

SOME REMARKS ON THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION  
OF MILITARY SERVICE UNDER  
THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE SYSTEM

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I

In an earlier short paper, "Bakuhansei ni okeru Kinai no Chii ni tsuite (Some Remarks on the Progressive Area during the Tokugawa Shogunate)"—*The Hitotsubashi Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3 (March, 1962), pp. 87-101—referred to a criterion for periodizing the developmental stages of the Tokugawa Shogunate System and advocated that "it is most appropriate to prescribe these stages in terms of the patterns of movement of all surplus labor (i. e., both land rent and 'surplus')." "Surplus labor" refers to what is left in the hands of farmers, either as a form of product or as money after deducting what is necessary for land rent and simple reproduction.

Mr. Moriaki Araki agreed with this advocacy and expatiated the point further in his "Bakuhanseishi-kenkyu no Dōko to Gimon (The Trends and Problems of Historical Study of the Tokugawa Shogunate)"—*The Hitotsubashi Shimbun*, May 30, 1963. He said, "I think we should in the first instance pursue this problem (viz., the problem of periodization as referred to above) theoretically as one of economic accumulation in feudal societies, which is as important for our study as that of capital accumulation for the study of capitalism, and then analyze the structure of the basis of such a theoretical pursuit." Basically I agree with this proposal but I cannot directly reply to it because the problem of accumulation has never been asked from such a viewpoint. I would rather take it as a key problem for future study.

But, in the same article, Mr. Araki touched upon a few points that I developed in my theory of military service, and add "I would repudiate any analyses of the social structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate System if done in terms of military service." I think this demands a reply. Mr. Araki's idea of "military service" does not seem very clear in this article and I have some difficulty in understanding the point of his criticism. What at least clear to me is that he apparently thinks I see the problem of military service as quite different from that of the already mentioned criterion for periodizing the developmental stages of the Shogunate System; In fact, in "Gun'eki-ron on Mondaiten (Crucial Issues in the Theory of Military Service)"—*Rekishi Hyōron*, October and November, 1962—I wrote that "the major point of the problem presented here does not lie in a mere historical analysis of military powers, systems and ordinances, but in stipulating the principles of authority-formation in terms of the system of military service, and in scrutinizing its historical meaning in terms of the types of feudal land rent (or, simply, types of rent) which are identifiable with the types of economic realization of feudal land ownership, thus contributing to clarification of the structural characteristics of the Tokugawa Shogunate." This is an important point, related

to the very starting point of my problem-consciousness. In other words, I consider that the criterion of periodization must be the most unifying and fundamental problem in the study of the Tokugawa Shogunate System from its establishment to its corruption, and it must at the same time be the basis for a structural analysis of the Shogunate System. I presume Mr. Araki would agree with me on this point. But the difference between his and my way of understanding the problem relates to the question of what should be the criterion for analyzing the structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate System in its first stage of development between the end of the sixteenth and the middle of the seventeenth century, when the basic principle that the exploitation of all surplus labor results in a lack of "surplus labor" was applicable. In Mr. Araki's work "Bakuhantaisei Shakai no Seiritsu to Kōzō (Society under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Its Establishment and Structure)" the analysis is done consistently on the assumption that the criterion lies in the policy of accommodating peasants. It is true that this policy was the basis for various other policies maintained throughout all stages of the Tokugawa Shogunate System; but it is necessary to examine whether or not it is the proper criterion for stipulating the first stage of the Shogunate System as such. Furthermore, there is another way of viewing the question in which it is assumed that the nature of land ownership was most typically exposed in the period of growing feudal land ownership, since the land ownership does in itself lead to the exploitation of all surplus labor. Mr. Araki's assumption will thus reduce the unique problem of structural analysis of the very first stage of the Shogunate System to an abstract problem of land ownership in general and, therefore, I am afraid it is not appropriate as a logical historical analysis.

With this academic background of historical studies in mind, I felt compelled to raise, in my report to the Annual Conference for Historical Studies, 1960, compiled later as "Bakuhantaisei no Kōzō-teki Tokushitsu (Structural Characteristics of the Tokugawa Shogunate System)" in *Rekishigakukenkya* (The Journal of Historical Studies), No. 245 (September, 1960), pp. 8-17, a question about the historical necessity embedded in the social structure of the first stage in which all surplus labor was exploited. Here I regarded the first stage (from the end of 16th to the middle of 17th century) as the most typical of Shogunal Systems and all succeeding stages as indicating certain declining phases of the Shogunate. Therefore, the characteristic of the first stage is replaced by a structural characteristic for the Tokugawa Shogunate System as a whole.

