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PHILOSOPHY VS SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

—A Criticism of So-called Sociologism and Psychologism—

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It is a noteworthy fact that such empirical and useful sciences as sociology and psychology, together with cultural anthropology, favoured by the circumstances of public needs and interests, have made a successful appearance on the grand stage of the times.1 Sociology, setting up human relations and conduct as its main objects, psychology, striving to make clear the inner sides of personality, and cultural anthropology, aiming to depict the prototype of culture in primitive society,—all are in each of their fields attaining remarkable results, making us anticipate a splendid future for their development. But these sciences, which are aiming at obtaining theories of human action, personality, and culture, provoke, in so far as they have the whole human life and its interrelations as objects, some problems concerning the border-line between them and the other sciences, especially philosophy, which deals with the problems of human life as a whole. Of course it is not deplorable, but rather to be welcomed, that the same object is viewed from different perspectives and studied repeatedly, as the division of sciences is always made according to convenience; and problems and research often overlap or shift from one scientific field to another, so that the conception of the object in question can be expected to become all the more correct and elaborated. But if this is done without full consciousness of such different foci or perspectives on the side of sciences, it often results in the absolute assertion of the one-sided standpoint of some special science and the inevitable fault of “metabasis eis allo genos”, as logicians call it, so that there is some danger of “sociologism” or “psychologism”, which is quite different from sociology or psychology as empirical sciences. It is therefore all the more necessary for these sciences to draw a border-line between them from the viewpoint of methodology and to undergo self-criticism about this point, because the tasks of sociology and psychology are very important for the understanding of human life. It is not meant to underestimate the achievements of sociology or psychology, but to recognize them as fundamental data of human life which are indispensable for philosophy. But we must acknowledge at the same time, that philosophy can not identify itself with these sciences, nor can it be reduced to them; and that it has an independent viewpoint and field of inquiry. To make clear such difference and interrelations between philosophy and the above-mentioned sciences, which has always been one of the essential tasks of philosophycal criticism, is the main object of our present research.

1 About the correlation of these sciences cf. Parsons, Social System, p. 545 “The Classification of the Sciences of Action”. Further cf. Parsons and Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action, p. 3, 28; R. Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality, p. 3 sq.
The problems common to philosophy, on the one hand, and sociology and psychology, on the other, are those of culture and human relations.

Although certain criteria for making an essential definition of what is meant by "culture" are presupposed, we should like to start with the ordinary or daily conception of it. Therefore, by culture we mean the way of life which we find in our environment, such as the family or society, when we are born, and which makes contact with us through real life and education; which is internalized in our lives, both physical and moral; which is accepted and developed, distributed to others, and transmitted from generation to generation. Sociologists often divide culture in this sense into "social" and "nonsocial", of which the former is the main object of sociological research, while the latter can be such an object in so far as it relates with the former. The standard of division in this case, i.e. "social", is the presence of norms, which specify the evaluation of persons and the conduct between them. Accordingly, material culture, such as physical or technical objects, and spiritual culture, such as sciences, literature, and fine arts, are in themselves non-social culture. They become objects of research, only when they have some relation to social culture. According to the above-mentioned standard social culture is, for example, customs, fashions, public opinions, mores, and legal norms.2

Culture in this sociological sense has two distinct characteristics. One is that it has social norms, which regulate human interrelations, and the other is that it is shared and maintained by society, which is above individuals, i.e., it is institutionalized and current. These are in short called normativeness and institutionalization or currency.

