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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16329

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Title
Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs
Creator
Creator Name
Kamihigashi, Takashi Kamihigashi, Takashi
上東, 貴志 上東, 貴志
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Kobe University
Creator Name
Furusawa, Taiji Furusawa, Taiji
古澤, 泰治 古澤, 泰治
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
現代経済システムの規範的評価と社会的選択 = Center for Excellence Project The Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems
Abstract
This paper studies a class of in￣nitely repeated games with two players in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one- shot payo? of each player is additively separable in their actions. We de￣ne an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium such that the action of each player is a stationary function of the last action of the other player. We show that the set of IREs in the simultaneous move game is identical to that in the alternating move game. In both games, IREs are com- pletely characterized in terms of indi?erence curves associated with what we call e?ective payo?s. A folk-type theorem using only IREs is established in a special case. Our results are applied to a prisoner's dilemma game with observable mixed strategies and a duopoly game. In the latter game, kinked demand curves with a globally stable steady state are derived.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics and Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2008-03
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
COE-RES Discussion Paper Series ; No. 251
Number of Pages
41
Sponsorship
21世紀COEプログラム = 21st-Century COE Program
Appears in Collections
COE-RES Discussion Paper Seires
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16329