, i.e. promoting return, improving integration, and severely restricting any new migrants. In 1983, the government carried out the first part of its policy to encourage permanent return by passing the Encourage Return Act which was only temporary legislation. According to the Act, if an unemployed foreigner decided to return permanently, a subsidy of 10,500DM per person, and 1,500DM for children was paid. Applications had to be completed by 30 June 1984, and the applicants had to leave by the end of September 1984.

Almost 250,000 foreigners returned as a result of this Act, and the population of foreign residents decreased from 4,530,000 in 1983 to 4,150,000 in 1984. In 1985 however, the number of foreign residents again increased to 4,380,000. As the second Ombudswoman for the Foreigners Lieselotte Funcke (FDP) pointed out, the average subsidy paid to a family, about 20,000DM, was only equivalent to about seven months of unemployment allowances, and was really little incentive for unemployed foreigners to return permanently.

For Turkish families, even unemployed, it was reasonable to stay in Germany. If they returned, they faced many difficulties in finding ways to support their families, as Turkey had problems such as high levels of unemployment, hyper-inflation and insufficient social welfare. Particularly for old people, the satisfactory medical care and other social services provided by the welfare state were very attractive. The Encourage Return Act itself was, however, successful in that it appealed to the government's uncompromising attitude against the aliens. In fact, Germans especially those who were anxious about reducing the level of social welfare appreciated the government measure.

Opposing the alien policies of the CDU/CSU, Funcke as well as other liberals and social
democrats insisted that pressing migrants to choose either return or integration marginalized and alienated them from the host society. They thought that government schemes should focus on the integration of the second and third generation.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, various efforts had been made on improving integration throughout the country by using diverse public and private organizations and institutions. On the German side, for instance, the Volkshochschule offers German language courses for migrants free of charge. The Arbeiterwohlführung has information centers especially for Turks (Türkďanď) as well as preparing language and vocational training courses and counselling bureaus. For Turkish adolescents, the Jugendsozialwerk also offers opportunities for both language and vocational training.

These are mostly voluntary associations but are supported financially by the German local authorities, and some of them have close ties with the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). In most cities with many foreign residents, there are councils of foreigners (Ausländerbeirat) which are assemblies where the foreign residents can discuss various subjects concerning their lives, although their decisions have no legal force.

Awakening to the Contradiction

In spite of these efforts, further improvements in integration are definitely obstructed by several structural factors. Firstly, the German alien policy itself is contradictory, because it shows an unreasonable dichotomy which urges the migrants to choose either return or integration. Secondly, as Funcke indicated, lacking any recognition for different cultures and societies within the German society prevents the Germans from integrating. Integration cannot be achieved without a rapprochement between the host and migrant societies.

Thirdly, without granting them political rights, the subordinate status of the migrants cannot improve. Who wants to be integrated as a second class citizen? Referring to this critical question, Funcke as well as her predecessor Kühn suggested to the Federal Government that political rights should be granted in local elections, to facilitate the naturalization of adolescent migrants, and for dual nationality to be accepted. But, these proposals effect the heart of the Constitution, and are against the exclusive nature of CDU/CSU alien policies. More importantly, these proposals challenge the fundamental concept of the nation (Volk) in Germany.

Fourthly, it should be noted that most of the liberals who have expressed a tolerant attitude toward the migrants have failed to identify their antagonists. When they mention the significance of integration, they carefully avoid to implying any nuance of assimilation which would remind Germans of their stigmatized past of Nazism. But, ironically, in Germany, no one expects the Turks to be assimilated into the Germans. The real opponents with whom the liberals and social democrats are in dispute are the nationalists and extreme rightists, those who advocate the exile of foreigners in order to maintain the jus sanguinis of the German nation.

As a result, migrants are exposed to anti-foreigner statements from the CDU/CSU on one hand, and requirements to integrate from the FDP/SPD on the other. For the migrants, it was almost impossible to understand why the only alternative to their removal must be integration.
The Segmentation of Turkish Migrant Society

The Dichotomy between Secularism and Anti-secularism

Since the Kohl government urged the migrants to choose either return or integration, the Turks had to respond. The answer of most migrants was neither return nor integration, but “to stay permanently.” The illogical policy of “return or integration” was no more than a result of the disagreements between the CDU/CSU and the FDP/SPD which neglected to show any realistic future plan for the migrants.