Normativeness can be viewed from two aspects. In the first place, it is true that the so-called non-social culture, for example, literature or science does not regulate human relations directly. Of course, literature describes human relations, above all legal and ethical relations between persons, but this does not mean that literature itself gives such norms to the public. The sole aim, the original mission, of literature consists in the expression of beauty through such materials; in consequence of this it may often exert moral influence upon readers, while such an influence still remains a secondary result and does not decide the ultimate value of that literary work. But when we treat the moral or legal significance and influence of literature from this secondary result, literature can be the object of sociological research, as it has already become social through contact with social norms. It is the same with sciences. While sciences give us data as faithfully as possible without direct regulation of human relations, they can have moral significance by giving human life the application of remedies for the miseries of sickness; or antimoral significance by bringing ruin upon humanity through the destructive power of the atomic bomb. These are not the original aims of sciences, but secondary results from the theory of sciences, in consequence of which sciences as nonsocial culture become social, as they pertain to human relations. To sum up, literature and sciences are non-social culture; they become social, only when they have some relations, even if they are secondary results, with social culture. But is that the only case in which such culture become social?

Here we must mention some instances in which non-social culture is in itself quite social. For example, the fine arts, in so far as they appear in a certain society, express current style or taste, which exert a certain regulative influence upon the persons in that society. Sciences also indicate, as social phenomena, a current standard of research in that society, according to which scientific results are always estimated and from which the researchers can not deviate with impunity. Thus the fine arts and the sciences do not regulate human relations directly, but regulate artists and scientists in their achievements, so that we can even talk about artistic and scientific conscience, and in that respect they have a normative character, just as do customs, mores, and laws.

What does all this mean? The fact, that in this case, arts and sciences have a normative character, comes not only from the fact that arts and sciences are originally system of values which appear to persons who have intention towards them as "ought", but also from the fact that they are institutionalized in a certain society and have "currency" or are even "in vogue". This touches upon the above-mentioned second point, that the culture which sociologists are concerned with, is one which is shared and maintained by a certain society. In other words, when non-social culture is said to become social, two things are meant, i.e. that it has secondary results, in consequence of which it has normative character, and that it is institutionalized and has currency, in consequence of which it also obtains normative character. So we can summarize as follows: all norms come from the regulative power which a society exerts upon its members, so that we should make the distinction of social and non-social depend not upon the presence of norm, but upon the currency or institutionalization of culture in a certain society, from which the normative character of that culture originates.

We can view all the above-mentioned from the standpoint of the theory of action, for example, that of Parsons' and others. The objects to which an actor is oriented, are other individual actors and collectives (social objects) or physical or cultural objects (non-social objects). These objects are significant to the actor in so far as they gratify or frustrate the actor's needs; and the actor is oriented to the objects through the meaning which he attaches to the objects as his goals and interests. But the relation between the actor and the objects is not restricted to the gratification or frustration of his needs, but also includes cognitive discriminations, the location and characterization of the objects, and evaluative selection of objects among alternatives, all three of which motivate the action. When an actor acts thus according to motivation-orientation, another actor responds to it, and so there arise mutual expectations between actors and also mutual communication corresponding to them. Meeting these social-relational needs are the symbolic systems shared by both the actors, i.e. language, mores, etc. These shared symbolic systems are not only ways of orienting, but also have normative character to regulate the ways of orienting themselves. This is the most elementary form of culture, which provides the standards (value orientation) applied in the evaluative process of action. So culture is the object of research in sociology in so far as action is oriented to value as the standard of evaluation. In other words, though culture is a non-social object, it becomes social in so far as it makes interrelational human action possible and gives it evaluative standards. So all symbols, such as cognitive ("belief" or ideas), expressive (of leadership, artist's, etc.), and evaluative are treated in sociology with respect to their social roles.8

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When we conceive of culture in this way, there arises a problem as to whether all the phases of culture can be covered by such institutionalized current culture. In other words, it is true that we conform, on the one hand, with the current institutionalized aesthetic taste or style, the shared common ideas of moral norms and scientific truth, but, on the other hand, we can not help asking whether we can be fully contented with them. If all are reduced to the average level and people not only wear standardized clothes, eat standardized food, dwell in standardized houses, but also follow the general fashion, share general ideas, think and do just like others, all are simple enough. It is pointed out over and over again and with much reason, that there are such uniforming and leveling tendencies in our times. But we protest in our inner heart against such tendencies and even point out the most evident symptoms against them in our society itself. So we can not restrict culture to the institutionalized and the current. What we should acknowledge here is the difference between the shared, current culture and the essential, ideal culture. Then what is meant by the essential ideal culture apart from the institutionalized current culture?