I myself developed the problem as follows: First of all, on the basis of hitherto accomplished researches, I attempted to settle the problem of the economic structure in the first stage in terms of five categories of enterprise: (1) the fundamental enterprises, or the peasant enterprises based on rice production, (2) special enterprises, or the enterprises, in which the producers in farming or fishing villages, mines, etc., could not by themselves produce even the most essential of their necessities; typical of these enterprises is that in which, in the 17th century, some special products were produced which fell under the monopoly of feudal clans when, in many cases, the Shogunate or clans authorities supplied their workers with the necessities for reproduction, nominally as *shikomi-mai* (invested rice) or *gegyōmai* (given rice), (3) the manufacturing enterprises. These three are enterprises undertaken basically by producers. Besides these there are (4) the commercial enterprises and (5) the day to day life of the feudal lord which was supported by land rents. Of these the manufacturing enterprises were so absorbed into castle towns as to be combined with the social strata of warriors and merchants living by land rents; from this a city was formed, and with the separation

from the fundamental and special enterprises, the division between urban and rural labor was also formed. Here we observe the fact that the profits of commercial enterprises and the wages for manufacturing enterprises absorbed into a castle town, were restrained by the authority of a feudal lord to such an extent that the possibility of free development in these enterprises was severely restricted; therefore, a basic characteristic of the commerce and industry of this time was that both were unable to achieve their own unique and independent economic development through their proper activities—this is of course a logical necessity in an economic system exploiting all surplus labor. Finally disbursements by the feudal lords and the warrior class are seen to be classified into three kinds: (i) Expenses for official duties for Tokugawa Shogunate such as in their alternate-year residence in Yedo, the giving of temporary assistance for Shogunal projects, the maintenance of standing military forces, etc., (ii) expenses incurred in controlling farmers, on agricultural production conditions especially for the expansion and adjustment of service water and irrigation—and in collecting annual land taxes, and (iii) daily expenses of the warrior class. Of these three the daily expenses of the warrior class turn out to be a part of the income of the commercial and industrial enterprises and, therefore, in so far as we pay attention to the economic structure as a whole, the financial disbursement of feudal lords can be dealt with only in terms of the expenses for official duties and local government. But we can hardly view the expenses for local government as a unique economic activity of rental exploitation by feudal lords, because they were, after all, incurred in maintaining and expanding the exploitation of produce and land rent and, as a result, used mainly for production and land rents to be paid. Thus we are left with only the expenses for official duties as revealing the unique pattern of the economic movement of land rent exploited by the feudal lords.

We can thus say that the economic structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate System in its first stage is determined socially by the expenditure for official duties. But those official duties which I have described above were nothing but the military services which the feudal lords (*daimyō*) rendered to the Shogun, and military service was, as will be explained later, a basic way of serving the Shogun for *daimyō*, *hatamoto* (direct retainers of the Shogun) and *gokenin* (lower class descendants of the Tokugawas). The military service is, therefore, a clue to the principle of authorities within the class of feudal lords.

The above is a presentation of the problem in question as well as a prefatory operation in furtherance of my theory of military service. On the basis of such an operation alone, military service could provide the basis for an analysis of economic structure. It goes without saying, therefore, that military service in the period after the corruption of such a social system as was sustained by the exploitation of all surplus labor should also be thoroughly examined to see whether or not it can be of use in the analysis of the economic structure of that system. I have already stated by the belief (in *The Hitotsubashi Review* of March 1962, referred to above) that it cannot.

What I have said so far does, I think, answer Mr. Araki's questions and criticisms. I myself see in the military service a unique expression of both the essence of hierarchical regulations and the structural analysis of the Tokugawa Shogunate System in its first and proper stage, and I would not agree that the latter is separated from the former. I think, therefore, that any criticism of my assumptions should only be done with respect to the logical stipulations that I have, if briefly set out above.

## II

Military service, if defined as in the preceding section, could provide the basis for a structural analysis of the first stage of the Tokugawa Shogunate System. And change in the system of military services can therefore be regarded as a symbolic index to change in the social structure as a whole. A most important point that should not be overlooked here is that the Shogunate System is a feudal state organized under a centralized administration. Its nature is most clearly revealed in the principle that the lands owned by feudal lords belong in the event, to the Shōgun. The characteristic of this organized feudal state is that it necessarily involves in itself a distorted process of economic development, while implying at the same time that the fundamental spirit of an organized policy was made thoroughgoing over the nation in spite of this unbalanced process of economic development. And here, due to the discrepancy between basic political policies and the processes of economic development, a social confusion naturally and necessarily arises. This confusion emerges as a historical fact in the phenomena of farmers turning away, and of revolt against organized policies by those land owners intent on avoiding loss of their proper foundation of production caused by the dispersion of farmers; in other words, the riots in the first stage.

Hence the military forces after the establishment of a unified governmental authority, played two kinds of role in the first stage of the Shogunate: one obviously was that of the base of the legal coercion employed in actualizing the exploitation of products and land rent from peasants; the other was that of handling by force those land owners who resisted the policy of maintaining peasants on the old patriarchal and slavocratic *uklad* (economic institutions in the Russian sense) basis. With authority feudal lords attempted to realize and retain the former end of ruling the lower classes by playing the latter role.