More realistically, Turkish migrants, those who have experienced racial discrimination from Germans, are largely reluctant to make any further efforts toward integration. In other words, they have become aware of the fact that they will not be accepted as a member of German society as they are not ethnic Germans but aliens.

In parallel with the trend towards staying permanently, Turkish migrant society diversified and segmented according to their attitude toward the host German society and their political/ideological ties with Turkey. A lot of cultural, educational, social, religious, and political organizations were established by Turks in Germany.

There are two main dimensions to their activities, one is to support integration particularly language and vocational training, the other is to support the maintenance of their Turkish cultural inheritance, e.g. mother language, religion and folklore. In comparison with German organizations, the Turkish organizations are much more diversified politically, and range from secularist to anti-secularist as well as from the left to the right.

On the other hand, the government of Turkey has tried to keep migrant society united. There are labor attachés in almost all embassies and consulate general offices, and they are engaged in trying to improve employment and social security for Turkish workers. The Ministry of National Education (M.E.B.) sends Turkish teachers to give lessons on Turkish history and culture which includes some religious instruction. However, there is confrontation between the teachers sent by the M.E.B. and Turkish teachers employed by the German local authorities. While the teachers from the M.E.B. mostly emphasize the migrants’ Turkish cultural inheritance, these latter’s major concern is to give their children a better understanding of both German and Turkish cultures.

The dichotomy between secular-liberal and religious-conservative is partially a reflection of the similar confrontation in Turkey between laiklik and anti-laiklik (secularism and anti-secularism), and also partially shows the reaction against unreasonable German alien policies.

For Turkish migrants convinced they are Turks irrespective of their place of residence, secular/anti-secular confrontation is an essential question. Similar to France, the concept of laiklik was adopted by Mustafa-Kemal Atatürk as one of the principles of the state. Turkey is, therefore, not a Islamic state, but is possibly a Muslim state in which the overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim.

The seventy years of the modern history of Turkey can possibly be described as a struggle between the laik-Kemalist or Republicanist factions (Atatürkçü/Cumhuriyetçi) and the
religio-political or Islamist (Dinç/Islamci) factions. In addition, the radical nationalists whose ideas stem from pan-Turkism (Turanism) also have a certain amount of influence, and they often cooperate with the religio-political factions.

After World War II, Turkey implemented a democratic parliamentary system and achieved political pluralism. As a result of this, religion had opportunities to increase its influence in domestic politics even though it was an apparent challenge against Atatürk's concept of the state. When the religio-political factions explicitly attacked these principles, the military, which has faith in Kemalism, severely suppressed them.

The last military coup, in September 1980, affected the segmentation of Turkish migrants in Europe. During the coup, the Turkish military suppressed both Islamic activists and radical leftists, and a number of activists from both factions escaped from Turkey to the Federal Republic of Germany as asylum seekers (Asylbewerber).

In the FRG, the right to seek asylum (Asylrecht) is enshrined in the constitution. As a result, the Federal German government gave sanctuary to anti-democratic and anti-secular activists. While the activities of the radical leftists were not successful in the FRG, the Islamic activists widely infiltrated Turkish migrant society, and the size of their organizations has increased since the late 1980s.

Islamic Revivalism as a Response to Ausländerfeindlichkeit

The first generation of migrants, even though most are going to stay permanently, are still willing to retain certain ties with Turkey. In this regard, they are often active as supporters of Turkish political parties outside Turkey. The Welfare Party (RP), the only legal religiously oriented party, has a large supporting organization, the Avrupa Millî Görüş Teşkilatı, active throughout Europe.

This organization was first established to support the Turkish National Salvation Party (MSP) which was dissolved because of its militant Islamic activism by the military government after the coup in 1980. After the establishment of a civil government in 1983, the old MSP changed its name to RP, however Necmettin Erbakan still remains leader of the party.

