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FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION: ASIAN AMERICANS' EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II

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I. *Introduction*

A perception gap can be seen as one of the important causes behind recent trade frictions between Japan and the United States. Generally, such a gap is unavoidable between peoples whose cultures are so different from each other. During the Cold War era, the United States forged a political and military alliance with Japan mainly because of ideological reasons.

Now that the Cold War is over, cultural and racial distinctions have become more noticeable than before. But the necessity for both countries to find ways to reconcile their differences is indispensable, because they are now so interdependent.

Research to find ways on the processes of integration of Asian immigrants into American society will be suggestive. Of course, relationships between the various ethnic groups in one country is not the same as mutual relations between independent states. But an experiment in multi-culturalism in postwar United States can offer valuable insights into cross-cultural relationships in the global community, which is becoming smaller and smaller.

Between the pre and post World War II periods, a strikingly great contrast can be seen in the legal status of Asian Americans. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was repealed in 1943. This made Chinese immigrants eligible for naturalization and granted China an annual immigration quota of 105, however small it might be. This was followed in 1946 by a law placing India and the Philippines on a similar basis. Moreover the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 made all races, including the Japanese and Koreans, eligible for both citizenship and immigration.

Why were such drastic legal changes brought about in the 1940's and the early 1950's? Who endorsed them? How did local communities on the West Coast which had been so antagonistic toward Asian immigrants, react to these changes? These questions should be analysed not only domestically, but also internationally. In domestic American political terms, the special relationship between the federal government and individual states, especially those of the West Coast where many Asian immigrants lived in the pre-World War II period, should be investigated. Internationally, the impact on the United States government of the United Nations' war aims which severely denounced the racist ideology of Nazism should be examined.

Previously, Japanese scholars have paid much attention to Japanese American history. It might be a natural inclination for Japanese to show a great interest exclusively in their fellow countrymen who immigrated to foreign countries. But unfortunately, such ethnocentric concerns have often excluded other Asian immigrants from their research interests. In addition, Japanese studies on American minorities have had a strong tendency to study one ethnic group separately, such as black studies, Japanese American studies and so on.

But as a historical reality, Japanese Americans have had experiences similar to other Asian Americans. So comparative studies among them are of great importance. Moreover, in order to study the integration process of Asian immigrants into American society, it is absolutely necessary for us to pay more attention to the question of how ordinary white Americans react to this process. Therefore, a multi-ethnic approach and comparative studies will be very important for this research.

The process can be divided into three stages of the repeal of the Anti-Asian immigration laws. The first stage is the wartime era (1941–1945) in which the Chinese Exclusion Laws were abolished. The second stage is the period immediately after World War II (1945–1946), when immigrants from India and the Philippine became eligible for both citizenship and immigration. The last stage is the early Cold War era (1947–1952) in which the Walter-McCarran Act was enacted, giving rights to Japanese and Korean immigrants.

This paper will focus only on the first stage; the World War II era in which the curious contrast between the Chinese Inclusion of 1943 and the Japanese Exclusion of 1942 can be found. Why were these two sharply contrasted decisions made? Who promoted these decisions? Comparison of the pressure groups relating to these decisions will be a focal point in this paper.

II. *The Japanese Exclusion of 1942*

A. West Coast Initiative For The Evacuation

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the War Department to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from military areas on the West Coast. Accordingly, on March 2, General De Witt, the Western Defense Commander, issued Proclamation No. 1, setting up the Military Areas on the West Coast.

Before the issuance of Executive Order No. 9066, it is well known that there had been fierce campaigns for the mass evacuation on the West Coast. Morton Grodzins, the author of controversial book, *American Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*, presented interesting data on mail to the Attorney-General, Francis Biddle, who was responsible for protecting measures against alien enemies. From December 8, 1941 through September 1942, Biddle received 1,152 letters with respect to the Japanese question including letters opposing the evacuation.[1]

Table 1 and Fig. 1 show quantitative superiority of pro-evacuation letters (890). 77

[1] Morton Grodzins, *American Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*, The University of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 209–211.

