THE ROLE OF THE CANON IN WESTERN EDUCATION

JANE BARNES MACK

The role of the "canon" in the curricula of universities and colleges in the Western world is a subject of much heated debate—especially in America. Moreover, this debate is inextricably linked to the issues of multiculturalism, deconstruction, and "minority" studies. Further, these issues have been instrumental in the politicization of the canon and of the new curricula offered by Western institutions of higher education. Indeed, race, gender, and class are the new triumvirate which determines curricula content.

Just what the canon is, however, might be unclear to those who are not familiar with the intellectual climate in Western universities and colleges. Thus, our first task is to explore the etymology of the word canon. It originally came from ancient Greek: kanon, meaning "a straight rod, bar, ruler, reed, rule, standard, model, severe critic . . . limit, boundary . . . "¹ In Alexandrian Greek kanon was used by rhetoricians in reference to a body of superior written works.² The word later found its way into Latin, with the same general meanings which were expanded to include concepts of rule and law, together with the Alexandrian connotation of a body of received written works.³

The later Latin used in early Christian times, however, was instrumental in further expanding the definition of the word. It came to mean, in addition, individuals who were admitted into heaven because of the exemplary lives they had led.⁴ This expanded definition is seen by some critics as crucial to the current academic debate concerning the implications of the word, for it suggests an open, not closed, system in which new saints (canons) have always appeared.⁵ Yet these critics also maintain that we still have the implication of a closed system, the aforementioned body of received written works.⁶

This latter connotation forms the core of the modern-day canon: an "unofficial, shifting, yet generally recognized body of great works that have stood the test of time and are acknowledged to be central to a complete . . . education."⁷ It has also been defined as "a list of classic works that embody in a universally significant manner the common experience of men and women and enable us, by studying them, to grow into the full humanity that

¹ George Henry Liddell and Holt Scott, Greek-English Lexicon. (Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford University Press, 1961). As this is a dictionary, no page reference is given.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
we share with others)". We can see, then, that the alleged universality and commonality of the canon is also central to the debate. For the canon includes those historical, literary, artistic, and philosophical works which form the foundation of (primarily, but not exclusively) Western thought and technology. Representative authors (in addition to consideration of the Bible) usually include: Plato, Aristotle, Homer, Augustine, Dante, Thomas More, Machiavelli, Luther, Galileo, Voltaire, Marx, Freud, Darwin and Nietzsche, to name only a few.

In this context, many critics cite Mathew Arnold's well-known definition of the canon: "a disinterested endeavor to know and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world." The use of the superlative in his definition highlights one of the disputes over the canon—that it is elitist and hierarchical. As Irving Howe asserted, "... some works are of supreme or abiding value, while others are of lesser value." Thus, supporters of the traditional canon believe that education should not provide ... a "representation or sample of everything that has been thought and written, but rather should give students access to works of high quality." Moreover, they view education itself to be intrinsically hierarchical and elitist "because it is designed to enable and encourage the student to discriminate between what is good and what is bad, what is intelligent and what is stupid, what is true and what is false," in addition to impart[ing] a critical attitude. The critic and historian Peter Shaw takes these definitions one step further: "... our predecessors thought and expressed some things in ways that cannot be improved upon."

Yet it is important to also remember that which works are included in the canon transcends "doctrinal conformity ... Aristotelians know that Hobbes deserves to be read in company with Aristotle, Thomists admit Nietzsche to the canon, enthusiasts of classical literature recognize comparable greatness in some modern works even though these books may explicitly repudiate classical standards ... the necessary—and the only—condition is scale of intellectual achievement, mastery indicated by such virtues as scope, perspicacity, subtlety, power to illuminate, alertness to the antithesis, and command over intrinsic requirements of form." "[For] the canon does not speak with one voice regarding such questions as the existence and character of God or the possibility of divine providence, the specific difference between human beings and animals, the best way of life for human beings, the particular constitution of civil society most conducive to the best life, or the proper order of authority and subordination that should obtain among the various powers of thinking, willing, feeling, and imagining within the individual." One studies great authors "in order to enter into a controversy with a view to understanding the issues at stake so as, ultimately, to resolve them."