In the FRG, the Millî Görüş Teşkilatı has more than 450 mosques, and the approximate value of its property seems to be equivalent to almost 82 million DM. In Berlin which is one center of their activities, there are forty-five Turkish Islamic organizations, of which sixteen belong to the Avrupa Millî Görüş Teşkilatı, whereas seventeen are attached to the government controlled Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DİTİB).

The DİTİB was founded in 1972, for consultation about and the administration of the religious life of Turkish migrants, as part of the Turkish state policy that only imams and religious personnel approved by the Department of Religious Affairs in Ankara (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) can serve the religious needs of Turkish nationals abroad. In the FRG, there are more than four hundred imams and religious personnel who have been sent by the Department of Religious Affairs.

In spite of this policy to try to control religious life, the segmentation of religious factions is still going on and the most radical Islamists, like Cemalettin Kaplan and his group, are certainly a threat to secular-liberal Turkish migrants and the domestic political situation.

* Cumhuriyet, 18.5.1994.
in Turkey.

The resurgence of Islam among Turkish migrants in Germany was initially caused by the discriminatory attitude from German society. Especially for the first generation of migrants, their isolated lonely life could be eased only by their religion. In fact, both mentally and materially the imams supported them, and at mosques they could find friends in a similar situation. As their children increased their ability of German language and adjusted to German society, the elderly migrant men became isolated, even within their own families, and lost their patriarchal authority.

The second and third generation of migrants have also suffered from discrimination and alienation from the host society. But their reaction was often different from their parents. At least they can communicate easily with the Germans, and if they wish to defend their pride and identity through religion, they can learn the principles of Islam at Qur'an courses, and then choose for themselves whether life must be conducted along Islamic lines. Their faith does not exist as a part of a traditional culture as it did for most of the first generation Turks, but their conviction is firmer and often manifests itself as Islamic activism. In fact, they see Islam as a power which can protect them from racism.

On the other hand, secular Turks were much more vulnerable to the anti-foreign ideology in the FRG. To state "I am a Kemalist and Republicanist" is still recognized in Turkey where democracy often faces the menace of anti-secular ideology. But living in Germany, being proud of your identity as a secular Kemalist offered little comfort to Turks, and did not appeal to the Germans. In Germany, Turks given the German government's protection as asylum seekers were not secular Kemalists but radical Islamists, radical leftists, and Kurdish separatists.

Since the late 1980s, the Federal German government has repeatedly accused the Turkish state of violating human rights, denying religious freedom and freedom of speech. Such a negative attitude toward Turkey was needed to suspend the Turkish application for full membership of the EU. A series of negative campaigns in conservative newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung during 1989/1990, insulted Republicanist Turks, while encouraging the radical Islamists.

A Wall is Removed but a Wall Remains

Overt Anti-Foreign Policies

1990 will be an unforgettable year for the Turks in the Federal Republic Germany but not only because of the re-unification of West and East Germany. In July of that year, a new Aliens Act came into force, and in October, the granting of political rights to foreign residents was rejected by the Constitutional Court.

Compared to the fears of the migrants before the new Aliens Act was passed, their legal status had not seriously deteriorated. More importantly, in the discussions during the revision of the former Act, anti-foreign ideology was explicitly expressed by the CSU which is the Bayern counterpart of the CDU.

In 1988, as soon as the draft of the new Act prepared by the CSU Interior Minister
Friedrich Zimmermann was leaked, loud criticism came from their coalition partner the FDP as well as from the main opposition parties the SPD and the Grüne. The draft stated that a revision was necessary to avoid a collapse in the social homogeneity based on the ethnic purity of the Germans (\textit{deutsche Volkszugehörigkeit}).

Such a blatant racist attitude revealed that the criteria for German nationality known as \textit{jus sanguinis} and the xenophobia were two sides of the same coin. It meant that the very basis of the anti-foreign ideology which originated from the criteria had never changed even after World War II.

