Category

Number of Access this item:2,040（2024-04-16 20:27 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/14543

Link to primary information 

File Format Size Views Description
cover_14543 pdf
pie_dp326 pdf 91.6 KB 2,147

Item Information

Output File

Title
Formation of a Pool with Essential Patents
Creator
Creator Name
Aoki, Reiko Aoki, Reiko
青木, 玲子 青木, 玲子
アオキ, レイコ アオキ, レイコ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Auckland
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Nagaoka, Sadao Nagaoka, Sadao
長岡, 貞男 長岡, 貞男
ナガオカ, サダオ ナガオカ, サダオ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
世代間問題研究プロジェクト（世代間問題の経済分析） = Economic Analysis of Intergenerational Issues, Project on Intergenerational Equity
Abstract
We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders may not occur, despite significant gains for them and the users. We use the sequential coalition formation framework to show that no coalition may form when the number of patent holders is large, if a firm initiating the coalition can negotiate only sequentially and individually with the rest. Our results, complementing Ray and Vohra (1999) suggest that voluntary sequential negotiation cannot prevent the emergence of "tragedy of anticommons", even if side payments are allowed.
Description
September 2006
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2007-03
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion Paper ; No. 326
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/pie/stage2/Japanese/
NCID
AA11851730
Number of Pages
15
Sponsorship
科学研究費補助金（特別推進研究） = Grant-in-Aid for Specially Promoted Research
Appears in Collections
Discussion paper / Economic Analysis of Intergenerational Issues, PIE
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/14543