Category

Number of Access this item:1,769（2024-04-24 15:55 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16328

Link to primary information 

File Format Size Views Description
cover_16328 pdf
070resDP_250 pdf 517 KB 1,293

Item Information

Output File

Title
Contributing or Free-Riding?　A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation
Creator
Creator Name
Furusawa, Taiji Furusawa, Taiji
古澤, 泰治 古澤, 泰治
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Konishi, Hideo Konishi, Hideo
小西, 秀男 小西, 秀男
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Boston College
Editor
Contributor Name
現代経済システムの規範的評価と社会的選択 = Center for Excellence Project The Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems
Key Word
public good
coalition formation
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
free rider
core
lobbying
menu auction
common agency game
Abstract
We consider a two-stage public goods provision game. In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they join a contribution group. Then in the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schedules to influence the government’s decision on the public good provision. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an “intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the freeriding- proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium contribution group is formed by the players with the highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it true that group members are consecutive with respect to their willingness-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public good shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated in a certain way.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics and Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2008-03
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
COE-RES Discussion Paper Series ; No. 250
Number of Pages
43
Sponsorship
21世紀COEプログラム = 21st-Century COE Program
Appears in Collections
COE-RES Discussion Paper Seires
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16328