As a result of heated arguments, several new measures for improving integration were passed for permanent residents. On the other hand, the inflow of new migrants including those coming to take advantage of the right to family reunion was strictly restricted. In detail, the most important amendment related to the conditions for granting German nationality (\textit{Einbürgerung}). According to the new regulations, German nationality can be granted to second and third generation migrants, who are between sixteen and twenty-three years old, on the condition that they have legally lived for more than eight years, and have received more than six years of education, in the FRG, four years of which must have been general education (The Aliens Act, 1990, Article 85).

Besides adolescents, nationality can also be granted to first generation migrants who have legally resided in the FRG for more than fifteen years, however they must apply by the end of 1995 (Article 86). In addition, the application fee was reduced to 100 DM from the 3000-4000 DM under the former regulations.

These regulations have, so far, encouraged many young migrants to apply for German nationality. Among Turkish migrants, the number granted German nationality was 1,324 in 1990, but in 1993, more than three thousand Turks received German nationality in Berlin alone.

\textit{Institutionalized Discrimination}

This phenomenon cannot be explained only a result of the implementation of the new measures. On 31 October 1990, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that granting political rights to foreigners is unconstitutional. For permanent foreign residents, the only way to participate in German politics is to have German nationality. Prior to this final decree, in February 1989, the city council in Hamburg which is legislatively equivalent to a state (\textit{Land}) adopted a resolution granting suffrage in its district assemblies for foreigners on the condition that they had been legally resident for eight years. This resolution was followed by several municipalities and states under SPD rule, such as Schleswig-Holstein, Nordrhein-Westfahlen, Bremen, and Berlin.

The CDU/CSU raised strong objections to these decisions, and brought the case to the Constitutional Court. One year later, the Court gave its verdict that it was unconstitutional. According to the verdict, political rights are rights for German citizens (\textit{Staatsvolk}) of the FRG, and this citizenship is for German nationals (\textit{deutsches Volk}), consequently, granting rights to foreigners is unconstitutional. According to the Reich and State Nationality Act (\textit{Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz}, 1913), German nationality must be inherited along the principle of \textit{jus sanguinis}, and this criteria is still applicable.

Foreign residents, therefore, lost their opportunity to participate even in regional
politics, nevertheless they are required to integrate into German society. The revision of the Alien Act and the denial of political rights convinced the Turkish migrants that alienation of foreigners is systematically institutionalized. As far as the legislative aspect of the alien policies is concerned, all the measures are enforced based upon the principle which divides people in Germany into two categories, German nationals and foreigners.

The criteria to be a German national is mentioned in the Bonner Constitution. As is well known, Article 116 defined two different categories of Germans, one is the holder of German nationality, the other one is an ethnic German (deutsche Volkszugehörige) those who were settled in the German Reich on 31 October 1937, as well as refugees or those who had been deported and who had proof of their German ethnic origin.

Ethnic Germans, even if they cannot speak their mother language, can be accepted as German nationals by presenting evidence which proves their German ethnic origin and if they display some racial characteristics.

On the contrary, if permanent foreign residents apply for nationality, even if they can speak German fluently, they have to meet several conditions to get German nationality. In fact, under the previous Aliens Act, arbitrary conditions such as “sufficient German language ability” and “exemplariness (Unbescholtenheit)” were required for the granting of German nationality.

For foreign residents, it is impossible to achieve absolute legal equality, in a German society whose principles are based on jus sanguinis. Certainly, by getting German nationality, legal equality is granted for migrants, but discrimination against the German nationality holder without an appropriate ethnic background will still remain unless the difference is removed from the constitution.

Rules guaranteeing the equal treatment of foreign workers are present, in as far as migrants are given the status of Gastarbeiter, however, if they try to change their social status like a German can, they immediately face the obstacle shown by the question, “Who are you?” Institutionalized discrimination can also be observed when foreigners with general work permits attempt to find employment. According to the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz), Germans have first priority for employment, followed by the Aussiedler (ethnic German returnees from Eastern Europe), EU-citizens are third, and Gastarbeiter from non-EU countries like Turkey come fourth.

