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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17033

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Title
Sharing the Risk of Settlement Failure: Synopsis
Creator
Creator Name
Fujiki, Hiroshi Fujiki, Hiroshi
藤木, 裕 藤木, 裕
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Bank of Japan
Creator Name
Green, Edward J. Green, Edward J.
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Creator Name
Yamazaki, Akira Yamazaki, Akira
山崎, 昭 山崎, 昭
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Abstract (distribution restricted)
Two policies toward payments-system risk are common, but superficially appear to be contradictory. One policy is to restrict the exposure to risk generated by one participant to other participants who are, by one measure or another, directly concerned with the risky participant. The other policy is to provide a "safety net," typically provided by government and funded by taxes collected from all participants and even from non-participants, to share losses due to "systemic risk." In this paper, we provide a model in which both of these policies can be constituents of an economically efficient regime of payments-risk management.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
1998-10
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 1998-07
Number of Pages
14
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17033