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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17444

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Title
Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited
Creator
Creator Name
Okada, Akira Okada, Akira
岡田, 章 岡田, 章
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Montero, Maria Montero, Maria
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
University of Nottingham
Rights
The definitive version is available at http://www.interscience.wiley.com/
JEL
C78
Abstract
In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A non-cooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus/riskless) in the bargaining procedure.
Publisher
Blackwell
Issued Date
2007-06
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
journal article
Version Type
AM
Is Version OfRelation -
Related Identifier
DOI
  10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00351.x
ISSN
1352-4739
NCID
AA11037573
Source Title
Japanese Economic Review
Volume Number
58
Issue Number
2
Page Start
294
Page End
302
Appears in Collections
010a Journal Articles　=　雑誌掲載論文
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17444