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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17650

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Title
Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly with Separable Information, or Nondifferentiable
Creator
Creator Name
Haimanko, Ori Haimanko, Ori
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Key Word
Oligopoly
Incomplete Information
Information advantage
Bayesian Cournot
Equilibrium
Sunspots
Non-differentiability
Inverse demand
JEL
C72
D43
L13
Abstract (distribution restricted)
Einy et al (2002) showed that information advantage of a firm is rewarded in any equilibrium of an incomplete information Cournot oligopoly, provided the inverse demand function is differentiable and monotonically decreasing, and costs are affine. We extend this result in two directions. We show first that a firm receives not less than its rival even if that firm's information advantage is only regarding payoff-relevant data, and not necessarily payoff-irrelevant "sunspots". We then show that there is at least one equilibrium which rewards firm's information advantage even with non-differentiable, but concave, inverse demand function. Under certain conditions, these results hold even with always non-negative inverse demand functions.
Publisher
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2009-09
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Discussion papers ; No. 2009-13
Number of Pages
18
Appears in Collections
Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/17650