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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/14280

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Title
International Negotiations for Reducing Greenhouse Gases with Emission Permits Trading
Creator
Creator Name
Tadenuma, Koichi Tadenuma, Koichi
蓼沼, 宏一 蓼沼, 宏一
タデヌマ, コウイチ タデヌマ, コウイチ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
世代間問題研究プロジェクト（世代間利害調整） = Setting Options for Fair Distribution of Well-being among Different Generations, Project on Intergenerational Equity
Abstract
We build a three-stage game model of international negotiations on regulation of global emissions of greenhouse gases, and examine the Pareto optimality of an equilibrium allocation. First, we derive the condition for Pareto optimal allocations, which is an extension of the celebrated Samuelson condition. Next, we show that although production efficiency of a final allocation is always met at an equilibrium of the game, overall Pareto optimality may not be satisfied. This is because in negotiations on the level of global emissions in the first stage of the game, countries make expectations on the effect of the total supply of emission permits on the revenue from or the expenditure for emission permits in a later stage.
Description
37956
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2004-01
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion Paper ; No. 191
NCID
AA11851730
Number of Pages
20
Sponsorship
科学研究費補助金（特定領域研究） = Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas
Appears in Collections
Discussion paper / Setting Options for Fair Distribution of Well-being among Different Generations, PIE
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/14280