But if such a confusion as mentioned above was an expression of the conflict between the military system and the social foundation of production, the conflict itself did not occur only in the comparatively underdeveloped areas—those where the discrepancy between basic policy and the process of economic development was relatively great but was immanent in the whole Shogunal System including the more progressed areas. There are several reasons for this. The need to reinforce the military was conditioned by a level of strategy which, based on guns, resulted in a demand for large numbers of *ashigaru* and *jimpu* (infantry). Though these infantry, as a lower class of warriors and servants, could be raised in castle towns during the latter half of 17th century. Such a source of supply had not yet formed in the first stage of Shogunate. Accordingly there was nothing for it but to raise them by the direct impressment of farmers as a part of their labor rent or as slave labor.

We need to clarify another important point here. It is that the impressing of labor rent is basically incompatible with those peasant enterprises which are nothing but the labor investments of monogamous families trying to increase their land production by investing as much fertilizer and labor as possible who are nevertheless exposed to coercive exploitation to the crucial limit for even simple reproduction. The exploitation of labor rent leads to the destruction of the peasant enterprise based on rice production.

Thus, in the case of an intensification in the impressing of labor rent, the objects of impressment can necessarily be no other than the land owners, the sole class of farmers who

are basically supposed not to be directly affected by the destruction of enterprise resulting from such impressment. This was the reason why the central government, even after its establishment, neither protected nor in fact tried to support the land owner class.

In other words, the feudal authorities whose primary aims were the maintenance and stabilization of the peasantry, who were the object of exploitation for such rents based on rice production as were the essential ones in a feudal society, and the preservation and development of a unified country on the basis of such exploitation, could not help, in attaining their aims, preserving that class of land owners which detested the development of peasant enterprises. Land owners as a class, therefore, were forced, while intentionally opposing the centralized political policies, to play a reactionary role in suppressing those anti-feudal movements of which the fundamental claim was just the same as their own.

What would it be, if this fact did not indicate the main historical contradiction which characterizes the first stage of the Tokugawa Shogunate? For this contradiction resulted naturally in that fragility of productive power of the peasant enterprise which revealed itself so vividly to the feudal lords in the fatal failure of crops and resultant starvation which occurred during the 19th and 20th years of Kwan'ei (1643-44), as a result of this the agricultural policies of the feudal lords, especially those leaders who advocated unified political policies, were so greatly reversed that the system of military services must also have been greatly changed. I have already referred to this point in "Bakuhansei Daiichi Dankai no Shokakuki ni tsuite (Periodization of the First Stage of the Tokugawa Shogunate System)"—*The Journal of Historical Studies*, No. 260 (November, 1961), pp. 2-13—and I shall not describe the details here.

In the above considerations it has been presupposed that from the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the peasant enterprise was so developing that the economic foundation of Shogunal authority would be supported by the exploitation of production rents, especially those for rice production, and that the land lords would therefore necessarily develop policies aimed at peasant independence. On the other hand, however, many researchers claim that, according to *Shāmonchō* (lists of membership of religious sects), *Kenchichō* (records of land), and *Nayosechō* (lists of land held by each peasant), all of which were indispensable records for the feudal lords in ruling farmers and peasants, this independence was achieved in the middle of the 17th century. I see in this claim two problems related to my presupposition. One is that of whether or not the descriptions in these historical documents really and directly reflect the social situation of the time, when they were used by land lords to control the farmers and exploit their land rents. I myself think it necessary not to accept the descriptions in these historical documents as actual historical fact but to subject them to methodological examination for the purpose of definite historical verification. The other is that what is revealed by these historical records, even if acceptable as actual historical fact, is confined solely to rising generations of peasants and their development as land possessors, and do not tell anything whatsoever about the actual confinement of their productive capabilities. The main controversy involved here lies in our ways of judging whether production in a given situation was primarily the work of the peasantry, even if the peasants were not yet independent or developing according to the account in these historical records, or was managed by indigenous land owners; for the answer to this we need a new methodological examination of these materials.

As much, I would like to use the space below to attempt one specific and concrete

examination. As mentioned before, this illustrates nothing but an example of historical verification of the concrete and specific relationship between the historical development of the peasantry (the logic of which is a presupposition of my theory of military service) and the political policies for protecting and maintaining peasants. But, because of the limitation of space, I omit all the processes of methodological manipulation and refer only to the conclusions. The details will soon be published under the title "Kwan'ei-chūki no Kisokōzō ni tsuite (The Basic Social Structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the Middle of the Kwan'ei Period)."

