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WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT IN A
JAPANESE CONTEXT:
HIROYUKI KATO AND NYOZEKAN HASEGAWA*

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Introduction

The thought of Hiroyuki Kato (1836-1916) and Nyozekan Hasegawa (1875-1969), two prominent intellectuals in pre-war Japan, is analysed in this paper in order to shed light on an issue of crucial importance to an understanding of political theory in Japan: How is Western political thought accepted or rejected by a non-Western society like Japan? It is true that a number of case studies of prominent Japanese figures have been published in the last few years, but these studies do not necessarily provide a comprehensive overview of Japanese political thought due to a failure to pose questions of crucial importance for an understanding of European thought in a Japanese context.

There are three reasons for this. First, students of political thought in Japan are divided between those who study Western and those who study Japanese thought: the former tend to concentrate on Western theories, whereas the latter dwell on the specific nature of Japa-
nese thought. This division means universalistic Western thought is not considered in the same context as particularistic Japanese thought. The second reason is rooted in the nature of Japanese history. The political regimes of medieval Japan were primarily based on non-Western theories such as Buddhism or Confucianism, the impact of Western political thought being limited, except for a brief challenge to feudal rule when Christianity was introduced into Japan in the late sixteenth century. The Tokugawa regime's policy of isolation and exclusion (Sakoku Policy), adopted in the mid-seventeenth century, allowed Japan to maintain a non-Western culture and identity for nearly two and a half centuries. Unlike in many other parts of the world, therefore, it was not until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration took place, that Western civilization was introduced into Japan on any scale. This makes the Western impact on Japan of relatively short duration. The Allied Occupation from 1945 to 1951 is the only time that Japan has experienced anything approaching the colonization most other Asian countries suffered. Third, Western scholars tend to treat Japan as an aberration. By emphasizing Japan's unique situation, ignoring the importance of making an analysis within a framework of Western political theory, an attempt to see Japan in the universalistic context is lacking.

The above points can be clarified by briefly reviewing the internal and external conditions facing the newly-born Meiji state. Internally, pressure was brought to bear on the political elites to cast off the shackles of feudalism and modernize the state: externally, the government took measures to protect Japan from the Western imperial powers. The introduction of western technology and science was one of the means adopted to achieve these two ends. At the same time, however, the ruling elite took great care in the selection of western political ideas—those supportive of a highly centralized political system with a strong monarchy, authoritarian state structure and modernization from above being preferred to anything smacking of Anglo-American democracy. This is illustrated by the Meiji Imperial Constitution of 1889, which is said to have been strongly influenced by the Prussian constitution of the day.

Accordingly, in discussing political thought in Japan against the background of Japan's modernization, this lopsided introduction of Western technology should be kept in mind. In short, while Western technology was accepted by the Meiji government without hesitation, Western liberalism was recognized from the start as being incompatible with state goals. If Western liberal democracy was not welcomed by the government, then how did pro-government elites work to reject democratic ideas on the one hand, and 'liberal' intellectuals work to introduce them on the other? It is for this reason that Kato and Hasegawa have been selected: the former provided the theoretical foundation of the Meiji regime, the latter criti-

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cized the rising power of 'statism' which supported Japanese militarism, and devoted his life to democratizing Japanese politics.

The contrast between these two intellectual Titans is clear. Freed from the fetters of Japan's feudal past, the Meiji government in the early years introduced progressive Western ideas and programmes in an atmosphere of expectation and hope. Some of these were put into practice, as with the abandonment of the notorious feudal caste system in the early years. The transition to an authoritarian regime was set in motion by the fragile Meiji government under an external threat—the arrival of the powerful Western imperialists in the Far East. Thus, under pressures generated by the arrival of Great Britain and France, the government, in order to defend the fatherland, was forced to give priority to state rights at the cost of democratic freedoms. Although Kato, like many of his contemporaries in these early years, started out as a liberal intellectual, as seen in his book on Rousseau's theory of the social contract, he moved to legitimize the transition from a liberal government to an authoritarian regime which took place around 1881. Kato's writing can thus be seen to reflect the attitudes of the Meiji government.

