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PEDAGOGIC CODES AND THEIR MODALITIES

BASIL BERNSTEIN

Introduction

The models I will develop should be able to describe the organizational, discursive and transmission practices in all pedagogic agencies and show the process whereby selective acquisition takes place. I also want to make it very clear that my concept of pedagogic practice is somewhat wider than the relationships that go on in schools. To me, pedagogic practices would include the relationships between doctor and patient, would include the relationships between social workers and clients, would include the relationships between psychiatrist and the so-called mentally ill, would include the relationships between architects and planners; in other words, the notion of pedagogic practice which I shall be using will be to regard pedagogic practice as a fundamental social unit through which cultural reproduction—production takes place. I will operate with this rather wide definition of pedagogic practice. And the models of description which I shall try to create necessarily will have a certain generality in order that they can cope with the differentiation of the agencies of cultural reproduction.

I want to make it clear that I will not have time to consider in any great detail the macro institutional regulations on educational systems, but I am pleased to tell you that we are not short of such analysis. Neither will I be concerned with any major discussions of the changes in the orientations of contemporary knowledge systems. Again, we are not short of analysis of this kind, specially from Germany. Indeed, I have made a deliberate choice, and this deliberate choice is to focus sharply upon the underlying rules shaping the social construction of pedagogic discourse and its various practices. I am doing this because it seems to me that sociological theory is very long on metatheory and very short on providing specific principles of description, and so that I shall be concentrating very much on being able to provide and create models from which you can generate specific descriptions. It is my belief that without these specific descriptions there is no way in which we can understand the way in which knowledge systems become part of consciousness. Many of the models that we have I think are highly general, very important but highly general. They often do not serve to provide the necessary rules for the specific examination of specific agencies and transmission processes. So in a sense, I am not really apologizing for lowering the academic level of the discussions which will take place.

Indeed, I believe that the major theories of cultural reproduction which we have, essentially of the Parisian version, are limited by their assumptions and focus, and so are unable to provide strong principles of description of pedagogic agencies, of their discourses, of
their pedagogic practices. This I suggest, is because theories of cultural reproduction view education as a carrier of power relations external to education. So, from this point of view, pedagogic discourse becomes a carrier for something other than itself. It is a carrier of power relations external to the school; a carrier of patterns of dominance with respect to class, patriarchy, race. It is a matter of great interest that the actual structure which enables power to be relayed, power to be carried, in itself not subject to analysis. Paradoxically what is missing from theories of cultural reproduction is any internal analysis of the structure of the discourse itself, and it is the structure the of discourse, the logic of this discourse, which provides the means whereby external power relations can be carried by the discourse. And I shall develop this in rather more detail tomorrow.

So I would suggest that theories of cultural reproduction essentially see education, and in particular the school, as a site of social pathology, and their concern is to diagnose education as essentially a pathological device. In these analysis, clearly, social class is foregrounded, necessarily and importantly, and crucially foregrounded. But in the analysis which I will be giving today and tomorrow, social class will not be foregrounded. What will be foregrounded, I hope, will be an explication of the inner logic of pedagogic discourse and its practices. And I shall do this because I think it is important that if we want to understand how pedagogic processes shape consciousness differentially, I do not see how this can be done without some means of analyzing the forms of communication which in fact bring this about.

I shall be more concerned to analyse how a pedagogic text has been put together, the rules of its construction, circulation, contextualization, acquisition and change; and it is these matters that I wish to address. I will mainly be concerned with three interrelated problems:

Firstly, how does a dominating distribution of power and principles of control generate, distribute, reproduce and legitimate dominating and dominated principles of communication?

Secondly, how does such a distribution of principles of communication regulate relations within and between social groups?

Thirdly, how do these principles of communication produce a distribution of forms of pedagogic consciousness?

In summary, how does power and control translate into principles of communication, and how do these principles of communication differentially regulate forms of consciousness with respect to their reproduction and the possibilities of their change?

Power and Control

I shall start with the discussion of power and control for the distinction I will make here is crucial and fundamental to the whole analysis. In this formulation, power and control are analytically distinguished and operate at different levels of analysis. Empirically, we shall find that they are embedded in each other. Power relations in this perspective create boundaries, legitimates boundaries, reproduced boundaries, between different categories, between different categories of groups, gender, class, race, different categories of discourse, different categories of agents. Thus, power always operates to produce disloca-
tions, to produce punctuations in social space.

From this point of view then, power always operates on the relations between categories. The focus of power from this point of view is on the relations between, and in this way, power establishes legitimate relations of order. Control, on the other hand, from this point of view, establishes legitimate forms of communication appropriate to the different categories. Control carries the boundary relations of power and socializes individuals into these relationships. We shall see, however, that control is double faced for it carries both the power of reproduction and the potential of its change.

Summarizing this distinction between power and control. Briefly, control establishes legitimate communications, and power establishes legitimate relations between categories. Thus, power constructs relations between, and control relations within given forms of interaction. The forms of interaction in which I am interested are those of pedagogic practice; and the category relations in which I am interested are those of pedagogic discourse, its agents and its context. And here I would like to remind you again that the concept of pedagogic practice is somewhat wide.