### III

In this section I should like to consider Gōshigun in Higo Country, Kyūshū. Generally speaking, very few complete historical records were preserved under the Tokugawa Shogunate System, even for a country. In the 17th century, particularly nothing but some fragmental *Kenchichō* were left behind. As one of these rare historical materials there remains in Gōshigun of Higo Country *Ninchikuchō* (notes of population and domestic animals) for each village in the whole Gun, compiled by the Hosokawa clan of Higo in the 10th year of Kwan'ei (1633). I would like to analyze these here.

Altogether there are the *Ninchikuchō* of 121 villages. These 121 villages were divided up into ten "groups" (*kumi*), each "group" consisting of anything between six and eighteen villages. It is these "groups" as units that I now wish to consider. The constituents of the "groups" are shown in Table 1, the contents of the *Ninchikuchō* for each "group" in Table 2, and the average productivity of one male adult or family in Table 3.

TABLE 1. GROUPS (*kumi*) OF VILLAGES

Groups	No. of Constituent Villages	Serial No. of the Materials
I	9	1- 9
II	11	10- 23
III	13	24- 36
IV	6	37- 45
V	10	46- 59
VI	11	60- 73
VII	18	74- 93
VIII	15	94-110
IX	12	111-123
X	16	124-140
Total	121	1-140

In Table 3, which reveals the average productivity of each group, it is clearly recognized that the potential of peasant enterprises differed considerably from one group to another. These differences I take up for further examination below.

The real defect of Table 3, however, is that it shows only the averages of productivity in these agricultural communities and does not reveal the reality of mutually different enterprises embedded in different social strata within each group. We need first, therefore, to

TABLE 2. RECORDED CONTENTS OF THE *Ninchikuchō*

Groups	Rice Product. in <i>koku</i>	Populat.	Males 15-60 yrs. old	Families	Cattle	<i>Nago</i> 15-60 years old	<i>Genin</i>	Tenants Outcast
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
I	3684.9	1324	527	125	479	216	111	8
II	4401.8	781	285	119	218	86	26.5	2.5
III	3546.6	836	297	127	241	64	25	1
IV	2337.5	602	219	88	175	51	26	2
V	4324.4	867	383	172	336	98	28	5
VI	4448.4	918	317	122	371	118	27	1
VII	4451.2	1152	389	182	486	94	47	
VIII	2615.8	669	239	84	251	67	30	
IX	4135.3	922	336	148	378	79.5	19.5	7
X	5374.1	1011	387	146	459	140	34	2
Total	29320.0	9082	3379	1313	3394	1013.5	374.0	28.5

TABLE 3. AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITIES

Groups	A/C	C/D	A/D	E/D	F/D	(E+F+G)/D
I	7.00	4.21	29.5	3.84	1.73	2.68
II	15.40	2.39	37.0	1.83	0.72	0.97
III	12.00	2.34	27.9	1.90	0.50	0.71
IV	10.70	2.49	26.5	1.99	0.58	0.90
V	11.30	2.23	25.1	1.95	0.57	0.76
IV	14.00	2.60	36.5	3.04	0.97	1.20
VII	11.40	2.14	24.5	2.68	0.52	0.78
VIII	11.00	2.79	31.1	2.99	0.80	1.15
IX	12.30	2.27	28.0	2.56	0.54	0.72
X	13.90	2.65	36.8	3.14	0.96	1.20
Average	11.60	2.57	29.9	2.58	0.77	1.08

determine these strata by clarifying agricultural enterprises or the land owners included in each group in terms of the land ownership per ten *koku* of productivity (where a *koku* is approximately equivalent to 5 bushels and ten *koku* means an amount of agricultural production after all produce from farming fields is numerically converted into its equivalent in terms of rice production; and this, before the *Ninchikuchō* were compiled since the land surveys done in this district to determine such amount of productivity, may be regarded as representing almost the actual productivity of the land). We then clarify the distribution of the total amounts (numerical values) for each group in Table 2 between the social strata in the group. Supposing, for a moment, that the ratio of land owners in each stratum to the whole group be  $p$ ; the ratio of their land ownership or productivity in *koku*,  $q$ ; the ratio of the population of such subjugated farmers as family servants (*nago*), outcastes (*genin*) and tenant farmer (*tsukurigo*) by  $r$ , the ratio of domestic cattle by  $s$ , and the ratio of total male labor powers by  $t$ .