If we feel repugnance toward institutionalized current culture, it is because we entertain a different idea of culture, on account of which we criticize our current culture. The idea of culture we entertain is not always devoid of some incompleteness, so that it can not be immediately identified with the essential ideal culture. But in general our cognition is, on the one hand, not devoid of fault, but, on the other hand, it can also very well hit the mark and often participate in absolute truths. These truths we obtain constitute the realm of ideas in the Platonic sense. In the case of culture it is not otherwise. We often create false ideas of culture, but we also obtain correct ideas, which together constitute the realm of ideas of culture or essential ideal culture. How can such essential ideal culture be obtained by us? Not all of us can participate in scientific truths or produce works of art, so we must here acknowledge the presence of the elite, not in a political sense, but in a cultural sense. The elite in the cultural sense are the so-called geniuses who manifest themselves in human history. They are individuals who are not reduced to the collectives, of which they are members. Now, each individual may be a member of a collective; he has his individuality, of course, but as a member he often can not be discerned from other members, and himself represents his collective. If we carry this uniforming tendency to extreme, we arrive at individuals who can not be discerned from collectives, existing only as representative members of such collectives. But if we go to just the opposite extreme, we arrive at individuals who are distinct from, or rather, against collectives. Ordinary people are situated just between these two extremes, shifting according to circumstances to one or the other, i.e., we may at one time act as representative members, at another time private individuals. The elite in the cultural sense are such individuals who, having extreme individualities and being higher in their ability than...
collectives, can participate in the absolute idea of culture.

If we can reason in this way, there exist, corresponding to essential ideal culture, elite as chosen individuals; the culture which is attained through these chosen individuals is non-social in the sense of the above-mentioned definition, but, being institutionalized in society, becomes normative toward human relations, from which originate such sociological conceptions as "social culture". Reasoning thus, we may expect to explain better the socialization of the non-social culture in the case of science, literature, and fine arts.

For example, it is an acknowledged fact that arts and sciences are deeply rooted in the activities of the chosen individuals or geniuses, through which splendid works of art and scientific achievements can be produced, though the general support and assistance of the public is quite indispensable for the works and achievements of these individuals. There are some arts which are produced through the cooperation of many people, for example, dramatic performances, dancing, or music, but such people are also chosen individuals. So artistic works and scientific achievements flourish only through such individuals, and being evaluated, supported and even stimulated by the public, become commonly shared culture. Of course, if we maintain such thesis, it might be thought that all works of art and scientific achievements are produced only apart from the public, but that is not the case. The individual has already absorbed common culture through his education before he becomes productive in the cultural sense, so that he, having been brought up among common culture, shares the spirit common to the public. Thus being, so to speak, a child of the times, he is not isolated from current culture, but sharing it, acts as spokesman for the public, producing new culture, which can be more easily accepted by the public. So what he produces, represents the spirit of the times. Nevertheless, in the fields of science or art the position of the individual is always to be highly evaluated, because here the emphasis is always laid upon the value of the artistic or scientific contents rather than the acknowledgement or acceptance of the public.

So much for non-social culture. What happens then in the case of original social culture, such as customs, laws, or mores? In these cases it is of course out of the question that they are devoid of general acknowledgement, as they all regulate human relations as social norms. But even in these cases there certainly exist some individuals who originate or found them, so that there also exists such essential ideal culture, which, then being institutionalized and shared by the public, becomes social. Nevertheless, in these cases the originator or founder is not specially mentioned and so to speak becomes anonymous, because in these culture complexes the emphasis is laid upon acceptance or currency rather than the value of the contents. Thus here is the same difference between chosen individuals and collectives, so that the difference between social and non-social is rather relative. To such culture, in which emphasis is laid upon its currency or institutionalization, belong, furthermore, language, technique, or legend handed down orally. In these cases it is quite common that the originators are unknown to us. All these have no direct normative power toward human relations, but when usage is once established, they become normative to those who use them in the sense that deviation from them is not proper, just as in the case of current artistic taste.