TABLE 1. CHRONOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF LETTERS IN FILES OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Date	Urging or Approving Evacuation			Opposing or Criticizing Evacuation		
	Individual	Pressure Manifestation	Total	Individual	Pressure Manifestation	Total
Dec. 8–14	1	0	1	2	0	2
Dec. 15–21	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dec. 22–28	2	0	2	0	0	0
Dec. 29–Jan. 4	2	0	2	0	0	0
Jan. 5–11	6	2	8	0	0	0
Jan. 12–18	13	8	21	1	0	1
Jan. 19–25	6	3	9	0	1	1
Jan. 26–Feb. 1	38	17	55	3	7	10
January undated	0	1	1	0	0	0
Feb. 2–8	43	24	67	6	12	18
Feb. 9–15	100	67	167	19	14	33
Feb. 16–22	176	162	338	18	13	31
Feb. 23–Mar. 1	37	25	62	7	9	16
February undated	26	14	40	1	2	3
Mar. 2–8	14	8	22	9	4	13
Mar. 9–15	21	15	36	3	5	8
Mar. 16–22	3	7	10	5	9	14
Mar. 23–29	10	3	13	2	3	5
Mar. 30–Apr. 5	5	1	6	1	4	5
March undated	1	1	2	0	2	2
Rest of April	10	2	12	33	11	44
May	3	3	6	22	11	33
June	3	1	4	3	8	11
July	3	0	3	5	3	8
August	1	0	1	1	0	1
September	0	0	0	2	1	3
Undated	2	0	2	0	0	0
Total	526	364	890	143	119	262

Grodzins, *American Betrayed*, p. 210.

per cent of the total urged or approved evacuation. Moreover, they were concentrated in the period just before the issuance of Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942. Interestingly, the starting point in the skyrocketing increase of pro-evacuation letters was not after the Pearl Harbor Attack, but after January 25, 1942. On that day the Roberts Report, intentionally suggested "subversive activities" of the Japanese residents in Hawaii before the Pearl Habor Attack, was published.

As the Tolan Committee report suggested, following this publication, "public temper on the west coast changed norticeably" and "by the end of January a considerable press demand appeared for the evacuation of all aliens, and especially of the Japanese from the west coast."[2]

The same tendency can be found in the fact that 83 per cent of the pro-evacuation letters

[2] Tolan Committee, *Preliminary Report*, March 19, 1942.

FIG. 1



Note: change in time interval following March 30-April 5 period.
Source: Table 2. Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

were concentrated in the period between January 26 and March 1, 1942. On the contrary, anti-evacuation letters were only 42 per cent of the total (262) in the same period. Their peak was shown not in February, but in April 1942.

There were several influential anti-evacuation groups even before February 19. For instance, the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Alien of Japanese Ancestry was organized mainly by university professors before December 1941. Various church groups including the West Coast leaders of Protestant and Catholic and humanitarian groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union were also active to defend the human rights of the Japanese residents on the West Coast. But according to Grodzins, they showed "almost a complete lack of awareness with respect to the evacuation issue."[3] Their anti-evacuation movements were activated only after the issuance of the Executive Order No. 9066.

Regional concentration of pro-evacuation letters is also noticeable (Table 2). 80 per cent came from the West Coast; 71 per cent from California (44 per cent from Los Angeles County), 5 per cent from Washington and 4 per cent from Oregon. Interestingly, West Coast proportion of anti-evacuation letters is also high; 67 per cent (California 53 per cent, Washington 13 per cent, Oregon 1 per cent). This means that the evacuation issue had the same local character as the issue of prewar oriental immigration.

B. Pressure Group Activities

Local initiatives in favor of evacuation were first taken by rival economic groups of the Japanese residents on the West Coast.

On December 15, 1941, when a state of emergency was declared in California, Governor Olson asked that tolerance be accorded to American citizens of foreign descent, especially

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY AREAS OF MAIL IN FILES OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Area	Urging or Approving Evacuation		Opposing or Criticizing Evacuation	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
California	631	71	140	53
Oregon	31	4	3	1
Washington	46	5	35	13
Mountain States	26	3	2	1
Central	49	6	34	13
South Atlantic	25	3	5	2
Middle Atlantic	64	7	31	12
New England	4	0	7	3
Alaska	1	0	0	0
No address of sender	13	1	5	2
Total	890	100	262	100

Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

[3] Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

to the Japanese.[4] In spite of such a tolerant statement, as early as December 22, the Agricultural Committee of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce recommended that all Japanese nationals be placed "under absolute federal control."[5]

A week later, a spokesman of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of California sent a resolutilon, endorcing the recommendation of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce calling for the mass internment of Japanese American, to a Congressman from California. This resolution was also supported by the Salinas chapters of the Chamber of Commerce, the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The same line was followed by the Western Growers Protective Association whose membership controlled about 85 per cent of the row-crop vegetables from California. On January 22, they demanded that all Japanese be requested to move inland at least 300 miles.[6]