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 37.
16 Ibid., 30–31.
In spite of such qualifications, however, critics of the traditional canon argue that a break with the past is necessary because it does not serve the present. Thus, they call for the works of minorities to be included in the canon, for up to now, they have been left out. They are, in effect, asking for democratic “representation.” They say that the canon consists overwhelmingly of works by dead white males of European origin—DWEMs. Therefore, many of these critics want to open the doors to admit the works of writers who are not male or European.

Further, some of these critics believe that expansion of the canon is not enough. Rather, they think that it should be abolished because they view it as an instrument of minority oppression. Moreover, they regard it as exclusionary because it automatically creates opposite categories: those authors who are included and those who are not. In addition, they believe that culturally contingent values should take precedence over inherent values.

Thus, we see that these critics are calling for the inclusion, or even substitution, in the canon of the so-called “rainbow representatives,” in other words, non-Western minorities. Inclusion of such authors (provided they have withstood the test of ephemerality, some would argue) is quite defensible. The irony is, however, that the culture of the West has long been influenced by the culture of the East. History tells us that when Herodotus sought more advanced knowledge than was found in Greece during his time, he went to Egypt. Aristotle was known in the Middle Ages by virtue of his Arab translators and commentators. We learn much about Chinese art from the study of eighteenth-century English poetry. Nineteenth-century German philosophers and theologians were greatly influenced by Indian and Chinese thought. Indeed, the dominant Western languages are Indo-European, with origins in Sanskrit. Moreover, today we use Arabic numerals, instead of Roman numerals, and long ago the Indian discovery of the zero was adopted in the West.

Indeed, as Leslie A. Fiedler notes, “Western civilization has always been multicultural;” it has never been “ethnocentric.” As we have seen, Western culture has its roots in many cultures. “It was born . . . in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Middle East and Europe, Hebraism and Hellenism, the Semitic and the Japhetic merge . . . writers whom we thing of as belonging to a world dominated by Greece and Rome were in fact Africans: Aesop, for instance, and . . . St. Augustine . . . such canonical writers as Dumas and Pushkin [who] were of African descent. . . . They made it into the canon [as did] Spinoza and Heine [and] Proust and Kafka—not because of their alien ethnic origin, but in bland disregard of that fact.”

Yet the critics of the traditional canon still view it as an “instrument of domination.”

---

18 Searle, 34.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 McNew, 12.
24 Silber, 35.
25 Fiedler, 34.
26 Scholes, 151.
Moreover, feminist critics are determined to liberate women from its “disempowering constructs of patriarchy.”27 “Few of us can free ourselves completely from the power ideologies inscribed in the idea of the canon and in many of its texts merely by not reading “canonical” texts, because we have been reading the patriarchal “archetext” all our lives.”28 Here we have the intersection of deconstruction and feminism,29 and also deconstruction and the canon. The very use of the word “text,” rather than “work” (or writings) etymologically suggests an unraveling or disassembling. Moreover, the use of the former is intentional—not only because it is part of the deconstructionist lexicon, but also because deconstructionists regard “works” as part and parcel of the Western tradition, which they categorically reject.

Roland Barthes explains this distinction as follows: “... the work is a fragment of substance ... the Text is a methodological field ... The work can be seen ... the text is a process of demonstration ... the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in language ... The author is reputed the father and the owner of his work... As for the Text, it reads without the inscription of the Father ... the metaphor of the Text is that of the network; ... no vital “respect” is due to the Text ... it can be read without the guarantee of its father ... the Author's life is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction contributing to his work ...”30 Thus, the reader, as the interpreter of the text, assumes the dominant (primary) role, and any and all of his interpretations are equally valid. As Robert Scholes comments, “... text is aligned with the extension of democratic, social, economic, and political processes and canon with the maintenance or recovery of more hierarchical structures.”31