Now, in order to show formally how dominant power and control relations are realised as forms of pedagogic communications, I shall have to develop a special language. This language must be capable of recovering macro relations from micro interactions.

The language must also reveal both the process of interaction and the potential for change. It must be capable of providing general principles from which specific descriptions may be derived of the major agencies of cultural reproduction and their processes of transmission and acquisition.

Classification and Framing

I will now proceed to define two concepts: one for the translation of power, of power relations, and the other for the translation of control relations, which I hope will provide the means of understanding the process of symbolic control regulated by different modalities of pedagogic discourse.

And perhaps, one can add a note here. The models that are created must be capable of generating a range of modalities of pedagogic discourse and practice; and the models must also be capable of generating pedagogic discourse and practices which at the moment do not exist. I doubt very much if the model that I will provide will be able to do this, but that would be an ideal situation to me if it could.

I shall start first with power. We said dominant power relations establish boundaries; that is, relationships between boundaries, relationships between categories. The concept to translate power at the level of the individual must deal with relationships between boundaries and the category representations of these boundaries. I am going to use the concept of classification to examine relations between categories, whether these categories are between agencies, between agents, between discourses, between practices.

Now this may seem a somewhat bizarre use of the concept of classification because normally classification is used to distinguish a defining attribute which constitutes a category; but here classification refers to a defining attribute not of a category but of the relations between categories. Thus, if I take a series of categories, concretely we could think
about the categories of discourse in the secondary school: physics, geography, language, etc.—but they need not be discursive categories within the school. They could be the categories which constitute the division of labour in the field of production: unskilled, skilled, clerical, technological, managerial.

If we take a series of categories, and it may be useful here to base it upon the discourses of a secondary curriculum. Let us call them a series of categories A, B, C, D: then these categories may be considered to be a social division of labour of discourses, if we are thinking about the discourses in the school. Now if these discourses are differently specialized, then they must have a space in which to develop their unique identity. An identity with its own internal rules and special voice. It could be French, German, History if one thinks of the school.

But I want to argue that the crucial space which creates the specialization of the category—in this case the discourse—this space is not internal to that discourse but is the space between that discourse and another. In other words, A can only be A if it can effectively insulate itself from B. In this sense, there is no A, if there is no relationship between A and something else. The meaning of A is only understandable in relation to other categories in the set; in fact to all the categories in the set. In other words, it is the insulation between the categories of discourse which maintains the principles of their social division of labour. In other words, it is silence which carries the message of power; it is the full stop between one category of discourse and another; it is the dislocation in the potential flow of discourse which is crucial to the specialization of any category.

Now if that insulation is broken, then a category is in danger of losing its identity, because what it is, is the space between it and another category. Whatever maintains the strengths of the insulation, maintains the relations between the categories and their distinct voices. Thus, the principle of the relations between categories, discourses, that is the principles of their social division of labour is a function of the degree of insulation between the categories of the set we are considering. If this insulation changes its strength, then the principles of the social division of labour, that is, its classification changes.

What preserves the insulation? What preserves the space between? What preserves the regions of silence? What preserves the dislocations? What preserves the insulation is power. Attempts to change degrees of insulation reveal the power relations on which the classification is based and which it reproduces.

Now we can distinguish between strong and weak classifications according to the degree of insulation between categories, be these categories of discourse, categories of gender, etc. Thus, in the case of strong classification, we have strong insulation between the categories. In the case of strong classification, each category has its unique identity, its unique voice, its own specialized rules of internal relations. In the case of weak classification, we have less specialized discourses, less specialized identities, less specialized voices. But always classifications, strong or weak, carry power relations.

However, these psychic defenses are rarely wholly effective and the possibility of the other, the unthinkable, the yet to be voiced, are also rarely silenced.
**Classification: Some Examples**

I want now to give some examples of classificatory principles. Put some kind of flesh around this formal lecture. I want first of all to take a very brutal look at two different organizations of knowledge. One in the medieval university, and secondly in the twentieth century, in order to illustrate the significance of classificatory principles. In the first case there is a strong classification and in the second case, an example of a weakening classification.

If we look at the organization of knowledge in the medieval period, there are two distinct differently specialized organizations of knowledge. One for mental practice, and one for manual practices, strongly classified, with strong insulation between these two, between mental practice and manual practice. The relays are the systems which transmit mental practice and manual practice, have their own internal rules and their own carrier. So is the case that when we see today the problem of inserting manual practice in education, often some individuals see the exclusion of manual practice as some kind of nasty capitalist plot. But the crucial point is that manual practice was never integrated into formal public systems of knowledge and transmission. They are two, and separate. Manual practice was relayed through the family and guild.

I want to look at the system for mental practice, and I want to look deeply at the organization of knowledge. In the medieval university, we find the first fracturing, the first dislocation, the first classification of orders of knowledge in the relationship between the TRIVIUM and the QUADRIVIUM. Now it is the case, of course, that not all medieval universities had both knowledge systems. Some university systems may have only had the TRIVIUM. But whether the university had a QUADRIVIUM or not, for this argument is beside the point, because the TRIVIUM always presupposes the QUADRIVIUM.