The Pacific War also presented an unusual opportunity for traditional Anti-Asian groups and patriotic societies to fulfill their long-term aims. On January 5, the War Council of California Department of the American Legion urged that "all Japanese who are known to hold dual citizenship also be placed in concentration camps."[7] In the case of the nortorious anti-Oriental organization, the Native Sons of the Golden West, its Long Beach parlor demanded the immediate removal of "all Japs" from the coastal zone on January 7. After about a month later, the board of grand officers resolved the policy of forced mass evacuation for all resident Japanese, regardless of citizenship status.[8]

On February 7, the California Joint Immigration Committee, sponsored by the Native Sons of Golden West, the Grange, the State Federation of Labor, and the American Legion, met for the first time after the outbreak of war. In the presence of the California Attorney-General, Earl Warren, the Committee resolved that the Japanese, including American citizens of Japanese ancestry, be removed as quickly as possible from combat zone.[9]

Influenced by these private pro-evacuation activities, the entire West Coast Congressional delegation met in Washington, D.C. under the chairmanship of Senator Hiram Johnson on February 2. Eleven days later, the delegation submitted a letter to the President recommending "the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage."[10] Local top officials such as Earl Warren and Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles agreed with the evacuation plan in early February.[11]

With these combined pressures from private and official groups on the West Coast, General De Witt submitted a memorandum to the War Department on February 14, in which he recommended mass evacuation of the Japanese.[12] In the capital, the Justice Department had been critical to the evacuation program because of its supposed violation of civil rights. But Biddle reluctantly agreed with the War Department which had insisted the evacuation as a measure of "military necessity."[13]

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[4] *Berkeley Gazette*, December 15, 1941.
[5] Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–25, 28.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[10] Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance*, Little, Brown and Company, 1944, p. 108.
[11] Grodzins, *op' cit.*, pp. 96, 102.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 363.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 363.

C. Exclusionist Coalition and Their Logic

It is worthy to note that the West Coast initiative based on broad coalition of exclusionists gave decisive influence to the evacuation decision of the Federal Government in February 1942.

As Grodzins concluded, there were so many factors involved in the evacuation demand. "The necessity for protecting coastal areas, the widespread hostility toward resident Japanese, racial animus, economic cupidity, fears of attack and apprehension over the growing victories of the enemy—these factors became so intertwined that their separation was impossible. Yet they all had the common feature of pushing in the direction of evacuation."[14]

As for the importance of each factor, Grodzins shows interesting result from his content analysis of Tolan Committee testimony and the letters to the Justice Department.

Table 3 shows percentage distribution of Tolan Committee testimony in which almost all witness were leaders of community organizations. Among various factors, "economic" (25.2%), "sabotage, etc." (19.5%), and "drastic measure" (11.3%) were the three major factors. In Table 4 which shows regional distribution, witness from Southern California shows the highest percentage of 67%, because economic competition was so high in this area.

In the case of the letters to the Justice Department, written by an undefined group of persons, the result is a little different from that of Tolan Committee testimony. As Table 5 shows, "Sabotage, etc." (49.7%), "drastic measures" (18.8%), "Racial" (10.2%), were three dominant factors. Very little attention was paid to economic issue.[15]

TABLE 3. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EVACUATION, TOLAN COMMITTEE TESTIMONY, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

	Argument	Percent
I.	Sabotage, espionage, fifth column	19.5
II.	Public morale	0.3
III.	Humanitarianism:	
	a) Vigilantism, race riots	5.3
	b) Humane administration	5.6
IV.	Approval of Japanese militarism	6.5
V.	Influence of Japanese government	7.9
VI.	Migration and distribution	7.9
VII.	Racial	6.9
VIII.	Cultural	2.7
IX.	Economic	25.2
X.	Appeal to patriotism	0.9
XI.	Necessity for drastic measures	11.3
	Total	100.0

Total units (*sentences*): 1,750.
Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 413–416.