TABLE 6 (A). STRATA OF TENANT FARMERS

Groups	$p$	$r/p$	$s/p$	$q/p$	$t/p$	$t/q$	$r/q$	$s/q$
I	4.30	1.51	0.96	0.27	0.48	1.76	3.38	2.16
VII	5.71	0.60	1.08	0.64	1.03	1.60	0.92	1.65
VIII	4.22	0.48	0.77	0.61	0.67	1.10	0.75	1.19
II	2.63	0.34	0.32	0.63	0.72	1.14	0.71	2.36
X	3.27	0.28	0.69	0.34	0.69	1.98	0.96	0.67
IV	2.82	0.25	0.60	0.47	0.65	1.37	0.48	1.15
III	3.12	0.25	0.53	0.49	0.76	1.55	0.43	1.10
IX	4.19	0.22	0.69	0.48	0.76	1.59	0.49	1.45
VI	2.03	0.21	0.28	0.40	0.53	1.36	0.64	1.86
V	1.48	0.09	0.41	0.24	0.74	2.89	0.36	1.64
Average	3.38	0.42	0.63	0.46	0.70	1.60	0.91	1.40

TABLE 6 (B). STRATA OF LAND OWNERS

Groups	$p$	$r/p$	$s/p$	$q/p$	$t/p$	$t/q$	$r/q$	$s/q$
I	1.81	4.11	2.29	1.41	1.11	0.75	1.77	0.97
VII	2.55	1.59	1.76	1.67	1.54	1.92	1.93	1.04
VIII	0.96	2.20	1.62	1.65	1.26	0.77	1.24	0.92
II	1.41	0.46	0.60	1.29	0.80	0.63	0.47	0.67
X	4.88	1.16	1.17	1.19	1.07	0.64	0.81	0.75
IV	0.93	2.63	1.60	2.10	1.84	0.88	1.23	0.72
III	2.21	1.26	1.04	1.68	1.43	0.85	0.77	0.63
IX	1.14	2.55	2.52	2.61	2.08	0.79	1.03	1.03
VI	0.93	2.43	2.05	3.00	1.87	0.62	0.97	0.83
V	0.19	3.63	1.10	3.02	2.86	0.94	1.20	0.36
Average	1.70	2.22	1.58	1.96	1.49	0.78	1.04	0.79

TABLE 6 (C). STRATA OF SELF-SUSTAINING FARMERS

Groups	$p$	$r/p$	$s/p$	$q/p$	$t/p$	$t/q$	$r/q$	$s/q$
I	3.31	2.86	1.72	0.59	0.69	0.98	2.88	1.74
VII	3.05	0.84	1.21	1.02	1.27	1.23	0.80	1.16
VIII	1.51	2.28	1.74	1.42	1.33	1.02	1.50	1.13
II	2.63	0.93	0.66	1.59	1.25	0.79	0.70	0.55
X	5.54	1.07	1.08	0.88	1.02	0.82	1.02	1.04
IV	2.19	1.06	0.94	0.97	1.17	1.21	1.00	0.89
III	3.69	0.80	0.85	1.06	1.19	1.12	0.78	0.81
IX	5.20	0.71	1.06	1.19	1.23	1.04	0.63	0.95
VI	2.03	0.91	0.97	1.20	1.00	0.84	0.91	0.98
V	1.48	0.89	0.97	1.04	1.20	1.14	0.83	0.90
Average	3.06	1.24	1.12	1.10	1.14	1.02	1.11	1.02

TABLE 7 (A). TYPES OF SELF-SUSTAINING FARMER

$r/p \div t/p$	$r/q \div t/q$	Types
1.49-	1.33-	Pure <i>nago</i> ownership type
1.09-1.49	1.09-1.33	<i>Nago</i> ownership type
0.60-1.09	0.57-1.09	Consanguineous family type
-0.60	-0.57	Pure consanguineous family type
$s/p \div t/p$	$s/q \div t/q$	Types
1.06-	1.01-	Pure domestic animal type
0.98-1.06	1.00-1.01	Domestic animal type
0.90-0.98	0.88-1.00	Intensive labor type
-0.90	-0.88	Pure intensive labor type

TABLE 7 (B). TYPES OF TENANT FARMER

$r/p \div t/p$	$r/q \div t/q$	Types
(The same as in (A))		
$q/p \div x$	$s/q \div y$	Types
0.80-1.00		Owner farmer type
0.50-0.80		Mixed type of owner farmer and tenant farmer
-0.50		Tenant farmer type
	1.20-	Special self-sustaining farmer type
	0.90-1.20	Self-sustaining farmer type
	0.60-0.90	<i>Nago</i> type
	-0.60	Prototype of <i>nago</i>

TABLE (C). TYPES OF LAND OWNER

$r/p \div t/p$	$s/p \div t/p$	Types
(The same as in (A))		
$q/p \div x$	$s/q \div y$	Types
1.5-		Tenant farmer type
1.3-1.5		Mixed type of tenant farmer and hand farmer
1.0-1.3		Hand farmer type
-1.0		Pure hand farmer type
	1.5-	Prototype of <i>nago</i> ownership
	1.1-1.5	<i>Nago</i> ownership type
	0.9-1.1	Self-sustaining farmer type
	-0.9	Special self-sustaining farmer type

which are shown in Table 7 (A, B and C). In Table 8 the groups are classified comprehensively in terms of these types.