Now if we look at this organization very quickly, we know that the TRIVIUM is concerned with logic, grammar, and rhetoric. And we know that the QUADRIVIUM is concerned with astronomy, music, geometry, and arithmetic. We know also, that the TRIVIUM is studied first and that the QUADRIVIUM is second. There is no QUADRIVIUM without the TRIVIUM. But TRIVIUM, from this point of view, symbolizes the limitations of the possibilities of the word, and the word is God. The QUADRIVIUM is concerned with abstract formulations about the fundamental structure of the world, of the physical world. A dislocation between two languages—linguistic (Trivium) and Mathematics (Quadrivium).

Strongly classified, the word and the world are integrated through God. It is the principle of integration. The strong classification does not create dislocation because of its relation to God. Further, it is socialization into the word that makes the abstract exploration of the world safe. The TRIVIUM comes first. So the TRIVIUM is very much the regulative discourse. The TRIVIUM establishes a legitimate form of consciousness which can then be realized in other explorations.

I want to take it one stage further. So far we have looked very much at the surface, but it could be argued—and this is very provocative—that the TRIVIUM is concerned with the construction of the inner, the inner consciousness. The QUADRIVIUM is concerned
with the structure of the outer. From this point of view, the **TRIVIUM—QUADRIVIUM** signifies a dislocation between inner and outer. A dislocation between inner and outer which finds a productive synthesis through the particular concept of God, the particular theological relationships of the Christianity.

From this point of view, the **TRIVIUM—QUADRIVIUM**, inner—outer, is symbolic of a dislocation which Christianity itself inserted, a dislocation between inner and outer as a means of a possibility and transformation of total experience. And I would suggest that this is the first moment of pedagogic classification. It is clear that this dislocation between inner and outer becomes a fundamental problematic of all European philosophy and social science. Because what we have here, at another level, is the dislocation between inner and outer with respect to the individual, inner and outer with respect to the relationship between the individual and the society. And this becomes a doxic principle of European consciousness, a principle that we do not find in the Orient. This is an example of the use of classification, of strong classification, in the medieval period and the power on which it was based and relayed—the church.

I want to give another example, and this time I want to take the example from the restructuring of European knowledge in the twentieth century. Here I want to make a distinction between discourses as singulars and discourses as regions.

A discourse as a singular is a discourse which has appropriated a space to give itself a unique name. So for example physics, chemistry, sociology, psychology, are for me singulars. And the structure of knowledge in the XIX century, was in fact the birth and development of singulars. And these singulars produced a discourse which was only about themselves. These discourses had very little external references other than in terms of themselves, and they created—if you like—the field of the production of knowledge. But the field of the production of knowledge was only about knowledge.

In the XX century, particularly in the last five decades there has been a change. The very strong classification of singulars has undergone a change and what we now have I may suggest is a regionalization of knowledge. By that I mean the following: a region is created by a recontextualizing of singulars. So for example, medicine, architecture, engineering, information science, we can see the development of the regionalization of knowledge. But any regionalization of knowledge implies a recontextualising principle: which singulars are to be selected, what knowledge within the singular are to be introduced and related?

Now the regionalization of knowledge is a very good index of the technologizing of knowledge, because regions are different from singulars. Singulars only address themselves. Singulars are intrinsic to the production of knowledge in the intellectual field. Regions are the interface between the field of the production of knowledge and any field of practice, and therefore, the regionalization of knowledge has many implications, and this is a change in the classification of knowledge.

The classification has become weaker and we shall see that as the classification becomes weaker that we must have an understanding of the recontextualizing principles which construct the new discourses and the ideological bias that underlies any recontextualizing. Everytime a discourse moves, there is a space for ideology to play. New power relations develop between regions and singulars as they compete for resources and influence.

I have been talking about classification at a macro level. Now I want to move down again. I want now to look at an example of strong and weak classification at the level of
FIG. 1. **Ideal Typical Organizational Structures**

![Diagram of ideal typical organizational structures](image)

**Key:** Continuous lines represent strong boundaries, continuous arrows represent direction of strong relationships. Dotted lines represent weak boundaries and dotted line arrows represent direction of weak relationships.

- **Collection code type** = Strong classification: strong framing
- **Integrated code type** = Weak classification: weak framing

Any educational agency, it could be a school, it could be a university. I think it is easier if we think about it as a school. So what I have done here is this.

If we take the letters here, these represent discourses. It could be French, physics, chemistry, etc. And these are departments. The strong lines indicate strong classifications. The first thing we notice in this diagram is that you have a very strong classification between the inside of the institution and the outside. If there is a very strong classification between inside and outside, then the knowledge here is given a special quality of otherness. If there is a strong classification between inside and outside, then there is a hierarchy of knowledge; between the so called common sense and the so called uncommon sense. If we look at the diagram, we can see the following: that the staff are tied to the departments for two reasons; the department is symbolic of their category and therefore of their internal cohesion, that is the sacred reason. The main reason, however, is that promotion only comes by appropriate activities in the department. The staff are necessarily tied to their category and its organizational base. This means that in this system the staff cannot relate to each other in terms of their intrinsic functions; staff are unable to relate to each other in terms of their intrinsic function which is the reproduction of pedagogic discourse. The lines of communication between staff are established by a system of this kind, so there will be weak relations between staff with respect to **pedagogic discourse** as each is differently specialised. Thus, their contents are not open to public discussion and challenge.

