Category

Number of Access this item:1,015（2024-04-20 22:39 Counts）

Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17020

Link to primary information 

File Format Size Views Description
cover_17020 pdf
gd08-028 pdf 346 KB 1,649

Item Information

Output File

Title
Sequential Internet Auctions with Different Ending Rules
Creator
Creator Name
Tsuchihashi, Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, Toshihiro
土橋, 俊寛 土橋, 俊寛
ツチハシ, トシヒロ ツチハシ, トシヒロ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences
Abstract
Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. In hard close auctions, each auction ends with a fixed deadline determined by a seller. In soft close auctions, the end time automatically extends if at least one bid is submitted in the last few minutes, so each buyer has an opportunity to reply to other buyers' bids. The reserve prices set by the seller in hard close auctions are higher than the reserve prices in soft close auctions. The result is consistent with data of DS Lite auctions in Yahoo! Japan.
Description
January 2009
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2009-02
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series ; No. 28
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Number of Pages
24
Sponsorship
グローバルCOEプログラム = Global COE Program
Appears in Collections
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17020