TABLE 4. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EVACUATION, TOLAN COMMITTEE TESTIMONY, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY AREAS

	Argument	Oregon	Washington	California (Total)	Northern California*	Southern California*
I.	Sabotage, espionage, fifth column	41.3	20.2	15.4	17.5	8.5
II.	Public morale	0.5		0.2		
III.	Humanitarianism:					
	a) Vigilantism, race riots	7.4	13.1	1.6	0.1	0.2
	b) Humane administration	2.0	1.3	8.0	5.3	13.5
IV.	Approval of Japanese militarism	3.7	3.4	8.4	10.0	4.7
V.	Influence of Japanese government		5.4	10.4	3.1	
VI.	Migration and distribution	0.5	12.4	7.1		
VII.	Racial	7.8	9.7	5.6	16.2	1.2
VIII.	Cultural	1.1	0.3	4.0	9.3	
IX.	Economic	28.8	26.9	23.8	15.3	67.3
X.	Appeal to patriotism	0.3	0.4	1.3	0.8	1.2
XI.	Necessity for drastic measures	6.6	6.9	14.2	22.4	3.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total units (*sentences*)		190	469	1,091	304	247

*State officials eliminated.
Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

TABLE 5. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EVACUATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT LETTERS, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION (SENTENCES)

	Argument	Percent
I.	Sabotage, espionage, fifth column	49.7
II.	Public morale	2.4
III.	Humanitarianism:	
	a) Vigilantism, race riots	2.1
	b) Humane administration	1.6
IV.	Approval of Japanese militarism	3.1
V.	Influence of Japanese government	2.0
VI.	Migration and distribution	3.1
VII.	Racial	10.2
VIII.	Cultural	2.5
IX.	Economic	3.2
X.	Appeal to patriotism	1.3
XI.	Necessity for drastic measures	18.8
	Total	100.0
Total units (*sentences*): 1,426		

Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

It goes without saying that economic factor involved in demands particularly of economic rival groups such as Western Growers Protective Association. The racial factor was certainly promoted by traditional Anti-Oriental groups like the Native Sons of the Golden West and the California Joint Immigration Committee. Of course, these Anti-Oriental groups also shared the "internal security" concerns of such patriotic groups as the American Legion.

But these "internal security" concerns, activated by wartime patriotism, were the main element combining all other factors, as Louis Fisher pointed out in the *Nation* of March 7, 1942: "the reactionary press and the politicians are out for blood and wholesale internment. Jingoes are endeavoring under the cover of wartime flag-waving patriotism, to do what they always wanted to do in peace-time: get rid of the Japanese, harness labor, and frighten the liberals."

III. *The Chinese Inclusion of 1943*

A. The East Coast Initiative for Inclusion

The initiative for the Inclusion of Chinese was first taken by the East Coast groups. On May 13, 1942, an informal meeting to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts was held in New York. The attendants were Richard J. Walsh, editor of *Asia and the Americas*, Pearl Buck, and representatives of church and labor. They decided that the New York group should assume responsibility for publicity and that a committee should be formally organized after the November election and a popular base for the committee on the West Coast had been established.

Other core members were Donald Dunham (a former diplomat stayed in Hong Kong), Roger Baldwin (the American Civil Liberties Union) and Monroe Sweetland (director, the National Committee for American and Allied War Relief of the C.I.O.). Julean Arnold, China Council of Berkeley, CA., was one of the active leaders on the West Coast, Congressman Walter Judd (Republican, Minnesota), who stayed as a medical missionary in China for about 4 years, was actively involved in the group.

In early 1943, Mme Chiang Kai-shek made a goodwill tour in the United States. The Wellesley-bred Chinese lady appealed to American popular opinion as a symbol of the U.S.-China Alliance in the Pacific War. At the end of March, Walsh sent a confidential letter to say "that the time had come for repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws and establishment of a quota, and that full advantage should be taken of the presence of Mme Chiang for strong agitation."[16]

In Congress, Martin Kennedy (Democrat, N.Y.) seized this moment to introduce his repeal bill to make the Chinese eligible for naturalization in the House on February 17. Nine days later, Congressman Vito Marcantonio (Labor, N.Y.) introduced his bill to provide the right of naturalization regardless of race. On March 26, Congressman Warren Magnuson of Washington proposed his bill to provide for the admission of Chinese immigrants under a quota system of the Immigration Act of 1924.

In the Congress there were heated debates on its objectives (only Chinese or all Asian?) and its methods (continuation of national quota system of 1924 or not?). Finally the House Committee on Immigartion and Naturalization decided that the hearings were to be restricted to the Chinese bills and announced the start of the hearings on May 19.

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[16] Fred W. Riggs, *Pressure on Congress: A Study of The Repeal of Chinese Exclusion*, King's Crown Press, 1950, p. 53.