We have noticed that the difference between social and non-social, which some sociologists take for granted, is rather relative. We should instead establish another difference between essential ideal culture and institutionalized current culture, or chosen individuals
and collectives. We should also acknowledge that the object of sociology consists mainly in the latter half of the above-mentioned alternatives and that the object of philosophy should be the former half of those alternatives. The aim of philosophy lies mainly in the research in the essential or the ideal; it is concerned with currency or real facts only in this respect. On the other hand, the aim of sociology does not consist in research in the essential, but in its manifestation in society. Only in this respect it is concerned with the essential.5

Here we can not help recalling Hegel’s philosophy of mind. Hegel divided the realm of mind into subjective, objective, and absolute; and subjective mind, from the viewpoint of the sciences which treat it, into anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology; objective mind into laws, morals, and moral institutions, the last being sub-divided into family, civil society, and state; absolute mind into arts, religion, and philosophy, which is the synthesis of subjective and objective mind. Of course, in all these conceptions there are tints of the metaphysical residuum of Hegelian philosophy, but if we can discern what is suggested, at bottom, by his metaphysical thought, we can perceive quite the same conception as the above-mentioned. What Hegel dealt with under the head of the objective mind covers what sociology calls the social. Though we can not perceive in Hegel the sociological treatment of the social, there is no doubt that he sees the social in this field of objective mind. As for absolute mind, religion here considered, not from the viewpoint of social institution, but from the content of beliefs and dogmas and together with arts and philosophy, is an attempt to secure the absolute; and philosophy, though it is not immediately identified with science in general, represents the ideal of science in respect to its search for truth. In so far as art, religion, and philosophy are apart from objective mind, which is the field of the social and in which emphasis is laid upon institutionalization, they are non-social culture. If we further consider subjective mind to be the field of individual psychology and anthropology, and absolute mind to be one in which subjective and objective coincide and which corresponds to the mind of the elite in the cultural sense, then does it also coincide with what we have already mentioned about art and science? So it is not a distortion of facts to consider Hegel’s philosophy of mind as an attempt to systematize the fields which are the objects of research in psychology, sociology, and philosophy.

We do not hesitate to acknowledge that culture is a social phenomenon and in this

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5 All the above-mentioned originates from Hegel’s objective mind or world-historical individual. According to Hegel’s philosophy of history the process of world history is the process of world-mind (Weltgeist), which manifests itself in the mind of the nation of each period. The world-historical individual is the one who participates in the progress of world history and stimulates it in accordance with the mind of the nation. As for objective mind, it originates from Hegel’s philosophy of mind and is considered to be the group mind constituting and supporting laws, morals, moral institutions, such as family, civil society, and state, and also culture in general and its concrete product; so it is identified with the mind of the nation, but only from another point of view. In that sense the world-historical individual is one realizing the objective mind of the historical world. In Hartmann’s philosophy division is made of personal mind, objective mind, objectivated mind, of which the last denotes the cultural product or expression, the middle, the group mind, whose corresponding consciousness is the personal mind. So the objective mind is only perceived through personal consciousness and when the objective mind errs, it is made good by returning to the personal mind and in that respect we can acknowledge the role of individuals in the objective mind. Hartmann’s ideas can be called the modernization of Hegel’s philosophy of mind. Cf. N. Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, pp. 151, 170, 290sq. Further the chosen individual who conceives the ideal culture is elite in the cultural world, while the elite in the historical world is the world-historical individual, and the one in the political world is the power elite. Miller, The Power Elite, pp. 3, 269.
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We must maintain at the same time that institutionalized culture as a social phenomenon can not cover all the phases or features of culture; in other words, there exists another phase or feature of culture beyond social phenomenon, i.e. culture as ideal. We may call this aspect of culture ideas in the Platonic sense, or essence or value, which refer not to the empirical standard of the evaluation of sociology, but to the ideal standard of philosophy. Here we can draw a border-line between philosophy and sociology. If we cross over this border-line and enter into another realm of science, yet think that we are in our own field, there certainly occur false "isms", such as sociologism and psychologism from the side of sociology and psychology, and philosophism or metaphysicism, if we may call so it, from the side of philosophy. It is plain that all such isms can not hold out against strict criticism.