Even among foreign workers, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese and Greeks have a higher priority as EU-citizens when getting jobs, and the remaining jobs are given to Turks, Moroccans, and people from former Yugoslavia. Discrimination is also institutionalized through German foreign policies based upon the Treaty of Rome which set a boundary between EU and non-EU citizens. The former are regarded as community citizens (Gemeinschaftsinländer) receiving almost the same treatment as German nationals, and the latter are regarded as foreigners (Ausländer). As Turkey's application for full membership of the EU was turned down in December 1989, Turkish migrants must be reconciled to their lower position relative to EU migrants.

Turks in Germany generally use the word uyum as the translation of the word integration, and uyum sağlamak as the translation of to integrate in the context of migrants. Uyum originally meant cooperation or harmony, therefore, most of the Turks felt positively towards integration, in the sense that they wanted to form a harmonious society with the Germans. Thirty years later, only negative feeling remains regarding the term “Integration,”
for the actual process was acculturation, and the result was the granting of only limited rights.

It should also be noted that no consensus was ever reached by the German public on the ideological basis of integration. Integration was seen as one measure, but was not widely recognized as an indispensable principle toward achieving democracy in a multi-ethnic society. It was too difficult for Germans to conceive of foreigners as Mitbürger (fellow-citizens) within their own concept of the German nation-state.

Through a series of events in 1989/90, it became clear that the criteria to become a German national (deutsches Volk) and its legitimacy created many questions. Inevitably the arguments concentrated on essentials such as, “Who is a member of the country?”, and “To what extent can rights be granted to foreigners?” The answers from the Federal German government to these questions were a long way from the reality, which was that a multi-ethnic society already existed in Germany, nonetheless the German government never approved. Moreover, the answers revealed that the basis of the nation itself formed an indestructable wall obstructing integration, and causing the further segmentation of Turkish migrant society.

**Intensification of Ausländerfeindlichkeit**

In Mölln (November 1992), and in Solingen (May 1993), houses of Turkish families were set on fire. Both Germany and Turkey mourned the victims. Not only migrants, but Turkish public opinion was also infuriated by the racial incidents, however the anger in Turkey was aimed at the German government, which repeatedly reproached Turkey for human rights violations. Vehement objections greeted the series of insulting campaigns, but it should be noted that the Turkish public opinions' major concern was not the difficult situation of the migrants.

The xenophobia (Ausländerfeindlichkeit) intensified first in former East Germany after re-unification. Lots of plausible explanations stated that such racial violence would be a temporary phenomenon arising from the chaotic situation. Fear of unemployment and a lack of experience of living in a multi-ethnic society are cited as reasonable factors causing the violence. The people in former West Germany regarded racial violence as something that could not happen in the West, however it erupted frequently shortly after the Berlin Wall had been removed. In the West, the xenophobia was caused by a rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers and ethnic German returnees before re-unification.

As a result, how to control the influx of asylum seekers became top of the alien policy agenda. The popular tabloid Bild devoted a great deal of space to a campaign criticizing the fact that there were no measures being used by the government to control the number of asylum seekers. It was quite successful, the campaign aroused both fear and hostility against asylum seekers. Needless to say, there was no reason to attack the Turkish migrants at least in the context of the questions of asylum seekers. For the skinheads affiliated with Neo-Nazi organizations however, it was enough if the victims were non-German, more precisely, if they were obviously heterogeneous people like Turks and refugees from outside Europe.

Certainly, the upsurge in racial violence may be a temporary phenomenon. However, the Turks in the FRG believe that racism itself never diminished in Germany even in the West, but had concealed itself within the legislative principles defining the Federal Republic
of Germany and its society.

**Future Prospects for the Never Ending Story**

In the last few years, the Turkish government has again noticed the migrants, in particular their savings and properties which in Germany alone amount to more than twenty billion DM. The government of Turkey, suffering from a huge trade deficit, is expecting more contributions from remittances and investment by the migrants. Since investment by the migrants had already peaked by the end of the 1980s, it is aiming for the return of their savings to increase its foreign currency reserves. Apart from the government’s financial expectations, it should be noted that after the enormous financial support given by the Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilati to the Welfare Party (RP) was disclosed shortly after the local elections in March 1994, the major political parties including the ruling True Path Party (DYP) began to appeal to migrants to invest in Turkey.