Supposing in Table 7 that the relation between  $t/q$  and  $t/p$  for the self-sustaining strata in each group should be validated, we can calculate the values that  $q/p$  can possibly take for the self-sustaining type in each tenant farmer group. Putting  $x=t/p \div t'/q'$ , where  $t'/q'$  refers to  $t/q$  for the self-sustaining stratum, we can easily obtain values of  $x$ . In a similar way, since we have obtained definite values for cattle distribution in relation to labor distribution we can further obtain the specific value of cattle distribution necessary for any given distribution of labor. This we denote by  $y$ ,  $x$  and  $y$  in the above Tables represent these values.

Finally we have a graph (Table 9) of correlations among group averages by plotting  $A/D$  (Table 3) on the horizontal axis against  $C/D$  on the vertical axis. Similarly, in Table 10 we have three cases of such correlations, where with regard to  $F/D$  in Table 3, A denotes a value of more than 7.0; B, a value between 5.0 and 7.0; C, a value between 3.0 and 5.0; D, a value between 1.0 and 3.0, and E, a value of less than 1.0. Thus, a social stratum is shown as C7, for instance, where the number 7 indicates an enterprise producing between 70

TABLE 8. CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS I-X

		Types of distribution of domestic animals				
Types of Labor Distribution	Self-sustaining Stratum	Pure intensive labor type	Intensive labor type	Pure domestic animal type		
	Pure <i>nago</i> ownership type	II III, IV, V, VII, IX	VI, VIII, X	I		
	<i>Nago</i> ownership type					
	Consanguineous family type					
	Tenantry Stratum	<i>Nago</i> ownership type	Prototype of <i>nago</i>	<i>Nago</i> type	Self-sustaining farmer type	
	Pure <i>nago</i> ownership type	I	VI, X	V	II, VII, VIII IV, III, IX	
Consanguineous family type						
Pure consanguineous family type						
Land Owning Stratum	Prototype of <i>nago</i> ownership	<i>Nago</i> ownership type	Self-sustaining farmer type	Special self-sustaining type		
Pure <i>nago</i> ownership type	IX	IV VII, II	VI, VIII X III	I V		
<i>Nago</i> ownership type						
Consanguineous family type						
		Types of Tenant Farmer				
Types of Land Owner		Tenant farmer type	Mixed type of owner farmer and tenant	Tenant farmer type		
	Pure hand farmer type	IV, VIII	II, V, I, III VI, VII	X		
	Hand farmer type					
	Mixed type of tenant farmer and hand farmer					
Tenant farmer type	IX					

TABLE 9. CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS I—X IN TERMS OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN  $A/D$  AND  $C/D$  IN TABLE 3







TABLE 10. THREE CASES OF CORRELATIONS HAVING REGARD TO  $F/D$  IN TABLE 3



and 90 *koku* a year.

The analysis of historical material attempted thus far, especially the method of quantitative analysis, has never, at least in any historical studies of the Tokugawa Shogunate System, been presented before. I admit, therefore, that it is nothing but a preliminary analysis which will need to be full examined in the future. Nevertheless, and although realizing the risks, I would like in the following sections to draw some conclusions from the above analysis. I would add that the reason for my employing this kind of audacious preparatory method is an academic situation in which the historian is being strongly urged to re-examine methods of historical verification.

#### IV

The term peasant enterprise has in general two implications. One is that it refers to a type of farming family the typical example of which is the agricultural enterprise supported by such a family system as includes only lineally related monogamous families and does not need to employ *nago* or outcasts. The other involves problems concerning the foundation of productivity in which it refers to the enterprise stipulated by its proper productivity which is to increase labor productivity by putting more intensive labor and more fertilizer into smaller plots.

The concrete process of the development of peasant enterprise with the two implications just mentioned above is the problem that we have been facing so far, and analysis could, therefore, be done with three factors in mind: the quantitative weight of *nago* and *genin* (outcasts) as an index to family types, that of cows and horses as an index to the relations of labor ownerships, and productivity in *koku* per unit labor by one male adult laborer as an index of labor productivity. The results of the analyses are shown clearly in the Tables provided and, almost without question they are confirmed by the historical materials, although I am not touching upon the details here.

Let us temporarily confine our problem to that of the relationship between labor productivity and family types. According to Table 9, which deals with the groups only in terms of average, labor productivity can roughly be said to have increased with the development of the peasantry except in groups X, VI, and II. The peasantry can also be said to have expanded in accordance with the development of the peasant family type except in groups II, V and VII. In general, therefore, the development of the peasantry can be said to correspond to that of peasant family type and to have resulted in the advancement of labor productivity.

