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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/19222

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Title
Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems
Creator
Creator Name
Xu, Yongsheng Xu, Yongsheng
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Georgia State University
Creator Name
Yoshihara, Naoki Yoshihara, Naoki
吉原, 直毅 吉原, 直毅
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
JEL
C71
C78
D6
D7
Abstract (distribution restricted)
This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued. We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution which has the same informational requirement on individual utilities as the Nash solution does and has an equity consideration as well. We then use this procedure to introduce two new solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems and study them axiomatically.
Publisher
Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date
2011-07
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
technical report
Version Type
VoR
Is Part OfRelation -
Related Title
CCES Discussion Paper Series ; No. 42
Number of Pages
21
Appears in Collections
CCES Discussion Paper Series
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/19222