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Identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10086/22160

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Title
WTO as Moral Support
Creator
Creator Name
FURUSAWA, Taiji FURUSAWA, Taiji
古沢, 泰治 古沢, 泰治
Affiliation
Affiliation Name
Hitotsubashi University
Rights
© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Abstract
International cooperation in trade policies under the auspices of the WTO makes countries “feel” more obliged to uphold agreements. The paper emphasizes the role of the WTO to give moral support: countries incur “psychological costs” when they renege on the agreements that are formally signed under the WTO. Using the concept of Kandori's (2003) “morale equilibrium,” we formalize this idea and show that countries can agree on a cooperative level of the binding tariffs but they occasionally deviate from the agreement, which lowers the morale and invites further deviations in the future.
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing
Issued Date
2009-05
Language
English(eng)
Resource Type
journal article
Version Type
AM
Is Version OfRelation -
Related Identifier
DOI
  10.1111/j.1467-9396.2009.00827.x
ISSN
09657576
NCID
AA10959196
Source Title
Review of International Economics
Volume Number
17
Issue Number
2
Page Start
327
Page End
337
Appears in Collections
010a Journal Articles　=　雑誌掲載論文
URL
https://hdl.handle.net/10086/22160