In the summer of 1994, public opinion in Turkey was unable to maintain any good will toward Germany or the EU, which had previously been the norm among upper- and middle-class people. The continuous campaign of insults against Turkey through the German media which criticized Turkey’s human rights record led to a great deal of antipathy from the Turkish public. Patriotism is still strong among the first generation of migrants, and it was reinforced as a result of the series of events in 1989/90 and the negative campaign against Turkey which caused a deterioration in their situation. Under these circumstances, it is very reasonable for religious and extreme nationalistic parties in Turkey to try to attract and organize them as their support base outside Turkey. In fact, a certain number of Turkish migrants have been drifting toward religious activism as well as radical nationalism.

Meanwhile, a view which promoted hostility against Islam was becoming popular among the Western allies after the threat from communist regimes had diminished. At first, the threat from Islam was exaggerated by political leaders in the West. Margaret Thatcher indicated that the enemy of the West in the twenty-first century would be Islam, Dan Quayle spoke of the dangers of Islam, lumping it together with Nazism and communism, and Patrick Buchanan stated that the Shiites are humiliating the West, and their co-religionists are filling up the countries of the West.1 Such provocative statements were to certain extent put more sophisticatedly by Samuel Huntington in his controversial “The Clash of Civilizations?” According to him, the paradigm, which can fundamentally explain present conflicts and wars must be the “difference in civilizations,” and Islam will be one of the most dangerous civilization threatening the West.

Western European countries, where more than seven million Muslim migrants are living, may have an explosive situation if these predictions are reasonable. However, there are more facets to Turkish migrant society in reality than the stereotyped images put forward to support the idea of the Islamic threat. The resurgence of Islam in migrant society in Europe should be interpreted as being a result of the alienation and racial-ethnic discrimination. The fear of Islam was created from the accumulation over a millennium of stereotyped and dis-

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torted images, such as female circumcision, polygamy, amputation for theft, stoning for fornication and adultery, the sword and *al-Qur’an*, intolerance and fanaticism. Actually, lots of studies have often been proved to be surprisingly ridiculous after using such an view of the “Islamic heritage” as part of their argument relating to the problems of the Muslim migrants in Europe.

It should be stressed that such anti-Islamic perceptions themselves threaten multicultural and multi-ethnic societies in most Western European countries. It encourages intolerant radical Islamists, and also pushes the larger numbers of secular migrants toward religious activism. For secular migrants, these prejudices are naturally perceived as challenges to their tradition and culture. Much more attention should be paid to the fact that such discussions remove opportunities to more realistically consider problems like the gender gap in migrant society. It is noticeable that Turkish women’s organizations with secular-liberal leanings strongly oppose the idea that problems such as the oppression of women can be blamed directly on Islam. In fact, these ridiculous arguments themselves encourage radical Islamist movements which show overt hostility against the West.

More importantly, these arguments are explicit racism in the post-Cold War world which is not being recognized as such. With the exaggerated images of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini, many believe that Islam and the Muslims threaten democratic rule in the West, and have little hesitation in alienating and discriminating against Muslims because of their religion. This new racism does not receive attention in most countries in the West.

In comparison with the “Islamic question” in France where secularism (*laïcité*) is a principle of the Republic, Islam in Germany, so far, in the context of the alienation of the Turkish migrants, seems to have a lower profile relative to the racial-ethnic question. However, as anti-Islamic ideology becomes more popular, perhaps another basis for the xenophobia (*Ausländerfeindlichkeit*) may be added to the idea of *jus anguinis*.

**Acknowledgement**

The study was conducted with the generous cooperation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Securities of Turkey and the Labour Attaché Offices outside Turkey. For help in the initial phase of this study, I am especially obliged to Mr. Midhat Şerif, former general director for Migrant Workers’ Affairs of the Ministry of Labour and Social Securities. My sincere thanks also go to Mr. Andrew Milburn-Stone who proof-read my paper. I received valuable assistance from Mr. Hiroyuki Aoyama and Ms. Yukie Kawakami who painstakingly printed my paper for the symposium.