In this context, it is also important to note that one of the central theses of deconstruction is that nothing really is; ontology (“being”), as construed by Western metaphysics, is an illusion.32 Thus, Jacques Derrida has remarked that deconstruction operates on the margins of philosophy. One scholar observed that Derrida really meant on the margins of European philosophy because deconstruction “fits comfortably with the philosophy of the East.”33 In Taoism, “all things are relative. ‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ are just words which we may apply to the same thing, depending upon which partial viewpoint we see it from.”34

Indeed, one critic of the traditional canon, Richard Rorty, has remarked that “truth is a matter of useful tools rather than the accurate representation ... truth and power will always be inextricably interlocked ... there is no such thing as “rationality” other than that contextually defined by the practices of a group (italics added).”35 Another opponent of the canon said, “... I renounce the claim to objective standards ...”36

29 Schor, 272.
31 Scholes, 155.
33 Thompson, 26.
35 As quoted in McNew, 21.
36 McNew, 17.
The rejection of objective truth or standards also reflects the essential relativism of such critics, and also of deconstruction itself. As John R. Searle has observed, this rejection also entails a repudiation of what he calls the "Western Rationalistic Tradition." Historically, this tradition holds that "statements are typically true in virtue of, or because of, features of the world that exist independently of the statement... Moreover, the world exists independently of language and one of the functions of language is to represent how things are in the world. One crucial point at which reality and language make contact is marked by the notion of truth." Conversely, "if all of reality is just a text anyway, then the role of the textual specialist... is totally transformed. And if, as Nietzsche says, 'There are not facts, but only interpretations,' then what makes one interpretation better than another cannot be that one is true and the other false, but, for example, that one interpretation might help overcome existing hegemonic, patriarchal structures and empower previously underrepresented minorities."

Here we see the connection of the dispute over "canonicity" (as Robert Scholes calls it) with deconstruction and multiculturalism. Both deconstructionists and multiculturalists (including, of course, the advocates of minority studies) regard the canon and the Western philosophical tradition as "patriarchal," "oppressive," "phallogocentric," "hegemonic." Thus, they are committed to modifying them—if not overturning them entirely. Moreover, they are challenging the idea that any hierarchy of works can be established, and also challenging the possibility of rational norms for determining intellectual, moral, and aesthetic excellence. It logically follows, then, that if their challenges are valid, the canon should not just be "opened up"; it should be eviscerated.

On the other hand, it is also possible to mount a strong defense of the canon and the Western philosophical tradition. First of all, this tradition is grounded in reason, which has two aspects: speculative, distinguishing the essences of the various categories of beings; and practical, governing within the soul and ordaining conduct that is accountable. Speculative reason produces science and also a philosophic understanding of first causes. Practical reason attains its end in wisdom and its resulting self-control. What distinguishes both these aspects of rationality is that they acknowledge an obligation to offer an account.

Thus, the Western philosophical tradition (and, by extension, Western education) differs from relativistic theories (such as deconstruction or multiculturalism) in that it promotes scientific and philosophical activity which proceeds by argumentation, by dialectics, by examination, and by confronting hypotheses with evidentiary challenges. John Searle formulates the basic tenets of this tradition as follows:

1. Reality exists independently of human representations. This is called "realism." For example the elliptical orbit of the planets relative to the sun, or the structure of the hydrogen atom, are totally independent of both the system and the actual instances of human representations. This is called "realism."

---

81 John R. Searle, "Rationality and Realism," Daedalus, Fall, 1993, 58 passim.
82 Ibid., 65.
83 Ibid., 71.
84 Young, 17–18.
85 Ibid., 18.
86 Alvis, 29.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
representations of these phenomena.

2. At least one of the functions of language is to communicate meanings from speakers to hearers, and sometimes those meanings enable the communication to refer to objects and situations in the world that exist independently of language. Understanding is possible because the speaker and the hearer can come to share the same thought, and that thought sometimes concerns a reality independent of both.

3. Truth is a matter of the accuracy of representation. A statement attempts to describe how things are in the world that exist independently of the statement, and the statement will be true (or false) depending on whether things in the world really are the way the statement says they are.