After the announcement, on May 7, Walsh sent a letter asking individuals to become members of a formal committee. Accordingly, on May 25, the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion was formally established. Walsh was elected as its chairman. The following objectives were adopted: (1) repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts, (2) a quota basis for Chinese, and (3) eligibility of Chinese for naturalization. Over 250 persons, representing more than 40 states, joined the committee. Early in the campaign, over 30,000 copies of a booklet, *Our Chinese Wall*, were distributed. *Asia and the Americas*, published its June editorial, "Repeal Exclusion Laws Now," and reprinted 10,000 copies for wide distribution.[17]

After the House Committee hearings, a compromised bill (H.R. 3070) was introduced by Congressman Magnuson on June 29. He proposed to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, to establish a quota for the Chinese (only 105 persons a year), and to make Chinese immigrants eligible for naturalization. On September 30, the same bill was introduced by Charles Andrews of Florida in the Senate (S. 1404).

On October 11, President Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress to call for passage of the bill, in which he said that "I regard this legislation as important in the cause of winning the war and establishing a secure peace. China is our ally. . . . By the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda."[18]

Ten days later, the House passed the Magnuson bill. On November 26, the Senate gave its approval. The President signed the bill on December 17, 1943. It passed over 60 years after the first enactment of Chinese Exclusion.

B. Inclusionist Coalition and Their Logic

Religious and humanitarian groups emphatically demanded the repeal not only of the Chinese Exclusion laws, but also of discriminatory laws against all Asian immigrants.

From the first, church leaders had been critical of Chinese exclusion. This is because many American churches had a long history of sending missionary to China. By 1926 the number of missionaries in China reached 8,325. Of the approximately 850 letters received by the House Immigration Committee, more than 150 came from religious groups. None of them opposed the repeal. Of the 42 witnesses for the repeal at the House hearings, 10 were from religious organizations including the YMCA and YWCA.[19]

On May 19, 1943, the executive committee of the Federal Council of Churches, the official representative body of some 24 large Protestant communions, adopted a resolution, asking Congress to revise existing laws so that persons of all friendly nations could enter under the quota system on the same terms as non-Oriental immigrants.

Many of humanitarian and internationalist groups were especially inclined to demand repeal of all Anti-Asian laws, not limited to the Chinese. For instance, Oswald G. Villard urged before the House Committee hearings that "all restrictions should be removed from

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[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 210–211.

[19] U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee of Immigration and Naturalization, *Hearings on H.R.1882 and H.R. 2309, Bills to Repeal The Chinese Exclusion Acts, To Put The Chinese on a Quota Basis, And To Permit Their Naturalization*, Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 119.

other peoples of color similarly." He testified as representatives both of the Postwar World Council and National Peace Conference, the latter was a clearinghouse for 37 organizations including the League of Nations Association.[20]

Thus, how to focus the target, whether to include only Chinese or not, became a hot issue among the inclusionists. Pro-China groups were mainly concerned with the Chinese. There were several pro-China organizations, often called "old China-hands," mainly interested in cultural activities, such as American Friends of China, China Club and American Friends of the Chinese People. Their influence as political pressure groups was limited, but some members frequently held influential posts, especially in commercial and religious organizations.

According to Fred Riggs, of the 42 persons testifying for the repeal before the House Committee, 19 were "old China-hands"; 8 missionaries, 7 businessmen, 2 scholars, 1 naval officer, 1 employee of the Chinese government.

Pro-China groups as well as the Citizens Committee to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion, worried about the possibility that the argument of "racial equality" would surely arouse the strong opposition of Southern politicians in Congress. Therefore they wanted to focus only on the Chinese by emphasizing its importance not as a racial matter, but as a war measure. The point was clearly shown in the following testimony of Pearl Buck who had spent most of her life in China in a missionary family, before the House Committee.

"It is the injustice of the total exclusion that hurts the Chinese, the humiliation it puts upon them as a people, and now as our ally, and this hurt is what is difficult for the American in China to bear. He is ashamed of being unable, as an American, to meet this accusation of injustice. It is more than injustice. It is a denial of our democratic ideals, and this makes the American on Chinese soil ashamed." After saying this, she was asked about the problem of "social equality among the races." She answered: "I do not think that is very important now, because this is wartime, and this is a war measure. I do not think social equality has one thing to do, at this moment, with war. I think repeal of these acts has a lot to do with war measures."[21]

The theme of "justice for our Chinese ally" could have great popularity. As Grodzins pointed out, it "not only capitalized the current enthusiasm for China, but also stimulated the active support of Sinophiles."[22] Humanitarian and religious groups, who had demanded "racial equality," could accept this argument as a step in the direction of racial equality. As a result, the argument of "justice for our Chinese ally" could make a broad coalition of the inclusionists and make traditional Anti-Oriental groups isolated even on the West Coast.

