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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17021

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Title
Downsian Model with Asymmetric Information: Possibility of Policy Divergence
Creator
Creator Name
Kikuchi, Kazuya Kikuchi, Kazuya
菊地, 和也 菊地, 和也
キクチ, カズヤ キクチ, カズヤ
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences
Abstract
This paper presents a model of Downsian political competition in which voters are imperfectly informed about economic fundamentals. In this setting, parties' choices of platforms influence voters' behavior not only through voters' preferences over policies, but also through formation of their expectation on the unknown fundamentals. We show that there exist pure-strategy equilibria in this political game with asymmetric information at which the two parties' policies diverge with positive probability. This result is in contrast with the well-known median voter theorem in the classical model of Downsian competition. We also study refinement of equilibria, and identify the perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and the strictly perfect equilibria (Okada, 1981). The Nash equilibria with the strongest asymmetry in the parties' strategies are proved to be strictly perfect.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2009-02
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series ; No. 29
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Number of Pages
35
Sponsorship
グローバルCOEプログラム = Global COE Program
Appears in Collections
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17021