Category

Number of Access this item:1,424（2024-04-25 15:21 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/13457

Link to primary information 

File Format Size Views Description
cover_13457 pdf
DP487 pdf 380 KB 1,921

Item Information

Output File

Title
Endogenous Relationship Banking to Alleviate Excessive Screening in Transaction Banking
Creator
Creator Name
Ogura, Yoshiaki Ogura, Yoshiaki
小倉, 義明 小倉, 義明
オグラ, ヨシアキ オグラ, ヨシアキ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
relationship banking
informational externality
interbank competition
commonvalue
repeated auction
JEL
G21
L14
Abstract
This paper analyzes how learning a borrower's creditworthiness, from past lending decision by a rival bank that is publicly observable through private or public credit reporting systems, affects the performance of subsequent lending competitions. Our analysis of twicerepeated lending competitions demonstrates that such ex post information sharing causes inefficient and excessive screening of new borrowers when banks undertake transaction banking since each bank expects future disadvantages to result from the information revelation. Relationship banking arises endogenously as a defense against such anticipated disadvantage, and improves the economic efficiency by alleviating the excessive screening.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2006-12
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion paper series. A ; No. a487
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/English/
NCID
AA11476336
Number of Pages
44
Appears in Collections
Discussion paper series / Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/13457