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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18835

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Title
Privately Informed Parties and Policy Divergence
Creator
Creator Name
Kikuchi, Kazuya Kikuchi, Kazuya
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Abstract
This paper presents a Downsian model of political competition in which parties have incomplete but richer information than voters on policy effects. Each party can observe a private signal of the policy effects, while voters cannot. In this setting, voters infer the policy effects from the party platforms. In this political game with private information, we show that there exist weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBEs) at which the parties play different strategies, and thus, announce different platforms even when their signals coincide. This result is in contrast with the conclusion of the Median Voter Theorem in the classical Downsian model. Our equilibrium analysis suggests similarity between the set of WPBEs in this model and the set of uniformly perfect equilibria of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) in the model with completely informed parties which we studied in a previous paper (Kikuchi, 2010).
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2011-01
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series ; No. 160
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Number of Pages
13
Sponsorship
グローバルCOEプログラム = Global COE Program
Appears in Collections
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18835