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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18885

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Title
Incomplete Procurement Contracting with a Risk-Averse Agent
Creator
Creator Name
Nishimura, Takeshi Nishimura, Takeshi
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Editor
Contributor Name
社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築 = Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences
Abstract
In a two-stage procurement model, we compare two types of fixed-price contracting schemes, bundling and unbundling. The buyer's choice of scheme involves an intertemporal tradeoff: providing incentives for cost-reducing investment and sharing production-cost risk between the risk-neutral buyer and the risk-averse supplier. The main result shows that unbundling outperforms bundling when both the supplier and the entrant in ex post competitive bidding confront an aggregate risk, and the externality of the supplier's investment on the entrant's production cost is low.
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2011-01
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series ; No. 165
Relation
Related Identifier
URI
  http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/english/index.html
Number of Pages
23
Sponsorship
グローバルCOEプログラム = Global COE Program
Appears in Collections
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/18885