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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16940

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Title
Strategic Complexity in Repeated Extensive Games
Creator
Creator Name
Muto, Nozomu Muto, Nozomu
無藤, 望 無藤, 望
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Abstract (distribution restricted)
This paper studies a two-player machine (finite automaton) game in which an extensive game with perfect information is infinitely repeated. We introduce a new measure of strategic complexity named "multiple complexity", which considers the responsiveness of a strategy to information as well as the number of states of machines. In contrast to Piccione and Rubinstein (1993), we prove that a machine game may include non-trivial Nash equilibria. In the sequential-move prisoners' dilemma, cooperation can be sustained in an equilibrium of the machine game.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2006-11
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2006-07
Number of Pages
14
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16940