Of course, a complete answer to the problems in question is impossible in a general treatise of this sort, for the exceptions themselves are of the utmost importance. Groups X and VI are, farmer type, while group II is a group in the process of passing from this prototype to the *nago* and tenant farmer type. All of these share the characteristic of average production per family being more than 35 *koku*. It is clear from the description in the *Ninchikuchō* of "men lost" that the possession of land by the self-sustaining strata in these three groups amounted to 42-72% and there is a strong possibility that farmers ran away. Moreover, we can see that the self-sustaining farmer and land owner strata in groups VI and X do not much differ from one to another so far as their family types are concerned, while both clearly

differ from tenant farmer strata.

Thus the level of labor productivity of these groups is nothing but that of self-sustaining farmers and land owners, so that we should not evaluate the actual productivity so high as is shown in the Table. But we cannot deny, either, that it is higher than for any other type. That is, we cannot deny that labor productivity during the prototype relationship of *nago* and tenant farmers is the highest of all. This was the result of the development of *nago* ownership or, more strictly, the development of enterprises by *nago* owners. There is, however, one inconsistency involved. It is symbolically demonstrated in the case of group II. According to Table 10, the highest labor productivity for the group comes to between 20 and 30 *koku*, but in other higher strata the level either falls or remains steady at this despite the numerical increase of cattle, *nago* and labor populations in the family.

This fact clarifies the trend in which the productivity of the *nago* enterprise comes to determine the enterprises of other strata during the change to the relationship of *nago* and tenant farmers from the prototype relationship. This aspect of group II was realized in the fact that it had a much lower average number of family workers than groups X and VI, especially as regards the enterprises of land owners (cf. Table 10).

Thus the enterprises of those whom I call *nago* owners or pure *nago* owners displayed the highest labor productivity in their final stage of development. But this is nothing more than a transitional phenomenon. When a *nago* is at the stage where he appears as a tenant farmer, equipped mainly with means of labor of which he himself has possession (symbolized in this case by the number of cattle he uses), or when he is at the *nago* tenancy stage, his average possession of fief necessarily decreases; here the number of family types is much reduced as are the average labor productivities. This is revealed in a transition such as from group II to groups V and VIII, and the decrease in labor productivity is not due to the peasant enterprise at all, but to the dissolution of the enterprise of *nago* owner.

As to the peasant enterprise, we can say that it is still in the process of development and that the level of its labor productivity at this stage determines that of the average labor productivity of group as a whole. This fact is clearly demonstrated in the case of group V (see Table 10), where the level of productivity above approximately 10-20 *koku* shows scarcely any variation. This group V, according to the Tables, is that in which the weight of tenancy is the heaviest of all. But this tenancy plays no other role than merely to have two extreme social strata yielding 0-10 *koku* and 70-90 *koku* approach the level of their labor productivity of 10-20 *koku*.

In the development that follows the average possession of fief does not vary much with regard to the hierarchical aspect, for instance, group III clearly shows that even the higher strata consist of families with not more than 5 to 8 laborers, so that the level of productivity appears to increase considerably. It goes without saying that the official reports of labor productivity by land owners are often fictitious and should as assessed with considerable reservations in regard of their tenant farmer's productivity. And the tenancy in question is nothing but the tenancy in that peasant enterprise in which the tenant farmer cultivates the land owner's marginal fields with his own means of labor, while the land owner runs his manufacturing enterprises by himself with almost the same means of production as the tenant. It is this idea of tenancy that could be a general criterion for scrutinizing the development of peasantry.

## V

The last problem is that of how the feudal lords coped with such a basic economic structure as that described thus far. The Hosokawa clan came into possession of Higo Country in the 9th year of Kwan'ei (1632). We know, from a petition presented in the 10th year of Kwan'ei (1633) by 146 village headmen in Masukigun of the economic difficulties existing during the preceding period under the rule of the Katō clan. The headmen complained (1) that there had been some unfair land surveys, (2) that compulsory labor such as the services in Yedo was an extremely heavy burden, (3) that farmers were subject to such unbearable difficulties that there was no help but to "canvass for the sale" of their wives, their servants or even themselves, and (4) that the ratio of the annual land tax to total production was too high for it to be payed off.

The Hosokawa clan, finding in Higo Country this kind of economic situation, undertook immediately, in 1633, the task of surveying all the lands which came into its possession and attempted improvements in the hitherto assessment of land tax due to inappropriate land surveys. It also carried out an investigation of population and domestic animals in order to enlist the quantities of laborers and cattle required for official labor though trying to refrain from using farmers as slave laborers.

These facts, we may say, clearly demonstrates a characteristic of clan authority in this period. The intensified exploitation of labor rent for military service purposes as well as of land rent for production is pointed out here as a main cause of the "human trafficking" by farmers. I have already stated that the intensification of these two aspects of land rent exploitation goes against the development of peasant productivity. And it is clear from these historical materials that this contradictory exploitation of land rent could basically no more be dispensed with under the Hosokawa than under the rule of the Katōs when it had been particularly severe.