Despite his lack of formal academic training, in 1877 Kato was appointed to the most prestigious and powerful academic position in Japan—the first president of Tokyo Imperial University, the university at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of Japan's seven imperial universities in the pre-war period. It is this university, both then and now (renamed Tokyo University), which produces the majority of political, bureaucratic and business elites in Japan. It is noteworthy that, although Kato never attended school nor university formally, he rose to such a powerful position, epitomizing the self-taught man. He mastered Chinese prior to the Meiji Restoration, then Dutch followed by German after the introduction of western thought in the early restoration years. This is ironically referred to as Kato's 'triple jump': Chinese studies (Confucianism), Dutch studies (Liberalism), and finally Social Darwinism (Conservatism).

In contrast to Kato, Hasegawa was a graduate of Chuo University (a private, far less prestigious university) who became a leading journalist. As the imperial universities monopolized social, political and academic prestige, little account was given of private universities, Hasegawa as a graduate being considered far less prestigious and influential than Kato. Apart from a few exceptions like Tatsukichi Minobe,7 Sakuzo Yoshino,8 Eijiro Kawai,9 and Yukitoki Takigawa,10 who took advantage of the more or less liberal and accommodative posture of the government during the period known as Taisho Democracy11 to criticize the political regime (only to be purged by the government), few professors of the imperial universities were prepared to raise a critical voice.12 The same is true of professors at private universities, such as Waseda and Keio, except for the rare voice crying in the wilderness, like Ikuo Oyama, a professor of politics at Waseda University who worked for democracy.

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7 Professor of Law, Tokyo Imperial University, see F.O. Miller, Minobe Tatukichi: Interpretation of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
8 Professor of Politics, Tokyo Imperial University.
9 Professor of Economics, Tokyo Imperial University.
10 Professor of Law, Kyoto Imperial University.
and freedom in Japan and was finally given political asylum in the United States in 1932.\footnote{M. Maruyama, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Oyama Ikuo} (Tokyo: Shin Hyoron, 1980).} Few professors at private universities raised their voices against militarism and fascism. Instead, most Japanese professors buried their heads in the sands of purely academic discourse and abstract discussions, with little thought for the political reality of the time.

It was particularly during this period, from the late 1910s to the mid-1930s that the strident voice of Hasegawa was heard at the vanguard of the intellectual movement for democracy. He was one of the most gifted liberal thinkers in Japan. Based on his long-term strategy for Japanese democratization, he aimed to enlighten the Japanese public through writing and speaking, not by direct political action. His modified version of a Japanese proverb characterizes his behavior: \textit{yugen fujikkou} (no direct action, only speech).

Both Kato and Hasegawa directed their energies to investigating the political reality of their time. Still, the reasons both were able to give air to their political views are naturally different. On the one hand, Kato was a supporter of the government, and Hasegawa was an independent journalist. Needless to say, Hasegawa had more difficulty than Kato due to his anti-government stance. In order to understand how both of them used, in their separate ways, Western political thought to either criticise or legitimize Japanese statism, let us first examine the failure of Kato to understand modern natural law.


The theory of modern natural law, as refined by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, can be regarded as the quintessential element of modern democracy, especially the concepts of liberty and equality. The failure of the Germans to fully grasp the importance of these two concepts has been lamented by Troletch, who points out how parochial nationalism was advocated at the expense of more universal and cosmopolitan principles. The same is true of Japan. Interestingly, both Germany and Japan failed to grasp the theories of modern natural law and social contract, a failing that underlies their common and ultimate failure—the rise of fascism. In neither country was the concept of modern natural law incorporated into the political system when the modernization of political institutions was undertaken.

Kato, one of the most enlightened intellectuals of the early Meiji era, became one of the most powerful advocates of the imperial Meiji regime. In order to give legitimacy to the Meiji Restoration, for instance, Kato introduced in his \textit{Shinsei Taii} (The Real Meaning of Politics: The Social Contract Theory as the Basis of Politics)\footnote{\textit{Shinsei Taii} (The Real Meaning of Politics: The Social Contract Theory as the Basis of Politics), 1870, in S. Yoshino, ed., \textit{Meiji Bunka Zenshu}, Vol. 5.} Rousseau's social contract theory, for which he won wide acclaim. In his second book\footnote{\textit{Kokutai Shinron} (A Discourse on New Political Institution: The Danger of Mass Franchise), 1974, \textit{ibid.}} however, published in 1874, he defines fundamental rights as property rights and freedom of thought, on the one hand,
and political rights on the other hand, the latter being regarded as inappropriate for uncivilized Japanese. Kato came out against the establishment of a parliamentary system, preferring a Prussian type of enlightened monarchy instead.

