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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/13822

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Title
A New Insight into Three Bargaining Solutions in Convex Problems
Creator
Creator Name
Xu, Yongsheng Xu, Yongsheng
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Georgia State University
Creator Name
Yoshihara, Naoki Yoshihara, Naoki
吉原, 直毅 吉原, 直毅
ヨシハラ, ナオキ ヨシハラ, ナオキ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Abstract
We reconsider the three well-known solutions: the Nash, the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, to the classical domains of convex bargaining problems. A new proof for the Nash solution that highlights the crucial role the axiom Contraction Independence plays is provided. We also give new axiomatic characterizations for both the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. Our results focus on both contraction and expansion independence properties of bargaining problems and, as a consequence, some new insights on the three solutions from the perspective of rational choice may be derived.
Description
38078
Bibliography: p. 11-12
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2004-07
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion paper series. A ; No. a453
NCID
AA11476336
Number of Pages
13
Appears in Collections
Discussion paper series / Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/13822