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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/14563

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Title
Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence
Creator
Creator Name
Okada, Akira Okada, Akira
岡田, 章 岡田, 章
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Kyoto University
Creator Name
Riedl, Arno Riedl, Arno
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Tinbergen Institute
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Amsterdam
Rights
Copyright (C)2004, Elsevier Inc. The definitive version is published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 50, Issue 2, February 2005, Pages 278-311, DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.006
Key Word
Coalition formation
Inefficiency
Reciprocity
Social exclusion
JEL
A13
C91
D61
D63
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of reciprocal behavior in multilateral bargaining and coalition formation. Our results show that reciprocal fairness strongly affects the efficiency and equity of coalition formation. In a large majority of cases, inefficient and unfair coalitions are chosen when their coalition values are relatively high. Up to one third of the experimental population is excluded from bargaining and earns nothing. In monetary terms economically significant efficiency losses occur. We find that the interplay of selfish and reciprocal behavior unavoidably leads to this undesirable consequences. We also compare the predictions of recently developed models of social preferences with our experimental results. We find that some of these models capture the empirical regularities surprisingly well.
Publisher
Elsevier Inc.
Issued Date
2005-02
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
journal article
Version Type
AM
Is Version OfRelation -
Related Identifier
DOI
  10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.006
ISSN
0899-8256
NCID
AA10718484
Source Title
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume Number
50
Issue Number
2
Page Start
278
Page End
311
Appears in Collections
010a Journal Articles　=　雑誌掲載論文
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/14563