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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16954

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Title
Coalition-proofness and Dominance Relations
Creator
Creator Name
Shinohara, Ryusuke Shinohara, Ryusuke
篠原, 隆介 篠原, 隆介
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
Strict domination
Weak domination
Anonymity
Monotone externality
Strategic substitutability
JEL
C72
Abstract (distribution restricted)
This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on different dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination does not necessarily coincide with that under strict domination. We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic substitutability, then the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict domination contains that under weak domination. The above three conditions are met by standard Cournot oligopoly games and participation games in a mechanism producing a public good.
Description
October 20, 2004 (First Version: March 2004)
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2004-10
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2004-04
Number of Pages
14
Edition
[Revised version]
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/16954