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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18687

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Title
Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Complete Characterization
Creator
Creator Name
Yoshihara, Naoki Yoshihara, Naoki
吉原, 直毅 吉原, 直毅
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Creator Name
Yamada, Akira Yamada, Akira
山田, 玲良 山田, 玲良
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Sapporo University
Key Word
Unequal labor skills
Nash implementation
Nonmanipulability of Irrelevant Skills
JEL
C72
D51
D78
D82
Abstract (distribution restricted)
In production economies with unequal labor skills, where the planner is ignorant to the set of feasible allocations in advance of production, the paper firstly introduces a new axiom, Nonmanipulability of Irrelevant Skills (NIS), which together with Maskin Monotonicity constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. Secondly, the paper defines natural mechanisms, and then fully characterizes Nash implementation by natural mechanisms, using a slightly stronger variation of NIS and Supporting Price Independence. Following these characterizations, it is shown that there is a Maskin monotonic allocation rule which is not implementable when information about individual skills is absent. In contrast, many fair allocation rules, which are known to be non-implementable in the present literature, are implementable by the natural mechanisms.
Publisher
Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2010-10
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
CCES Discussion Paper Series ; No. 38
Number of Pages
30
Appears in Collections
CCES Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18687