Thus drawing a border-line, we can easily solve some controversial problems about "ideology". Apart from the historical significance of Marx's theory of the upper and under structure (Überbau und Unterbau) which is the starting point of ideology, it is quite probable that culture is influenced or determined by an economical factor, the so-called under-structure, when culture appears as a social phenomenon. In this sense the phases of religion and art may well be objects of cultural sociology. But at the same time we see that the relation between the upper and under structure is reciprocal, e.g., religious ideas influencing economical foundations. Behind such considerations lies the concept of culture as an ideal, which is always beyond the social field, so that it never loses its independency.

II

Now we shall turn to another problem, that of human relations. The social system is made up of human relations, which in turn presuppose action by individuals. Sociology considers such human relations from the viewpoint of "status" and "role". Status is the assigned position of individuals as members of society; corresponding to their status individuals have roles, which are the points of contact between the action of the individuals and the social system. In concrete social relations, in which individuals are involved, there arises expectation of roles between them, each playing his own role, and fulfilling the role-expectation.

What is the content of role and role-expectation? It is, in fact, no other than the obligation and responsibility which are imposed upon individuals in respect to their status, and which are of course based upon ethical or legal norms institutionalized in that society.

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4 About the upper and under structure of Marx cf. Fujita, op. cit. It is a well known fact that Max Weber treats the influence exerted by protestant ethics on the formation of the spirit of capitalism in his sociology of religion, but he treats in his sociology of art the reverse influence of economical factors on music. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 2. Halbband Anhang, *Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik*. When Weber says that social action, which is the object of sociology, is one that is related to the act of another actor in the sense which the actor intends, and that it is oriented to it in the course of the action, and that by sense he means here one that is conceived subjectively by the actor in cases historically given... and not the objectively "valid" or "true" sense based upon the metaphysical ground, he sees the very difference between sociology as empirical science and philosophy which seeks the ideal sense. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. 1. Halbband, p. 1-2.

1 Concerning status, role and role-expectation, in addition to the items in the above-mentioned works of sociology, cf. Parsons, op. cit., p. 236. Parsons and Shils, op. cit., pp. 91, 154, 190, 199.
Here we must acknowledge again the relation to the social culture above-mentioned. In so far as the culture which sociology deals with is institutionalized, obligation and responsibility conform to the institutionalized norms in the form of role-adoption, and even if the selection or evaluation of role is based upon the independence or productivity of personality, the personality itself is no other than a system of action, so it is clear that all are considered from the viewpoint of institutionalization or currency.

Here again we can not help asking, as in the case of culture, whether all the phases or features of human relations are covered by what is viewed in the field of sociology. Then we are aware of the fact that we can not avoid the essential problem of the moral evaluation of our actions when we act according to our role and role-expectation. Such moral evaluation presupposes moral standards, which are acknowledged not by this or that person nor all who now exists on earth but by people in general, and which we call ideal or "idea" in the Platonic sense. For example, an individual who has a certain social position is expected to fulfill a certain duty proper to his position. He will be praised or rebuked according to his fulfillment or non-fulfillment of what is expected from him, but such praise or rebuke is different according to the individuals or collectives who place expectation in him, or according to time and place. Sociology may be content to analyse such facts, but the individual actor must decide, in spite of his role-expectation, what is to be done in such a case and what is good or bad from the moral point of view. We consider such decisions to be a problem of ethics, which, though it makes human relations and actions its object, is always related to moral ideals.