It is also the case that the heads of the departments will relate to each other. And
here we will have the Principal, and power will be directed downwards. Now if we look
at the diagram, the diagram is a symbolic representation of the origin of the discourse be-
cause it is a temple. This is a representation of what I call a collection code; the visual re-
presentation shows also its origin, its mixture of Greek philosophy and the church. This
is an example of strong classification.

In Fig. 1 we have a model of weak classification. There are weak lines which show
that the boundaries are permeable. A model like this is highly vulnerable because com-
munications from the outside are less controlled. Its identities are not established by the
organizational structure because of the weak classification, but the staff are part of a strong
social network (or must be strong if the transmission is to work) which should be concerned
with the integration of difference. And this is no easy activity.

Further, the relations between staff within a weakly classified system, the relationship
between staff, cohere around knowledge itself. The new organization of staff made pos-
sible by weak classification establishes an alternative power base, so the power line in such
an organization are more complex. Here with weak classification there is a reordering
of specialized differentiation and this can provide a new social basis for consensus of interest
and opposition. These are examples of strong and weak classifications at the level of the
school.

I will now want to look at classification of the distribution of knowledge in the school.
Although it is not logically necessary, strong classification of discourse at the level of the
school is likely to produce a particular temporal dislocation of that knowledge. Strong
classification of discourse is likely to lead empirically to a dislocation in the transmission
of knowledge, because with strong classification, the progression will be from concrete local
knowledge, to the mastery of simple operations, to more abstract general principles which
will be only available later in the transmission. Thus there is an internal classification and
distribution of forms of knowledge. When children fail at school, dropout, repeat, they
are likely to be positioned in a factual world tied to simple operations, where knowledge
is impermeable. The successful have access to the general principle, and some of these—
a small number—those who are going to produce the discourse, will become aware that the
mystery of discourse is not order, but disorder, incoherence, the possibility of the unthink-
able. But the long socialization into the pedagogic code can remove the danger of the
unthinkable, and of alternative realities.

There are two basic rules that are sufficient to generate this whole section of the model.
Where we have strong classification, the rule is: things must be kept apart. Where we have
weak classification, the rule is: things must be brought together. But we have to ask, in
whose interest is the apartness of things, and in whose interest is the new togetherness and
the new integration?

Framing

So far, I have discussed classification and the translation of power relations into prin-
ciples of classification, and the relationships between these principles of classification and
the metaphor structuring of space, because we can see that classification can construct
the nature of social space. And now I want to look at framing, which is the second concept.
Framing, if you remember, is to do with the local pedagogic relations, the interactions of the local pedagogic relations.

So, so far, we have shown how power relations translate into principles of strong and weak classifications, and how these principles establish social divisions of labour, how these principles establish identities, how these principles establish voices. We have seen how these classifications disguise the arbitrary nature of power relations, create imaginary identities, replace the contingent by the necessary, and construct psychic systems of defense internal to the individual. And when I mean psychic systems of defense, I do not simply mean this at the conscious level.

I now want to turn to pedagogic practice, to the forms of communication where classificatory principles—whether strong or weak—form consciousness in the process of their acquisition. That is, I am going to look at the form of control which regulates and legitimizes communication in pedagogic relations; the nature of the talk and the kinds of spaces constructed. This will be a very limited analysis. I shall use the concept of framing to analyse the different forms of legitimate communication realised in any pedagogic practice. Thus, the concept of framing must be capable of being taken to any pedagogic relation.

As an approximate definition, framing refers to the controls on communication in local, interactional pedagogic relations: parents/children, teacher/pupil, social workers/client, etc. Endless series of these relations, the delicacies and indelicacies of symbolic control. Now if the principle of classification provides us with our voice and the means of its recognition, then the principle of framing is the means of acquiring the legitimate message. Thus, classification establishes voice, and framing establishes the message; and they can very independently. There is more than one message for carrying any one voice. Different modalities of communication can establish the same voice. Different modalities of framing can relay the same voice (identity).

Now the principle of the classification provides us with the limits of any discourse, whereas framing provides us with the form of the realisation of that discourse; that is, framing regulates the realisation rules for the production of the discourse. If you like, classification says WHAT, framing is concerned with HOW meanings are to be put together and the forms by which they are to be made public, and the nature of the social relationships that go with it.

In this way then, framing regulates relations within, within a context—which is exactly what we want if we are analysing control, because our first statement was "that control regulates relations within." We now find that framing does exactly this: it regulates relations within a context. Briefly, framing refers to relations between transmitters are acquirers, where acquirers acquire the principle of legitimate communication.

Framing is about who controls what. Now what follows can be described as the internal logic of the pedagogic practice. Framing refers to the nature of the control over:

* the selection of the communication.
* its sequencing (what comes first, what comes second).
* its pacing (the rate of expected acquisition).
* the criteria, and
* the control over the social base which makes this transmission possible.