By 1882, when he published one of his most widely acclaimed books, Jinken Shinsetsu (The New Theory of Fundamental Rights), he had turned to Social Darwinism as a means of attacking the concept of the social contract. There are two reasons for his use of one western concept to undermine another. First, given that political power was now in the hands of those who had overthrown the Tokugawa regime, Confucianism, the same ideology used in the Tokugawa period, could hardly be trotted out to attack the social contract theory. Kato, who regarded himself as an enlightened thinker of the day, was not so insensitive as to return to Confucianism. He was a conservative ideologue of the Meiji government, not a reactionary. Second, as many Japanese were receptive to new ideas from the west, it was relatively easy to criticize one theory on the basis of another, particularly when it was new, as in the case of Social Darwinism. Western ideas were regarded as legitimate and held in high esteem by many influential Japanese.

His attack on the social contract theory was instrumental in destroying the democratic opposition in Japan, "the Jiyu Minken Ha," which firmly believed in the social contract theory. He used Social Darwinism for a four-pronged attack. First, he tried to impress upon the minds of the people that the social contract theory was out of date: it was Social Darwinism, he argued, that was new in the west. Second, like Burke, he insisted no historical evidence could be provided to show that people created a state based on the social contract, arguing that the idea was nothing more than a fantasy. This he knowingly or unknowingly rejected the hypothetical argument for the social contract as accepted by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, who assumed the logical rather than the historical premise of the theory. Third, as only the strong can rule over the weak in a political community, he openly declared that people are neither free nor equal, for the weak possess no power to participate in the creation of the state and government. Implicit in Kato's argument is the acceptance of the government of the day as strong and the population as weak, the latter being required to follow the directions of the former. Kato here echoes Burke and Filmer. Fourth, as Social Darwinism is premised on the idea of the survival of the fittest, Kato had to face the possibility of the Meiji government one day being overthrown by democratic forces. Although he was sympathetic to British democracy, especially the Glorious Revolution, this was not so much a consequence of the revolution being carried out by democratic forces as it was a consequence of it being carried out by the well-educated, wealthy British gentry. In other words, for Kato, the democratic forces in Japan represented a bad form of survival, precisely because they lacked the intellectual and economic standing of the British bourgeoisie. He thus recommended improvements in these two regards, for he did not yet consider that the majority

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of the Japanese deserved the merits of democracy. He was indeed the Burke of Japan.

Kato’s trenchant criticism of the social contract theory prepared the ground for the Meiji government’s introduction of a feudalistic constitution in 1889. Despite his rejection of Confucianism, Kato nonetheless witnessed the political elite introduce an even more feudalistic state system after the promulgation of the imperial constitution. Ironically enough, while he rejected Confucianism at the time of the Meiji Restoration, he eventually established a strong Confucian doctrine synthesized with western political thought.

**Nyozekan Hasegawa: An Advocate of Liberalism**

The above discussion of Kato can be taken as an indication of the weak support for liberalism in Japan. The concept was not so popular. Of course, as is well known, Fukuzawa, the founder of Keio University, Kuga and others were early advocates of liberalism, but they later became skeptics. Two reasons can be given for this lack of support for liberalism in Japan. First, as the regime attempted to establish strong state power at the expense of individualism and freedom, no room remained for liberalism to become a part of the national ideology. In this situation, statism was used to suppress liberalism, and socialism was rejected outright. Indeed, to advocate socialism was tantamount to high treason. Second, many Japanese intellectuals found liberalism suspect, given the role of Britain as an imperial power abroad. The sole consistent advocate of liberalism was thus Hasegawa, who refused to bow to the state, carving out a career for himself in journalism as the Laski of Japan.