We consider moral norms to be ideal values which make human relations harmonious. In this sense there are some moral ideals which are realized in human relations according to a social status and role. It is clearly seen in Confusian morals how they are combined with social status, for example, morals between lord and subjects, parents and children, husband and wife, etc. Even the morals of the Greeks are combined with status, though they seem at first glance to be to the contrary, such as the morals of ruler, warrior, slave etc. As virtues based upon social status presuppose the presence of such status and are often abused to support this very status, they are considered worthless after such status is abolished by a revolutionary change in society; in other words, on account of the conservative role played by such virtues, virtues themselves are neglected. But the main reason for such negligence is that the presence of the general humanistic virtues which should always be at the base of these status-virtues and on account of which the latter, as application of the former, obtain their validity, is forgotten, so that the latter are considered independent and fixed. While status itself may vary with a change in physical condition (parents and children), in social structure (lord and subject), in social custom (man and woman or husband and wife) etc., according to which the corresponding virtues may also vary, the general humanistic virtues are not alterable. Therefore when such status-virtues lost their general appreciation, the general humanistic virtues appeared instead under the name of religious virtues. At any rate this does not mean that status-virtues have no validity. Even at present the relation between parents and a minor child is different from that between old parents and an adult child. This relation is now considered mainly a legal relation of right and duty, but behind such legal relation there certainly exists moral relation, of which the moderns would not be conscious in the form of virtue.
Thus sociology may well consider human relation in the form of status and role, which is an empirical analysis of social phenomena, but we on our part can not help considering that human relations and conduct are examined fully only when we take the moral ideal behind the sociological analysis into consideration. Here we can again draw a borderline between philosophy and sociology.

Next we will try to indicate how psychology also confronts the same border-line problem as the above-mentioned. When psychology treats human relations, it attempts, being unable to neglect moral problems, to establish "psychology of ethics". For example, Fromm maintains that good is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers or his potentialities. It is also called productive in that very sense, and happiness is an achievement brought about by such inner productiveness. This productiveness, according to him, finds expression in the satisfaction of appetite, which is a phenomenon of abundance, in contrary to the satisfaction of hunger, which is a phenomenon of scarcity. Thus, in so far as happiness consists in the productive realization of his potentialities and is the criterion of excellence in the art of living or of virtue in the meaning it has in humanistic ethics, the paralysis of this tendency is itself a symptom of mental sickness, and it may be said that every neurosis represents a moral failure. So his solution of present moral problem is to return to man's real self, which is productive.  

We do not hesitate to appreciate Fromm's attempt to establish humanistic ethics, which is based upon the position that there is nothing higher and nothing more dignified than human existence, and which is an applied science of the art of living, so that it is also based upon the knowledge of human nature, i.e. modern psychology. But we can not help asking, at the same time whether his attempt can be successful in an ethical point of view without presupposing genuine moral ideas.

For example, his fundamental proposition that good is the development of man's possibilities or potentialities is mainly based upon Aristotle or Spinoza, but if we take this view literally, we can not avoid the conclusion that all development of possibilities or potentialities, including even ethically bad or mentally defective ones, turns out to be good. Fromm tries to avoid such consequence by saying that destructiveness is a secondary potentiality in man which becomes manifest only if he fails to realize his primary potentiality, and so man is not necessarily evil, but becomes evil only if the proper conditions for his growth and development are lacking. Here he distinguishes between two potentialities, i.e. primary and secondary, productiveness and destructiveness, good and bad. So good is not the development of man's potentialities alone, but of man's primary potentiality, which is productive and good. Thus, when Fromm assumes that good is the development of man's potentialities, he unconsciously presupposes that it is such productiveness which is associated with the productive ability of making material and spiritual culture, and furthermore even the productive ability of making moral personality; in other words, in his concept of potentiality or productivity is unconsciously presupposed cultural or even moral value, so that the development of potentiality or man's productiveness itself becomes immediately good. Otherwise it does not establish an ethical standpoint at all.