C. Isolation of Traditional Anti-Oriental Groups

Such a wartime appeal as "Justice to our Chinese ally" was very influential with patriotic groups like the American Legion. Like the Veterans of Foreign Wars which maintained their opposition to the end, national leaders of the American Legion were critical

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–73.
[22] Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

to the repeal at first, in early May. But in early August, its California Department expressed their support. Then in November, its national executive committee adopted a resolution supporting the repeal.

The argument of economic interest regarding postwar U.S.-China trade was also influential, particularly among business leaders. President of the U.S. Life Insurance Company testified that "Trade with China and cooperation with her 400,000,000 people are going to be very important factors in America's postwar prosperity. . . . .Why should we limit those opportunities by keeping on our statute books legislation which no longer is serving any very usefull purpose, ..."[23]

This economic concerns were shared not only by representatives of individual companies such as California Texas Oil Co., and American International Underwriters, but also by the West Coast branches of the Chamber of Commerce. In spite of the silence of the national Chamber of Commerce, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco branches supported the repeal.

No open opposition from the West Coast branches of the Chamber of Commerce showed sharp contrast with the case of Japanese evacuation. The reasons can be found in differences in economic situations. At that time, almost all Chinese on the West Coast were engaged in such ethnic businesses as hand laundry and Chinese restaurant enclaved in China Town. This occupational specialization made white business's fear soften.

The same tendency can be found in labor market. In spite of the opposition of the AFL national leaders, the national convention of the CIO supported the repeal, because of their anti-racism stands and their judgement that an annual quota of 105 would be negligible in the American labor market.

In the case of the Japanese evacuation as analysed in Chapter 2, business, labor and patriotic groups were the main forces to advocate for evacuation. But interestingly, many of them changed their attitudes, supporting the Chinese inclusion. As a result, the main forces which stubbornly opposed the repeal were limited only to traditional Anti-Oriental groups such as the California Joint Immigration Committee and the Native Sons of the Golden West. Their isolation even in the West Coast politics was so obvious that no West Coast congressmen testified in opposition in the House Committee hearings. And newly elected Governor of California, Earl Warren, influential advocate for the Japanese evacuation one year earlier, said that he had no opposition to repeal for the Chinese on September 6, 1943.[24]

IV. *Conclusion*

In considering causes of curious contrast between Japanese Exclusion of 1942 and Chinese Inclusion of 1943, three factors may be stressed.

First, a difference in initiative for the campaigns can be pointed out. The campaign for Japanese Evacuation was initiated by traditional Anti-Asian groups on the West Coast. They tried to embrace an opportunity caused by the Pacific War to fulfill their long-term

[23] House, *Hearings, op. cir.*, p. 228.
[24] Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

aims, exclusion of Japanese from the West Coast. On the contrary, the Chinese Inclusion campaign was started by pro-China and humanitarian groups on the East Coast. They intentionally emphasized the importance of Chinese Inclusion not from racial standpoint, but as strategy for the wartime alliance between the United States and China.

Second, a difference in coalition politics among pressure groups can be seen. In the case of Japanese Exclusion, traditional Anti-Asian groups succeeded in making a broad coalition with patriotic, business and labor groups on the West Coast. But interestingly, they were isolated in the decision on Chinese Inclusion, because pro-China groups successfully made an ally of labor, business and patriotic groups, even on the West Coast.

Third, a difference in the underlying logic of the coalition can be stressed. In Japanese Evacuation, "internal security" concerns were most influential for the decision. Under their dominance, racist ideology and concerns for local economic competition were closely combined. So it goes without saying that impact of the Pacific War was the most powerful factor influencing the evacuation decision. Interestingly, the same situation can be seen in Chinese Inclusion in which the main slogan for the campaign was not "racial equality," but "Justice for our Chinese ally."

In other words, the influence of international affairs enhanced by W. W. II gave a strong impetus for abolition of racial discrimination against Asian residents in the United States. But that was only the starting point on the long road in the American experiment for racial equality.

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