To dub Hasegawa the Laski of Japan for his original understanding of liberalism and his political activity is not to suggest he used the same methods. Since the majority of his opinions, which were considered subversive by the military regime, were suppressed, he wisely used his journal *Warera* (We Proclaim) and *Hihan* (Critique) to voice oblique criticisms of the regime during his long years of political activism in Japan. The journals, which were self-supporting, carried pieces by socialists as well as liberals. The subscriptions from the journals constituted Hasegawa’s only income.

Any attack on the Emperor system had to be couched in indirect language, analogy or some other rhetorical device given the danger posed to critics by the Japanese state. Hase-
gawa used the German case to advantage, suggesting a parallel between the Japanese and German situation. Again, Hobhouse’s *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* proved useful for his analogy, given Hobhouse’s rejection of the supremacy of the state over the individual, in contradiction to Bosanquet, the British Hegelian of the time. Without an understanding of the essence of liberalism, Hasegawa would have been unable to turn to Hobhouse as a means to indirectly criticise Japanese statism. This was Hasegawa’s way of challenging the Japanese state, which was concerned mainly with the supremacy and authority of the government, rejected out of hand liberalism and its major tenet, individual freedom, and created a situation where no room remained to directly express criticism in the media or academic community.

In later years Hasegawa faced an even more formidable opponent: Japanese fascism. In his classic paper, “The Possibility of Japanese Fascism,” Hasegawa presents, with uncanny vision, an original analysis of Japanese fascism, two years prior to Laski’s *The Crisis of Democracy* (1933). In contrast to the accepted analysis of fascism, which regards it, as does communist theory, as an aberration of state capitalism, Hasegawa’s prescient analysis indicated how an unstable middle class could be mobilized in the fascist cause. His examination takes on particular importance in two contexts: first, leaders of the big powers in the west, such as Britain and the United States, tended to regard fascism as a sort of counter-communist force on the European continent. In the early years of the 1920’s and 1930’s, therefore, neither governments nor people were particularly sensitive to the dangers of fascism, as shown by the lack of a single article on fascism in the British Labour Party’s journal, *Statesman and Nation* prior to 1932. Second, Hasegawa’s analysis was influential at home and abroad: leading Japanese political thinkers like Maruyama, as well as the American journal, *The Nation*, both studied his approach to Japanese fascism.

In 1934, having been suspected as a financial contributor to left-wing activists, Hasegawa was arrested, the publication of his journal, *Hihan*, was suspended, and he was finally proclaimed to be a communist. Nevertheless, many of those involved in the postwar democratization and the intellectual reconstruction of Japan, such as Ouchi, Arisawa, Maruyama and Matsumoto can be counted among Hasegawa’s ‘informal’ students: although never a formal professor, his dedicated advocacy of liberalism and political commitment based on a firm understanding of Western political thought gave him a standing in intellectual and political circles. In his prominent role of introducing the concepts of democracy to the tiny islands of the Far East in the 1920s and 1930s, Hasegawa was in more ways than one the Japanese Laski of the Far East.

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29 Needless to say, this analysis was pointed out by E.F. Fromm as well. *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941).
30 M. Maruyama, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, especially chapters 2 and 5.
32 Professor of Economics, Tokyo University.
33 Professor of Economics, Tokyo University.
34 Director, the International House of Japan, Tokyo.
35 I have tried during the past decades to compare British/German/Japanese political thought by looking at T. Hobbes, C. Schmitt and N. Hasegawa. Many of Schmitt’s works are translated into Japanese by the author and T. Harada. The author has also written several papers on Schmitt’s political ideas.
Conclusion

My study of Hobbes over the years has sensitized me to his outstanding contribution to our understanding of sovereignty. Although Hobbes was well aware of the potential of the state to become the biblical monster of peace, Leviathan, he had no intention to create an oppressive political regime. Rather, through the consolidation of political power or sovereignty, he expected peace and justice to be possible for the people. As is often argued, his political position can be regarded as opportunism, but his endless effort to create a new theory to transcend day-to-day politics is worthy of praise. His ultimate goal was the realization of democracy, peace, justice and human rights. Even today, Hobbes’ question of the relationship between sovereignty and individual freedom still remains unsolved. But we may come closer to answering Hobbes’ question by looking at various types of nation-state theories. Japan was and still is an interesting case for political theorists to examine in this context.

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