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Again we can not help asking whether mental sickness is in itself a moral defect. It is true that to be mentally healthy is a very good thing, but if it is morally good because it is the consequence of the development of man's primary potentiality, then all mental patients must be morally bad. And it may be the same with physical patients, because there is no difference between physical and mental in respect to defectiveness and abnormal condition. So we can not logically avoid the conclusion that all the sick and the deformed are likewise morally bad. We can not agree with such a conclusion, because we think the value of health is quite different from moral value. It is just the same as the fact that the value of art and science or that of producing such culture can not be identified with the value of moral conduct or producing a moral personality, though art and science are in themselves very good things. All such confusion comes, we think, mainly from neglecting to analyse the variety of values and confounding genuine ethical value with others.

As for the division of universal and socially immanent ethics made by Fromm, we are of the following opinion: by socially immanent ethics he means such norms which are necessary for the functioning and survival of a specific kind of society and of the people living in it, so it aims at the interest of that particular society; by universal ethics on the other hand he means the norms of conduct whose aim is the growth and unfolding of man. Between these two ethics there are gaps in the present society. As long as humanity has not succeeded in building a society in which the interest of "society" has become identical with that of all its members, the historically conditioned social necessities clash with the universal existential necessities of the individual. But the conflict or contradiction between immanent ethics and universal ethics will be reduced and tend to disappear to the same extent to which society becomes truly human, i.e. takes care of the full human development of all members. Here we can not help thinking it rather proper that the difference between universal and socially immanent ethics should be replaced by that between essential ideal and current institutionalized, for his concept of universal ethics does not include the essential or the ideal. Here is a point that has been discussed through the history of philosophy, i.e. absolute vs relative ethics, and surely Fromm's standpoint is rather the latter, for he thinks the history of science is a history of inadequate and incomplete statements or an ever-increasing approximation of the truth. But he also interprets absolute vs relative into universal vs socially immanent. In this his concept of universal is not objectively valid and absolutely true in that sense, but only relatively true. Thus we wonder how we can maintain such a universal norm instead of a socially immanent norm, because both the norms are equally relatively true and there is no priority between such relative truths. Nevertheless if the universal norm has priority, it is because the universal norm is of ideal value and has absolute validity. Fromm explains the meaning of the universal by saying that the aim of norms in universal ethics is the growth and unfolding of man, pointing out examples of those ethics in norms such as "Love thy neighbour as thyself" or "Thou shalt not kill". We have already said that the growth and unfolding of man alone cannot make norms ethical, only the growth and unfolding of ethical personality makes them so. Only under that premise can we consider universal ethics to have validity prior to socially immanent ethics and all such norms as the above-mentioned are valid in so far as they contribute to the aim of such universal ethics.

Fromm also refers to Nietzsche's proposition of true and genuine self, which is closely
related to present existential philosophy. We may here notice that the true or genuine self, which is here alluded to, is in itself already moral personality, only that it is not the ready-made concept of ordinary ethics. If by true or genuine self he means just the same concept as that of the "existence" of existential philosophy, which is beyond an average personality and in itself an unreplaceable individual, it is after all a kind of personality of original value, even though we can not define it explicitly. Without presupposing such a personality of ethical value, it is of no meaning to speak about the true self.

Thus we have maintained that only with the presence of idea, essence or ideal, is the true realm of philosophy opened. But it is not our purpose to emphasize the difference between philosophy and sociology or psychology, but their correlation or cooperation. Even if ethics as a part of philosophy make moral ideas or ideals its objects of research, it can not neglect the fundamental data of sociology and psychology, because moral ideas or ideals can be realized in society only through the status and role of individuals and their system of personality. So we must maintain, on the one hand, the ideal character of culture and moral norms, which transcends the real world, but, on the other hand, the real character which is immanent in society. Without such acknowledgement of difference and interrelation there always arises confusion.

