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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.15057/21409
Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/19844

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Title
Non‐Discrimination and the Pareto Principle
Creator
Creator Name
Xu, Yongsheng Xu, Yongsheng
Editor
Contributor Name
一橋大学経済研究所
Abstract
This paper proposes and examines the notion of non-discrimination in an Arrow-Sen social choice framework. A minimal requirement for non-discrimination is that there are at least two individuals, each with a pair of social states, such that the society should treat them symmetrically so long as the two individuals are symmetric and have symmetric preferences over their respective pairs. It is then shown that this minimal requirement is in conflict with the weak Pareto principle if all logically possible individual preferences are allowed.
Publisher
岩波書店
Issued Date
2000-01-14
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
journal article
Version Type
VoR
selfDOI
10.15057/21409
ISSN
00229733
NCID
AN00070761
Source Title
経済研究
Volume Number
51
Issue Number
1
Page Start
54
Page End
60
Appears in Collections
51巻1号 (2000.1)
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/19844