According to the *Ninchikuchō*, details of which cannot, for reasons of space, be set out here in full, it was in those groups which were at the stage of either the relationship of *nago* owner tenant farmer or the prototype relationship between *nago* and tenant farmer (as I have called them) that, under this kind of economic situation; there were many *nago* who still possessed their own cows and horses (the case in which farmers with their own cattles sold themselves into bondage) as well as some abandoned lands (the case in which "sold" famers gave up their cultivation). In other words, there could be devastated lands in areas where a comparatively small number of peasants were engaged in cultivating fields, while they appear in those areas where the *nago* ownership determined the level of productivity.

Here is seen one characteristic of labor rent in this period, namely the exploitation of labor rent which was itself a type of rent in closer affinity to the enterprises by *nago* owners. And, therefore, intensification of the exploitation was a factor that obstructed the independence of peasantry. Yet the process of the development of productivity was directed toward the dissolution and corruption of the enterprises of *nago* owners and independence of *nago* farmers. This process is particularly demonstrated by the fact that, in those groups in which both prototype relationship and relationship of *nago* and tenant farmer was predominantly strong, the number of *nago* who possessed their own houses increased considerably. This necessarily shows that the *nago* was acquiring his independence under the severe conditions



imposed on him. This tendency betrays the social contradiction which the duality of these rent-services implied, or the contradiction faced by enterprises of the *nago* owner.

But, whatever independence the *nago* with his own house might have cherished, it was much less stable than the independence which the *nago* with his own fief enjoyed, and thus the former was identifiable with those *nago* in the prototype relationship of *nago* and tenant farmers. It was necessary, therefore, for *nago* owners to increase the productivity of their enterprises by developing the prototype relationship of *nago* and tenant farmers and by encouraging them to attain their independence to such an extent that they could only increase productivity and break up into families of *nago* with their own houses and their own little fiefs. In such a situation solidification of the independence of *nago* and peasants would soon result, in which case the enterprises of the *nago* owners might naturally collapse. The reason, however, why this collapse could not easily occur also lay in the exploitation of labor rent, since the nature of the productivity of these enterprises of the *nago* owners was such that they also could be the object of labor rent exploitation.

Thus, the actual existence of the enterprises of land owners was supported by political authority for the sake of their labor rent, while at the same time a contradiction appeared in the matter of their rent pattern, since the intensified exploitation of labor rent did not, at this stage of development, square with the proper productivity of *nago* owners of development. This led to the decline of the enterprises of the lower classes of *nago* owner and the reversion of these owners to mere *nago*. With such a state of affairs a request to a feudal lord for a lowering of rents, such as in the petition of the village headmen in Masukigun, would be natural.

The reason why the Hosokawa clan had no choice but to carry out a survey of population and domestic animals immediately after it began ruling Higo Country, also derived from the general historical state of affairs described above. The Hosokawa clan was no different from the Katō clan in desiring to exploit the people for labor rent and they unquestionably tried to expand this exploitation and tend it to all the enterprises of various types that were developing at the time. This intensified the antagonism of farmers towards their ruler. Because of this antagonism the attempt to establish a proper foundation for independent production by the peasants faced an extremely difficult state of affairs, which was the cause of the instability of the peasant enterprise. But peasants, though surrounded by various difficulties, would succeed in establishing enterprises and even come to repel the existence of labor rent as such. Accordingly such a contradiction of the ruler's political intention would eventually vanish that he had to support the enterprises of *nago* owners in order to exploit their labor rent and yet had to dissolve these enterprises in order to exploit the rent for production.

So far as the exploitation of rent for production is concerned, even that developmental stage of prototype relationship between *nago* and tenant farmers in which labor productivity or, conversely, the quantity of the total surplus labor was the greatest, must have been a most desirable situation for a feudal lord. In this regard, the dissolution of enterprises of *nago* owners was to a certain extent necessary. This dissolution, however, could never remain within the limits desired by feudal lord, but proceeded towards the point of full prosperity for the peasant enterprise. The relative decrease of labor productivity caused by this dissolution was a historical result unaffected by political authority; all that this political authority could do was in connection with the advancement of the labor productivity of

peasant enterprises as a given historical reality and with the desperate planning of an intensification in the exploitation of the rent for production.

Several points in the above exposition are problems for the future. The present paper, as was mentioned earlier, is a preliminary survey of a method of historical verification and the conclusions that can possibly be drawn from it are merely these :

The independent peasant enterprise must have developed at least thirty years before the 1660s which are ordinarily supposed to be the time when the peasants became independent. The historical direction of its productive power must probably have been determined at the very beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The ruler's policy for peasant independence was also established, even in this area of Kyūshū which was still an underdeveloped district, not as a mere idea but as a political principle of intensifying exploitation on the firm basis of productivity. And, this principle was applied not only to land rent for production but to labor rent as well. Applied to the latter, however, it obscured the natural process of development of peasant independence even in 1630s, so that we often fail to see its real nature.

These are the conclusions of this paper.