When we acknowledge idea, essence or ideal as a main object of philosophy, it may well be a problem, how we can obtain it. We have already discussed this problem from the point of view of individuals who obtain it, calling them elite in the cultural sense, but we will consider the problem from the point of view of the way or method of obtaining it. We consider such ideas, and in the present case moral ideas or values, as ideal objects, which, as empirical or real objects are given to us through sense perception, are given to us through another kind of perception or intuition, "essential intuition" (Wesensanschauung) as Husserl calls it. As the presence of empirical objects depends upon sense perception, so the presence of ideal objects depends upon essential intuition. Therefore we should show one who does not admit the presence of such value now to get the correct perspective and where to find ideal value. For example, in order to get a perspective of aesthetical value we may give him some explanations about works of art, why they are so beautiful, i.e., the proper division of the plane, the freshness of colour, the strength of touch, or the balance of composition etc. But all these are in fact not the explanation of the reason of the beautiful, but an indication of where to see the beautiful; for when we are asked further why under such and such conditions a thing becomes beautiful, we can not but answer that it is beautiful because it is beautiful as you see it with your own eyes, and this answer, which is not an answer at all, implies that in this respect all is a matter of intuition. It is the same in the case of moral values. It is not necessary to talk about what Buddha saw when he went out in his carriage, i.e. the four fundamental ways of life, birth, old age, sickness, and death. We can mention what we feel according to Mencius when we see a child walking directly toward a hidden well without knowing what may happen, i.e. the irresistible impulse to save its life. Or again what we appreciate in the

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1 Various empirical concepts of value are formed by sociology, psychology and cultural anthropology, cf. Parsons and Shils, op. cit., pp. 388, 394. Here value is defined as "a conception of... the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action," which we think is not the definition of value itself, but rather a social and phenomenal mode of value. Against such empirical concepts compare the assertion of the ideal character of value in Max Scheler, Versuch einer Soziologie des Wissens, p. 14; N. Hartmann Ethik, p. 148 sq.; Aesthetik, p. 361.
conduct of a child resisting the custom of getting rid of aged parents because they lack social utility but demand sustenance of life. In all these cases one can, if he is normal, obtain an essential intuition of moral values, as one obtains the perception of a rose before him. But as the physically blind can not see a rose before them, so the mentally blind can not see moral value. Thus we can aid only those who have not yet opened their eyes to get rid of their obstacles and place them in a situation to see and intuit value, to which purpose literature and arts may contribute much. In addition except to this direct method there is an indirect method of proving the presence of value in the life and conduct of those who disapprove the presence of all these values (when it is found, their disapproval is self-contradictory), or by pointing out the absurd results produced from the negation of value (from which we can conclude the falseness of their statements).  

Thus we consider the objects of ethics to be human relations and conduct, but quite different from those of sociology and psychology, only from the viewpoint of ideal value. When sociology and psychology are concerned with norms, they are only real or current norms, so they are concerned with the fact of norms. But when ethics is concerned with norms, they are ideal norms, on account of which we can criticize current social norms and discuss what they should be. Again when sociology and psychology treat culture, it is current culture, which, having some normative influence, becomes social, but when philosophy treats culture, it is ideal culture, and in so far as it remains so, it is independent from and rather indifferent to morals, while it can not but be criticized from the viewpoint of moral ideal, when it becomes immanent in society and has some moral influence.

It is not our purpose, as we have said, only to distinguish fact and ideal, for ideal is always based upon fact and only in such a case has concrete real significance for a living society. So philosophy or ethics, which is a part of the former, is always based upon sociology and psychology together with cultural anthropology; the former is not devoid of the basic fact of human relations, action, personality, and culture, which the latter give. But sociology and psychology together with cultural anthropology can not have deep insight into social structure, culture, and personality without the aid of philosophy, which gives the former the ideal aspect of human life. Such difference and correlation are vital to the true development of sciences, as was clearly pointed out about the sociology of knowledge by Scheler. "Epistemological research is empty and fruitless, unless it is accompanied by the studies of the social and historical development of the highest types of human knowledge; and the theories of the development and sociology of human knowledge, unless they carry out their tasks clearly conscious of epistemological convictions, are devoid of orientation and support and always without ultimate foundation."

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11 Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, Vorwort, p. V. Further, Scheler maintains that he has already stated as a main part of "pure sociology" his theory of the essential forms of human relations in the last chapter of his ethics (op. cit., p. 2 note 2), but from our point of view it rather belongs to ethics or social philosophy.