Where framing is strong, the transmitter has explicit control over selection, sequence,
pacing, criteria and the social base. Where framing is weak, the acquirer has more apparent control (I want to stress apparent) over the communication and its social base. Now note that it is possible for framing values—be they strong or weak—to vary with respect to the elements of the practice; so that for example, you could have weak framing over pacing but strong framing over other aspects of the discourse.

Now we can distinguish analytically two systems of rules regulated by framing. And these rules can vary independently of each other. That is, their framing values change and they may be strong or weak. These are rules of social order and rules of discursive order.

Firstly, the rules of social order refer to the forms that hierarchical relations take in the pedagogic relation and to expectations about conduct, character and manner. Now this means that an acquirer can be seen as a potential for labels. Which labels are selected is a function of the framing. So where the framing is strong, the candidates for labeling will be terms like conscientious, attentive, industrious, careful, receptive. Where the framing is apparently weak, then the candidates for labels will become equally trying for the acquirer as he or she struggles to be creative, to be interactive, to attempt to make his or her own mark. So the actual labeling of the acquirer varies with the nature of the framing.

Secondly, there are the rules of discursive order. The rules of discursive order refer to selection, sequence, pacing and criteria of the knowledge. We shall call the rules of social order regulative discourse and the rules of discursive order instructional discourse. And we shall write this as follows:

\[
\text{framing} = \frac{\text{instructional discourse}}{\text{regulative discourse}} = \frac{\text{ID}}{\text{RD}}
\]

In other words, the instructional discourse is always imbedded in the regulative discourse, and I shall argue in the next conference that the regulative discourse is the dominant discourse.

Now I have suggested that the strengths of framing can vary over the elements of instructional discourse. And the strengths of framing can vary between instructional and regulative discourse. So you can have a weak framing of regulative discourse and a strong framing of instructional discourse. It is very important to see that these discourses do not always move in a complementary relation to each other, but where you have weak framing over the instructional discourse there must be weak framing over the regulative discourse.

In general, where framing is strong, we shall have a visible pedagogic practice. Here the rules of instructional and regulative discourse are explicit. Where framing is weak, we are likely to have an invisible pedagogic practice. Here the rules of regulative and instructional discourse are implicit, and largely unknown to the acquirer. Perhaps that is why such framings are called progressive.

Now, I am not going to give concrete illustrations of the variations in the strengths of framing (see "Social Class and Pedagogic Practice"). But we are now in the position to begin to write pedagogic practice. However, before we do this, unfortunately I have to introduce yet another delicacy in the analysis. I have to make the concepts of classification and framing more sensitive.
Pedagogic Codes

So far, we have the following: the pedagogic code so far exists in this form

$$\pm \text{C/F} \quad +/\- \quad \text{are the strengths of classification and framing}$$

But remember, this simple formulation can generate a very great range of modalities, both of discourse and practice. However, we have to do something else. We have to introduce internal and external features to complete the delicacy of this description. So, for example, classification we know always has an external value because it is concerned with relations between. But classification can have an internal value.

For example, if we look at our context here, there is an internal classification. The relation that you have to each other, is inverse of the distance of my relations to you; you see, you are sitting close together and I am here. And that is part of an internal classification.

Secondly, there is a certain classification of dress, of posture. This is part of the internal classification. The internal classification refers to the arrangements of the space and the objects in it. So in a classroom with strong classification, you have a specialization of spaces, etc. That is internal classification. Similarly, framing can have both an internal and an external value. The external value of framing refers to the controls on communications outside of that pedagogic practice entering the pedagogic practice.

Let me give you a very quick example of this. There is a great difference if you go to see a doctor when you pay and when you don’t. And one of the major differences between the two is in the framing. If you are not paying, it is no good telling a long story about your particular problem, because the doctor is certainly not interested in that. Because here the pacing is very strong, there are many to see and it is unlikely that the doctor will count this as legitimate communication; so the external value of the framing can strip you of your identity and biography outside of that context or it can include it.

In a classroom, we will be concerned with, for example, the absence or presence of images on the wall and the form they take, the seating arrangements, the distribution of tasks among the pupils, and that is internal classification.

In the case of framing, formally the external feature refers to the controls over communication outside of the pedagogic context entering pedagogic communication within that context. Where framing is strong, that is when the external (e) feature is strong, social class may play a crucial role. Where the external framing is strong, this often means that the images, voices and practices the school reflects, makes it difficult for the children of the marginal classes to recognize themselves in the school. Now we can construct the basic code. We can write the code and it will look like this:

$$E$$

$$\pm C^{e}/\pm F^{e}$$

E (elaborated orientation), under this we will have the values + or − and then the functions C/F. In this way we can show how the distribution of power and the principles of
control translate themselves in terms of communicative principles and spatial arrangements which give the elaborated orientation its particular modality. *Changes in the C's and F's will produce different modalities of elaborated codes.*

**Codes and Change**

I want to briefly look at change. We have put together classification and framing, and we can state that classification and framing provide the rules of the pedagogic code; that is of its practice, and not of the discourse. As C’s and F’s change in values, from strong to weak, then there are changes in organizational practices, changes in discursive practices, changes in transmission practices, changes in psychic defenses, changes in the concepts of the teacher, changes in the concepts of the pupils, changes in the concepts of knowledge itself, and changes in the forms of expected pedagogic consciousness.