4. Knowledge is objective. Because the content of what is known is always a true proposition, and because truth is, in general, a matter of accurate representation of an independently existing reality, knowledge does not depend on, or derive from, the subjective attitudes and feelings of particular investigators. An argumentum ad hominem and a genetic fallacy (assuming that because a view has a reprehensible origin, the view itself is fallacious and discredited) are, *sui generis*, invalid.

5. Logic and rationality are formal. Logic tells us what must be the case, given that our assumptions are true, and hence we are committed to believing, given that we believe those assumptions. Rationality provides us with a set of procedures, methods, standards, and canons that enable us to assess various claims in light of competing terms.

6. There are both objectively and intersubjectively valid criteria of intellectual achievement and excellence. An example of an objective criterion is that for assessing validity in propositional calculus. An example of an intersubjective criterion is that appealed to in debating rival historical interpretations of the American Civil War.45

It is not only these tenets of the Western philosophical tradition that support the canon, however. There are other attestations as well. First of all, the charge by opponents of the canon that it is invalid because its authors are primarily "dead white males" is specious. For one reason, there are more dead people than living people. For another, classics, by definition, have been around for a long time. Therefore, they have withstood the test of ephemerality, and this fact has made them classics. That their authors were white is unavoidable, given the fact that the Western tradition has European roots. That they were male is related to the fact that most educated people in history were male. This is inequitable and therefore lamentable, but history has to do with what happened, not what we wish had happened.46

Moreover, the charge that the canon is hierarchical, that is to say, "judgmental," and therefore deplorable, is considered by many critics to be unsupported. A canonical hierarchy suggests a historically based judgment that some works are of greater significance and more lasting value than others. Only the most confirmed cultural relativist would assert that the potboilers of a Sidney Sheldon or a Stephen King are equal in value to the works of Shakespeare. As Irving Howe notes, "... the making of judgments, even if

45 Searle, "Rationality," 60–68 *passim*.
provisional and historically modulated, is inescapable in the life of culture."® Indeed, one can argue that all civilizations have always been judgmental.® As we have already seen, Roman numerals were long ago displaced by Arabic numerals because they were deemed more practical and therefore better. Parchments and scrolls were displaced by paper, printing, and books (all three of which originated in China) because they are better in the opinion of people all over the world.®

In addition, the charge by opponents of the canon that it is "hegemonic" is also rebutted by many critics. These critics argue that all civilizations cannot be studied equally for a very practical reason: the 24-hour day and the limited number of days spent by students in the university. Just to cover Western civilization in two semesters is arguably superficial; add a few other civilizations and the task becomes impossible.® The focus of Western education, whether we like it or not, is the Western intellectual and philosophical tradition.

Further, these charges of hegemony would seem to reflect a double standard. Opponents of the canon argue that this hegemony should be replaced by a respect for diversity. "The heirs of a dominant culture, they say, should learn the parochialism of their inherited perspective and practice toleration . . . of non-Western views. . . On the other hand, dissidents, minorities, and those from 'Third World' countries are encouraged merely to be themselves. Whites are supposed to learn "sensitivity" toward the different ways of [minorities], whereas [these minorities] are encouraged to learn their roots. [In addition,] males must acquire new openness toward feminist preoccupations whereas women become specialists in new programs for studying feminist preoccupations."®

That is not to say, of course, that the canon should not include both non-Western books and works written by women. Allan Bloom viewed Buddha as being as important as Moses, Jesus, and Homer because all of these "men formed horizons, and founded Jewish, Christian, Greek and Indian culture."® And Irving Howe thought that the canon should be expanded to include some works by Confucius, or the modern novels of Tanizaki or Garcia Marquez—in addition to a wide range of works from the pens of women who were previously neglected.®

The basic orientation of the canon, however, is Western and predominantly male, which is precisely what its opponents criticize and ultimately reject. Moreover, their criticism is perceived in many quarters as reflecting a political agenda, and this has led to the politicization of the canon itself. Those critics of the canon who lament its authors are "dead white European males" argue that minorities cannot identify with them. Rather, these minorities derive their identity from their ancestors. For these critics, "it is no longer one of the purposes of education . . . to enable the student to develop an identity as a member of a larger universal human intellectual culture. Rather, the new purpose is to reinforce his or her pride in and self-identification with a particular subgroup. (italics