Finally about change. The potential of change is built into the model. Although framing carries the message to be reproduced, there is always pressure to weaken that framing. There is very rarely a pedagogic practice where there is no pressure to weaken the framing, because in this formulation, pedagogic discourse and pedagogic practice construct always an arena, a struggle over the nature of symbolic control. And at some point, the weakening of the framing is going to violate the classification. *So change can come at the level of framing.*

Although classification translates power into the voice to be reproduced, we have seen the contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas which inhere in the principles of classification are never entirely suppressed, either at the social or individual level. Finally, one of the problems of theories of cultural reproduction, amongst many, is that any theory of cultural reproduction should have strong rules which enable the theories to say that this is the same, this is an elaboration, this is a change. What is quite remarkable about theories of cultural reproduction is that mostly they lack such rules. And to a very great extent change is relegated to the millennium, although sometimes I think that the millennium has now arrived with a market oriented "democracy."

I suggest the following: if a value changes from strong to weak, or viceversa, if framing changes from strong to weak or the classification changes from strong to weak, there are two basic questions we should always ask:

* which group is responsible for initiating the change; is the change initiated by a dominant group or a dominated group?
* if values are weakening, what values still remain strong?

I have tried to do is to examine the internal logic by means of which pedagogic practice is constructed. In the second meeting, I want to show empirically how this translates into research, and to give some results of using these various models.

I think it is important to see how the model is applied, how it generates research and how the findings of research change the model. There is always this interaction between the model and research which is absolutely crucial. And I am aware that there really isn't much discussion about the research. General discussion on the work has concentrated in the early papers, so, for example, on this issue of classification and framing, generally
speaking the paper that is read is one that was written 20 years ago. And clearly, much has happened in that 20 years. And my style of writing is not terribly helpful to the re-contextualisers, because for me a paper is only important if it opens the way to another one. The papers follow each other in a way that I hope shows there is some kind of conceptual development. However, what is very useful for me can be very confusing to recontextualizers, because recontextualizers tend to take one paper as a terminal paper as if nothing is ever going to happen after it. That is, they fail to see the work in terms of its continuity. But I think that I should also take some responsibility for my rather bizarre style of writing.

Codes and Consciousness

Before I comment on the research, let me spend a few minutes explaining the code. So far we have discussed classification and framing as they regulate modalities of pedagogic practice, and more generally, modalities of official elaborated codes. But we have only hinted about the relationship between these codes of transmission and the shaping of the pedagogic consciousness of the acquirer. So we have a model that can generate modalities of transmission, whether these modalities of transmission are realized in the family, in the school, in the hospital, in the prison (a crucial agent of cultural reproduction). But there is no linkage between the model of transmission and the process of acquisition. In the next lecture, I will turn to the research bearing on this question.

I want now to turn to develop the general model so that I can show the biasing of the pedagogic consciousness of the acquirer and transmitter. One could in fact say in this discussion of the consciousness of the acquirer that no reference is made to ideology. And the reason why ideology has not been spoken of is for the simple reason that this system constructs ideology. Ideology for me is a way of making relations, it is not a content but a way in which relationships are made and realized. The reason why I have not used the word ideology separately is because it is in the model already, which shows the process whereby a specific ideology is incorporated into a specific consciousness.

Transmission and Acquisition

Now the model in Figure 1 does not introduce any new concepts. The model simply puts together all the concepts that we have developed and shows their dynamics. This model is going to refer to the process of acquisition within a given framing relation. It refers to the model of acquisition within any pedagogic context.

First of all, I want to show the relation between the principle of the classification, strong and weak, and the development of what I have called recognition rules. And these recognition rules are at the level of the acquirer. I shall argue that changes in the classification change the recognition rules by means of which individuals are able to recognize the speciality of the context that they are in. We should remember that classification refers always to relations between contexts, or between agents, or between discourses, or between practices.

Now the classificatory principle, strong or weak, will indicate how one context differs
from another. The classificatory principle provides the key to the distinguishing feature of the context, and so orients the speaker to what is expected, what is legitimate to that context. For example, we have here as far as the members of the seminar are concerned, a weakly classified seminar because you are drawn from a whole range of different discourses. But despite the discourses that you represent, all of you have a recognition rule which orients you to the speciality of this context. And this recognition rule will determine what this context demands of you and as a result of this recognition rule, you can read this context. Let's assume that we have here people who have not had the tremendous fortune of your pedagogic socialization. It would be very difficult for them to produce what you would call—privately—legitimate communication. So the recognition rule orientates to the speciality of that context, and to what is legitimate in that context.

So from this point of view, the classificatory principle at the level of the individual creates recognition rules whereby the subject can orient to the special features which distinguish the context. And there may well be an unequal distribution of recognition rules in as much as the classificatory principle regulates the recognition rules, recognition rules refer to power relations. Certain distributions of power will give rise to different distributions of recognition rules and without the recognition rule you cannot say anything which is legitimate in the context.

It may well be at the more concrete level that some children from the marginal classes are silent in school because of the unequal distribution of recognition rules. There are relationships between power, classification and recognition rules. Power is never more fundamental as far as communication is concerned that when it acts on the distribution of recognition rules.

There may well be an unequal social distribution of privileging recognition rules, and if you do not have the recognition rule you cannot produce legitimate communication, nor can you evaluate it in others. Thus, recognition rules are fundamental to appropriate communication. Indeed, recognition rules are a necessary precondition.

However, we may have the recognition rule which enables us to distinguish the speciality of the context but we may still be unable to produce legitimate communication. That is, if you have the recognition rule then basically you are aware of power relations and you are aware of category relations. For many children of the marginal classes, some of these may indeed have a recognition rule—that is, they can recognise the power relations in which they are involved and their position in it—but they may not possess a realisation rule. If they do not possess a realisation rule, they cannot then speak the expected legitimate text. These children in school then will not have acquired the legitimate pedagogic code, but they will have acquired their place in the classificatory system. For these children, the experience of school is essentially an experience of power relations, and its realisations and its principles of classification.

The recognition rule essentially enables us to put appropriate realisations together. The realisation rule essentially determines how we put meanings together and how we make them public. The realisation rule is necessary to produce the legitimate text. Thus, different values of framing act selectively on realisation rules and so on the production of different texts. Simply, recognition rules regulate what meanings are relevant and realisation rules regulate how the meanings are to be put together to create the legitimate text.

We now can see how the distribution of power and the principles of control translate
into classification and framing values which select out recognition and realisation rules to create contextually appropriate text. In the model, the pedagogic context is essentially on interactive practice.

Interactive practice is defined by classification and framing procedures. The classification and framing procedures will act selectively on the recognition rules and on the realisation rules. These recognition and realisation rules at the level of the acquirer enable that acquirer to construct the expected legitimate text. However, the text that is constructed, may be no more than how you sit or how you move. In this system a text is anything which attracts evaluation.

The definition of a text is anything which attracts evaluation, and this can be no more than a slight movement. Evaluation condenses into itself the pedagogic code and its classification and framing procedures, and the relationships of power and control that lie behind it.

However, the text is not something which is mechanically reproduced. The text which is produced can feed back on the interactional practice and there can be a dynamic relation between the text that is produced and the interactional practice. So the text itself under certain conditions can change the interactional practice. But what does it mean to say “change the interactional practice?” It means that there has been a change in classification and framing values. Here the text has challenged the interactional practice and the classification and framing values upon which it is based.

Codes and Research

And now I want to turn to some research in order to illustrate this model. And I am going to start with a micro example and then end up with an institutional example. So I will start with small pieces of talk and then I will share research bearing on more macro
aspects of this particular model.

I believe much of the research I am going to report here has in fact been reproduced in a number of different countries. In this particular research, we were very interested in the way in which children classified. Now truly, it is very difficult to study classificatory behaviours with children coming from different social classes. The very media that we use is ideologically loaded. In fact all work on the study of classification is ideologically loaded in terms of what it is that children have to classify and the context.

One thing we did know when we carried out this research was that all primary school children had lunch at the school. It was in the early days of Thatcher, and in the early days of Thatcher the children had meat at school, they had potatoes, they had milk, they had cereal, they had bacon, they had fish fingers. And all this within five years had evaporated, and had been replaced by the market principle.

So what I did was to have lots of little cards made with food items on them. Some had sausages, some had ice cream, some had a bowls of soup, some had butter, some had vegetables, a total of 24 of these. And we gave them to the children and had a rather long interview with them. Nevertheless, I am only going to refer here to the first four minutes. The children were given the cards and we found out whether or not the children could recognize this pictures. Then after they could recognise the pictures, we said to the children: “Here are some pictures of food. What we would like you to do with them is to put the ones together that you think go together, you can use all of them or you can use only some of them.

The characteristics of that instruction appeared to be as follows:

-Ci/—Fie

Then we asked the children why they put them together the pictures they had put together because they made several groupings. We then analysed the groupings and we could distinguish basically two different kinds of groupings. In one grouping, the children said they put them together because they were the foods they have at home, or they put them together because they did not like these and they liked those, or they put them together because they said that this is what we made for our mom when she comes home from work —you see some of the children cooked for their parents.

Then there were other kinds of reasons in which the children said “I put these together because they come from the sea, or I put these together because they all come from the farm or I put all these together because they go with butter, etc.”

The differences between these classifications cannot be understood in terms of concrete and abstract. Once you interpret this in terms of concrete and abstract, you have totally lost the meanings of these classifications. Basically, one classification refers to a principle which has a direct relation to a specific material base. The reason is imbedded in the local situation, in the local relationship, in the local division of labor, in the local social relationship, so in a direct relation to a specific local material base. And the other set of reasons refers to an indirect relation to a specific material base. In sociological terms, we are looking at the selection of classifying principles each of which has a different relation to a material base.