48 Sowell, 47.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Alvis, 27.
53 Howe, 169.
added).”54

Yet is not such a view a manifestation of separatism, and as such patronizing, if not racist? Supporters of the canon readily agree that such black writers as Richard Wright, James Baldwin, Ralph Ellison and Albert Murray merit inclusion, as do a whole panoply of women: Jane Austen, Emily and Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, Emily Dickinson, Edith Wharton, Katherine Anne Porter, and Flannery O'Connor, to name but a few. But should not such authors be read on a universal level, for mental stimulation and aesthetics, rather than from the viewpoint of propagating social revolution, radical feminism or minority “self-esteem”? Moreover, cannot such authors be read within the parameters of traditional curricula? Do they have to be read in the context of black studies or women’s studies? Is not reading them in this context stipulating that diverse literary studies are appropriate for whites but not for minorities? Such “diversity” has led to the Balkanization of American society, for “the idea that students must be conversant with the history of their race or their nationality in order to learn is a pernicious idea, robbing the individual of the chance to construct a hard-won and genuine identity on his own.”55

Not only do revisers of the canon insist on separatist studies, but they also insist on both including and excluding works on ideological grounds. “On the one hand, they urge teaching works written by members of previously underesteemed groups in . . . society, along with those written by anyone which present . . . correct views on ethnicity, sexuality, age, and physical impairment. Yet at the same time, . . . they urge dropping from [the] curriculum books which support views on the subjects with which they . . . disagree, labeling them ‘racist,’ ‘sexist,’ ‘ageist,’ ‘homophobic,’ etc.”56 The result is that “their new canon is even narrower than the [traditional] one they began by deploring.”57 As Geoffrey H. Hartman commented, “the present multicultural consensus is a pseudoconsensus, since the omnes in this consensus omnium share mainly a certain rhetoric but act in an exclusionary or counterexclusionary way.”58 In the process, a subtle redefinition of the idea of an academic subject has taken place: from that of a domain to be studied to that of a cause to be advanced.59

The supporters of the new canon advocate it because, in their opinion, Western civilization has been unjust and oppressive. While they claim to be “non-judgmental,” they also condemn “evils” of Western society which have been endemic in other cultures, too. The classic case they cite is slavery. While Western societies practiced this abominable institution in the past, they were also the first to get rid of it. Moreover, they pressured other societies, which they had conquered or controlled, to abandon it. In contrast, it was African, Asian, and Arabic cultures who retained it the longest (the latter practiced it up to the 1950s). Yet multicultural critics of the traditional canon and the supporters of the new canon do not readily acknowledge these facts, perhaps because such facts mitigate their arguments.

In all the discussion, invective, and even bombast surrounding the controversy over

54 Searle, “Rationality,” 72.
55 Silber, 35.
56 Fiedler, 33.
57 Ibid.
59 Searle, “Rationality,” 73.
the traditional canon, the universality of the human condition and the common human enterprise would seem to have been forgotten, or at least ignored. Our curiosity, our eternal striving to learn the unknown is what unites us. The contribution of Western thinkers and writers has been that they did not consider themselves "bound by a culture, but bound instead to voice truths that could be perceived by anyone of any culture provided he were capable of thinking through the terms of argument. (italics added)." As John Alvis observes, "The Western world's distinctive contribution has been the tradition of controversy best conveyed by great books. [Moreover], the minds who produced this controversy, these books, have transmitted standards of reason regulating arbitrary will . . . In contrast, cultural relativism and its political cognate, the new racism, interpose dogmas that impede access to nature in the realm of thought as they impair public spiritedness in conduct."61

Hitotsubashi University

Bibliography

Silber, John, "Free Speech and the Academy," The Intercollegiate Review. Fall, 1990.

60 Alvis, 32.
61 Ibid., passim.