What we found is this, and the first finding offers no problem. Clearly, everybody will say that the items classified showing an indirect relation to a specific material base were
made by the middle class. And the children who gave reasons clearly related to a local, specific material base were the working class, and of course, this is the case. If not, there would not be a class structure.

However, this is not the interesting thing. We then said to the children "Marvelous. What we would like you to do is to take the pictures and put them together in another way." And the children did this. But this time, when we asked them, the middle class children had changed their principle of classification. They produced reasons just like the working class children. So they talked of what they had at home, what they liked, who they had their food with, etc. Most of the working class children maintained their principle of classification.

We could see that the middle class children had two principles of classification which stood in a hierarchic relation to each other, and that one was privileged and came first. And this did not seem the case to the same extent in the case of the working class children. Why then did the middle class children select out one kind of reason first, why was one kind of reason privileged?

In the case of the LWC children, the coding rule $-C - F$ is taken as the rule and the children from their point of view select a non-specialised recognition rule which in turn regulates their selection of a non-specialised recognition rule. By non-specialised we are referring to the selection of a rule of everyday practice.

The difference between the children is not a difference in cognitive facility/power but a difference in recognition and realisation rules used by the children to read the context, select their interactional practice and create their texts.

Finally, I want to turn to research which explains the relation between Cie/Fie values of pedagogic practice and the recognition and realisation rules which children tacitly acquire. This research shows the relation between the form of the pedagogic practice and what is acquired.

Dr. Daniels was concerned to investigate the expected relation between classification and framing and recognition and realisation rules. He selected four schools varying in their Cie/±Fie values.

This was done through observation of the schools, study of curricula programmes, and their theories of instruction. The heads of each school were presented with their descriptions and asked whether these were accurate descriptions. Observations of the school class allowed Dr. Daniels to identify the pedagogic code of transmission. The four schools and classrooms represented a continuum from $C+/F$ to $-C/-F$ pedagogic codes. The children were asked to talk about a series of pictures in an Art Class and also in a Social Science Class when they were actually taking these lessons. These interviews took place at different times. The responses of each class for each lesson, Art and Science, were offered to the teachers to classify. In this way we could determine whether children produced statements which the teachers could classify as either arts or science. Thus, the production of the statements would indicate realisation rules.

Dr. Daniels then selected a group of children, four in each of the four schools on the basis of their teacher's classification of degrees of the children's competence in distinguishing between science and art statements. Teachers' judgements were highly correlated. Paired statements one child who was very good (ten correct), and one who was intermediate (7 correct), and one who was poor (three correct out of ten), were presented to each of the
above sixteen children. All but one child was able to say which was the science statement and which was the art statement.

We could relate possession of recognition rules, or possession of realisation rules, or possession of both, to the codes of pedagogic practice of each class; that is to their classification of framing values. We also studied the art work produced by the children in each school in terms of the classification and framing of the images the children produced (Daniels 1988, 1989). In general, we found that all children had the recognition rules for discriminating between Science and Art statements. This was taken to mean that these recognition rules were probably acquired outside of the schools. We came to this conclusion because the realisation rules for the production of a text, which the teachers could recognise as science or art depended upon the classification and framing of the pedagogic practice. Thus, children in the most weakly classified and framed classrooms (emphasis upon highly personal control, integration of disciplines, project methods) created texts which teachers could not distinguish as art or science, whereas children in the most strongly classified and framed pedagogic practice produced texts which the teachers could recognise as either art or science. These results are of some interest because there is no specific instruction in any of the schools in either recognising the difference between these types of sentences or in producing them. No teacher in the art lesson teaches how to produce a spoken text which is an art text. Nor do the science teachers teach how to construct a science text. Yet the children, at least those in specific pedagogic modalities, are able to so construct.

Daniel's research raises basic questions of what is it about statements which enable children to classify them as art or science statements. What is the origin of this process of recognition? As the process was not linked to any of the pedagogic codes, not even negatively to the most weakly classified, it seems recognition is acquired outside of the school. But where and how? The recognition and realisation of these statements refers to fundamental ways of organising our experience of the world. The social origins are of great interest, and perhaps, concern. Daniel's research shows the value of theory in creating new empirical problems of some importance.

Conclusion

I have developed a model for showing how a distribution of power and principles of control translate into pedagogic codes and their modalities. I have also shown how these codes are acquired and so shape consciousness. In this way, a connection has been made between macro structures of power and control and the micro process of the formation of pedagogic consciousness. Of importance, the model shows how both order and its change inhere in codes. The models make possible specific descriptions of the pedagogising process and their outcomes.

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FIG. 4

International Field

State

Fields: Production

Dominating Principles

Symbolic Control

Official recontextualizing Field

Official Pedagogic Discourse

Pedagogic Recontextualizing Field

Pedagogic Discourse of Reproduction

Time

Communication

Selection

RD

Transmission

Organisation

Space

Specialized Context/Agencies within
and between levels

Transmitters

Pedagogic Code

Acquirers

Recontextualizing Field

Primary Contextualizing Context
(Family/Community)